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-ABSTRACT 
At present runway congestion in the airline industry has reached a dangerously high 
level. The effects of this are very costly to all parties involved; US$5bn per year in 
Europe in 1989 alone. The problem demands urgent attention to accommodate the 
expected average growth in air transport of 6% per annum. up to the year 2000. It is 
becoming more and more obvious, however, that the construction of new runways is 
not a feasible option due to both political, environmental and physical space 
limitations within Europe. Alternative solutions are therefore required 
In 1991 the European Regional Airlines Association, (ERA), produced a document 
entitled, "I"he Vital Link', which outlined a number of ways in which regional aircraft 
could use there performance differences from the larger jet aircraft to help generate 
extra runway capacity from existing runways. Whilst the author was a member of the 
ERA operations committee he developed some of these ideas further. It is the 
objective of this thesis to examine the ideas developed by the author from both a 
theoretical and practical point of view to determine the feasibility of implementing 
them at congested European airports. 
T'heoretical simulation modelling of Manchester, Zurich and Gatwick airports was 
undertaken using the FAA SIMMOD airport and airspace simulation model. This 
produced delay time savings and changes to peak hour movement rates which were 
used in a cost benefit analysis model to see whether or not the procedure would make 
a cost saving. The practical side of the thesis focused on an industry questionnaire to 
regional airlines, major airlines and airports to obtain their views on the new 
procedures and case studies of the procedures at Manchester and Gatwick airports. 
Results of the work show that whilst the procedures can effectively reduce operating 
delays they have a lessor impact on peak hour movement rates. Optimum use of the 
procedures is unique to individual airports and depends on the runway operation 
mode, TMA airspace configuration and the type and variability of the traffic mix. 
Actual application of the procedures will be dependant on political and environmental 
restrictions and likely future changes in regional airlines aircraft fleets. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction. 
1.1: Scope of the Thesis 
The air transport industry is a large, complex, and highly interactive system which is 
constantly changing and evolving. The components which make up the industry are 
shown in figure 1.1. 
Elements of the Aviation Industry 
Air T affic 
Aircraft Part Aircraft 
Control Suppliers 
Manufacturers 
Consultancy 
Airports 
Operational Support AirTransport Travel Agentaý 
Industries Industry 
Hotels 
Trade Unions 
Economy 
(Muldplier) 
Legislation and 
Regulation Financial (Naliiýnal and Services 
Other Modes 
European Governnwnts) ofTransport 
FIGURE 1.1 
Some figures, to indicate the size of this industry, were prepared by the Air Transport 
Action Group, (ATAG), in 1992 which show: 
- Over 1.25 billion passengers per year rely on the worlds airlines for 
business and leisure travel. 
- US$230 billion in annual turnover was generated by airlines in 1992. 
- Over 3 million people are directly employed by the industry, 
throughout the world. 
- The world's airlines have a combined fleet of approximately 17,000 
aircraft which operate a route network of around 15 million kilometres, 
serving nearly 15,000 airports. 
Add to these figures a growth rate of 6% per annurn and the scale of this industry 
begins to emerge. Unfortunately this rate of growth is beginning to test the limits of 
current aviation infrastructure. No where is this felt more than on the runways of the 
major international airports. As demand increases due to the factors pushing growth in 
air transport, (see table 1.1), this pressure on airport runway capacity will only get 
worse. In addition, growing environmental and political opposition to large scale 
expansion of airports based on quality of life arguments, are only tending to make this 
problem worse by enforcing further operating limits on an already critical system. 
Factors Driving Growth in Air Transport 
1. Falling Real Cost of Air Travel 
2. Increasing Economic Activity 
3. Intensifying International Trade 
4. Increasing Disposable Incomes 
5. Political Stability/Instability 
6. Relaxation of Travel Restrictions 
7. Expanding Ethnic Ties 
8. Increased Leisure Time 
9. Tourism Promotion 
I O. Air Transport Liberalisation 
1 I. Emerging Regions and Countries with Low Base 
Traffic Growth 
TABLE 1.1 
Source: ATAG, (1993) - The Economic Benefits of Air Transport 
Within the European arena this problem is particularly acute and alternative solutions 
to building new runways are urgently required. In 1991 the European Regional 
Airlines Association, (ERA), produced a document entitled, 'The Vital Link'. It 
presented results of various studies which showed 24% of major European carrier's 
flights in Europe, were delayed by 15 minutes or more in 1989, which, according to 
the London School of Economics, was generating costs to the industry of US$ 19,580 
per annum. per traveller by 1991. The document then went on to propose a number of 
possible procedures that regional aircraft could perform utilising their distinct 
performance characteristics compared to jet aircraft. These focused on early turns 
after take off, steep approaches, intersection departures and discrete separate arrival 
routings. This thesis intends to determine by theoretical and practical examination 
how far airport runway capacity in Europe can effectively be increased by making use 
of the procedures outlined by the Vital Link as well as the ideas developed by the 
author whilst attending the ERA operations committee. To achieve this aim we must 
first determine what is defined as a regional aircraft. For the purposes of this thesis 
regional aircraft shall be any turboprop or jet engined aircraft capable of carrying out 
the special procedures of steep approach and early turn after take off which operate on 
sector lengths of less than 1400nm. Maximum seat sizes for regional aircraft will be 
120 which accommodates the BAe 146-300 aircraft. This definition is based on data 
which will be presented in chapter 3. 
The following figures, prepared by the ERA, show the size and scope of regional 
airlines in Europe: 
A fleet of 655 aircraft, of which 494 are turboprops and the rest jets. 
1.43 million landings in 1993, an 8.8% increase from 1992. 
16,000 people directly employed. 
Average passenger growth for 1992-3 was 14.2%, over double that of 
the major carriers. 
- Sector time averages one hour, with forecast for this to reduce slightly 
in the future. 
Given their size, if the procedures can be effectively implemented to all the regional 
airlines, significant reductions to airport congestion in Europe, it can be argued, could 
be made. 
1.2: Thesis Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to determine to what extent regional aircraft special 
procedures can effectively reduce airport congestion in Europe and to make 
recommendations based on the results as to their practical application. 
In order to satisfy this aim there are three questions that require answering: 
* Can these special procedures reduce airport congestion in Europe? 
+ If the special procedures can theoretically reduce congestion at an airport, can they 
realistically be applied? If not, why not? 
* Do these special procedures represent a short or long term solution to airport 
congestion? 
A final objective of the thesis, once these questions are answered, is to produce a 
methodology for airports and airlines to help them optimally apply the special 
procedures. 
1.3: Thesis Structure 
In order to answer the questions posed above this thesis has been broken into nine 
chapters of which this is the first. Chapters two, three and four provide the 
background to the work and the base knowledge that is required before moving into 
the more in depth analysis of the special procedures in the remaining chapters. 
Chapter two takes a detailed look at the current operating environment in which 
aviation exists. The aim is to provide the reader with an understanding of the 
intricacies, complex interactions and conflicts of interest that must be considered 
when looking at airport congestion. Figure 1.2 gives an indication of the number of 
factors to be considered and will be expanded on in chapter two. Chapter three 
provides the reader with an introduction to the principle components that make up 
aircraft performance and outlines the specific differences that exist between regional 
and jet aircraft. Chapter four will outline current trends in international aviation 
before embarking on a detailed examination of European airport congestion, both 
present and forecast. Analysis will then look at current issues with European ATC 
and proposed solutions. The chapter will close with a look at current changes. 
occurring in the European airline market. 
With the work properly placed in context chapter five will outline in detail the 
proposed regional aircraft special procedures along with the background and current 
practical applications of the procedures. Chapter six will then outline the 
methodology that the author intends to use to evaluate the special procedures. This 
3 
will focus on a theoretical SMILIlation modelling of certain European airports using the 
FAA SIMMOD simulation model, and application of these results to a cost benefit 
Factors Af -A viation Congestion. ffiectin, o 
Direct Factors Indirect Factors 
Flight Procedures 
Environmental 
Separation Stindaids 
weathe, 
Level of 
Congestion Runway Occupaucy Time 
Traflic Demand 
andVariabi lily 
Ait crati Pei fonnance 
Runway Configuration 
SN. slem Integration 
I'axmay Layout 
Air 1'raffic Management 
Physical / Geographic 
+ 
FIGURE 1.2 
Wake Vortex 
FfTect ofother airports 
Ground Handling 
Demands by 
Special Users 
Forecasting Accuracy 
Level offechnology Used 
New Technologies/Procedures 
Operator Training 
Lighting/Markings 
Intenial Regulation 
Extenial RegUlation 
Politics 
analysis model. Chapter seven will present the results of this methodology whilst 
chapter eight will discuss what the results mean on a more practical basis and outline 
possible areas of application within Europe. Finally chapter nine will present the 
conclusions ofthis work by referring back to the questions asked in this chapter and 
the discussion rnade in chapter eight. 
1.4: Sumniai-y 
This brief chapter set out to place the work of this thesis in context within the scope of 
the aviation industry. In doing so, it has touched upon the magnitude and severity of z: 1 
the problem of airport congestion. It then moved on to outline the aims and objectives 
of the work and defined how the task will be tackled. 
Obviously, there are niany ways to tackle a problem such as airport congestion and it 
must be stated that this thesis only touches upon a small but significant part of the 
whole problem. It is, however, one the author feels can be done by academic study 
and one, which it is hoped, will prove ot'value to the aviation industry. 
CHAPTER 2: The Operating Environment 
2.1: Introduction 
This is the first introductory chapter of three which aim to provide the background to 
this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to define the general operating limits within 
which aircraft operate, and how these limits affect the capacity of the operating 
environment. The chapter is broken into four sections; the airport, air traffic control, 
(ATC), airline operations and the regulators. The airport section will examine airport 
development, capacity and operating restrictions. The ATC section again will briefly 
describe the system, its function and operation as they pertain to this study. Section 
three outlines airline operating economics and the effect of competition and 
congestion to these economics. Finally the effect of regulation on the air transport 
infrastructure will be examined. 
2.2: Airport Development 
The development of any airport may vary in scale and time compared to other 
airports, but will be driven by the same factors. These are the demand from 
passengers, airlines and other associated companies for the airport to provide adequate 
facilities to satisfy the users. For the airport this covers three areas; landside, 
terminal, and airside developments. Due to the nature of this thesis, airside 
developments only will be considered. 
Unfortunately the development of airside facilities are not as straight forward as they 
could be, due to ever increasing economic and financial considerations. Figure 2.1 
shows how an airport tries to plan development to meet demand, whilst remaining 
competitive and profitable. Both an excess or dearth of supply are regarded as an 
inefficient use of resources and a potential loss of revenue. An airport, therefore, must 
try to operate in a constant state of equilibrium. This, however, is very difficult as to. 
provide extra facilities at an airport involves substantial planning and building phases. 
These can cost huge amounts of money, (US$170 million for the second runway at 
Manchester), and take considerable time to complete, (30 years for Munich2 from 
conception to operation). As a result of this problem an initial dearth of facilities 
followed by an excess occurs, (figure 2.1), as airports must plan not just for now but 
for the next 5 -10 years. 
In figure 2.1 the grey blocks demonstrate the available level of facilities at the airport 
at any one time. These facilities over time become fully utilised and then fail to meet 
user requirements. At this point, or preferably before, a decision to expand is made 
and the available facilities jump to a new level, where the process described repeats 
itself. Before these facilities come on line however, there will be a period where 
demand is greater than available capacity, with congestion and delays likely. 
I Airports International (1993) World Development Survey, pg 23 
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2-3: Airport Capacity 
The assessment of airport capacity will focus on airside, rather than landside areas of 
the airport, due to the nature of this thesis. The three parts of the airside, (runway, 
taxiway, apron), each have a capacity limit. Apron capacity is relatively fixed and 
easy to define by the number of' parking stands available at an airport. It will vary 
with aircraft mix, as large aircraft may occupy more than one parking stand, and also 
the location of the stands, as this may prohibit sorne aircraft from using them due to 
nearby buildings. Taxiway capacity can limit the capacity of an airport where there is 
limited taxiway construction, either causing aircraft to backtrack along an active 
runway, or where airport terminal growth has reduced available taxiways, as at 
London Heathrow for instance. There are various types of taxiway, defined by tile 
size and weight of aircraft they can handle. 2 
Whilst the two previous capacity limits are worthy of mention, it is runway capacity 
that is the most variable aspect of airport capacity, and this is therefore tile focus for 
the thesis. In the following discussion, it should be remembered that the aims of 
capacity management are to provide a set level of service for users and to meet set 
delay criteria. These delay criteria vary greatly from airport to airport, and from 
airline to airline. 'Acceptable Delay" or tolerated delay, is what is perhaps more 
important, and as a general rule 15 minutes delay per movement could be classed as 
acceptable', although this is very subjective. Acceptance of a residual delay in tile 
system though does allow airports to make economic use of the capacity. For an 
airport to have no delays at all would require huge investments to provide sufficient 
capacity to cope with peak demand traffic, which would be Linused during off peak 
periods. 
2-r\, pes of'Taxi\Nays are defined in ICAO Annex 14 - 'Acrodrornes' 
3Source: ECAC ( 1993) Feasibilitv Study for a Furopean Systern to Monitor AirTraffic Delays - Coopers & 
Lybrand. 
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2.3.1: Definition of Runway Capacity 
Runway capacity is the maximum number of take offs and landings that can be 
processed during a specific time interval and operating conditions, with an acceptable 
level of delay! This definition of runway capacity can be broken into four principal 
sections: 
Theoretical Capacity - This defines the theoretical maximum capacity of a single 
runway, assuming a continuous supply of the same type of aircraft for take off and 
landing. The figure is given in aircraft movements per hour of operation. If we 
assume each landing and take off takes fifty seconds to safely execute, the theoretical 
capacity of a single runway would be 72, i. e. 36 landings and 36 take offs per hour. 
Practical or Strategic Capacity - This defines an hourly capacity for a runway taking 
into account actual traffic patterns, mixes and assumed operating restrictions in 
perfect weather. ICAO has laid out figures for, 'achievable runway capacities', in its 
Airport Master Planning document. The US FAA gives, 'declared target capacity 
rates'. These figures are combined in table 2.1 below: 
Runway Capacities 
Runway Configuration ICAO FAA FAA 
Capacity Capacity Realistic 
Figures Figures Capacity* 
Single 50-59 53 58 
Dual (to 760m) 56-60 53 63 
Close Parallel (to 1300m) 62-75 74 115 
Independent Parallel (above 1300m) 99-119 106 116 
Intersecting 56-60 n/a n/a 
Figures from the FAA are broad potential runway capacity targets as a result of 
new techniques and procedures. 
Source: SH&E/Cranfield Report to APATSI Board - August 1993 
TABLE 2.1 
Declared Capacity - This is the hourly capacity declared by the airport and air traffic 
control authority. It represents what capacity the authorities feel is safe to handle in 
poor weather conditions, and is based upon the practical capacity. It takes into 
account any other restrictions which may be imposed on the airport. It is used by the 
IATA scheduling committee at slot constrained airports, to equate airline demand with 
available supply. The current declared capacities of the 'best in class', runways in 
Europe are given in table 2.2. 
4 Source 'A Guide to Runway Capacity for ATC, Airport and Aircratl Operators' - CAA CAP 627 
7 
The differences in the figures shown in the two tables above reflect the effects of 
weather, aircraft, pilot, and ATC controller performance, plus airport operational 
restrictions. 
Optimum Runway Capacities 
Runway Configuration Movements per Hour* Airport" 
Single 42 LGW 
Dual 68-70 FRA, CPH 
Close Parallel 70-78 ORY, LHR 
Independent Parallel 76-80 CDG, AMS 
Intersecting 60 STO, ZRH 
The airport figures represent those of normal operating procedure even though the 
airport may have more runways than the figures suggest. 
Airport Codes are standard IATA three letter codes. 
Source: SH&E/Cranfield Report to APATSI Board - August, 1993 
TABLE 2.2 
Sustainable Capacity - If an airport operates at its declared capacity for greater than 
a few hours, delays generally start to build and 'firebreaks', or periods of reduced 
runway movements are required to clear any backlogs of aircraft, and provide an 
acceptable level of service and delay. -This variation in capacity leads to sustainable 
capacity. It is usually quoted as changes in the capacity of an airport per hour. 
London Heathrow is a good example. In 1992 DORA, the CAA's operations research 
department, set the sustainable capacity shown in table 2.3. 
The four definitions of capacity given above can be depicted together by comparing 
hourly movement rate to incurred delay, (figure 2.2). 
Hourly Declared Capacity at London Heathrow 
Time Interval Arrivals Departures Total 
First Six Hours 37 38 75 
Next Two Hours* 34 34 68 
Next Two Hours 36 38 74 
Next Three Hours 38 39 77 
Last Hour 38 38 76 
This represents the firebreak to provide an acceptable level of delay. 
Source: Sharpe, A. et al (1991) Heathrow and Gatwick Runway Capacities for 
Summer 1992 - DORA Report 9152, CAA. 
TABLE 2.3 
Figure 2.2 clearly demonstrates that if you operate a runway above a set declared 
capacity, a penalty of increased delay per movement is incurred. The diagram also 
shows that as the movement rate increases, the delays per movement incurred increase 
at an exponential rate, tending towards infinity as the absolute capacity is reached. 
Finally, it does not define where delays become unacceptable, as this is subjective and 
varies depending on whether you look at it from an airline or airport point of view, 
and how important it is for you to remain at the congested airport. Airlines are more 
likely to accept higher delays at strategic airports in their network than, at less 
important ones. For the purpose of this thesis however, declared capacity will mark 
the limit of acceptable delays and sustainable aircraft movement rates. 
Levels of Airport Capacity 
Unacceptable 
Delay per 
Movement 
Acceptable 
TC 
PC 
DC 
sc 
Sustainable Unsustainable 
Movements per hour 
SC Sustainable Capacity PC = Practical Capacity 
DC Declared Capacity TC = Theoretical Capacity 
FIGURE 2.2 
2.3.2: Factors Affecting Runway Capacity 
Runway Geometry 
The pavement strength, width and length of the runway will determine the size of 
aircraft that can be handled by it. The presence of stopways and clearways will assist 
in increasing allowable aircraft take off weights for the runway. Finally, the location 
of obstructions on the approach or departure track from the airport, could limit the 
maximum weight the aircraft can safely land or take off at, which in turn may limit 
the maximum payload the aircraft can carry. ' 
Rapid Exit Turnoff's (RETS) 
The location, type and number of runway turnoffs will significantly affect runway 
capacity by influencing runway occupancy time. An RET is an angled turnoff from 
the runway to allow aircraft to exit the runway at a speed higher than possible on 90' 
513efinitions for all the aspects raised in this section along with recommended standards can be found in ICAO 
Annex 14 - Aerodromes Vol. I Aerodrome Design and Operations - July 1990 
turnoffs. The actual speed aircraft can exit on these RET's depends on the angle of 
the turnoff, its length for deceleration, and manoeuvring required at the other end of it. 
A. A. Trani, et al (1990 & 1992) from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State 
University Centre for Transport Research, Blacksbury, Virginia, has carried out 
detailed research into the optimum design of RETS for runway capacity 
improvement. ' Results of their research showed firstly, that aircraft using existing 
RETS do so 10-15 knots below the design speeds of the RET. In addition with the 
use of three, four, or five optimally located RETS, a 7% to 18% reduction in runway 
occupancy time could be made Optimal exit angles for RETS range from 17* to 30'. 
Further work showed, that for a single runway, a 15% reduction in runway occupancy 
could be achieved with optimally placed 20* angle RETS. Maximum entry speeds to 
the RETS were demonstrated to be 35m/s or 78mph. More work was needed to assess 
the issues of aircraft landing gear tolerance to higher exit speeds, and the impact of 
new RETS on already complex runway and taxiway interactions. 
Rapid Access Taxiways (RATS) 
These are defined by ECAC Airports Bureau special working group, APATSI, as 
taxiways constructed at an angle to the runway to permit expeditious line up and/or 
rolling take offi' They could quite conceivably be RETS in the opposite direction and 
as such, should help reduce runway occupancy time and so increase capacity as the 
aircraft are already moving when they enter the active runway. 
Departure Sequencing Pads (DSP's) 
These are paved areas located at the departure end of the runway, large enough to 
allow aircraft to be held without blocking other taxiways and permit aircraft to pass 
one another. The primary benefit of DSP's is their ability to assist the air traffic 
controller generate the optimum departure sequence of traffic, minimising wake 
vortex and track separation standards! In combination with the above two runway 
modifications delay reductions, and runway capacity increases may be possible 
depending on traffic mix and patterns. 
Runway Occupancy 
The time an aircraft spends on the runway for take off and landing determines the 
movement rate of the runway. It can be altered by the addition of the previous three 
modifications. In addition the performance of the pilots and air traffic controllers will 
affect the occupancy. The effect of slow pilot reactions to take off clearances is 
demonstrated, when it is considered that an average saving of 5 seconds for each 
aircraft movement per hour would create another one, to one and a half movements in 
that hour. 9 The UK CAA recommendations to pilots include completion of cockpit 
checks before take off and nomination of preferred RETS in the landing brief.,, ATC 
performance is measured by their ability to sequence traffic to minimise the separation 
restrictions. The complexity of this task is appreciated when Heathrow departures are 
6A. A. Trani, et al (1990) Runway Exit Designs for Capacity Improvements Demonstrations Phase I Algorithm 
Development - DOT FAA/RD 90-32 1. Followed up in 1992 with phase 2- Computer model development. 
7Source ECAC Airports Bureau 'APATSI Draft Document on Mature Air Traffic Control Procedures' 1993. 
8These separation restrictions will be explained under the air traffic control procedures section. 
9Source 'A Guide to Runway Capacity for ATC, Airport and Aircraft Operators' - CAA CAP 627 
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considered to offer the controller over 500 route combinations, each with their 
associated rules. 
Air Traffic Mix and Patterns 
Traffic pattern and mix are more important than all the factors already discussed in 
relation to runway capacity, which is unfortunate, as both of these factors are 
relatively unpredictable. A traffic pattern looks at the variations in the flow of 
arriving and departing aircraft at the airport during the day, whilst traffic mix is 
concerned with the variations in aircraft types operating in and out of the airport. The 
principal problem with traffic mix, is that poor traffic sequencing can cause 
unnecessary wake vortex separations, hence reducing capacity. This shall be 
examined in more detail later. 
Traffic patterns are slightly more predictable than traffic mix and it is the peaks in 
traffic per hour which are of most interest to airports, as they must decide how much 
capacity of the peak traffic demand they are prepared to provide. The decision will be 
made by the capacity management aims of the airport. Methods of describing peaking 
at airports are currently related to passenger flows through the airport. " These 
principles can also be applied to runway capacity. The first of five methods is 'the 
standard busy rate', which is defined as the 13th highest hour of traffic flow, or the 
flow rate surpassed only 29 hours throughout the year. This level of flow sets the 
capacity requirements and is used in the UK and the rest of Europe. Obviously, the 
more hours of operation a year that an airport has, the lower the percentage of total 
operation, the 29 hours will be, consequently this method applies more readily to 
high, rather than low, operation airports. 
The above problem led to the development of the 'busy hour rate', which represents 
the hourly rate above which 5 percent of the traffic at the airport is handled. The FAA 
have also developed a measure of peaking called, 'typical peak hour passengers', 
which gives a recommended flow figure as a percentage of annual flows and total 
annual passengers. The simplest method is the 'busiest timetable hour', and is self 
explanatory. It is, though, subject to errors such as rescheduling by airlines. The final 
method is the 'peak profile hour', which assesses the average hourly volume for an 
average peak day, using data from the peak month. The result is similar to the 
standard busy rate. 
Effect of Other Runways 
So far we have considered a single runway airport. More than one runway can cause 
restrictions on operations off other runways. There are three factors which will affect 
capacity. The runway configuration and runway separation, as demonstrated by table 
2.1, and runway stagger. The latter can help improve the runway capacity of two 
closely spaced parallel runways by reducing the effect of wake vortex separation for 
arrivals and departures. This permits clearances to depart to be given earlier after an 
arrival than without the stagger, (See ATC section). 
I OSource AshfordN et al (1991) Airport Operations Pitman Publishing 
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Runway Mode of Operation 
With more than one runway the method of operating the runways can be different than 
for a single runway, which must allow for 'mixed mode operation', or arrivals and 
departures on the same runway. Other modes of operation are 'segregated mode', 
where a runway is used purely for arrivals or departures, or 'dependent mode', where 
two closely spaced parallel runways must co-ordinate their arrivals and departures, 
even though they are on different runways. Each of these operating modes will affect 
final runway capacity. 
This section has clearly defined runway capacity as well as methods of assessing it 
and the factors that need considering by airport planners when setting the airport's 
capacity. There are two points to note in conclusion. Firstly, the closer an airport 
operates to it's finite limit the greater will be the delay for the users. Secondly, 
operating an airport close to the capacity limits will increase the chances of aircraft 
go-arounds, due to blocked runways. This latter point needs to be contrasted with the 
fact that an airport operating close to its capacity is operating in its most cost efficient 
manner! 
2.4: Airport Operational Restrictions 
The purpose of this section is to examine operational restrictions preventing airports 
from operating to their optimum potential we have discussed so far. The restrictions 
covered are those which the airport management has little scope to remove 
themselves. The section covers two areas, firstly environmental restrictions followed 
by political ones. 
2.4.1: Environmental Restrictions 
Weather 
There are four aspects of weather that can reduce runway capacity. Visibility is 
perhaps the most important and restrictive form of bad weather. The precise limits of 
operation in poor visibility are given in appendix 2.1. 
The level of precision navigation equipment installed on a runway will depend on the 
regularity of severe weather conditions, and the demand of the airlines to maintain 
access to the airport in all weather conditions. At London Heathrow for example, the 
likelihood of category II or III conditions is less than 2% of total operations, however 
the large demand to use Heathrow 365 days a year from the airlines, justified the BAA 
investing in Category IIIC systems for both its parallel runways. This decision would 
not have made sense for smaller regional airports with lower traffic demand. The 
effect of low visibility conditions on runway capacity can be significant, as the 
runway occupancy time (ROT) tends to increase, due to arriving aircraft exiting at 
slower speeds from the runway and reduced ability to optimise the runway exit. 
Departure ROT also tends to increase as aircraft ground movement is slower and 
restricted by ATC. In addition departures have to hold short at a distance further from 
the runway threshold, than in visual conditions, as the ILS landing aid needs a 
protection zone either side of the runway, clear of obstacles, to provide an 
uninterrupted high integrity signal. The precise effect on ROT will depend on such 
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factors as taxiway lead in lighting, aircraft systems, pilot and ATC performance and 
clarity of surface markings. If we consider the theoretical capacity situation ý for a 
mixed mode, single runway, and an increased ROT of ten seconds, from 50 to 60 
seconds, the hourly runway capacity would decrease from 72 to 60 movements. A 
loss of 12 movements an hour. The cost of this reduced ability to handle traffic can be 
huge, with aircraft delayed in the air and ground, or diverted to alternative airports. 
The above example is not unrealistic when compared to actual operations at 
Heathrow,. where under 'average' winter conditions, average separations between 
arrivals increase by about 5 seconds to allow for increased ROT. " At Amsterdam 
ATC limit the landing capacity of the airport to 12 per hour during CAT III 
conditions, compared to 60 per hour during good visibility. 12 As a consequence they 
expect delays to increase from less than 2 minutes in good visibility to over 45 
minutes during CAT III conditions. 
Wind, heavy precipitation and lightning can also affect runway capacity. Excessive 
cross winds, (greater than 30 knots with a dry runway), can close primary runways 
and force traffic 'onto sub-optimal runways due to safety constraints on aircraft' 
operations. Departure runways that have tailwinds also reduce capacity by 
necessitating longer take off runs. Finally, blustery wind conditions with rapid 
changes in wind speed and possibly direction, lead to pilots landing at higher speeds 
to allow for sudden drops in wind speed, which could bring an aircraft's true airspeed 
close to stall. This higher speed will result in longer landing runs though. Wet or 
contaminated runways can reduce runway capacity, as aircraft breaking actions on the 
ground are reduced, which could result in increased arrival ROT's if RETS are 
insufficient or inadequately located. Snow or slush on the runway can also reduce 
aircraft acceleration rates and increase take off runs. Lightning and thunder are the 
last aspect of the weather to consider. Their activity around airports also reduces 
runway capacity for the time they pass close to the airport, due to the severe 
downdraughts of air that flow out from the thunder cells. These downdraughts, 
known as 'windshear', can cause aircraft landing accidents as the downward pressure 
of the air forces the aircraft below the glidepath, even under full engine power 
settings! Clearly this can reduce runway capacity by effectively shutting the airport 
while it is overhead. 
Noise 
This is perhaps the most well known and understood problem associated with airports. 
It certainly appears to be the primary issue inhibiting airport development. ICAO 
Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation provides international 
guidelines for noise control at airports. The intensity of nuisance caused by noise can 
be shown to depend on three separate factors, firstly; by the duration of the sound, 
then by its repetition and finally by the time of day it occurs. Actual methods of noise 
measurement are diverse and beyond the scope of this thesis, except to note the effect 
of noise control strategies on runway capacity. " 
II From 'A Guide to Runway Capacity for ATC, Airport and Aircraft Operators' - CAA CAP 627 
12 As defined in the Dutch Aeronautical Information Publication from the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority. 
13Those wishing to examine noise measurement techniques should consult Annex 16 to the ICAO Convention 
13 
Clearly, airports located close to industrial or low habitation areas are less likely to be 
restricted than those next to high density residential areas. Noise preferential runways 
and minimum noise routings (MNR), are used to control noise around airports. They 
involve a limited number of fixed departure routes from the airport on preferred 
departure runways up to a specified altitude to reduce the geographic area affected by 
noise. Runway capacity is limited, as aircraft are forced to follow one another along 
the limited MNR's. This forces ATC to impose strict wake vortex and time 
separation restrictions to prevent conflicts. 
Runway operations are also affected by noise restrictions such as the use of de-rated 
take off thrust and minimal use of reverse thrust on landing. Capacity restrictions 
occur as ROT's tend to increase due to slower acceleration and deceleration rates. 
Finally, the airport may have restricted hours of runway operation during night time, 
when the airport is forced to shut to prevent noise disturbance as local residents try to 
sleep. If the airport is not shut, a strict limit is set on the number or type of aircraft 
that can use the airport during a specified time interval. These curfews are greatly 
dependent on local government, location, and traffic volume handled by the airport. 
2.4.2: Political Restrictions 
Due to the large economic impact of airports, both positive and negative, on the local 
and national economies, any development tends to be restricted by large planning 
processes which include planning applications, government reviews, public enquiries 
and re-submissions. This requires large investments in time for all parties involved, 
with the associated opportunity costs of that lost time. This time lag can lead to 
periods where an airport is unable to adequately handle traffic demand. Where this 
occurs, governments can impose traffic distribution rules to set artificial capacity 
limits at the airport. In addition preferential operating fees at uncongested airports can 
be offered to attract demand away from the limited airport. The best example of this 
was the UK government's policy towards London's airports, where traffic was 
encouraged to use Stansted airport, north of London, instead of Heathrow or 
Gatwick. 14 
The aforementioned measures represent enforced restriction on runway capacity, and 
taken with the environmental restrictions, their impact on an airport can be severe, 
resulting in inefficient use of a resource and potential loss of revenue. 
The restrictions also make the already complex issue of runway capacity even more 
intricate. The current implications of these issues to Europe, and how they are dealing 
with them, will be examined further in chapter four. The next 3 sections will discuss 
the other key parts of the infrastructure system affecting runway capacity, Air Traffic 
Control. 
14 Source: HMSO (1985) Airports Policy HMSO. 
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2.5: Functions of Air Traffic Control 
The primary function of Air Traffic Control, (ATC), is to prevent the collision 
between aircraft in flight and between aircraft and any obstructions moving, or 
stationary on an airport. In addition to this, ATC also aim to provide a fair and 
efficient flow of traffic from origin to destination. " 
The job of an ATC controller it must be stated is not an easy one. It has often been 
described as three dimensional chess as they have to move aircraft around a country 
in the vertical as well as horizontal plane, within limited airspace. A fourth dimension 
of time could be argued to be integral to this job, as well due to the need for aircraft to 
enter and leave the system at set time intervals. 
To help controllers carry out their task, the airspace aircraft operate in is structured, as 
indicated in appendix 2.2. This allows the controllers to focus their work into dealing. 
only with aircraft operating in the controllers allotted airspace segment. The 
controller is helped in this task by the many systems developed over the years. These 
are laid out in appendix 2.3. Once the aircraft passes beyond the limits of the 
controllers airspace it is handed off. 
From the discussion in the appendix, it can be clearly seen that co-ordination between 
different sectors of the ATC system are crucial and can affect the number of aircraft 
each can handle quite significantly. 
2.6: Factors affecting Airspace Capacity 
2.6.1: Separation Standards 
These are the greatest restriction on airspace capacity, but they are unavoidable if the 
aims of ATC to provide a safe, orderly flow of traffic are to be met. Aircraft are 
separated using two methods, vertical and horizontal separation. The latter method is 
broken into three sections; lateral, longitudinal and radar separation. The separations 
used are the minimum safe distances that should be maintained between aircraft, as 
defined by ICAO, assuming instrument flight rule, (IFR), conditions. Vertical' 
separation minima are 1000ft between aircraft flying below flight level", (FL), 290, 
and 2000ft above FL 290. Vertical separation is used en-route to reduce horizontal 
separation and at the holding stacks on the edge of TMAs. On climb and descent 
vertical separation may be lost due to high traffic densities in the TMA. Where this 
occurs the aircraft must be separated horizontally. Obviously, individual aircraft rates 
of climb and descent will be used where possible by a controller to expedite an arrival 
or departure and optimise the traffic mix. 
15 From 'A Guide to Runway Capacity for ATC, Airport and Aircraft Operators' - CAA CAP 627 
16A Flight Level is the altitude under the standard pressure setting of 10 13.2 millibars which all aircraft operate. 
Altitudes are reported using the first three figures, e. g. FL 290 is equivalent to 29,000ft. 
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Horizontal separation will depend on an aircraft's track, speed and weight. Lateral 
separation is applied to prevent aircraft on different tracks interfering with the others. 
track. Separation distances vary if the aircraft are on diverging or converging tracks 
depending on the angles between the two aircraft tracks. Details of the restrictions 
can be found in the UK CAA Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) - Part 1, which 
is based on ICAO guidelines. " Minimum separations will take into account the 
navigational accuracy of the navigation device, the pilot competence and a safety 
buffer. Longitudinal separation is applied to cover two aircraft following each other 
on the same track and altitude. Separation is determined either using time or distance. 
Time separation for en-route aircraft is 10 minutes for all scenarios, but can be 
reduced if the lead aircraft is moving quicker then the trail one. Departing aircraft are 
subject to minimum time separations to provide a continuous, safe and orderly flow of 
traffic from the TMA into en-route sectors, as well as to satisfy wake vortex 
restrictions. Times vary from I to 10 minutes depending on the speed and track of the 
aircraft, (see UK MATS Part 1). The reliability of time based separation depends on 
the accuracy and frequency of aircraft position reports, and estimated arrival times at 
the next reporting point. As previously, a safety buffer is applied to the minimum 
separation. Distance separation can be used by the controller in airspace which has a 
high quality of frequently renewed aircraft position information. Specific separations 
again are given in MATS Part 1. The minima applied will be dependent on accuracy 
of position information, the age of information displayed on the radar screen, elapsed 
time between radar updates, and the safety buffer. If an aircraft is within the coverage 
of a radar minimum separation can be reduced to 3 nautical miles, (run), provided the 
aircraft is below FL 245 and has been identified. In all other cases the separation is 
5nm. Appendix 2.4 describes how these separation minima are developed and may be 
reduced. 
2.6.2: Wake Vortex Separation's 
This factor concerns specific approach, arrival and departure separations imposed by 
an aircraft's wake turbulence. Every aircraft in flight generates an area of unstable 
air, aft of the wings, known as wake turbulence, as a by-product of lift. Detailed 
explanations of vortex formation can be found in Kermode, (1972) and Barnard and 
Philpott, (1989). The strength of the wake vortex depends on the weight, airspeed, 
wing shape, and attitude of the aircraft. Maximum vortex generation occurs with 
heavy and slow aircraft on take off and landing. The vortex duration commences on 
take off and ends as the aircraft's wheels touch down again. In the air the vortex will 
sink at 500ft per minute to 900ft below the aircraft's altitude and then dissipate. The 
latter is aided by strong winds which help destroy the vortex. 
Wake vortices are potentially very dangerous to aircraft and in some cases cause 
structural damage to airframes, particularly when light or small aircraft follow heavy 
ones. Loss of lift can also be due to heavy wake vortex, and finally control problems 
can occur with small aircraft encountering uncommanded roll and pitch. The situation 
17 Source: ICAO (1987) Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Rules of the Air and Air Traffic ICAO 
ICAO (1986) Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Operations ICAO 
181nformation taken from CAA (1993) Wake Turbulence - UK Aeronautical Information Circular 178/1993. 
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is most critical on take off and landing as aircraft airspeed is close to the stall. Table 
2.4 defines the required separations between differing aircraft classes for arrival, due 
to wake vortex. 
Table 2.4 clearly demonstrates the problems that a controller faces in sequencing 
arriving traffic. In the worse case of a single mode arrival runway, if a light aircraft 
followed a heavy, a separation of 8nm would be required. This equates to about 180 
seconds when the aircraft are on final approach, if one assumes the aircraft are both' 
travelling at 160kts. If the time for the heavy aircraft to land and clear the runway is 
70 seconds, then there are 110 seconds, almost two minutes wasted due to wake 
vortex separation. 
Arrival Wake Vortex Separations 
Leading Aircraft Following Aircraft Minimum Distance 
Heavy Heavy 4 nm 
(e. g. B747-B757) Medium 5nm 
Small 6mn 
Light 8nm 
Medium Medium 3mn 
(e. g. A320-FlOO) Small 4nm 
Light 6nm 
Small/Light Medium or Small 3nm 
(e. g. ATR72-J3 1) Light 4mn 
Source: UK CAA MATS Part 1. 
TABLE 2.4 
This lost time will result in reduced runway capacity that hour and, if the system is 
operating at capacity, increased delays. This scenario does assume the runway is used 
in segregated mode for arrivals only. Bearing this in mind, the controller is tasked 
with optimising the traffic mix to minimise these wake vortex restrictions. This is 
done by attempting to bunch aircraft of similar types. The advantage of this approach 
can be demonstrated below in a simple sum. 
3nm 4nm 3nm 5nm 4nm 
1. Bunching Small=: >Small=>Medium=>Medium=>Heavy=>Heavy= Total 
Separation 
Required of 
19nm 
3nm 6nm 3nm 3nm 6nm 
2. Random Medium=>Small=>Heavy=>Medium=>Small=>Heavy = Total 
Separation 
Required of 
21run 
The saving of 2nm in the example above would relate to 45 seconds at 160kts 
approach speeds, from a total time of 472 seconds for random arrival to 427 seconds 
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for bunching. To accomplish the above traffic mix, controllers radar vector aircraft 
within the TMA off the holding stack to the final approach path, (FAP). As aircraft 
approach the FAP they are turned on to an intercept course at different distances to 
optimise the sequence, (see figure 2.3). 
There is one further factor which will also affect this traffic sequence and that is 
aircraft approach speed variability. Different aircraft types will have different final 
approach speeds, a Shorts 360, for example has a landing speed of 106kts, whilst a 
Boeing 747 will land at 153kts. 19 This means that as well as requiring standard wake 
vortex separation, extra separation is required to prevent a wake vortex separation 
infringement as the aircraft travel down the FAP. Optimum separation would result 
with only the wake vortex separation existing between the two aircraft as the leading 
aircraft lands. Obviously, the likelihood of achieving this optimum on every landing 
is slim at best, but will increase with controller experience. 
A TCFinal Approach Sequencing 
(The Fanning Method) 
Heavy 
FAP 
FIGURE 2.3 
Wake vortex must also be considered on departure and the specific restrictions are 
given in table 2.5. Unlike arrivals the traffic mix is not the critical issue, here the 
point where the take-off run is commenced and the aircraft's departure track are more 
significant. This time separation may be increased to account for aircraft accelerating 
at different rates along the same track if they can not be separated vertically. This will 
be particularly relevant to a jet following a turboprop on the same route. The 
separation can be reduced to I minute between two successive departures, however if 
the aircraft's tracks diverge by 45* or more immediately after take off, (see UK 
MATS Part 1). As with the arrival situation the sequence of departing traffic needs 
careful management to prevent faster aircraft catching up a slow one, and infringing 
the separation standards. The arrangement of departures which avoid two successive 
departures along the same track is also preferred. 
The above cases can be taken one step further by considering operations on a mixed 
mode single runway. The aim from the arrival situation was to bunch aircraft of the 
same weight categories to minimise separation. If that works correctly, there will be a 
19Source: Flight International -Regional and Commercial Aircraft Directory 1993 
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Runway Small Medium Heavy 
run of aircraft separated by 3-4nm, or 68 to 90 seconds respectively, assuming 160kts 
approach speed. 
Departure Wake Vortex Separations* 
Leading Aircraft Following Aircraft Minimum Spacing 
at time aircraft are 
airborne 
Heavy Medium Departure from 2 minutes 
Small the same take- 
Light off position 
Medium or Small Light Departure from 2 minutes 
the same take- 
off position 
Heavy - Full Length Medium Departure from 3 minutes 
Take-off Small an intermediate 
Light take-off point 
Medium or Small Light Departure from 3 minutes 
an intermediate 
take-off point 
* Applies to aircraft departing from the same runway or from a parallel runway less than 760m apart. 
Source: UK CAA - MATS Part 1. 
TABLE 2.5 
If it is assumed that the optimum use of a single runway is a sequence of arrival, 
departure, arrival, it can be demonstrated that, if an arrival and a departure each take a 
minimum of 50 seconds, 68 seconds will not permit a safe operation of this sequence. 
This poses yet another complication to the ATC controller, who must now increase 
arrival separations to create a departure slot in between two arrivals. This could be 
partly managed by re-arranging the arrival mix of aircraft, but will also lead to 
reduced runway arrival movement rates. 
A final aspect of wake vortex concerns the tactics to avoid it. Strong winds are the 
vortices worst enemy, especially turbulent winds, which can break them up sooner 
than still air. A problem can be induced by this however, as the vortices could be 
blown onto a parallel runway. Early deployment of flaps or slats and landing gear can 
also help degrade vortices, as can engine power adjustment and high air density. On 
departure if an aircraft can aim to rotate and climb above the track of the preceding 
aircraft it will be free from the vortices. 
In summary, wake vortex is the largest restriction on optimising runway capacity and 
whilst a number of strategies have been developed to alleviate the severity of the 
restrictions, one is unlikely to ever be rid of the problem. 
2.6.3: Airspace Geometry 
As the complexity of controlled airspace increases due to new airways, airports and 
TMA's, etc. the efficiency of the earlier system can be degraded, as more convoluted 
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routes in and out of the airport are developed to avoid conflict with surrounding 
airports. In the UK, the London TMA is the prime example of this complexity. 
Coping with arrivals and departures into five closely located airports has led to a 
highly complex series of routes, which looks like spaghetti from above. Problems. 
arise as the controllers have to sequence traffic from different airports together 
through bottlenecks, which in this case, are where the TMA routes cross or link to the 
airway system. The absolute effect on capacity will be determined by controller 
experience and decision making ability, radar accuracy, and the number of 
intersections along routes where co-ordination of aircraft is required. In the London 
TMA, NATS attempted to reduce some of these problems by introducing the Central 
Control Function, (CCF). " This envisaged the development of discrete and 
independent 'tunnels in the sky', linking each airport in the area, to the airways. 
Practical application of this was limited however and the focus has now shifted to 
improving controller co-ordination between the five airports and the TMA. 
This section has discussed many factors that define airspace capacity and 
demonstrated the complexity of the task in hand. The final ability to handle the 
aircraft rests with the ATC controller though, and it is that person's ability to cope 
with the workload, that will determine the final capacity of any airspace sector. 
Appendix 2.5 discusses some aspects of controller workload in more detail. 
2.7: ATC Management of Multiple Runways 
The discussion of ATC has so far focused on aircraft operations on a single runway. 
Modifications to the rules outlined apply when multiple runways are used. These are 
detailed in the ICAO air traffic services planning manual with the relevant operating 
restrictions highlighted in appendix 2.6. 
When ATC have more than one runway to use it can effectively double the 
complexity of the system, as both runways could potentially be operated in mixed 
mode. - In general though, one runway is used for arrivals and one for departures. In 
this situation, the need to optimise traffic mix is the key to minimising the limits of 
wake vortex separations. Multiple runways also tend to increase the problems of 
airspace geometry discussed previously. 
This concludes the discussion of ATC operations. It has been the intention to detail 
the rules and methods by which aircraft are controlled. The depth of the coverage 
reflects the subject's prime importance to this thesis. The latest developments and 
concerns of ATC within Europe will be returned to in chapter four. 
2.8: Airline Operations 
Following the previous discussions of airport and ATC operations, it is now relevant 
to examine airline operations to highlight what factors drive airlines, what concerns 
them, how they deal with these concerns, and how their actions may put pressure on 
airport and ATC capacity. 
20 Source: CAA (1990) CCF- Handling London's Air Traffic in the Nineties. CAA 
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Airlines exist due to the public's desire to travel, either on business or leisure. In 
providing a service to the public, the airlines aim to operate an efficient route network, 
with the right sized aircraft to ensure they satisfy the public's requirements for the 
niche market they have decided to operate in, Also they must make a sound financial 
return on any investments. Achieving this relatively simple aim is complicated by the 
operating environment in which they operate as well as by competition from other 
airlines. 
2.8.2: Aspects of Airline Economics and Competition ý 
Whilst airlines control the routes they fly and the aircraft they operate, it is how they 
deploy these resources that will determine their fate. When considering routes to fly 
the airline must gather information regarding operating restrictions on the route, such 
as airspace and airport slot restrictions, existing operators on the route, nature and 
type of passenger demand, (business or leisure) and forecast future change in 
passenger demand on that route. Once these jobs are complete, the right aircraft must 
be acquired to operate the route. This will be dependent on the route length, 
passenger demand, crewing requirements, airfield performance, aircraft operating 
costs and availability, predicted average load factors and the aircraft's ability to 
accommodate future possible growth capabilities or route structure changes. 
Decisions will be based on the aircraft's payload range potential as indicated in figure 
2.4. 
Typical Payload Range Chart 
Range for Maximum Payload 
Area of Operational 
10 Flexibility cl Maximum Range at 
.2 Minimum Payload 
Aw 
Range 
FIGURE 2.4 
Absolute payload range figures will vary for each route depending on the departure 
and arrival airport. The reasons for this will become apparent in chapter three. 
Once these factors are decided, the scheduled operating times need finalising, along 
with the route operating costs and finally, the service is marketed to the general public 
at set fares. The ultimate aim of this process must be to see a positive return on 
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investment within a specified time interval. Success will depend on the airline's 
ability to fill the aircraft with sufficient business and/or leisure passengers to cover 
costs. Once a route is launched, careftil monitoring is required to ensure that if 
external circumstances change, the airline can react by modifying its service to 
balance demand with supply. In achieving this airlines must ensure they remain 
competitive compared to other carriers. There are four factors which airlines use to 
accomplish this. The first is timing of flights. A new airline competing with an 
existing one must try to match or improve on the latter's timings, to effectively make 
any impact on the business passenger market. This causes bunching of flights around 
peak demand times, usually early morning and evening. Secondly, work by Taneja, 
(1988) has shown that the percentage of flight frequencies an airline operates on a 
route compared to its competitors, can directly be related to the percentage of the 
business market share attained. His classic S-curve is shown in figure 2.5. Obviously 
the absolute effect of extra frequencies will be dependent on the size and composition 
of the market, but it does encourage airlines to continually increase frequency to 
capture the business market share which, if done within busy time periods, can put a 
strain on infrastructure capacity. ' 
The final methods are promotional fares or fare undercutting by the new entrant to 
attract passengers and the use of passenger loyalty schemes, such as frequent flyer 
points. The former option can be effective in the leisure market, if airlines have 
sufficient cash reserves to accommodate lost revenue during the promotion, whilst the 
latter option is focused on the business market and usually only made available by 
larger airlines, due to the greater incentive for passengers to take part in a scheme with 
a large route network, compared to a small one. ''In addition it is easier for a larger 
airline with greater access to cash reserves to implement this, than a smaller airline 
with tight cost margins. The issue of airline size will be returned to shortly. 
3, 
Note: 0a Numbef of com"fitows in the morket. 
FIGURE 2.5 
Source: Taneja, N. K. (198 8) The International Airline Industry, pg. 144 
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FREQUENCY SHARE MI 
In summary then, if an airline wants to attract the business passenger it must offer the 
right combination of flight timings and frequency on a route, whilst if they are trying 
to attract the leisure market, the key must be to capture as much market share as 
possible and offer the lowest fare to the customer. 
2.8.3: Congestion and Airline Economics 
In economic terms congestion would be seen as an imperfection in the market as it 
serves to restrict competition to the detriment of the consumer. The two significant 
aspects which congestion forces on airlines are increased flight times, and restricted 
airport access. In the first case, an increase in flight delays will increase flight 
operating costs, decrease passenger satisfaction and lead to missed connecting flights 
and knock on delays. The impact of delays will vary dependant on route length. On 
short sectors, delays will represent a larger percentage of total flight time due to an 
increased percentage of the flight operating in the restrictive departure and arrival 
TMA's compared to a long haul flight. This can also affect operating costs on shorter 
sectors, as aircraft tend to fly around at sub-optimal flight levels in busy TMA's for a 
greater percentage of the time than long haul flights. It can lead to sector distances 
well in excess of the direct track distance. " In addition the ability to make up for 
delays on a shorter flight is less than for longer sectors for the same reason. This is 
especially relevant for regional airlines which tend to operate the shorter routes, with 
slower aircraft than the larger airlines, but with the same published time schedules to 
provide an acceptable level of service to the passenger. In addition once an aircraft 
has been delayed, it will tend to have a knock on effect to the rest of the daily 
schedule for that aircraft, although the airline's operation department will do their best 
to avoid this. Again it is harder for regional airlines to achieve this, due to generally 
tighter aircraft schedules and less spare aircraft than the larger airlines. 
The second issue caused by congestion is slot control of an airport. These slots 
effectively restrict access to the airport during busy periods to prevent excessive 
delays. From a competitive point of view, unless an airline can obtain a slot to 
operate from the airport during these busy times their flight timings will be 
uncompetitive compared to established carriers which will make the task of attracting 
passengers to the new airline that bit harder. 
Basically, the slots prevent full exploitation of market demand and consequently, lost 
potential revenue to the airlines. 
2.8.4: Effects of Airline Size 
The size of an airline will significantly affect how it reacts to competition from others 
as well as problems such as congestion. If we consider a large airline with many 
different route networks, the effect of disruption on one of its routes will be 
21 On Air UK's flight planned routes significant variations can occur between track distances flown versus the 
great circle distance between two airports. On the Edinburgh-London City route, for example, Air UK fly 
409nm, whilst the great circle distance is only 294nm. The additional distance is due to an extended STAR for 
London City which vectors the aircraft around from the north west of London, over Stansted and out over the 
Thames estuary before turning back into the airport. This is due to the very limited airspace around London. 
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proportionally less than an airline with a few key routes. This holds true as long as 
the larger airline has not co-ordinated routes together to provide passengers for other 
routes - the hubbing philosophy. The larger airline will also work from a greater 
money reserve, allowing it to cross subsidise poor revenue generating routes. 
The factors outlined produce possible barriers to market entry for smaller airlines, 
unless they can make friends with a large airline themselves and gain from the latters 
position in the market. This can be achieved by a buy out, codeshare or franchise 
agreement and have become more prevalent recently. 
This concludes the discussion on airline operations which has focused on the 
economic impact of competition and congestion on them. Jt is now time to consider 
the final part of the operating environment, air transport regulation. 
2.9: Air Transport Regulation 
Regulation of air transport has always been the responsibility of national governments 
through acts passed in parliament. There are two types of regulation, either technical 
or economic. The former covers aircraft, airport and ATC operating standards whilst 
the latter concern regulation of airport and airline growth and competition. During the 
last few years there has been a push to reduce the level of regulation imposed on 
aviation, which was led by the deregulation of the domestic air transport market in the 
US. This section aims to analyse the development and change of regulation in Europe 
and the consequences of this change on the capacity of the aviation operating 
environment. 
2.9.1: European Regulation 
Regulation affecting aviation in Europe is split into a number of separate 
organisations each affecting the industry in different ways. Appendix 2.7 defines the 
separate sections of the regulatory system and the work they are currently involved 
with. 
The predominant drive by the EU, during the last fifteen years, has been that of 
liberalisation in air transport. The process of liberalisation is the reversal of the 
bilateral agreements proposed by ICAO and aims at increasing competition between 
airlines by removing restrictions against new airlines entering the market. As a 
consequence they hope this will generate reduced air fares for the consumers. The 
concept originated from the US which began domestic deregulation in 1978 following 
complaints by airlines and consumers over the lack of choice of operators on routes, 
poor level of service and barriers to market entry. The result of the deregulation was 
an initial growth in the number of airlines followed by a later decline as the less 
efficient airlines went out of business. The result forced airlines to intensify their 
competition, improve services and marketing for the customer and become generally 
more cost efficient in all areas of their operation. The effect was to remove excessive 
monopoly profits, a success for free market economics, but more importantly to this 
thesis, it led to increased congestion at major airports as the new airlines tried to 
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squeeze their services into the peak hour periods. Further effects of US deregulation 
can be found in Doganis, (1991). " 
The economic success of deregulation in the US meant it was only a matter of time 
before it was tried in Europe. Unfortunately though, unlike the US, Europe is a 
collection of very different and individual countries, whose opinions and cultures have 
conflicted with one another over a long time period. For this reason, attempting to 
reach agreements is at best difficult and at worst impossible. If liberalisation was to 
work a slow and careful approach would be required. Initial changes came with the 
re-negotiation of bilaterals in the mid to late 1980's following the outlining of the 
EU's nine air transport objectives in March 1984. " New styles of bilateral 
agreements were developed permitting more than one airline access to more than one 
route. Capacity control was removed and fares had to be rejected by both 
governments to prevent it being implemented. Doganis, (1991), indicates that when 
the UK-Netherlands bilateral was re-negotiated in the above format, the number of 
airlines operating on the London - Amsterdam route doubled. The effect on other 
routes was much less dramatic however. Liberalisation continued despite these poor 
early results with the ruling of the European Court of Justice in April 1986, that 
articles 85-90 of the Treaty of Rome regarding competition, did apply to air transport. 
These rules prevented airlines agreeing fares to reduce competition, giving 
commissions to travel agents promoting the airline, misusing computer reservation 
systems for their gain, manipulating airport arrangements to create disadvantages to 
competitors and using predatory pricing to force competitors out of a market. Breach 
of these rules would result in considerable fines. By 1987 these rules had led to 
airlines forming alliances, or merging with others to circumnavigate these restrictions. 
The EU's response came in December 1989 with a regulation that any merger would 
be investigated if the combined turnover of the two companies exceeded 5 billion 
ECU. The final process of liberalisation was three packages passed by the EU to open 
up further the European market. The detail of these packages are defined in table 2.6. 
A good summary of the Liberalisation process and the effect it subsequently had can 
be found in the 1997 EU Single Market Review. 
The table clearly shows the lifting of operating restrictions but it is two points in the 
last column that are of most importance. Firstly, regulations are still imposed at 
airports considered as congested, which aims to prevent unrealistic aspirations of new 
airlines flying anywhere they want. Secondly, and more importantly though, April 
1997 is the date when total domestic deregulation in Europe occurred. This mirrors 
the situation in the US, and allows any airline of any country in the EU to fly on any 
route in the EU. This is likely to encourage growth in air transport which will then 
tend to put a strain on existing airspace and airports which are already noticing 
capacity limits or those close to it but not protected by being currently classed as 
congested. 
22 A good source of information on US Deregulation is Buton, K. J. (1989) The Degregulation of US Interstate 
Aviation: An Assessment of Causes and Consequences Transport Reviews, Vol 9, pg 189-215 
23These are defined in Doganis, (199 1) Flying Off Course - The Economics of International Airlines. p82-83 
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European Liberalisation Schedule 
1st Liberalisation 
Package 
1" January 1988 
Creation of a fa e zone to 
allow generation of 
discount fares 
2nd Liberalisation 
Package 
1" November 1990 
Range and scope of fare 
zone extended 
3rd Liberalisation 
Package 
1" January 1993 
Free pricing regime for air 
fares 
Equal sharing of capacity 
abandoned 45% to 55% 
allowed from Jan 1988. 
Extended to 60% by Oct 
1989. 
Traffic rights between 
regional and main airports 
created 
Allowed second carrier on 
intra-Community routes 
once traffic passed a 
certain level 
Fifth freedom rights 
granted for airlines on 
routes between two other 
Community states (30% of 
seats on the route only) 
If 60% limit had been 
reached, the airline was 
allowed to increase it at 
7.5% in the following two 
years 
Multiple designation on all 
community routes with 
more than 140,000 pax. 
per annum 
Exemptions granted to 
airports on congestion 
grounds were withdrawn 
Fifth freedom rights 
increased to 50% of seats 
offered on the service 
All bilateral limits on 
capacity to be abolished by 
I January 1993 
Double disapproval of air 
fares on all intra- 
community routes by 1 
January 1993 
Open market access - 
Freedom to fly between 
any two points in different 
community states. 
Restrictions for safety, 
environmental, congestion, 
and preservation of public 
service obligations were 
not lifted 
Common airline operators 
licence - Complete 
harmonisation of all 
regulations 
Right for a foreign airline 
to operate between two 
points in another country 
restricted until April 1997 
TABLE 2.6 
Source: EU (1997) The Single Market Review Subseries II - Impact on Services Vol 
II - Air Transport 
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2.9.2: Consequences of Regulation 
Whilst before liberalisation, airlines complained about the restrictive access of 
markets, and the development of a few large airlines who exploited their monopoly 
positions. It did enable the governments to protect their national airlines, their local 
community services, and let them manage the balance of demand with supply at 
airports. It prevented the system from operating at its economic optimum by 
artificially restricting supply and consequently there was a loss of potential revenue. 
Free market competition, on the other hand, leads to new entrants and price cutting. 
Consequences of price cutting can be serious for jobs and the local community if it 
leads to airlines going out of business. Finally regulation prevents the loss of key 
routes for the general public, which would disappear if airlines were allowed to 
remove unprofitable routes without consultation, especially those to small remote 
settlements, where the traffic generated is too small to finance a private air service by 
itself 
In conclusion regulation and liberalisation both have their advantages and 
disadvantages and the move from one to the other will result in some sort of 
opportunity cost. Within Europe though, the trend is for liberalisation which, by 
encouraging new airlines, new routes and frequencies, will do little to ease pressure on 
already congested airports and, it could be reasonably argued, will lead to increased 
congestion problems. Reasons for this are due to the problem of an imperfect 
operating market as, whilst the airlines are free to operate in the deregulated market, 
the airports and ATC are not, and passenger demand is therefore focused at a few 
principle airports, rather than at many smaller ones. 
2.10: Summary 
This chapter has, outlined how the capacity of 
'the 
aviation system is derived, and the 
number of restrictions, direct and indirect, that exist within the operating system. 
Table 2.7 outlines the factors that contribute to the system capacity and which player 
in the system is principally responsible for them. 
Table 2.7 provides not only a useful summary of the factors affecting congestion, but 
is also useful in looking at how different parts of the operating system should deal 
with conflicts of interest. Delays to a flight arriving at an airport could be the airline's 
fault for a late departure, air traffic's fault for en-route delays, or the airport's for lack 
of arrival slots or ground congestion. This approach is quite logical, assuming each 
party is responsible for managing their portion of the operating system, but consider, 
if the system is operating at capacity, then no matter how any part of the system is 
managed, reduction in delays will be impossible. In this case the only solution lies 
with the regulators who are the only party capable of increasing or expanding existing 
resources, by providing finance or less strict regulations to the other parties, which 
could enable them to increase capacity. 
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System Capacity Responsibilities 
Airports Air Traffic Airlines Regulators 
Control 
Rate of Airport Separation Runway occupancy Environmental 
development standards restrictions, esp. 
noise 
Apron size and Wake vortex Aircraft Airport 
number of stands separation performance development 
restrictions 
Number and type Sequencing of Flight frequency Liberalisation of air 
of taxiways traffic mix and timing transport 
Runway Airspace Flight routing Control of 
configuration integration and available airspace 
management 
Number and Controller Hubbing flights Protection of 
location of RETS workload and consumer and 
experience general public 
interests 
Number and Mode of runway Political agendas 
location of RATS operation 
Slot Allocation Multiple runway 
management 
Number and size of Air traffic flow 
DSPS management 
Category of runway 
operation 
Factors beyond control: Weather, Physical environment 
Factors all are responsible for: Use of latest technologies and development of 
accurate forecasts 
TABLE 2.7 
In conclusion the operating system is established and maintained by airports and air 
traffic control to permit the airlines to satisfy the public's demand to travel. However, 
the absolute capacity limits on the system are controlled by the regulators. An 
appreciation of this point by the airlines, airports and air traffic control, and the need 
to work in collaboration to achieve meaningful results, will be the key to optimum 
future capacity improvements. 
This thesis will now turn to examine the technical aspects of aircraft performance 
which permit the regional aircraft to carry out special procedures. 
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CHAPTER 3: Regional Aircraft Performance 
Characteristics 
3.1: Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to outline and explain the aspects of aircraft design and 
performance that permit regional aircraft' to carry out the special procedures which 
will be defmed in chapter five. 
The chapter will be broken into six sections. The first section will set the background 
to aircraft performance. The basics of aircraft performance followed by a brief 
discussion on the regulations that affect performance will complete the general part of 
the chapter. The remaining sections will focus on regional aircraft specifically 
looking at aircraft speed flexibility, initial climb and low level turning ability, and 
finally the ability of aircraft to carry out steep descents. 
3.2: Background 
I 
Each aircraft has a unique set of performance characteristics which are determined by 
its physical shape and design. The design is usually focused at producing an aircraft 
capable of effectively competing with other aircraft in a specific operating market. 
The final design will be a result of the consultation between aircraft manufacturer and 
airlines over the required performance limits for, such factors as aircraft operating 
range, payload uplift, speed, rates of climb and desc ent, fuel efficiency and 
manoeuvrability. There tend to be two types of compromise that occur before the 
aircraft is finally built which are design compromise and economic compromise. 
If the aircraft is designed with one particular performance characteristic in mind it is 
likely that the remaining characteristics may be compromised. For instance, if an 
aircraft is designed, for maximum speed, fuel efficiency and operating range may be 
poor. On the other hand, an aircraft designed for maximum payload uplift may have 
slow rates of climb and descent or poor speed flexibility. The final design is likely to 
be a compromise in performance terms to prevent excessive degradation of a 
particular characteristic. 
The design of the British Aerospace 146 jet is an example of an economic 
compromise. ' Due to the bankruptcy of Rolls Royce in 1970, the engine the designer 
had anticipated to use on the 146 was no longer available. Instead they turned to 
Textron Lycoming who offered the ALF502 which was the best alternative engine 
available at that time. Unfortunately, it only offered 6,5001b of thrust which meant 
1 The term regional aircraft is that defined in chapter I of this thesis. 
2 Source: Hardy, M. (199 1) Modem Civil Aircraft II- BAe 146 Ian Allen Ltd. 
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four engines would be required instead ofthe two originally expected. ]'his caused 
higher relative fuel burns compared to the twin engine competitors which came at the 
same time as rising fuel prices following the Arab-Israeli Yorn Kippur war ofOctober 
1973. The advantage though was that four engines helped the aircraft meet It's 
original design philosophy of offering ajet replacement for the Viscount and Fokker 
27 capable of operating without restriction from airfields up to 500011 and 
temperatures of ISA+20. This was due to less restrictive penalties for engine failure 
on a four engined aircraft compared to a two engined aircraft. 
Taking the above argument one stage further it can be deduced that an aircraft is 
designed to meet specific requirements at a specific time. However, in the future 
these specific requirements may no longer be relevant. In the case ofthe BAe 146, its 
ability to operate like a turboprop in and out of short fields has now meant it can be 
considered as a regional aircraft and those earlier performance requirements can now 
be used to help reduce congestion at busy major airports. It is this approach to 
utilising previous performance characteristics in a new environment that this thesis is 
built on and the specifics of these characteristics will be explained in more detail in 
further sections of this chapter. 
3.3 Aircraft Performance Principles 
Prior to discussing the specific performance characteristics that differentiate tile 
regional aircraft from the jets, it is worth covering a few of the principles of aircraft 
performance. Figure 3.1 shows the four basic forces acting on any aircraft. 
Basic Forces A cting on an Aircraft 
FIGURE 3.1 
The figUre shoxvs all the forces as balanced which is applicable when the aircraft is in 
straight and level flight at constant speed. This is not always the case though and all 
appreciation of how these forces interact together and vary is crucial to understanding 
the rest of this chapter. 
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Lift 
This force acts at right angles to the direction of the airfloW. 3 Almost all the lift on a 
conventional aeroplane is generated by the wing. In terms of physics, lift is generated 
by producing a greater pressure under the wing than above it. Precisely how much lift 
is generated by a wing depends on it's design, the speed of the aircraft and the air 
density. Mathematically the lift force is defined using the following equation: 
2pV2 XS Lift' = CL X Vý 
CL = Lift Coefficient S Plan Area of Wing (rn') 
p =Air Density (kghn) V Aircraft True Airspeed (Kts) 
Source: Kennode (1972) pg. 85 
These factors are relatively self explanatory with the exception of C,. The lift 
coefficient is dependant on the shape of the aerofoil, (i. e. thickness and 
curvature/camber), and it alters with the angle of attack of the wing, (i. e. the angle the 
wing makes with the aircraft flight path). This basic relationship is shown in figure 
3.2. 
Lift Coefficient and Angle of Attack 
Relationship 
Lift 
Coefficient 
C, 
FIGURE 3.2 
Derived from Kermode, A (1972) 
The figure shows two important points. Firstly, even when the angle of attack is 0" 
there is still a positive lift coefficient which is due to the camber of the aerofoil. 
Secondly, there is a set angle of attack beyond which any further increase in the angle 
of attack will result in a loss of lift. This is the stalling angle of the wing and will 
always occur at this angle almost irrespective of speed. 
To increase the lift generated by any wing the following changes can be made: 
Source: Kermode, A (1972) Mechanics of Flight pg 72. 
Source: Kermode, A (1972) Mechanics of Flight pg 85. 
31 
Angle of Attack 
Increase Wing Camber - This is the most significant change that can be made and 
will lead to the same increase in the lift coefficient compared to uncambered wings at 
all angles of attack but it will reduce the maximum speed of the aircraft due to 
increased drag. To optimise the high lift properties of a highly cambered wing with 
the speed advantage of a lower cambered wing, flaps and leading edge devices are 
used. These can vary the wing camber and consequentially permit operations at lower 
speeds than would of been possible with a fixed camber wing. The precise effect of 
specific high lift devices will vary from aircraft to aircraft but general effects are 
outlined in Kermode (1972). 
Increased Aircraft Speed - Simply the faster an aircraft flies the greater will be the 
lift generated other things being constant. This statement only applies whilst the wing 
is unstalled. 
Increase the Aspect Ratio - This the ratio of the wing span to the wing cord, i. e. it 
tells us whether the wings are long and thin or short and fat. A high aspect ratio wing 
will provide a better lift to drag ratio, i. e. the lift is increased with a lower increase in 
drag, than a low aspect ratio one. 5 
Increase Air Density - The denser the air, the greater the lift generated by a wing and 
vice versa. This means that operations from a hot airport at a high elevation will be 
more limited due to the lower relative air density than ones from a cold and low 
airport. 
Increase the Wing Area - This can be achieved by putting out the flaps at slower 
speeds. Any other changes are only possible by major structural change and are 
unlikely to occur once the aircraft has been designed. 
Increase in Wing Thickness - Thicker wings generate more lift and are best a low 
speeds and for weight uplift whilst thinner wings are better for higher speed. 
Increased Wing Incidence - This has already been covered in figure 3.2. 
Graphically, the effects of high aspect ratios and high lift devices on the lift 
coefficient compared to plain wings is shown in figure 3.3. 
The high aspect ratio wing offers an improved rate of increase in the lift coefficient 
with angle of attack compared to the plain wing, but reaches the stalling angle at a 
lower angle of attack. It does, however, achieve a greater C, Max. High lift devices 
offer a fixed increase in the lift coefficient with angle of attack compared to the plain 
wing and also an improved stalling angle. 
Drag 
This force acts in parallel to the direction of the airflow and represents the air 
resistance felt by the aircraft as it moves through the air. Effectively it opposes the 
motion of the aircraft. The factors that determine the drag are similar to lift, however 
'Source: Kermode, A (1972) Mechanics of Flight pg 104-109. 
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drag is not just generated by the wings but the whole aircraft including the fuselage, 
tail plane and engines. 
Effect of High Aspect Ratio and High Lift 
Devices to the Lift Coefficient 
High Aspect 
C, Mar Ratio Wing Wing with High Lift 
I 
-------- :- ----- 
C, 
- 
Max 
Devices 
Cocý. 
Ilicnt 
C, Plain Wing 
Angle of Attack 
FIGURE 3.3 
Derived from Kermode, A (1972) 
There are three principle types of drag. ' ' Parasitic drag is the drag created by the 
pressure change of the air as it passes over the aircraft and has three parts. Skin 
friction drag is caused by the disruption of the air as it passes over the aircraft skin. 
Form drag is created as the airflow separates from the aircraft surface and can be 
reduced by streamlining. Finally, interference drag is drag created by the flow 
interference caused at the junction of various surfaces on the aircraft, i. e. the wing and 
fuselage junction. 
Induced drag is the second principle type of drag. This is drag caused by the wing 
vortices which represent a by product of lift generation, i. e. Wake vortices as already 
mentioned in chapter 2. It can be reduced by having a wing with a high aspect ratio. 
This drag is increased as aircraft weight and lift generation increase. It decreases as 
the aircraft speed increases however, which is the reverse of parasitic drag which 
increases with aircraft speed. 
Finally drag can be varied during flight to permit the aircraft to operate in conditions 
it would otherwise not be capable of. This is done by the use of flaps and high lift 
devices, lift dumpers or spoilers, clam shell doors and a variable pitch propeller. This 
point is especially important to this thesis and the reasons will be explained later. 
The mathematical equation for drag is almost the same as for lift: 
" Source: Thom, T (1988) The Air Pilots Manual Vol. 4- The Aeroplane Technical. Airlife. 
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2pV2 XS Drale =CD X V-1 
C, = Lift Coefficient S Reference Area of Aircraft (M) 
p= Air Density (kg/ m') V Aircraft True Airspeed (Kts) 
Source: Kermode (1972) pg. 85 
The relationship of these factors to drag is not the same as lift though, and the 
relationship between lift and drag is not constant. The lift force is generally 10-15 
times greater than the drag force, although this diminishes with increased wing angle 
of attack as drag increases at a faster rate than lift! The relationship between the drag 
co-efficient and the angle of attack is shown below in figure 3.4. 
Drag Coefficient andAngle of Attack 
Relationship 
Drag 
Coefficient 
C. 
FIGURE 3.4 
Derived from Kermode, A (1972) 
If this figure is compared to figure 3.2 we can see that as the lift coefficient increases 
so does the drag coefficient but initially at a lower rate. As the angle of attack 
approaches the stalling angle though the drag coefficient will increase at a greater rate 
than the lift coefficient. This relationship between lift and drag is very important in 
determining the optimum angle of attack for the aircraft during climb, cruise and. 
descent and the design of the wing and it can be appreciated that a compromise 
between lift generation and drag must be made in every aircraft designed. 
Thrust 
This is the force generated by the aircraft engine which opposes the drag and moves 
the aircraft forward. The size of the thrust is proportional to the mass of air moved by 
the engine and the degree of acceleration imparted to that air. ' 
Source: Kermode, A (1972) Mechanics of Flight pg 85. 
MSc Air Transport Course Notes (1995-96) Cranfield University 
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Angle of Attack 
For level, unaccelerated flight, thrust must equal drag, whilst for an aircraft to 
accelerate or climb the thrust must exceed the drag. During climb the greater thrust is 
required to support a proportion of the aircraft weight acting with drag against the 
thrust. 
The thrust on most 'commercial aircraft these days is either generated by a turboprop 
or a turbofan engine. 
If we consider the turboprop first we can see that the thrust is generated by a propeller 
on the front of the engine pushing a large volume of air back over the wing. In this 
case the propeller is basically driven by a jet engine with a compressor, combustion 
chamber and turbine". Gearing is then introduced on the propeller drive shaft to 
reduce the rotation speed, allowing the propeller to turn at manageable speeds. T11e 
basic layout of the turboprop is shown in figure 3.5 which is a breakdown of the 
Fokker 50 Pratt and Whitney PW125B engine. 
A Cross Section of a Turboprop Engine 
PROPELLER REDUCTION GEARBOX ENGINE 
FIGURE 3.5 
Source: Fokker (1988) Fokker 50 Aircraft Operating Manual 
A detailed description on the operation of turboprop and iurbofan engines can be found in: 
Rolls Royce (1986) The Jet Engine Rolls Royce. 
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From the diagram it can be seen that the entyine has both a low pressure, (LP), spool Z- 
and high pressure, (HP), spool. These coniprcss the all- before II tile it is mixed w'th 
fuel and burnt. The exhaust from this accelerates the air through the turbine which in 
turn drives both spools and the propeller, thrOL11-111 the reduction gearbox. 
The thrust developed by the turboprop is determined by the propeller rotation speed 
and pitch plus the number and shape of the blades. Figure 3.6 shows that each 
propeller blade is shaped in the same fashion as the wing, aerofoll. As the propeller 
rotates then a lower static pressure is generated ahead of the blade than behind it and it 
is this pressure differential that creates the thrust force. effectively pulling the aircraft 
aIo ng, 
The blade angle shown in figure 3.6 is a combination of the blade angle of attack. 
which is similar to that discussed for a wing, and the pitch or helix anole. This pitch 
angle is the angle between the resultant velocity of the propeller blade and the plane of 
rotation of the propeller. '' 
Almost all modern turboprop engines are what are termed, Jariable Pitch Constant 
Speed Propellers'. This means that the pitch angle of the propeller blade is varied to 
ensure the enoine is generating thrust at optimum efficiency as the aircraft speed 
changes. The speed the propeller is rotating though is not changed except for take off 
and go-around. The Fokker 50 for instance has a fixed cruise propeller revolution per 
minute, (RPM), which is 85% of maximum RPM. 12 This is changed to 100% of 
maximum RPM for take off and go-around. 
The Propeller 
PLANE OF 
ROTATION 
BLADE 
BACK 
, )7 
BP LA 
DýE 
FACE 
_ý 
DIRECTION 
)ýiF ýFLIGHT 
SPINNER 
FIGURE 3.6 
Source: Thorn, T (1988) The Air Pilots Manual 
Source: Thom, T (1988) The Air Pilots Manual Vol. 4- The Aeroplane Technical. Airlife. 
Fokker ( 1989) Fokker 50 Aircraft Operating Manual Fokker. 
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At low speeds the blade angle needs to be small for the angle of attack to be optimum 
and this is known as, fine pitch. As the aircraft speed increases, the blade angle needs 
to increase to optimise the angle of attack, this time it is called, Coarse Pitch. This 
coarsening of the blade pitch will also serve to minimise the drag of the propeller 
during high speed flight. The blade angle on the Fokker 50 for instance varies from 
12" for approach and landing to approximately 45* for high speed flight. 
Two further developments have occurred with the development of variable pitch. 
Firstly, if the engine fails the propeller blade can now befeathered. This is where the 
blade is turned beyond the normal fully coarse position, until the blade lies along the 
direction of flight. This minimises the drag and prevents windmilling of the propeller. 
The second development was to use the propeller as an air brake on the ground to aid 
deceleration. It is achieved by turning the blade beyond the fully fine position so 
generating a reverse thrust force. 
The principle advantage of the variable pitch propeller over a jet turbofan is that it can 
give an almost instantaneous response to demands for variation in thrust which makes 
the aircraft easier to manoeuvre and accelerate or decelerate. This advantage will be 
returned to later. 
If we now look at the turbofan engine, there a few specific points that need making. 
Firstly, the engine is physically different from the turboprop as the propeller has now 
effectively been enclosed within the engine casing and finther blades have been added 
to make it the first fan section of the engine compressor. The important point to make 
is that now all the blades are fixed in pitch because they are enclosed. Use of variable 
pitch blades inside the casing would only serve to rip the casing due to the higher 
rotation speed and minimal blade tip clearance. 
The fixed pitch of the blades also means that the only way to increase thrust is to 
increase the rotational speed of the engine. Unfortunately there is a spool up time 
involved with this, unlike the turboprop, due to the inertia of the front fan. This needs 
careful accounting for during an approach and go-around situation as slower responses 
to demands for thrust can delay the point at which the turbofan can begin to climb 
away from the airfield. 
Now the two types of engines that generate thrust have been considered it is important 
to note what factors can affect the total thrust generated on any given day. 
As ambient temperature increases the difference in temperature compared to the 
internal jet engine temperature will decrease and this will decrease the maximum 
thrust that can be generated by the engine. An increase in the ambient pressure 
however will increase the maximum thrust generated. Finally the difference in speed 
between the ambient airflow and the jet exhaust airflow will determine the magnitude 
of the thrust that can be generated and consequentially, as the aircraft accelerates, so 
the thrust begins to decrease. 
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Weight 
This is the final and most simple force acting on the aircraft. Put simply this is the 
force which must be overcome to enable the aircraft to get off the ground and fly. The 
force always acts vertically downwards to the ground, irrespective of the aircraft's 
flight path. This means that during climb a proportion of the weight will act in the 
same direction as drag so necessitating higher thrust settings than in cruise. During 
descent the reverse is the case as the weight proportion now acts in the same direction 
as the thrust which encourages the aircraft to accelerate. 
This concludes the discussion on the basic forces acting on an aircraft and it should be 
remembered that is it not necessarily the magnitude of the force that is important but 
how the forces relate to each other and work in union or opposition. It is no use 
having a hugely powerful engine if the airframe weighs a ton and the drag created 
exceeds any thrust the engine can provide. This relationship of forces is particularly 
relevant during descent, where the descent glide angle is determined as: 
Sin, y= T-D 
w 
Where: T =Thrust D Drag 
W= Weight y The Descent Glide Angle 
Source: Campbell, R. D. (1985) 
This will be discussed further when looking at steep descents. Inevitably however the 
final design of the aircraft will be a compromise of all the factors discussed above. 
3.4: Aircraft Performance Requirements 
This topic is a very weighty matter and the author only intends to point out a few 
relevant points that affect this thesis, however a useful reference for this topic is 
Wagenmakers (1991) which outlines the requirements aircraft are expected to meet 
regarding performance along with observations on how this affects airlines. 
Today all public transport category aircraft on a countries register are certified in 
performance groups based on weight and whether or not they have performance for an 
engine failure. Aircraft listed in class 'A' should not need to make a forced landing if 
an engine fails at any time during the flight and concerns aircraft with a maximum 
authorised take off weight in excess of 5700kgs. This definition applies to all the 
regional and jet aircraft that will be considered in this thesis. To satisfy the 
requirements stated aircraft in this group must have detailed performance charts 
covering four distinct areas, take off, net take off flight path, en-route and landing. In 
addition the aircraft must achieve maximum gross climb gradients of 2.4% for twin 
engined aircraft and 3.0% for four engined aircraft after engine failure which is 
assumed to occur at, 'W, the take off decision speed, i. e. the worst possible 
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moment". To achieve this the twin engined aircraft needs to be significantly more 
overpowered than the four engined aircraft due to the greater impact of a failed 
engine. The advantage of the twin engined aircraft over the four engined aircraft in 
terms of performance though when all engines are operating is significant because of 
this restriction, and gives the twin aircraft a comparative advantage or unique 
performance characteristic which can be utilised. 
3.5: Special Performance Characteristics for Regional Aircraft 
Following the introduction to aircraft performance above, it is now time to look at 
some specific aspects of performance in more depth, to determine specific differences 
in performance that exist between regional and jet aircraft. The discussion will be 
based on figures presented in the appendices to this chapter. 
3.5.1: Aircraft Speed Flexibility 
Take Off 
Figure 3.7 combines the take off speeds and field lengths of a selected number of 
regional and jet aircraft. From this a number of points can be made. Firstly it can be 
seen that whilst no distinct break occurs in take off speed between the regional and jet 
aircraft there is a clear upper limit for the regional aircraft which in turn forms the 
base level for the jets. This occurs at approximately 120 kts where the jet speed 
increases to 180 kts. There is one anomaly to this, the Fokker 100, which although its 
take off length ranks it as a regional aircraft, its take off speed falls into the jet 
category. For this reason the author will assume that the Fokker 100 is a jet aircraft. 
This is also based on the limited ability of the Fokker 100 to carry out steep 
approaches. 
A similar picture can be made for take off field length with regional aircraft requiring 
field lengths of less than 5000ft whilst the jets require 5000ft or more. A final 
interesting point to note in the graph is that whilst take off speed has a general 
increasing trend from left to right, it does not directly mirror the increase in field 
length. This can be explained by the differing acceleration rates for individual aircraft 
which reflect the difference in the thrust to drag ratio compared to the aircraft's 
weight but is ultimately due to the aircraft's stall speed which, as previously 
explained, is due to the aircraft weight and wing design. The exception is the BAe 
146-300 which has a comparatively high take off field length for its take off speed. 
This is due to the aircraft having four engines and consequentially lower thrust 
requirements from each engine due to the less significant penalties of a single engine 
failure compared to twin engined aircraft. This, though, results in a slower 
acceleration than the twin engined aircraft. 
The reasons for the differences outlined between the regional and jet aircraft are two 
fold. Firstly, regional aircraft generally have a higher aspect ratio wing than the jets. 
This provides the regional aircraft with a lower stalling angle of attack and speed as 
" MSc Air Transport Course Notes (1992-93) Cranfield University 
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previously explained. The second reason for the difference is that the propeller 
engined aircraft can accelerate from stop more efficiently than the jets. This is due to 
the fact that their blade angle can be altered to prevent the propeller from having a 
stalled airflow passing over it unlike the fixed pitch jet fan blades. This then enables, 
instantaneous thrust generation for the propeller from a standing start. If we consider 
the concept of propulsive efficiency as work done on the aircraft to change speed over 
the energy imparted to the engine airflow, we can highlight the differences between 
jets and turboprops as shown in figure 3.8. 
Propulsive Efficiencies for Selected Engine Types to 
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FIGURE 3.8 
Source: Rolls Royce (1986) The Jet Engine. Rolls Royce 
Clearly from this figure it can be seen that turboprop engines have an efficiency 
advantage over jets from zero to approximately 450 kts. Beyond this speed the jets 
achieve optimum efficiencies as the propeller blade tips on a turboprop begin to 
approach the speed of sound where the airflow over them gets disrupted. 
Approach and Manoeuvring Speeds 
Appendix 3.2 provides a breakdown of take off, landing and manoeuvring speeds for 
the BAe 146-300 and Boeing 737-200 whilst appendix 3.3 provides the same 
information for the Fokker 50 and ATR 72. From these tables we can see that the 
speed schedules for the jets are greater than the turboprops in all areas of operation. 
In terms of this thesis though there are two principle issues that need to be noted. " 
Firstly, the regional aircraft will climb out at a lower speed than the jets. If we take 
the Fokker 50 for instance, it will climb out after take off, until it reaches acceleration 
altitude at a speedOfV2 +10 kts. This gives a speed of 112 kts, assuming a take off 
weight of 17,500kgs, i. e. the mid range weight. The Boeing 737-200, however, has an 
Information presented in the following discussion will be based on Air UK's aircraft operating 
procedures or Boeing recommended flight procedures, as appropriate. 
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initial climb out speedOfV2+ 20 kts which gives a speed of 163 kts at it's mid weight 
of 45,000 kgs. The importance of this variation in speed will be returned to later as it 
will affect the turning radius of the aircraft. For comparison the BAe 146-300 climbs 
out at V2+ 10 kts, which at it's mid weight of 35,000 kgs, gives a speed of 140 kts. 
Whilst these slower climb out speeds for the regional aircraft may be useful for early 
turns after take off, they can be restrictive in a busy airport environment if they slow 
remaining jet traffic. The significance of this can be seen if VFTo speeds are compared. 
The Fokker 50 mid weight speed will be 108 kts compared to 190 kts for the Boeing 
737-200. This speed differential will require careful aircraft departure sequencing to. 
prevent excessive aircraft separation delays. When this problem is linked with the 
need for jet engined aircraft to accelerate as soon as possible to achieve optimum 
engine efficiency, there is a clear advantage to the segregation of regional aircraft 
from jets on departure. 
The second point to make concerns the approach speeds. Generally regional aircraft 
have a greater ability to vary their approach speed to fit in with other airport traffic 
than the jet aircraft. This is possible by the turboprops due to the near instantaneous 
thrust available from the propellers as previously discussed, compared to the delayed 
spool up time of the jet engines. The variable pitch also enhances the flexible speed 
control on approach by permitting rapid thrust variations and slight increases in drag 
as the blades are moved to the fine position, again not possible with jet engines. The 
BAe 146 aircraft, whilst having jet engines, has a very effective aft fuselage, clam 
shell door, air brake which allows the aircraft to mimic the rapid drag variations 
possible in turboprop aircraft. Following a flightdeckjumpseat trip by the author on a 
Boeing 737 it was brought home just how difficult it was to maintain approach speed 
in this aircraft. Due to the relatively slippery profile of the aircraft, any attempt to 
increase the rate of descent beyond the optimum glide path would result in an increase 
in speed which could not be counteracted by increasing drag. For this reason the 
aircraft had to be approach speed stable a long way out from the runway, (on average 
I Onin from the threshold). This is not the case with regional aircraft. The Saab 340 
operated by Business Air for instance could vary flight speed from 210 kts to 160 kts 
in the approach phase up to the outer marker, (approximately 6nin from the runway 
threshold) to suit traffic and ATC requirements. Once past this point the speed was 
rapidly reduced to a final approach speed of 110 kts. The Fokker 50 operating with 
Air UK, optimally passes the outer marker at 160 kts and 10* of flap. This however 
can be increased to 210 kts if absolutely necessary, although it does make the final 
deceleration to final approach speed quite heavy on both the airframe, engines and 
passengers. The Boeing 737 has no choice but to be established at around 160 kts 
well before the outer marker. Obviously the benefit of being able to modify your 
approach speed can be very useful to ATC in preventing excessive separation of 
aircraft. 
Landing 
Figure 3.9 shows the landing speeds and field lengths for the same group of aircraft 
considered in figure 3.7. As with the take off graph, there is no clear break between 
regional and jet aircraft, however there is an upper limit to the regional aircraft which 
forms the base of the jet aircraft parameters. For landing speeds regional aircraft vary 
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from 80 to 120 kts, where jets come in and continue up to 150 kts. This classification 
does ignore the BAe 146 however. Landing field lengths range from 1500ft to 
approximately 4000ft for the regional aircraft, whilst jet aircraft start at 4000ft and 
increase to 9500ft. As with the take off case, the variation in landing speeds for 
regional aircraft does not uniformly follow the increase in landing field length. This 
is not true for the jet aircraft though which do follow a gradual increase with field 
length. If these figures are compared to figure 3.7 it can be seen that both speeds and 
field lengths as less. This is due to the modified aircraft configurations for landing, 
i. e. greater use of high lift devices than for take off which affect the lift and drag 
coefficients as previously mentioned. 
The point to make from this figure and figure 3.7 is that regional aircraft can land and 
take off at lower speeds than jets and can land on shorter lengths of runway that jets. 
This can be exploited to allow regional aircraft to operate from stub or separate STOL 
runways. It also allows regional aircraft to vary their landing roll to optimise their 
exit Point on the runway and minimise runway occupancy time. Jet aircraft on the 
other hand will find it harder to achieve this and will rely more on the optimal 
location of RET's. 
3.5.2: Early Turns after Take Off 
With the speed flexibility of regional aircraft explained it is time to look at the 
advantage regional aircraft have over jet aircraft in the initial climb out and early turn 
phase of the flight. 
As discussed, the turboprop engine works by pushing a large volume of air over the 
aircraft. A consequence of this propwash is to further accelerate the air that is flowing 
over the aircraft wing, which in turn will increase the lift generated during low speed 
flight. 
The early turn after take off will make use of this greater initial lift generation 
combined with the difference in turning ability between the regional and jet aircraft. 
Figure 3.10 returns to look at the basic forces acting on an aircraft in a turn. 
For an aircraft to turn a force must be present and act towards the centre of the circle. 
This centripetal force is generated by banking the aircraft and tilting the lift line as 
shown in figure 3.10. In doing this however, lift now no longer equals the aircraft 
weight and unless the pilot corrects for this by increasing the angle of attack and so 
the lift force, the aircraft will sideslip out of the turn and also descend. The extent to 
which the pilot must increase the lift will depend on the angle to which the aircraft is 
banked. 
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Forces Acting on an A ircrqft during a Turn 
Lift 
Bank Angle 
Centripetal Force 
Weight 
FIGURE 3.10 
Source: Derived from Kermode (1972) 
At 60' for instance the lift force required is twice the weight of the aircraft. ' In 
addition, as the aircrafts angle of attack is increased and the aircraft weight is 
effectively increased, the stalling speed will also increase during a turn. The increase 
will depend on the bank angle with the increase being relatively small at bank angles 
below 30', but becoming more significant above this angle. In terms of this 
discussion, however, if an aircraft is entering a turn a relatively slow speed after take 
off the pilot will have to be careful not to put the aircraft into a stall when entering all 
early turn. These days standard operating procedures and speeds should prevent tills 
situation arising. It will become critical however ifan engine were to fail during tile 
turn. 
The radius of turn an aircraft will follow varies with the bank angle and tile speed 
flown during the turn. The following equation is used to calculated the turn radius: 
Turn Radius (ft) V2 
g tan 
V Turning Speed (ft/sec) 
g Freefall Acceleration (32.2 ft/s 
0 Bank Angle (') 
Source: Kermode, A (1972) 
From the equation it can be seen that the smallest turn radius possible is achieved 
when the aircraft turns at the stall speed for the norninated bank angle. This however 
would be quite foolish for the reasons already stated. Figure '). I I dcnionstrates how 
the turn radius will increase with aircraft speed if the bank angle is fixed at 25' and is 
based on figures calculated in appendix 1.4, table 1. 
" Source: Kermode, A (1972) Mechanics ot'l, 'Iigllt p-249. 
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If we use the climb out speeds of the Fokker 50 and Boeing 737-200 discussed under 
the approach and manoeuvring speeds section, we can see that the turn radii vary from 
2299 ft for the Fokker 50 to 4863 ft for the Boeing 737-200. This, in turn, relates to a 
turning circle increase of 2.65nm or 16,112 ft. This proves that regional aircraft, by 
achieving lower climb out speeds, can out turn the jet aircraft significantly and 
highlights a potential to use this improved turning ability close into the airport to 
segregate the two aircraft types. Figure 3.11 also shows that this differential between 
turning radii increases at higher speeds. A regional aircraft cruising at 260 kts for 
instance will have a turn radius of 12842 ft compared to a jet turning radius of 17097 
ft. cruising at 300 kts, a difference of 4255 ft! 
VAfilst the preceding discussion has highlighted a potential to exploit differential 
aircraft turning abilities there are some practical restrictions that currently limit the 
full application as mentioned. Due to safety reasons the aircraft discussed all limit 
bank angles to less than 15* below 500ft and require speeds of V2 + 10 or V2+ 20 kts 
before bank angles can be increased further. In addition as all modem commercial 
aircraft are flown on automatic pilot these days, bank angle limits are imposed. The 
limits still apply when pilots fly manually as they must fly using the flight director. 
For the Fokker 50 this limits bank angles to 27.5* with the figure decreasing to 25" for 
the BAe 146-300. Similar figures apply to the Boeing 747-400 although the bank 
angle limit can be changed from 5" to 25' or set on automatic. If bank angles beyond 
25* are required the autopilot must be disengaged which goes against current 
recommended practices of airline operations, it is not, however, impossible. The final 
practical limit concerns ATC. Most airport departure routes assume the aircraft will 
follow standard flight profiles. These include rate 1, (31' per second), turns and turns 
to intercept fixed navigation beacons. Whilst these limits are not too far removed 
from the optimum jet flight profiles they do limit the regional aircraft. Table 2 in 
appendix 3.4 shows how bank angle varies with aircraft speed, assuming the turn 
radius is constant. The effect on a regional aircraft can be seen if we compare the 
bank angle of a jet turning at 180 kts to a regional turning at 140 kts. A 7.51' 
difference in bank angle is required. In this situation then the regional aircraft is 
forced to fly like a jet which takes no account of its differing performance capabilities. 
This discussion on turning abilities will form the basis of future discussion on the 
early turn after take off procedure and it is hoped that the increased flexibility of the 
regional aircraft over jets in this area has been clearly demonstrated in the preceding 
discussion. 
3.5.3: Steep Descents 
In a descent the aircraft approach gradient will be determined by the, (thrust minus 
drag), to weight ratio, (see earlier equation), plus the head wind or tail wind 
component. A head wind for instance will make the approach gradient steeper. 
assuming all other factors remain constant. 
The flight crew will have the means to vary the thrust and the drag to alter the 
approach gradient. The drag is altered by the use of the flaps and the air brakes 
although the latter is unlikely to be used on the final approach. The BAe 146 is an 
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exception to this rule and makes specific use of large air brakes at the rear of the 
aircraft during steep descents. 
Once the aircraft configuration has been set, the flight crew will control the descent 
gradient using the elevators to maintain the correct speed, corresponding to the aircraft 
weight, whilst rate of descent is controlled by varying the thrust. The descent gradient 
usually used for commercial passenger aircraft is approximately P, and this is the 
angle to which the ILS glide paths are set. 
Up to now we have been considering standard descent profiles. More recently,. 
however, there has been an increasing need for aircraft to approach airports located 
within difficult terrain which necessitate the use of a steep approach. In a consultative 
document by the UK CAA to the JAA, a steep approach is defined as any approach 
where the final glide angle is greater than 4.5. 
Today this steep approach is applied at a number of European airports but most 
famously London City airport in the UK. The type of aircraft that can currently carry 
out steep approaches are BAe 146, Fokker 70, Fokker 50, ATR 72, ATR 42 and Dash 
8. The Fokker 100, whilst it has completed landing trials at London City is not 
currently operated there. The turboprops achieve this steep approach by making 
increased use of the propeller blade variable pitch which allows the thrust minus drag 
force to be rapidly altered, i. e. minimum thrust and slightly increased drag. The 
regional jet aircraft have clam shell door air brakes to achieve the similar thrust minus 
drag force increase, as previously discussed. Other modifications that are required to 
the aircraft are the suppression of the ground proximity warning system, (GPWS), to 
prevent nuisance warnings with the increased rate of descent, and the strengthening of 
the undercarriage to accommodate the heavier landings. 
In terms of operating steep approaches there are a number of operational 
considerations that need to be taken into account. Firstly steep approaches require 
flight deck simulator training as the approach procedure is different than normal. This 
requires different piloting techniques compared to the standard approach with higher 
landing minima, i. e. the point at which a missed approach must be executed if the 
runway can not be seen, shorter landing flares and rapid deceleration using all braking 
means. In Air UK the actual steep approach into London City is flown on the 
autopilot down to decision height. Specific instructions for carrying out a steep 
approach with the BAe 146-300 in Air UK are contained in appendix 3.5 which is an 
extract from the Air UK operations manual. As the brief notes, speed control during 
the approach is crucial to a successful landing and an increased awareness of 
windshear and gusts is required as the aircraft is more susceptible to drift and stall 
than a standard approach due to the lower thrust settings and higher drag 
configuration. 
The discussion on steep approach has highlighted another asset of regional aircraft 
which makes them distinct from standard jet aircraft and potentially provides ATC 
with another tool to help segregate regional and jet traffic. There is one final area also 
worthy of note however. 
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3.5.4: Noise Footprints 
Noise is an ever critical factor for aircraft designers today. Aircraft noise comes from 
two sources, the engines and displacement of air by the airframe. A comparison of the 
noise footprints for regional and jet aircraft is given in figure 3.12. It can clearly be 
seen that the modem regional turboprop and jet generate a considerably smaller noise 
footprint than the larger jets. This fact has the potential to be exploited by ATC to 
enable different routings for turboprops compared to jets and make them more 
acceptable to noise environmentalists. 
Comparison of 90 PNDB Noise Footprints for Varying Aircraft 
Groups 
Modem regional turboprop 
Modern regional jet 
25 year old turboprop 
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5.2 sq miles (13.5 sq km) 
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FIGURE 3.12 
Source: ERA (1991) The Vital Link 
3.6: Summary 
This chapter has sought to explain the basic aspects of aircraft performance in order to 
demonstrate the differences between jet and regional aircraft. Clearly from the 
discussions there are distinct performance advantages available to the regional aircraft 
that are not found on standard jet aircraft. It is these specific characteristics that this 
thesis intends to exploit in order to permit regional aircraft to carry out special 
procedures and consequentially help reduce airport congestion. 
Now the tools with which regional aircraft special procedures can be constructed have 
been presented it is time to take a closer look at the arena in which this thesis intends 
to apply the concepts, before describing in detail each of the proposed special 
procedures in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 4: European Airport and Airspace 
Congestion. 
4.1: Introduction 
This is the final introductory chapter and aims to focus some of the issues raised in 
chapter two into a European arena. The chapter begins with a brief analysis of the 
current trends, issues and forecasts in the international aviation environment which 
affects all aspects of the European operation. Focus will then be put on the airports, 
air traffic and airlines within Europe, looking at their current status, operational 
problems and proposed solutions. 
4.2: Trends in International Aviation 
4.2.1: The Current Situation 
In 1991 two factors came together to reverse the boom growth of the industry during 
the late 1980's, namely the Gulf War and fear of terrorism, and a general worldwide 
recession. The combined effect of these events was critical, resulting in the operating 
profit for world scheduled airlines turning into losses of $3 billion US dollars during 
1991, from profits of $7 billion US dollars during 1990. ' These losses were more as a 
result of previous actions than the current world economic situation as Doganis, 
(1993) explains. 1980 to 1991 had been a period of deregulation in the US and 
liberalisation in Europe which had encouraged airline growth, combined with a period 
of falling fuel prices from 1980. The industry forecasts also anticipated world air 
transport growth following a growth in revenue tonne kilometers of 6% per annum. 
(p. a. ) during the 1980's. ' These factors led to airlines planning huge capacity 
expansions to cope with expected increases in demand for air travel in the form of 
more aircraft and route frequencies. Unfortunately, this demand reduced instead of 
growing, which left the airlines with massive over capacity problems and reducing 
revenue, so they cut fares in an attempt to fill seats and stimulate demand. During the 
boom phase the situation was made worse, as the airlines faced with increasing 
competition let passenger yields fall, and additionally became relatively inefficient at 
controlling and recovering costs, as profits at that time were almost guaranteed. This 
only served to amplify the lost revenue problems during 1991. The response that was 
required from airlines to this dip in demand should have been rapid capacity and cost 
reduction. Unfortunately, the size, lethargy, and arrogance of some airlines gave them 
the idea that they were invincible? This proved almost, if not completely fatal for 
some airlines, such as Pan Am, TWA, Continental, US Air, Air Canada, Air France, 
Iberia, Olympic, and Alitalia. British Airways was the only European airline to 
I Source: Boeing Current Market Outlook 1995 - World market demand and airline supply requirements. 
2Source: Doganis, (1991) Flying off Course - The Economics of International Airlines 
3 Source: Doganis, (1993) Dinosaurs or Pterodactyls - European Airlines after Liberalisation - Inaugural Lecture 
at Cranfield University 
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remain profitable following 1991, but paid for it by the loss of 6400 jobs in 1991, the 
cutting of it's routes, and the development of low cost subsidiary operations .4 The 
Asia Pacific region fared better than Europe and America due to a booming economic 
market in that region. 
The airports at this time were forced to turn to other sources of revenue than just 
aeronautical, so developed their secondary services outlined in chapter two. Air 
traffic control on the other hand had some of the pressure on it removed, as air traffic 
services were cut and frequencies reduced. Regulation was also reducing as 
liberalisation progressed, but governments were being forced more and more to 
consider the environmental obligations of air transport, During the last few years the 
environmental movement has developed into a powerful political group, heavily 
influencing air transport development. The three final factors occurring during this 
time, were the breakdown of socialism in the USSR and eastern Europe,. the 
development of the Chinese market and the rapid expansion of the air transport 
market in Asia, in contradiction to the US and Europe. 
Since 1991 there has been a return to growth in the market, and in the US and Europe 
the emergence of rationalized and stable airline growth with profits again being seen. 
Unfortunately, due to the relaxed attitude of governments with regard to developing 
airport and ATC infrastructure during the recession, and their focus on liberalisation 
and environmental concerns, a serious problem of capacity now exists within the 
industry, which is having to deal with a recovering, expanding and newly liberalised 
airline industry operating on a limited and in some cases out of date infrastructure. 
4.2.2: Future Forecasts 
The primary sources of reference for this section are the Airbus, Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas global market forecasts for the industry, and an open mind is 
required concerning the figures as they represent the manufactures justification for 
selling aircraft. The forecasts can be broken into five principle sections. 
World Economy and Airline Growth 
Boeing's forecast covers the period 1995-2014 predicting an average world economic 
growth rate of 3.2% compared with airline traffic growth of 5.1%. They expect the 
recovery from the recession to be slow and led by the US and Europe. Airline growth 
is expected to continue following the world economic trend. The Association of 
European Airlines, (AEA), reported a 9% growth in member airlines in 1994, with the 
figure being 9.4% in Asia and 4.6% in the US. Boeing indicate that. the pace of 
recovery is currently being set by individual countries, but expects this to eventually 
lead to an increasingly integrated world with a truly global trading system. 
McDonnell Douglas's forecast is equally optimistic, expecting the world economy to 
grow at higher rates over the next two decades than the past decade, with Asia/Pacific 
markets continuing to out perform the other regions. The report states that the airline 
4Source: Doganis, (1993) Dinosaurs or Pterodactyls - European Airlines after Liberalisation - Inaugural Lecture at 
Cranfield University 
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industry'growth is positioned at the beginning of its next growth cycle, which is 
expected to end at the turn of the, century. Airbus Industrie forecast for airline 
passenger traffic growth is the same as that given by Boeing at 5.1 %. 
Airline Performance 
Boeing outlines improving profit performance for the top 25 airlines by examining 
dollar sales between 1989 and 1994. McDonnell Douglas examine airline passenger 
yields. They show that, in real terms, yields have dropped annually by 1.5% per 
annum, (p. a. ), for the last 20 years. This has been offset with reductions in airline 
operating costs, improvements in aircraft efficiency, other technological advances, 
longer average passenger trips and economies of scale. They expect these efficiency 
improvements to be achieved at a lower rate in the future, as passenger yields will 
decline at a slower rate, around 1% p. a. between 1993 and 2013 due to airline 
productivity improvements. 
Future Airline Strategies 
Boeing argues two substitutes to air travel, high speed rail in Europe and tele, or video 
conferencing will have limited impact on the airlines. They indicate that if the 
Community of European Railway's master plan is fully implemented, it would take 
50% of travel in Europe by 2010. However they doubt the plan will ever be fully 
implemented due to high investment costs. They also expect airlines will recover 
some of the traffic through a more liberalised operating environment. Boeing expects 
fuel price, regulation, infrastructure and capacity to be favorable to airlines in the 
future, although the premise of this thesis does not agree with this latter statement. In 
addition they consider that the problem of too many seats for too few people has been 
solved during the first half of the 1990's. 
When the above points are combined with an expected easing of legal, political and 
regulatory roadblocks, along with promotion of smaller airlines and low cost carriers, 
Boeing indicates future success will rely on airlines providing increased value for 
passengers at lower costs. Political pressures on airport capacity are expected by 
Boeing, who forecast a rise in new non-stop flights and one stop, on-line connecting 
services, combined with increased hubbing by large airlines. Flight frequencies are 
expected to increase to a minimum of three a day on short to medium range markets, 
and at least once a day on long haul routes. In the long term airlines will shape their 
strategy to take account of the changing mix of travelers, and deploy their fleets on the 
routes they can serve most profitably. McDonnell Douglas supports this scenario 
adding that they expect fuel prices to remain constant, in real terms, at 60 cents per 
gallon. Airbus adds to the scenario two factors% firstly, it sees the potential for 
increasing frequency to be greatest on thinly traveled, long distance routes; secondly 
they anticipate that airline market concentration will be little changed by 2014, with 
the top 12 airlines share of the world fleet only having dropped from 45% to 37%. 
Aircraft Size Trends 
Airbus expect aircraft size to increase in high-density, high-volume route structures 
where airports and terminal area air traffic management systems are close to 
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saturation. They forecast a 34% increase in average aircraft seat capacity for world 
airlines over the 20 years from 1995-2014. Figure 4.1 from the Airbus forecast links 
expected increases in aircraft seat size with increases in flight frequencies. and breaks 
this down by geographic region. It clearly demonstrates that forecast increases in 
passenger demand will not be met by increasing aircraft size alone. 
Aircraft size Flight frequency 
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Lalin America 4.1% ; 3.1 
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0ý7 Middle East 5.7% 15.0 
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7A 
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Average annual grow1h (% 
FIGURE 4.1 
(Source: Airbus Global Market Forecast 1995-2014) 
Table 4.1 provides average seat size demands for the seven regions. It clearly 
indicates the upward trend in aircraft size and the significant differences in growth 
that occur in separate regions. These can be explained by the lack of airport capacity 
in the US and Europe, and the huge growth prospects of the Asia Pacific market. 
Focusing on the capacity problem, airports are encouraging the use of larger aircraft 
with the increasing use of landing charges independent of aircraft weight, but related 
to operation during congestion times. Further issues of this nature will be returned to 
when looking at European airports in more detail. 
Variations by Geographic Region 
All the forecasters indicate that the Asia Pacific market will become the second largest 
in size and grow at a faster rate than any other, with the exception of the Peoples 
Republic of China. The North American market they argue has reached maturity and 
will grow at a slow rate around 4% p. a., whilst remaining the largest in size. Europe 
will remain the third largest market and will soon mature following liberalisation with 
growth rates only slightly greater than America. Finally, African. Latin American and 
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the Middle East markets are expected to see significant growth, although from a lower 
base. 
Aircraft Size Trends 
Geographic Region Average seats per aircraft Percentage increase in 
_ 1994 2014 seat size from 1994 
Europe 179 225 26% 
Middle East 210 240 14% 
North America 161 211 31% 
Africa 164 181 10% 
Asia Pacific 243 356 47% 
Latin America 153 189 24% 
P. R. China 170 250 47% 
World 179 240 34% 
TABLE 4.1 
(Source: Derived from Airbus Global Market Forecast 1995-2014) 
4.2.3: Regional Airline Forecast Variations 
For these forecasts it will be assumed that regional aircraft reflect the definition given 
in chapter one and regional airlines are airlines that purely operate regional aircraft. 
Due to these considerations the effect of the factors outlined above are likely to differ 
for regional aircraft compared to the larger jets. 
Growth on the short haul routes is lower than long haul ones, according to Fokker. 
World average growth on intra-regional scheduled traffic will decrease from 4.2% to 
3.8%, although the exact change will vary from region to region, (see appendix 4.2). 
Fokker also predict that route sectors between 400nm and 1500nm will represent 50% 
of the future market with virtually no growth on sectors less than 200nm. Increased 
concentration is also expected following deregulation. 'The 
top 35 regional airlines 
account for 70% of the available seat mile production in 1994 compared to 45% in 
1984 say Fokker, which is due to code-sharing, as regionals fly under major airline 
liveries, in the US and Europe. Fokker expect this concentration to peak at 80% as 
code-sharing increases. Regarding the hub and spoke operation, Fokker indicate this 
has already reached its peak in the US and is showing signs of decreasing. 
, 
They 
expect the original turboprops used on these services to be replaced with larger 
aircraft types and possibly regional jets. The other suggestion is that hub bypass may 
be accomplished with. regional jets in the US, in future. The development of hub 
operations at other locations in the world, Fokker argue, will be dependent on the 
availability of uncongested airports. They point to the reduction of turboprop services 
at London Heathrow, a congested airport, compared to a, rise at Amsterdam, 
(uncongested), between 1984 and 1994. 
These points are supported by Jetstream Aircraft and Bombardier Regional Aircraft 
although they both add a further point. Jetstream argue regional airlines have been 
more profitable than the ma ors during the recession and are following the trend i 
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towards larger aircraft. They offer three arguments to support the growing aircraft 
size, the growth in passengers carried following code-sharing, increased airport and 
airway congestion, and the extension of regional airlines onto longer routes. 
Bombardier forecast a continued, strong and stable growth- in the regional airline 
market, averaging 3.6% p. a. to 2012 as airline code-sharing increases. The trend in 
aircraft size is also clearly illustrated by Bombardier as can be seen in figure 4.2. 
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FIGURE 4.2, 
(Source: 1993 Bombardier World Regional Market Demand Forecast) 
The chart clearly shows that Bombardier expect the 15-19 and 20-39 seat markets to 
diminish towards 2012, with an initial growth in the 40-59 seat market up to the turn 
of the century followed by its demise to the 60-90 seat market. British Aerospace also 
predict this scenario in their world civil market forecast covering 1992-2011. 
Turning to growth forecasts for specific regions, (appendix 4.2), Jetstream forecast 
that the largest growth will come from Asia, as do the others, with Fokker indicating 
that it will become the largest market by the end of the 21 st century, overtaking North 
America. Jetstream also predict the fastest growing regional aircraft type in all 
markets will be the 70 seat turboprop, along with the 50 seat jet in the US and Europe. 
The growth rates provided by Jetstrearn do seem significantly higher than those of 
Fokker and the other major industry forecasts which does bring them into question. 
These are the main variations in forecasts and conclude this first section looking at 
future trends in the air transport industry. All the figures given in the forecasts have a 
number of assumptions buried in them and consequentially, the exact result will only 
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be known with time. Bombardier does list eight useful points which represent what 
they feel will be the key market drivers in shaping the future. These are: 
1. A stable long term economic environment covering GDP growth, fuel 
prices and interest rates 
2. Continued strong regional growth 
3. Major/regional airline route re-distribution 
4. Governments encouraging greater competition 
5. Industry consolidation and globalisation 
6. Significant aircraft retirements for economic, and/or noise and emission 
restrictions 
7. Lower real airline yields 
8. Continued airport and airway congestion. 
The inclusion of the last point demonstrates the importance of this subject to the 
industry, both now and in the future with the increases in growth and flight 
frequencies that are predicted in all forecasts. 
4.3: European Airports 
This section will cover aspects of historical and current airport performance and 
congestion followed by an analysis of plans that are being made to overcome some of 
the problems. 
4.3.1: Historical Background 
Lack of capacity has long been the concern of those dependent on airports in Europe. 
The first major report to confront the problem was by the Association of European 
Airlines, (AEA), in November 1987. They analysed airport congestion by forecasting 
passenger and aircraft movement growth at 42 European airports under three 
scenarios. The scenarios represented differing levels of growth from 3.2% in the low 
growth case through 5.1 % in the medium case, to 7.0% in the high case. They classed 
a runway as being at saturation point when 70% of available slots were being used, 
which they considered very conservative as all peak slots would of been utilized long 
before this point. The findings of their work are collated in appendix 4.3. Significant 
points were the expectation that by 1995,30% of European runways, under the 
medium growth case, would have reached saturation outside the night period. By the 
year 2000, under the medium scenario 24 out of 46 main European airports were 
expected to be heavily congested which would rise to 3 1, if the growth rate followed 
the high scenario. They argued that the increased flight times due to the congestion 
would result in the loss of air services to surface competition and necessitate the use 
of larger aircraft. The effect of deregulation in Europe and the development of hub. 
and spoke operations it stated would only make pressure on key airports worse. 
Finally, they indicated that the problem had no simple solutions and success would 
depend on the combined co-operation of public authorities, airport management and 
the airlines. The building of new runways was seen as unlikely, although 
improvements in existing runway capacity were expected as technology advanced. 
This shall be demonstrated to have occurred in the following chapters. Restriction of 
airport access to small aircraft and charter traffic was suggested as were new pricing 
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policies to discourage use of the airport at peak times. Airlines, they argued, should be 
encouraged to increase aircraft size, promote off-peak travel and increase traffic 
between secondary airports, not affected by congestion. 
Unfortunately this report had little effect and in 1990 the SRI report provided figures 
to show that during the period from August 1987 to August 1989 the percentage of 
flights delayed by at least 15 minutes rose from 13.7% to 20.7% on a worldwide 
basis. In 1987 Lufthansa reported 5,200 holding hours over Frankfurt, Munich and 
Dusseldorf alone, which led to knock on costs of DM50 million. In September 1987 
IATA established a task force on airspace and airport congestion. The aim of the 
group was to seek co-operative solutions to congestion problems. By late 1988 
European congestion was the worst in the world, and IATA's executive committee 
commissioned a study to assess options to improve the situation. The result came in 
1990 with the SRI International consultative report entitled, "A European Planning 
Strategy for Air Traffic to the Year 2010. " The work was approached from five sides, 
an airport capacity assessment, demand forecasts, airway capacity assessment, 
economic analysis and institutional overview. The first three aspects of the work were 
used to generate initiatives which were combined with the last two pieces of work to 
generate the recommendations and action plan. The report showed that western 
European economic activity attributable to the provision or use of commercial 
aviation approached $75billion annually, whilst providing 2.5 million jobs. At that 
time the governments were spending $1.5 billion to provide the supporting 
infrastructure to the industry which SRI argued was inadequate to support the system 
of the time or allow growth. They concluded that this constraint of growth would 
cause annual losses to national economies of almost $10 billion by the year 2000. Of 
the 27 major European airports identified by the SRI, they concluded that by the year 
2000,16 would be capacity constrained, as figure 4.3 shows. 
The chart was countered with the argument from SRI that, if a commitment to timely 
implementation of existing airport development plans and adoption of procedural 
changes available in the next decade were made, the worsening airport congestion 
could be postponed until 2010, except at several critical locations. Using this idea 
they demonstrated Madrid and Barcelona could accommodate demand until 2000 
although little improvement would be found at Frankfurt and London. Individual 
airport graphs showing runway development plans and their ability to absorb demand 
were produced, and similarly to the AEA report, estimates of achievable runway 
capacities by 2010 were made. A summary of their results are presented in appendix 
4.4. The final part of the report was an eleven stage action plan, (see appendix 4.5), 
presented to the industry as the way forward. 
The dire picture of European aviation that these two reports presented must be seen in 
context. From their point of view they had the expanding influence of liberalisation 
with a growth in airline movements and forecasts indicating this trend would 
continue, if not increase its rate, as references. They could not have foreseen the 
effects of the Gulf War or the world-wide recession in 199 1. The dip in traffic caused 
by this was significant, but as IATA demonstrated in an updated forecast to the SRI 
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report in 1992', this would only be short term, with the long term consequences of 
inaction remaining the same. The forecast did predict a decrease in the growth of 
flights from 4.5% between 1995 and 2000 to 3.0% between 2005 and 2010 though, 
due to expected increases in aircraft size. In addition, analysis of appendices 4.3 and 
4.4 show that the SRI report expects airports to reach capacity at a later date than the 
earlier AEA report. For example the AEA report shows London Heathrow to be at 
capacity in 1986, where as the SRI report extends this to 1991. These differences can 
be explained by greater then expected efficiency improvements by ATC and the 
airport as well as increases in published declared capacities at many airports. Five 
additional movements per hour at Amsterdam and Brussels were generated according 
to information in the appendices. 
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(Source: SRI International Report 1990) 
The level of airport development since the SRI report, up to 1996 is given in appendix 
4.6. A summary is in table 4.2. 
5Source: IATA (1992) European Traffic Forecasts 1991-2010. In association with the Air Fransporl Action 
Group, (ATAG). 
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Summary of European Taxiway and Runway Developments since 1990. 
Airport Taxiway 
Extensions 
Runway 
Extensions 
New Runways 
Built Planned Built Planned Built Planned 
Amsterdam X X X 06/24 X X 
Athens X X X X X Two 
Barcelona X X X X X 07/25 
Brussels 1994 X X X X X 
Copenhagen X X X X X X 
Dublin X tip to 
2000 
X 10/2 8 X X 
Dusseldorf 1991) X X X 1993* X 
Frankfurt Yes Yes X X X X 
Geticva X X X X X X 
Hamburg X X X X X X 
Istaribul X X X Yes X X 
London 
Gatwick 
Yes Yes X X X X 
London 
Heathrow 
Yes Yes X X X X 
London 
Stansted 
Yes X X X X X 
Madrid Yes Yes X X Yes Yes 
Manchester Yes Yes X X X Yes 
Marseille ri/a ri/a X Yes X X 
Milan Linate Yes Yes X X X X 
Milan 
Malpensa 
Yes Yes Yes X X X 
Munich Yes Yes X X '1'%No X 
Palma de 
Mallorca 
Yes Yes X X X X 
Paris CDG Yes Yes X X X Yes 
Paris Orly Yes Yes X X X X 
Rome 
Fiumicino 
1994 X X X X X 
Stockholm 
Arlanda 
X Yes X X X Yes 
Vieniia 11 /ýI n/a X X X X 
* Ru 
Zurich Yes Yes IV 
Mot 
IIII 
, -I I 700m Io Ilmill 0ý/-") not ol 
Xý Not consldcred.. 
Source: Same as Appendix 4.5 
TABLE 4.2 
ýl 11CVV I-LIMUN'. 
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As can be seen from the table, only two airports, Madrid Barajas and Munich 2, have 
built new runways since 1990, although a further five intend to build ones in the near 
future. The largest work has been on taxiway modifications which include anything 
from new departure sequencing pads and RETS to new links between new terminals 
and existing taxi-ways. 
These problems were examined by the Comite de Sages in their report, 'Expanding 
Horizons', made to the European Commission in January 1994. The purpose of the 
report was to assess the future of aviation in Europe as an essential tool for economic 
and social development. The views of the industry and other related organisations 
were sought. Their primary conclusion stated that the root cause of Europe's problem 
was it's heritage with countries developing independently to one another, which 
caused the development to be at differing standards. The problem was made worse 
by overly enthusiastic managers, tradition and national pride, which led to irrational 
commercial and economic decisions being made. The ability to successfully 
reconcile this enthusiasm with rational and economic decision making was seen as the 
solution to the problems. Regarding the airports, the report recommended that, " as a 
matter of utmost urgency, inftastructure bottlenecks must be removed". They argued 
that this could only be achieved if airports were developed within a European context 
instead of by local authorities. The success of this report was limited, and in October 
1995 the members of the Comite des Sages attacked the EU over it's inaction. ' 
4.3.2: Current Status 
The status of European airports will be examined in four sections: 
I the scale of individual airport's operations will be assessed; 
2 an assessment of the extent to which hubbing has influenced them; 
3a look at current levels of congestion; 
4 aeronautical charges and ownership patterns. 
Scale of Operations 
Figure 4.4 shows the annual air transport movements, (ATM's) and average 
passengers per ATM, (Pax/ATM)' for the top thirty European airports, ranked by. 
annual passenger movements, (Pax's). Looking at the ATM's it can be seen that their 
magnitude does not always reflect those of the Pax's, although there does appear to be 
a general downwards trend from left to right. London Heathrow clearly dominates the 
other airports in both ATM's and Pax's followed by Frankfurt and Paris Charles de 
Gaulle. Amsterdam Schiphol comes next in terms of ATM's, where a drop in level 
occurs to Zurich Kloten, Copenhagen Kastrup, Stockholm Arlanda and Brussels. 
Another drop to the rest of the airports occurs after these to the 200,000 annual ATM 
mark. The importance of these variations are made more clearly when attention is 
6Source: Odell, M (1995) None the Wiser - Airline Business October 1995 p28-33 
7Pax/ATM is simply calculated by dividing the total annual Pax's by the total annual ATM's. (Raw data in 
appendix 4.7 
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turned to tile Pax/ATM line. This gives a very i-OLIgh indication to the size ol'aircral't 
that are using each airport, which is useful as a pointer to those airports where smaller, 
regional aircraft may form a more substantial part of' tile airport's trall-ic. The 
Pax/ATM line has seven distinct peaks within it at I leathrow, Paris Orly, Gatwick, 
Lisbon, Palma de Mallorca, Grail Canaria and Teneril'e Stir. The last three highlighted 
airports predominantly cater for charter traffic from the rest of' Furope, which would 
explain the larger size of aircraft used there. Tile rest represent large scheduled 
airports where the majority of aircraft are over the 90 seat category and there is more 
likelihood of long haul services. To place these airports in context with tile United 
States appendix 4.8 compares the size of annual Pax's, ATM's and average Pax/ATM 
for the top 40 European airports to their US counterpart's figures. I Icathrow I'or 
instance is compared to Chicago O'Hare, the largest I fS airport by annual Pax's. 
There are two distinct trends to note here. Firstly the annual Pax's and ATM's for tile 
European airports are significantly lower than the US at around 50-60%, and secondly 
the average Pax/ATNI are significantly higher, generally by at least 10%. Reasons for 
these variations can be argued to represent the larger use of hubbing principles in the 
US than in Europe. The hub feed traffic into these US airports is likely to be with 
smaller regional aircraft, which will keep the annual ATM's higher and tile Pax's 
figure lower than those in Europe. 
Conclusions from the points noted above are that on average, operations at European 
airports are on a smaller scale than the US but with larger aircraft, and within Europe 
there are significant variations between the annual ATM's and Pax/ATM, although 
there does appear to be a general reduction in them with annual Pax's. Finally, tile 
concentration of passenger and air traffic movements within Europe are greater than 
the US, with 52% of the total annual passengers for the top 40 Furopean airports 
being handled by the top 10, compared to 45% in the US. The figures Ior annual 
ATM's are 41% and 36% for Europe and the US respectively. This greater 
concentration will place higher demands on the top E, Liropean airport systems than tile 
US, and highlight congestion problems sooner! 
Hubbing at European Airports 
Dc-rcgulation of air transport in the US led to tile development of' key hub ail-ports 
where the dominant airline could combine it's short and long haul services most 
efficiently. Following liberalisation in Furope it was expected that similar trends 
would occur. A report by the department of Air Transport at Crantield I Iniversity, 
(1995) identified eighteen possible European hub airports. The success of tile 111.1b 
was measured by comparing tile number of intra Furopean Union frequencies that 
occurred at the airport to the number of frequencies to other world aviation markets. 
The results are presented in table 4.3). By far the most dominant huh airport ill all 
markets except Latin America is London I leathrow. It is 11ollowed by Frankfurt, Paris 
Charles de Gaulle and Amsterdam Schiphol. Thc other airports listed are much 
smaller in comparison and tend to flocus on one market region, which will he a 
function of either geographic location or historical colonial links like Madrid and 
Latin America for example. 
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Current LeveIs of Congestion 
Figure 4.5 is compiled by the author to provide an updated version of the 1990 SRI 
chart on available runway capacity at European airports! In the production of this 
chart actual annual ATM's for 1994 were compared to a calculated annual runway 
capacity. This latter figure was calculated as shown below: 
Annual Runway Capacity = Declared Hourly Capacity x 18 Hours x 365 Days 
18 hours instead of 24 was chosen to take account of possible ATC firebreak periods, 
night curfews, quota restrictions and other environmental restrictions, which would 
reduce the declared hourly capacity for the night period. In fact the figure may, in 
some cases, be an optimistic value, as due to the points highlighted above, airports 
may be unable to continuously maintain their declared hourly capacity from 0500 to 
2300 each on every day. For the purpose of this thesis and due to limited access to 
information for hourly variations in declared capacity, this approach will be 
maintained in further examination of runway capacity. 
Runway utilisation was calculated as follows: 
% of Runway Utilised Annual ATM's x 100 
Annual Runway Capacity 
Finally available runway capacity was calculated by subtracting the percentage of 
runway utilised from the 70% limit, beyond which significant congestion occurs, 
according to the 1987 AEA report. 
From the above approach figure 4.5 identifies that during 1994' seven of the 27 
European airports studied in the 1990 SRI report were congested. London Heathrow 
was the most seriously affected, followed by FrankfUrt and Dusseldorf. Vienna, 
Dublin, Geneva, and Barcelona also appeared to lack sufficient capacity, whilst 
Gatwick and Brussels had less than 5% of spare capacity. At the other end of the 
scale London Stansted and Milan Malpensa had over 40% of space capacity. The 
figure for Stansted is misleading though, as it currently operates under strict aircraft 
movement limits of 78,000 a year, " whilst the chart assumes no operating limits. In 
conclusion, however, the chart clearly shows that there is more than adequate capacity 
when all the airports are combined, so the problem is not lack of resources, but lack of 
adequate distribution of resources and capacity at the right airports. 
8 Raw Data in Appendix 4.9 (with Forecasts until 2010) 
9Traffic data taken from ACI Worldwide Airport Traffic Statistics 1994 whilst declared capacities were taken 
from 1993 APATSI report - These represent the latest, readily available, figures. 
I OThe Times 18/1/96 Focus on Stansted Airport. 
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Available Runway Capacity for Selected 
European Airports for 1994. 
Milan Malpensa 
London Stansted 
Manchester (NN ith 2nd Runway) 
Munich 
Hamburg 
Marseille 
Paris Orly 
(openhagen 
Rome Fiumicino 
Milan Linate 
Amsterdam 
Istanbul 
Stockholm Arlanda 
Palma 
Manchester 
Zurich 
Athens (1993 Data) 
Madrid 
Paris Charles de Gaulle 
Brussels 
London (. 'At% ick 
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Percentage of Available Runway Capacity 
FIGURE 4.5 
Source: Data Derived from ACI Worldwide Airport Traffic Statistics 1994 and APATS1 Report 199, 
65 
-10.00 0.00 
Aeronautical Charges and Patterns of Ownership 
Information for this section comes from the Department of Air Transport, Cranfield 
University report, (1995). As indicated in chapter two of this thesis, airports can set a 
number of operating charges for passenger handling, aircraft parking, runway use and 
use of local navigation services. Combined these are known as aeronautical charges 
and figure 4.6 shows how these charges vary per passenger between a 34 seat Saab 
340 and a 150 seat Airbus 320, (A320). 11 The positive figures indicate that it costs the 
passenger of the regional Saab 340 more to use the airport, than the passenger of the 
A320 which is true of London Heathrow and Gatwick, Munich, Dusseldorf, Brussels 
Zavantem and Stuttgart airports. The reason for this situation at Heathrow and 
Gatwick is the blanket landing charge of 090 and E286 respectively for category 3 
aircraft operations during peak hours, irrespective of aircraft weight. '2 BAA Plc., 
operators of the airport argue that, during peak hours the aircraft occupy a very 
valuable slot to use the runway, which does not depend on their size, and they should 
pay accordingly. This principle is known as peak period pricing and aims to ensure 
that only those operators who value their slots at market value use the airport at peak 
times, removing those less concerned with when they operate to the off peak times. In 
doing this the airport hopes to help equate demand with capacity during the peak. 
Manchester airport at the other side of the chart, varies it's landing charge depending 
on whether the aircraft is jet or propeller, from L8.54 to E6.77 per tonne respectively, 
although like the BAA, a blanket minimum charge of E50 applies during peak hours. " 
These examples demonstrate the significant variance in the charging structures of the 
European airports, which can penalize regional aircraft. 
4.3.3: Future Forecasts 
The purpose of this section is to assess how European airports will fare, in terms of 
congestion, into the future. To accomplish this growth, trends for the airports between 
1985 and 1994 will be assessed, and combined with forecast growth information from 
section 4.2. The results of this will then be used to project the annual ATM's for 
selected European airports to 2010, when new charts of available runway capacity 
will be produced. 
Growth Trends 
For this section annual Pax's and ATM's were collected from the ICAO Airport 
Traffic Statistics Report from 1985 to 1992. Additional data for 1993 and 1994 was 
collated from the ACI Worldwide Airport Traffic Reports. A ten year period of 
historical data was chosen, as it represents almost a complete cycle in the air transport 
industry, from recession of the early 1980's to the boom in the late '80's and back to 
recession in the early 1990's. The combining of this data should remove distortions 
due to any economic variability's, which might otherwise bias the data. The airports 
analysed were restricted to the 27 identified by the 1990 SRI report, due to practicality 
II Derivation and presentation of this data is given in appendix 4.10 along with Airport ownership information. 
12BAA Airport Charges from I st April 1995. 
13Manchester Airport - Fees and Charges I st April 1995. 
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of data handling and, as these airports represented a known hcrichinark against which 
to compare the forecasts. The raw data used in the forecasts is given in appendix 4.9. 
In addition to the primary data retrieved, annual average Pax/ATM's were also 
calculated over the ten year time period. Figure 4.7 shows the variation in growth 
rates in Pax's, ATM's and Pax/ATM's for tile selected airports between 1985 and 
1994. Istanbul and London Stansted are ornitted frorn this chart due to lack of 
sufficient available data over the time period, to provide statistically significant 
figures. Each figure represents an average of annual growth rates for tile airports. As 
was noted with the 1994 situation, much variability between individual airports exists 
although. all but Athens have demonstrated a positive growth in passenger traffic, and 
all have increased ATM's over the period. Average Pax/ATM. grexv by at least 1% 
over this period with the exception of Paris Charles de Gaullc, Madrid and Athens. 
Airports showing significant growth in Pax/ATM were Dublin, Manchester I lalliburg, 
Amsterdam, London Heathrow and London Gatwick. 
Although the above chart is useful in highlighting individual airport variations, to help 
assess the trends in Pax's, ATM's and Pax/ATM, a look a yearly changes is ofniore 
value. Figure 4.8 presents the indexed growth of tile three variables over tile time 
interval. The figures this time represent the combined average for all airports ill tile 
study, for the individual years, indexed against 1985 figures. Sustained growth in 
ATM's and Pax's can be seen with the exception of' 1990-91 for tile Pax's, which 
represents the commencement of the latest worldwide recession. Trends in Pax/ATM 
are interesting with initial growth between 1986-87 during the boom in air transport, 
followed by a levelling off until 1989, when two years of reduction Occurred bringing 
the 1991 figure below that of 1985. This dip in 1991 can be explained by tile 
decreased growth in Pax's compared to continued growth in ATM's. The severity of 
the 1991 dip in traffic appears to be confined to one year as rccovery in Pax's occurs 
rapidly during 1991-92. The final three years show a sustained increase reflecting the 
increasing difference between the Pax's and ATM's growth, to an extent not 
previously seen in the chart. This can be explained by tile effects oflibcralisation and 
also the airlines recent need, during the recession, to reduce frequcricies and attempt to 
increase aircraft load factors in order to stein their loss of' profits, as was discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter. 
In conclusion, the overall growth figures for Pax's, A, rm's and l1ax/ATM t1or those 
European airports over the same period were 6.3%, 4.7% and 1.4% respectively. 
Forecasts until 2010 
In order to produce the forecast two variables need to be decided. The first is the 
annual growth rate of ATM's over the time period, and the second is tile declared 
annual runway capacity for tile airports in question Lip to 2010. As with any forecast, 
the unpredictability of unforeseen events will make their accuracy very limited. For 
this reason, plus the limited availability of' resources and time in this thesis, tile 
forecasting methods employed will be relatively simple. 
The examination of market forecasts in section 4.2.2. placed the growth of' world 
airline passenger traffic up to 2014, at 5.1 % p. a., and in average of4.2! /() p. a. for intra- 
European passenger growth. This is at least 1% lower than the growth figures given 
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between 1985-94. If one aSSU111CS that, in addition to this Cact. the magnitude of' tile 
difference between Pax and ATM growth will remain the same, It'not increasc due to 
the trend towards larger aircraft size, the ATM growth rate for the period untl 1 2010 is Z-- 
likely to be around the 2% p. a. mark. " Due to the problems of' variability already 
discussed, this torecast Will use three ATM growth rate scenarios, 2')/, ) as tile most 
likely, I% for lower than expected growth, and 3% t1or higher growth. 
It is the intention of this thesis to Lise two annual declared runway capacities. The first 
will use the same method as described in section 4.33.2 except it will assurne that all 
the airports have achieved their optimum runway capacities, as dcfincd by tile 1990 
SRI report. 'File second 11011res will take this concept one stage further, by assurning 
that current operatin- curfews or qUotas have been removed and the airport can 
operate at it's theoretical declared capacity for 24 liours. 
Figures 4.9 reproduces the SRI format denoting available runway capacity I'Or tile 
airports by 2010, with a 2% annual growth in ATM's. Clearly 9 of these airports are 
lacking capacity. London Heathrow has a demand that exceeds it's total runway 
capacity by 4.4%, with London Gatwick and Frankfurt also very close to tile 100% 
utilisation level. As a comparison Manchester airport is entered both with, and 
Without a second runway. The significance of this runway in keeping Manchester free 
from excessive congestion is clear in this chart. Madrid, Zurich, Brussels and Geneva 
also Would have severe operating problems it' this scenario became reality. Vienna 
and Copenhagen being. just on the limits of the 70% Litilisation level would also need Z-- I 
to be developing their capacity, if they were to maintain an acceptable level of service 
to their customers. Figure 4.10 demonstrates the same growth scenario, but this time 
with 24 hour operating conditions. The significance of this availability in reducing I- 
congestion is readily apparent, as only three airports now exceed tile 70% limit, with a 
maximum at I leathrow of less than 10%. Appendix 4.9 provides details ofthe other 
scenario results With 14 airports congested Linder tile 3%, 18 hour operation, compared 
to 6 airports Linder the same growth but 24 hours operation. ThC figures for the 1% 
growth scenario are 5 airports, and 0 airports for tile 18 and 24 hour operations 
respectively. 
In COIICILISiOll these forecasts, albeit simple, do provide a Useful tool to analyse the 
implications of varying ATM growth sccnarios and operating restrictions oil FLItUrc 4- 
congestion levels at European airports. The charts also dernonstrate that, it' the listed 
airports can achieve their Optil"IlUrn declared capacities stated in the SRI report, many 
will remain out ofthe congestion area For the floreseeable Future. In fact, it' figUre 4.9 
is compared to the original SRI chart, it call be seen that Hamburg, Copenhagen, 
Marseille, Palma de Mallorca, Athens, Stockholin-Arlanda, Dublin, Dusseldorf. Milan 
Linatc, and Barcelona are no longer capacity constrained. However, nine of' the 
airports will remain siunillicantly congested. 
This comparison to the original SRI fivecast indicate the airports ability to increase 
their opcrational system capacity at a greater rate than predicted by dic carlier 
142% ATM growth is the fioure given in Ilic ICAO long lerm Iorccast 1995-2003 - ICAO Journal Dec 1994. 
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Forecast of Available Runway Capacity for Selected 
European Airports by 2010 (2% Growth p. a. ) 
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FIGURE 4.9 
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Forecast of Available Runway Capacity for Selected 
European Airports by 2010 (20/0 Growth p. a. ) 
24 Hour Operation 
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FIGURE 4.10 
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forecast. The two major limitations of the forecast are in assuming that ATM growth 
for each airport are the same, and the airports can maintain their optimum declared 
runway capacities over 18 or 24 hours, without a firebreak from 1995. When the 
forecast ATM figures are compared to individual airport forecasts differences can be 
seen. Manchester airport produced a series of ATM forecasts in 1994 as part of it's 
proof of evidence for a second runway. This comparison, along with similar forecasts 
for London Heathrow, from the BAA, in 1995, are presented in table 4.4. 
The lower than anticipated ATM's for Manchester, in comparison to the airport 
authorities, can be explained by the assumptions of the latter. Manchester assumes 
that the process of liberalisation will lead to an increase in new routes and frequencies 
which, when combined with expected levelling of aircraft load factors at 1980's 
levels, will lead to a greater growth in ATM's than the forecast in this thesis. The 
forecast for Heathrow is the reverse of the above, with the airport authority predicting 
lower ATM growth. As before this can be explained by the assumptions made by the 
BAA with an hourly average movement rate of 78, less than the thesis prediction. 
Validity of Airport Forecast Growth 
Airport/ Manchester* Heathrow" 
Year 1995 2000 2005 2001 2013 
Airport 
Forecast 
171.6 214.7 263.9 435.0 453.0 
Thesis 
Forecast 
I 
169.2 186.8 206.3 487.6 n/a 
Source: Manchester Airport Pic (1994) Proof of Evidence: The need for a second 
runway. 
Source: BAA (1995) Heathrow into the 21 st Century 
TABLE 4.4 
Finally the forecast does agree with the latest IATA" predictions on congested 
airports by 2000, that even with planned enhancements, London Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Frankfurt and Madrid will still be congested. IATA does also outline Milan Linate 
and Dusseldorf as being congested unlike the thesis however. 
Although these comparisons of forecasts have generated many differences, they have 
been demonstrated as being a result of varying forecasting assumptions, which, do not 
by themselves invalidate this forecast. 
4.3.4: Factors preventing the Forecast being Achieved. 
To fully appreciate the significance and limitations of the above forecast and the 
likely magnitude of future European airport congestion, a brief outlining of the 
specific operating restrictions at airports are required, along with plans to alleviate 
them. 
15Data taken from F. Ligi (1995) Airport Slot Allocation in Europe - Msc thesis, Cranfield. 
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Slot Allocation 
The initial concepts of slot allocation were discussed in chapter two. The specific 
problems affecting European airports will be covered here. As Ligi, (1995), states, the 
use of this approach should be seen as a last resort and only regarded as a short term 
solution to congested airports. The principles of the IATA Scheduling Procedures 
Guide has fallen foul of a number of criticisms recently. Ligi, (1995), identifies four 
main concerns, firstly overbooking where allocated slots are not utilised and other 
airlines are unable to use them. Secondly, giving new entrants 50% of remaining 
slots, once the historical slots have been allocated, does not give sufficient scope for a 
successful new entrant it is argued. Problems with bilateral agreements have also 
arisen as country A's airline operates to country B's uncongested airport, whilst 
country B's airline has restricted access to country A's congested airport. Finally, an 
economic row has recently arisen over the IATA procedures and their fairness. 
Opponents of the system argue that it is a closed shop operated by and for airlines, 
which contravenes the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome. This last problem has 
resulted in the US disallowing the system for anti-trust reasons. 
The problem of slot allocation, however, is more severe in Europe than the US as, 
according to a report in 1992, only three out of 24 main European airports were not 
slot coordinated, compared to only four slot coordinated airports in the US. " During 
the early 1990's the most hotly contested slot allocation issue in Europe has been that 
of historical precedence, or, 'Grandfather Rights'. Doganis, (1992), explains that 
when a carrier controls 30-50% of total available slots at an airport, they exert more or 
less monopoly power at those airports. Understandably the largest complaint to this 
has been from new entrant airlines and those wishing to expand at a congested airport. 
In the UK this has been demonstrated by Virgin Atlantic and British Midland trying to 
break what they see as the monopoly hold British Airways has over slots, (39% of 
total in 1992 17) , at London Heathrow. British 
Midland presented data, in 1990, that by 
1995 demand for runway slots at Heathrow would exceed supply by 65-120,00O. 's 
The basic argument, however, is that this lack of slots will reduce access to congested 
airports and prevent the free market competition between airlines, by severely limiting 
the addition of route frequencies for airlines. Figure 4.11 clearly demonstrates this for 
London Heathrow where, for all but four hours during the day, demand for the slots 
significantly exceeds availability. " During 1993 British Midland produced further 
statistics to demonstrate that Heathrow was the most congested European airport with 
99.5% of slots occupied during peak times. The figures for Paris Charles de Gaulle, 
Amsterdam and Frankfurt were 73%, 66% and 97% respectively. 2' The figure for 
Frankfurt, although high, was expected to fall as the US military removal freed up 
more slots. 
16Source: Reed, A (1992) Grandfather is well and living in Europe - Air Transport World, 5/1992, p65-67. 
170'Toole, K (1993) Searching for a slot -News Analysis -Flight International 27/1-2/2/1993, p 14. 
18Reid, A (1990) The case for additional runway capacity at Heathrow - Paper in Royal Aeronautical Society One 
Day Conference entitled, "New Runway Capacity in the South East - Solutions and Impacts. " p9.1-9.7 
19 See Appendix 4.11 for Raw Data and London Gatwick figures 
20Source same as footnote 19. 
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Solutions to this problem are many and varied. Following the US ruling on the IATA 
scheduling procedures the FAA introduced a buy-sell rule for slots. This allowed 
slots to be purchased, sold, traded or leased under the control of the FAA and was 
implemented at New York JFK, La Guardia, Chicago O'Hare and Washington 
National. The principle was based on, 'ring fencing', or grouping of slots into three 
types of operation, commuters, US domestic and US international. These fences, 
although allowing protection of key airline markets, did cause problems. The limit on 
aircraft seat size in the commuter class was 56. As regional airlines grew and larger 
regional aircraft such as the ATR 72 and Avro Regional Jets were developed, this 
restriction became very limiting. In 1993 the FAA agreed to a two year trial allowing 
25% of the commuter slots to be used by aircraft with 110 seats. In 1995 the review 
of the trial indicated a wish from the commuter airlines to increase the percentage of 
I 10 seat slots to 50%. The FAA argued this would allow larger airlines to use the 
commuter slots for their US domestic services and resisted the suggestion to protect 
the regional airlines. In addition to ring fencing the FAA told airlines that the slots 
were issued on a, 'use it or lose it', basis. If a slot was not used by 80% of its 
potential in a two month period, it would be revoked and put into a, 'slot pool', where 
25% of the slots would be provided for new entrant airlines. 
Results of this approach to slot allocation has been the ability to sustain availability of 
international slots at New York JFK and Chicago O'Hare, whilst enabling a healthy 
mix of domestic and commuter traffic to remain. In addition, experience has shown 
that the new entrant slots have been primarily used by regional airlines as opposed to 
the larger airlines, due to limited availability of ground facilities which has permitted 
the regional airline to maintain access to congested airports it might not otherwise 
been able to do. 
In Europe pressure from the airlines has also promoted research into ways to change 
the slot system. In 1991 the UK Department of Transport commissioned a study by 
the SD-Scicon Ltd. ", consultancy practice. Their recommendations were that, in 
order to stimulate competition, the grandfather rights to slots should be removed. 
Two scenarios were considered, firstly the modification of the existing IATA system 
of full regulation, and secondly the development of a, 'Market Hybrid', system which 
would rely solely on free market economics. The first system envisaged retention of 
grandfather rights, but with a 65% use it or lose it approach. 10% of existing slots 
would be sacrificed after the first three years of operation, with a further 5% after five 
years, to create a slot pool for new entrants. Similarities of this approach to the US 
system can be seen. The second approach was more radical with all slots sold at 
market auctions on seven year leases. Once the lease expired it would be re-auctioned 
and sold to the highest bidder. Within the system a small number of slots would be 
classed as, 'core rights'. These would preserve an element of the grandfather right 
system, but the owner must match the highest bid for a slot to retain it. In summary 
the slots would be sold to the airline prepared to pay the most for them. 
The UK was not the only European country facing slot problems. In 1993 the 
European Commission proposed a new regulation, (EEC No. 95/93), to introduce a set 
2lSource: Hulet, J, et al. (1991) Study on Airport Slot Allocation - Final Report. UK Department of Transport 
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of common rules on slot allocation. This followed previous regulation on the IATA 
procedures to exempt them from articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Details of 
the proposal are given in appendix 4.12. Variations from the IATA system include 
the introduction of slot exchange between airlines, the use it or lose its rule, and the 
generation of a slot pool for unused slots, although grandfather rights remain. In 
terms of regional airline operations, the ability to protect certain routes is good, 
although it depends on the political stance of member countries. 
This EU proposal is currently under review by all interested parties, with a final 
decision on the regulation planned for I July 1997. 'Me UK CAA presented it's views 
on the proposal in CAP 644, Slot Allocation: A proposal for Europe's Airports. The 
report reviews the effectiveness of the new regulation at Heathrow and Gatwick, and 
proposes modifications to the EU regulation following this experience. The CAA 
argued that the objective of facilitating competition and encouraging new entrants had 
not been successful, with only five out of fourteen new entrants at Heathrow and only 
two of those being on intra-EU routes. New slots generated were being used to 
increase frequency on existing routes rather than introducing new ones. The figures 
for Gatwick were slightly better, with four new entrants starting up, three on intra-EU 
routes. The proposed regulation is criticised in its lack of guidance over how to 
distribute the slots from the slot pool. They protest that to provide effective 
competition on key European routes, three or four daily frequencies are required, 
usually beyond the scope of a financially strapped new entrant. They also argue that 
the airlines best able to finance effective competition to the major airlines, for 
example in the UK: British Midland at Heathrow; and City Flyer Express and Jersey 
European at Gatwick, are not eligible for new entrant status. 
Following these criticisms, the CAA proposes that slot trading for money should be 
allowed, so long as the transactions are made public knowledge. Objectives of the 
regulation should be to further the interests of the users, maximise the use of slots, 
encourage the use of larger aircraft, and promote new entry and route competition, 
although it is recognised that the goals of these objectives are not all consistent with 
each other. In terms of slot allocation, the CAA, propose that allocation to routes 
should be based on route density, with preference to the denser rather than lighter 
ones. Slot allocation to airlines must be unbiased with pool slots going to airlines 
offering a frequency sufficient to compete effectively with the incumbents, or flag 
carriers. Subjective decisions by the coordinator should be avoided by increased 
operating guidelines, and 'paper airlines', or those not properly in existence at the 
time the slots are allocated, should only be granted slots if they have passed defined, 
'milestones', such as achievement of an air operators certificate. Regarding airline 
alliances, the CAA suggest that new entrant airlines gaining slots under their own 
name at the slot conference, should return these to the slot pool when they develop 
code sharing agreements or shared flight numbers with an incumbent carrier. Finally, 
regarding the 'use it or lose it', rule, any airline not actually serving a route for a year 
would not only be forced to surrender their slots but disqualified for three years from 
obtaining pool slots at that airport. 
Although this response is British biased, it does represent a well' respected voice in 
European regulation. For regional airlines it also highlights areas of concern for their 
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future. The CAA, in their arguments, do not support the -protection of smaller 
regional routes and would actively discriminate against them. The ability for regional 
airlines to enter the slot constrained airport as a new entrant would also be reduced if 
the CAA implemented its policy of giving preference of pooled slots to larger 
competing carriers. Finally, if slot trading were legalised and permitted without 
restriction, slots would go to the airlines prepared to pay the most money for them. 
This may well penalise the regional carriers because, although they may value a slot 
very highly, they may not have sufficient financial resources to meet the price, 
whereas a major airline is less likely to face this problem. 
Further comments to the EU regulations from the airlines was obtained by Ligi, 
(1995) who received questionnaire responses from 101 European airlines and 28 
others. Results of the questionnaire showed that although virtually all airlines 
supported the concept of grandfather rights, most felt the definition of new entrant 
needed refinement, although how was not commonly agreed. Most airlines did not 
want to see an increase in the percentage of pooled slots going to new entrants, or an 
increase in the 80% use it or lose it rule either. Generally, they were satisfied with the 
transparency and neutrality of European airport coordinators, although they all felt 
regulation should be added to prevent an airline abusing it's dominant position. 
Dominant being defined as an airline holding 40% or more of an airports total slots. 
Finally, when asked to consider who should own the slots, all agreed it should be the 
airlines. 
This represents the current situation regarding slot allocation within Europe. As has 
been shown, this issue is more directly debated between the airlines and regulators, 
but it is the airport that is left at the front line to either expand capacity or mediate 
between these parties to solve the problems. The implications to the regional airlines 
have been mentioned, especially the potential problem of equitable slot trading. The- 
issue of slot pricing was seen by most airlines as a bad idea. Future developments 
considered by the Toronto Consumer Policy Institute include slot lease with 
grandfather rights, or an airline condominium, where airlines run the airside facilities 
at an airport. Dispossession has also been considered, whereby carriers have to 
relinquish 10% of their grandfather slots each year for the slot pool. This would 
benefit the smaller carriers in their competition with the incumbents, although only 
I I% of these carriers supported the concept in Ligi's questionnaire. 
In summary we can see that airport slots can quite severely restrict free airline access 
to an airport. This thesis aims to demonstrate that by employing special regional 
aircraft procedures, regional airlines can expand the potential capacity of an airports 
runway. This in turn should help alleviate some of the misery inflicted by slot 
allocation 
Geographic Limitations 
The discussion on slot allocation could be avoided if airports were allowed to expand 
facilities in line with demand. Unfortunately this is rarely possible for a variety of 
reasons. Physical availability of space has become an ever increasing factor in this 
reasoning. Population densities can be used as an indicator of the likely effect, of 
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airport expansion on the surrounding population. The United States has a population 
density of 26 people per square kilometer, whilst European and Asian countries have 
densities of at least 50. Specific European countries, where expansion would be 
difficult, are the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and the UK which all have densities 
over 200.22 In addition to population density, airports also suffer from being centres 
of economic attraction due to their ease of access. This in turn leads to business, 
commercial and residential developments close to the airport, which will further limit 
its expansion options. In many cases airports will purchase land surrounding them if 
it is available in order to prevent some of the problems associated with airport 
expansion. In Europe the only airports that seem to have adequate spare land for 
expansion are the new green field airports, such as Paris Charles de Gaulle, Munich 2, 
and Amsterdam Schiphol, although all face problems gaining planning permission to 
change existing land use into taxiways or runways. This permission for changes in 
land use into taxiways or runways will also be much harder if existing land use is 
residential or high value commercial land, which is more likely in high population 
density areas, than if it is agricultural or waste land. Taking th e above reasoning into 
account, the ability to expand airports in Europe is lower than the United States. It 
will also make changes to arrival and departure routes harder over high population. 
density areas due to increased noise disturbance. 
Environmental Restrictions 
Environmental restrictions on airports are very significant. The issue in Europe is 
more significant than other regions the Airports Council International, (ACI), argues, 
with increased exposure of the population to aviation waste products, such as noise 
and air pollution, due to the high population densities, and passengers' preference for 
airports closest to centres of population. A report by ACI in 199523 points out that 
there tends to be a correlation between an increase in noise complaints and protests 
associated with increasing air traffic and standard of living. 
The current impact of environmental regulations on European airports was 
summarised in the 1995 ACI Environmental Handbook. The purpose of the report 
was to ensure that future growth was not constrained by environmental issues, and 
that environmental capacity was not reached before infrastructure capacity. The 
investment made in environmental issues at airports was already significant ACI 
argued, with 20 out of 104 airports in the region having specific environmental 
departments, 36 had noise monitoring systems, of which 86% were used for 
enforcement of noise limits or zones. In terms of land use planning around the 
airport, only 55% of those questioned had any say in the planning process, which may 
well cause future problems as available land in the vacinity of the airport is used for 
industrial or residential purposes, limiting airport expansion options. Noise optimised 
flight routes were used at 75% of the airports questioned, with 50% also applying the 
noise preferential runway scheme. In an attempt to gain recompense for all the 
environmental costs the airport faces, 29% of European airports now have a noise 
22 Source: Readers Digest (1989) Atlas of the World 
23ACI (1995) Environmental Handbook. ACT Europe 
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charge for aircraft which vary in absolute cost. Of these, 17 apply charges to propeller 
aircraft greater than 9,000kg, which includes most regional aircraft. 
The effect on regional aircraft will be limited to jet aircraft at present, although the 
likelihood of increased restrictions on turboprops at a later date cannot be ruled out, 
and the number of airports already charging regional aircraft for exceeding noise 
limits is proof of this theory. From an airport point of view the increase in 
environmental restrictions is worth the expense, if it satisfies the local population, and 
facilitates future land acquisition. Airlines on the other hand will be financially 
disadvantaged by the measures, particularly if different standards are made for 
separate world regions. 
This issue has been presented as a limiting factor to airport expansion, and 
consequentially an artificial cap on capacity. If environmental restrictions increase in 
the future, as they are forecast to do, the capacity restriction will increase. Assuming 
airlines still demand to use key airports, this will lead to greater congestion and 
pollution, so destroying the purpose of the restrictions, (55,560 tonnes of fuel burnt by 
British Airways aircraft airborne holding at Heathrow and Gatwick during 1994-95"). 
European Liberalisation 
With the fundamentals of liberalisation defined in chapter two, it is the intention here 
to outline the results of the liberalisation process as they relate to the impact on the 
current airport operating environment. Doganis, (1993) provided a good review of the 
changes since liberalisation began in his inaugural lecture to Cranfield University. 
Put simply, the anticipated effects of a rapidly increasing airline demand for slots, due 
to increased new entrant start-up and increased competition, has not occurred. This 
has been put down to both the 1991 recession and the significant barriers to entry for 
new start ups or smaller airlines, which include lack of sufficient airport 
infrastructure. By far the largest trend since liberalisation has been the growth of 
airline alliances or marketing agreements between the major European carriers and the 
smaller regional airlines. British Airways has led the way with agreements involving 
City Flyer Express, Brymon Airways, Maersk Air, Manx Airlines, and Loganair in the 
UK, and Deutsche BA and TAT in Europe. This has enabled BA to provide more 
frequencies and destinations in its route network, as well as provide more feed traffic 
for its longer haul services from Heathrow and Gatwick. It also now means that BA 
dominates its domestic market with 63% of the total market share by RPK's. ` More 
importantly however, it has allowed BA to operate these services at a much reduced 
cost than would have been possible using its own aircraft, due to its higher operating 
costs. Similar agreements stand with KLM, Alitalia, Air UK, Braathens Safe and 
Eurowings, and Lufthansa and British Midland. 
The results of liberalisation then, rather than leading to expanded growth have led to 
increased market concentration for European airlines, specialising in their own niche 
markets, with agreements with other airlines to feed traffic for their services. No 
24British Airways (1995) 1995 Annual Environmental Report. British Airways. 
25 Nat West Securities (1995) Strategic Assessment - British Airways Further to Fly. 
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major new entrant has emerged since liberalisation to compete with the existing 
carriers, due to the steep barriers to entry, especially due to the marketing and 
purchasing power of the current major carriers, which allow them to achieve lower 
operating costs than the new entrant. However, the emergence of new low cost 
operators are just beginning to be seen in the UK, with the growth of Easy Jet, 
Ryanair and Debonair. These are all built on the philosophy developed by Southwest 
Airlines in the US as a low fare, 'no frills', operation, providing passengers with point 
to point flights, avoiding the hassles associated with transiting through one of the. 
major airlines hub airports. 
This stagnation then since liberalisation, and the increased ties between airlines has 
prevented the huge growth expected in aircraft movements, and allowed the European 
airports a breathing space to improve their existing infrastructure, which they have 
been doing, albeit slowly. 
Future growth due to liberalisation is expected to grow rapidly, following the 
emergence of the airlines from the recession, increased new entrants and total 
domestic deregulation in January 1997. It is then that the plans of the airports during 
the last few years will be tested, and the true results of European liberalisation are 
discovered. 
Pofitical Interference 
The best example of this problem is the UK government's inability to make a decision 
regarding the construction of a new runway in the South East of England. In 1985 a 
government policy paper indicated that serious problems would occur by 1995 if 
capacity in the London area failed to grow in line with demand. The government 
decided that more information would be required before a decision could be made. 
The UK CAA suggested improvement to the existing runway operation to increase 
capacity. This idea was not developed in CAP 570 however, which presented a 
comprehensive examination of the UK's traffic distribution, future airspace and 
airport capacity prospects. CAP 570 stressed the importance of an early decision on 
the location of the new runway to avoid unnecessary congestion. Instead of making a 
decision though, the government set up a working committee called RUCATSE, 
(Runway Capacity in the South East). They examined the social and economic 
impacts of the new runway sites proposed in CAP 570, and concluded that to 
construct a new runway at the commercially preferred airports of Heathrow and 
Gatwick would be too costly. If Luton and Stansted were developed further, this 
decision on a new runway could be postponed a further three years. 
This is what occurred and, in 1992, this left the UK CAA no choice but to issue CAP 
615, which was a consultative report called 'Access to Congested Airports for 
Regional Services'. The report concluded that the CAA were not in a position to 
assist in maintaining regional services at congested airports, unless authorised to do so 
by the government. Obviously, this represented the first attempt to control further 
growth at major UK airports to prevent excessive congestion developing. In January 
1995 Brian Mawhinney, the then government Transport Secretary, announced that, 
following consideration of the RUCATSE report, neither of the Heathrow or Gatwick 
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runway options would be possible, although further work should be carried out on to 
assess the feasibility of a close parallel runway at Gatwick, given the advancements in 
ATC knowledge. In over ten years then, the government have still not made a 
decision regarding a new runway for London. This indecisiveness may well cost 
London its position as the international transfer capital of the world to either 
Amsterdam or Paris, not to mention cause airlines operating from Heathrow and 
Gatwick increased delays, costs and restrictions, and loss of revenue for the airports. 
Summary 
This concludes the discussion of the current status of European airports. The 
discussion has been comprehensive due to the author's intention to prove to the reader 
that firstly, congestion at European airports is a significant problem which is likely to 
get worse in the future. Secondly, due to the many operating restraints at the airports, 
the scope for major infrastructure improvements at existing airports are very limited. 
Both points support the need for application, where feasible, of low-cost, low impact 
changes to existing operating procedures. The author will demonstrate in the 
following two chapters that special regional aircraft procedures offer the low cost 
solution required to reduce present and future airport congestion. 
Before moving on it is necessary to discuss the current European ATC situation due to 
the direct interaction it has on airport capacity. 
4.4: European Airspace 
Problems with lack of capacity in European airspace were recognised in the summer 
of 1987, following excessive delays due to ATC strikes throughout Europe. 
Controllers argued that they were being put under too much pressure by being forced 
to accommodate volumes of air traffic movements far in excess of the design 
specifications of their systems, as well as attempting to coordinate traffic within 
Europe with incompatible ATC equipment between separate countries. Lange, 
(1989), calculated that ATC inefficiency in 1988 cost the airlines and users over 
US$5bn. The breakdown of this cost is given in table 4.5. It is the purpose of this 
section to examine what measures have been undertaken since that time to ease 
airspace congestion and reduce controller workload. 
4.4.1: Background 
Attempts to co-ordinate ATC in Europe go back to 1960 with the setting up of 
Eurocontrol. The aim was based on a semi-open sky policy, following the US system, 
and wanted to establish total control of all ATC facilities and operations in the upper 
airspace of member states. National sovereignty fears have largely prevented this idea 
becoming reality, however Eurocontrol has been involved in many other research 
projects, in particular EATCHIP and flow management. 
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The Cost of ATC Inefficiency 
Cost Element (in US$ million) User Airline Other Total 
Delay 540 970 - 1500 
Inefficient Routing 510 1270 1800 
Non-Optimal Flight Profiles 650 650 
Lower ATC Productivity 600 600 
Macroeconomic cost to European 400 400 
Community 
TOTAL 1050 2890 1000 5000 
Source: Lange, (1989) The Crisis of European Air Traffic Control: Costs and 
Solutions 
TABLE 4.5 
With the horrendous delay problems in 1987, the European members decided that 
action must be taken to improve existing ATC service. In April 1990 transport 
ministers representing 23 ECAC countries launched an, 'ECAC Strategy for the 
1990's', for ATC in Europe. The aim of the strategy was to ensure that the en-route 
ATC airspace would be able to cope with the forecast increase in air traffic, whilst 
maintaining a high level of safety. As a result of the strategy the European Air Traffic 
Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme, (EATCHIP), was established, 
which would be funded and controlled by Eurocontrol from Brussels. The goals were 
to harmonise some 51 air traffic control centres which used 31 different computing 
systems, introduce a standard en-route radar separation of 5mn, develop closer 
civil/military coordination of airspace use, and promote research into airspace 
congestion alleviation. 
The current four phase EATCHIP programme plans to create the future European Air 
Traffic Management System, (EATMS) by 2000. This envisages standardisation of 
all ATC centres with automatic data exchange and full exploitation of current and 
ftiture aircraft navigation and communication systems, such as RNAV and datalink. 
In addition to the launch of EATCHIP in the ECAC Strategy for the 1990's, they also 
appreciated that the en-route system only represented part of the total ATC system. 
With this in mind, the Airport and Air Traffic Systems Interface, (APATSI), project 
was launched. Detailed discussion of the work of this group will be presented after 
examination of European delay statistics. 
4.4.2: European Delay Statistics 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the IATA European ATS delay statistics for the last six 
years, given by 16 of IATA's member airlines. The delay figures are calculated from 
delay codes used by the airlines attributed to air traffic services and ATC/Ground 
Movement Control, with the delay only being reported if it is greater than four 
minutes. Figure 4.12 shows two interesting patterns, firstly, that the magnitude of the 
annual trend of monthly average delays per delayed flight has decreased over the time 
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period. Secondly, the monthly variability in the figures has also fallen demonstrating 
increased consistency in delays. 
Figure 4.13 shows the yearly trend of monthly average delay per movement. It shows 
that during 1993-1996 the average delay per movement has increased for each 
comparative month. This indicates that the peak airspace delays have been reduced 
by spreading the delays across the board, which was the aim of ATC flow 
management. In this case then it appears that efforts at delay reduction have been 
successful, especially when compared to the early 1990's where delay figures were 
substantially greater. 
It is now time to examine specific ATC projects in operation in Europe and how they 
aim to reduce delays. The focus will be on TMA related projects due to their more 
direct bearing on the work of this thesis. 
4.4.3: Airspace Delay Alleviation Projects 
En-Route Projects 
Flow Managemcnt - This affects both en-route and TMA airspace. In the early 
1980's Eurocontrol was asked to create a central data bank to regulate data on air 
traffic demand for long term planning. At the same time 12 national flow 
management units, (FMU), were established to ensure optimum use was made of 
available airspace. Unfortunately due to the differing levels of ATC equipment and 
experience, each FMU had different capacity levels, and whilst traffic flowed 
reasonably within individual states, major bottlenecks were appearing at state FIR 
borders, with demand exceeding capacity. To overcome this, in the late 1980's the 12 
FMU's were reduced to five, namely London, Paris, Frankfurt, Rome and Madrid and 
the Central Flow Management Unit, (CFMU) was established to co-ordinate slot 
availability and allocation throughout Europe. Departure slots were issued to restrict 
departure times, if necessary, to ensure demand at critical points in the system did not 
exceed supply. 
The CFMU is now effectively the central data bank containing flight plan information 
from all airlines operating through Europe. The total investment cost of the CFMU 
was 75.6 million ECU between 1989 and 1993, with annual operating costs of about 
42 million ECU. 
Flexible Use of Airspace Concept, (FUA) - As part of the EATCHIP programme this 
hopes to remove the designation of airspace as either military or civil, creating a 
continuum which can be used flexibly on the basis of daily need. The first phase was 
introduced on 28 March 1996 with the progressive establishment of flexible airspace 
structures and procedures. Wide spread application of the FUA concept will take 
place following implementation of phase two from 26 February 1998. 
The concept works by generating new routes, based on RNAV capabilities using three 
levels of availability. Conditional route one's are new routes an airline can flight plan 
on a regular basis. Conditional route two's are daily available routes notified to 
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airlines which may be used on that day. Finally, conditional route three's are variable 
routes available to ATC for flight routing on a short term basis. 
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum, (RVSM) - Also part of EATCHIP, RVSM 
is planned to be implemented from October 2001. It envisages reducing vertical 
separation between flight levels 290 and 410 from 2000ft to 1000ft. This will 
dramatically increase upper airspace capacity, but potentially cost airlines 
significantly, as some aircraft will need airframes re-skinning around the static ports 
to meet altimeter accuracy standards. 
Area Navigation, (RNAV) - By the 29 January 1998 all aircraft operating within 
Europe should be capable of meeting the new basic RNAV, (BRNAV), requirements 
of a track keeping accuracy of +/- 5nm for 95% of the flight time. This makes use of 
the advancements in aircraft equipment technology and will enable reduced separation 
between routes freeing up valuable airspace, as well as being a pre-requisite for the 
previous two concepts of RVSM and FUA. Due to the advancement of aircraft 
RNAV systems, precision RNAV, (PRNAV) rules will be implemented in time, 
which will require aircraft to achieve a track keeping accuracy of +/- I nm. for 95% of 
the time. As with BRNAV, this should release valuable airspace and allow for the 
development of more direct routings from flight origin to destination. 
There are concerns among current European airlines that these specifications, whilst 
welcomed for existing RNAV equipped aircraft, will impose significant cost Penalties 
for older aircraft to be equipped with RNAV. 
European Air Traffic Management System, (EATMS) - This is the final phase of 
the EATCHIP programme and is based on the integration of the airborne and ground 
based components such as RNAV, datalink, satellite communication, and radar 
returns. It envisages standardisation of all the ATC centres with automatic data 
exchange by the year 2000. The requirement for this system was strongly lobbied for 
by IATA, AEA and ERA, with the joint publication of their wishes in a document 
entitled, 'The Need for a Single Air Traffic Management System in Europe'. In the 
document they outlined what they would expect from the system, stating that it should 
be safe, reliable, and flexible, capable of providing enough capacity to meet demand, 
whilst promoting optimum cost efficient flight profiles. Above all costs was the need 
for common standards and specifications for the ATM systems. In addition they 
argued that national government involvement should be limited to the broad policies 
only, leaving the day to day management to separate ATC management organisations. 
This concept will require significant investment in both ATC and aircraft 
infrastructure. Current areas of development include discussion of the free flight 
concept, where aircraft are free to fly any route they wish, so long as they meet 
navigation requirements. Linked to this is research into four dimensional control of 
aircraft using RNAV and vertical navigation, (VNAV), in addition to strict time 
control for aircraft to be overhead waypoints. The proposals plan to further improve 
traffic flow, with the basic concept that the more accurately ATC know the position of 
each aircraft, the greater can be the reduction in imposed vertical and horizontal 
separation, and the greater will be the increase in airspace capacity. Within these 
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proposals, important human factor issues need to be resolved, especially who will be 
responsible for accurate navigation and terrain clearance, what problems with the 
man-machine interface are likely to occur, and how these can be solved. Due to the 
problems outlined with these current proposals, it is unlikely that we will see 
significant use of them before the end of the century. 
The only en-route system that has really developed recently is the, 'Future Air 
Navigation System', (FANS), which has been developed for long range operations 
outside normal ATC radar coverage. It has significantly increased capacity on the 
Pacific routes and is now being assessed for implementation on the North Atlantic 
tracks. Implementation of FANS within European airspace is currently limited due to 
current inflexibility in the airspace system and relatively few properly equipped 
aircraft. 
TMA Projects 
All work in this area is now being coordinated by the APATSI project set up in 1992 
through ECAC. The -initial report on mature ATC procedures, commissioned to 
SH&E consultants and Cranfield University, in which the author was involved, was 
presented to the ECAC commission in August 1993. The report outlined two main 
objectives: 
1. To encourage member states of ECAC to consider implementation of 
certain ATC procedures which can improve capacity at airports and in 
surrounding airspace. 
2. To encourage ECAC states to apply certain existing procedures in a 
standardised, and therefore safer way. 
Under the first objective twelve mature procedures were outlined. In the report a 
mature procedures was described as: 
"A procedure which has been implemented in one or more states, and which has been 
evaluated by APA TSI and judged suitable for implementation at airports in Europe 
which meet the conditions associated with the procedure. " 
For each procedure the concept was described, followed by conditions of application. 
Present ICAO provisions and proposed additions were added next, along with 
possible candidate airports, concluding with current implementation and status of the 
procedure. The procedures were endorsed by the Director General Civil Aviation 
ECAC States in May 1994. 
Appendix 4.13 describes each of the procedures along with their applicability to 
European airports. Further information can be found by consulting the APATSI 
manual from the ECAC Airports Bureau. 
There are a number of points to make regarding this project. Firstly this project 
should be commended for its approach in attempting to harmonise TMA ATC 
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procedures and reduce operating delays. Looking at the twelve procedures discussed 
in the appendix it can be seen that the success of each greatly depends on the close co- 
operation of the airlines, the airport and ATC. This fact further complicates the ease 
in applying the procedure successfully, more so than in the en-route phase. 
Looking at the procedures from the point of the regional airline, use of special 
regional aircraft procedures are not covered and regional aircraft are only taken into 
account with the use of intersection departures, multiple line ups and HIRO. In June 
1994 though APATSI accepted an addition to the procedures called the 'Modified 
Departure Procedure for Propeller Driven Aircraft'. This accommodated the early. 
turn after take off procedure, which will be discussed fully in chapter five. 
The other major benefit of this APATSI project is the development of co-operation 
between the three separate parts of the aviation industry. This co-operation is now 
becoming crucial to the success of these procedures. 
Other Projects 
In addition to the APATSI project, there are three other TMA based projects which 
are concerning Europe. 
The ILS/MLS/GPS Debate - Due to FM radio interference it was realised in the late 
1960's that the instrument landing system, ILS, would be unable to maintain required 
levels of accuracy by the late 1990's. A plan adopted by ICAO in 1985 called for a 
transition from ILS to the new microwave landing system, MLS, by 1998. MLS, at 
that time, was the best replacement system. The microwave beam, which offered a 
vertical scan angle of 0.9* to 15" and a lateral sweep of 40" either side of the runway 
centreline, was initially marketed on allowing curved approaches to congested 
airports, allowing ATC controllers greater routing flexibility to avoid noise sensitive 
areas and improve traffic sequencing. Another advantage of MLS was that it was not 
fixed to a line of sight radio beam and was not affected by reflections from nearby 
obstacles. In short it offered the perfect solution to ILS in the 1980's. MLS was 
initially tested in the US at the New York airports. At this stage problems in 
accurately defining and executing the curved approaches with MLS were discovered 
and through trial it was discovered that if aircraft used their own curved approaches 
with MLS, although reducing ATC communication congestion, the efficiency of 
traffic sequencing for final approach reduced. Since that time straight in approaches 
have been focused on with the ATC controller using the radar to vector aircraft onto 
the MLS in the same way as with ILS. Current trials in Europe include Heathrow, 
Amsterdam, Munich, Paris CDG and Frankfurt. MLS is now proven to provide 
European operators with the CAT III approach capability they require. 
The problem with MLS is that it is currently being superseded by the global 
positioning system, (GPS). This is based on 24 US military satellites which can give 
pin point accuracy of any object anywhere on the Earth's surface. It entered the 
replacement landing system debate in the late 1980's. The system works by the 
triangulation of at least three satellite beams to obtain a position. The information is 
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passed from the satellites to a ground station for processing, returned to the satellite 
and then passed to the aircraft. For GPS use as a landing aid, a secondary ground 
station close to the airport is required to correct the signal for position errors, to 
provide adequate accuracy for landing. This is known as a differential GPS system, 
(DGPS). There are problems with the system, the major one being that the US 
satellites are currently controlled by the US Department of Defense, who degrade the 
accuracy of the information given to civil users and also have the power to turn the 
system off when they like. In addition to this is has been proven that the signal can be 
interrupted by anyone on the ground with a simple blocking device. Current GPS 
landing trials have been undertaken in the US. In April and June 1995 a series of 
DGPS CAT III trial were undertaken using a Wilcox GPS system. Preliminary results 
showed that 95% navigation sensor accuracy's of 0.9m lateral and 1.3m in the 
vertical. Total system error was 6.4m laterally and 3.7m vertically. The first DGPS 
trial in Europe was with Crossair using their Saab 2000's at Lugano, a short field 
runway in the Italian Alps. Commencement of the trial was delayed due to 
unintentional signal blocking in Italy. Use of the GPS approach for Crossair enables 
them to make a direct approach from Switzerland, instead of having to approach from 
the Milan TMA, considerably reducing the track distance. The trial is still in its early 
phase but, if a success, Crossair intend to equip all its aircraft with GPS for CAT II 
and III landings. 
Guidance on which landing system will be approved in the future was addressed at the 
1995 ICAO Special COWOPS meeting. Three issues were examined: 
1. The substantial improvement in ILS performance, not forecast. 
2. Failure of MLS to deliver all the benefits originally promised, in 
particular curved approaches. 
3. The rapid rate of development and almost universal availability of 
satellite navigation systems. 
The results of the meeting led to a modification of the transition plan from ILS. The 
following recommendations were made: 
1. Continuation of ILS operations where operationally feasible to the 
highest level of service which can be maintained. 
2. Implement MLS where operationally required. 
3. Encourage the use of MMR to maintain interoperability. 
4. Validate the use of GNSS for non-precision use and CAT I 
5. Develop and implement CAT II/III where possible. 
6. Redefine regional transition plans with the above in mind. 
Within Europe there was a strong urge, by the major airlines, for the implementation 
of MLS as this was the only system proven to provide existing CAT III operations. 
Transition will begin in 1998 with the major airports using the two systems for as 
long as ILS integrity can be maintained, to give operators time to modify aircraft to 
handle MLS signals. 
91 
In closing this section on future landing systems, other - landing aids, under 
development should be mentioned. There are three principle future systems. The first 
is increased use of the Head Up Display, (HUD), concept where an artificial runway 
symbol is presented to the pilot through the HUD. The perceived benefit of HUD's is 
that the pilot is looking out of the window so making the adjustment from instrument 
to visual references less dramatic than the current head down operation. Alaskan 
Airlines in the US has been using HUD's since 1989 to gain FAA decision heights 
and visibility credits. The first operational CAT IlIa landing of a HUD equipped 
Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet was performed by Tyrolean Airways at Graz in 
Austria on 10th October 1996. 
The Autonomous Precision Approach and Landing System, (APALS), has been 
developed by Lockheed Martin Marietta from a cold war precision bombing tool. 
They aimed to certify APALS as a CAT II landing system in early 1997 and CAT III 
later in 1997. APALS offers ILS performance without the need for ground radio aids. 
APALS works by comparing stored radar images of the terrain around an airport with 
that received by the aircraft's radar. Differences in position are indicated to the pilot 
through the flight director. Below 100ft accuracy's of +/- 1.5m are achieved. The 
first demonstration system was tested in September 1994. Lockheed Martin saw a 
large potential in Europe for APALS but unfortunately had to cancel the system in 
early 1997 due to lack of interest. 
Finally, there is the Transponder Landing System, (TLS), which offers a low cost, 
high tech landing based precision aid, originally developed for the general aviation 
market. The system can be installed at any airport and uses existing on board aircraft 
avionics to provide precision CAT I approaches. The system works by the ground 
based TLS interrogating the aircraft's transponder. When the aircraft replies, ground 
monitoring sensors measure the time delay and send that *information to a central 
processor. This then calculates the aircraft's position by comparing the time delays 
received by sensors located in separate locations. The system has yet to be fully 
trailed at a major commercial airport. 
ATC Approach Sequencing Aids - There have been a number of developments in 
the final approach sequencing radar's used by ATC in Europe. The idea is to help 
reduce controller workload in the final approach stages of the flight as well as help 
improve aircraft sequencing to optimise wake vortex separation restrictions and 
increase arrival capacity. Computers assess the pattern of traffic entering their area 
and compute estimated arrival times. This information is then used to plan optimum, 
conflict free approach sequences. Systems in use in Europe are Computer Orientated 
Metering Planning and Advisory System, (COMPAS) in Germany, MAESTRO in 
France, Zone of Convergence, (ZOC) with Eurocontrol and TCSDG in the UK. 
Principle operational problems are due to the computers inflexibility. This led 
initially to many controller overrides of the system. This is now improving as the 
system is developed. Future development envisages four dimensional traffic 
sequencing aids, where aircraft trajectories are controlled in time as well as position. 
A final sequencing aid is the ability to mirror approaching aircraft on converging 
arrival runways on each arrival track. This ability will permit use of converging 
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arrival runways in IFR conditions, not currently possible. " Issues over who becomes 
responsible for the flight and ability to override the system are also areas that need 
further evaluation. 
Precision Runway Monitors - This is a system developed by Allied Signal. It is 
designed to offer a high update tracking system for monitoring aircraft arrivals on 
closely spaced parallel runways. Alarms are made when an arrival deviates from the 
runway centreline towards the other parallel runway. Benefits of the system are given 
as its ability to permit increased use of close parallel operations in poor visibility, so 
increasing capacity and safety due to the higher system update than the standard 
surveillance radar. Precision approach monitoring equipment is now installed at 
London Heathrow and Gatwick. 
This concludes the discussion of current issues in European ATC. Predominantly the 
systems discussed provide more accurate information to the pilots and ATC 
controllers during IFR conditions. It is this improved information which could 
potentially help reduce aircraft radar separation minima and consequently increase 
airspace capacity. 
4.5 European Airlines 
Due to the nature of this work the focus of this section is to outline what current 
trends exist in European regional airlines and how they are responding to the 
challenges placed on them by the restrictions outlined in the previous two sections. 
An excellent review of European regional airlines was done by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in 1995 entitled, 'Regional Airlines in Europe - Strategies for 
Survival'. A summary of the main points from this report will make up most of this 
section. 
Figure 4.14 demonstrates that European regional airlines grew at a faster rate than all 
other airline markets between 1989 and 1993. Survival during the recession was due, 
the ERA argues, to investment in modem aircraft, exploitation of strong business 
markets, withdrawal of major carriers from regional routes due to restructuring, and 
greater response flexibility of the regional airlines to changes in the market. 
Due to the lack of state aids and ability to cross subsidise poor revenue generating 
routes, regional airlines have had to keep operating costs as low as possible. This has 
no been easy in the relatively expensive operating environment of Europe. Figure 
4.15 shows the difference, especially in user charges between Air UK, British 
Airways and the average ERA result. 
26 Source: Mundra, A. (1989) New Display aid for Controllers could improve Airport traffic Capacity ICAO 
Bulletin Sept. 1989 pg37-38 
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A. 1 
The last ten years has seen the regional airlines in Europe change their approach to 
their major airline rivals. Following the US example, code sharing and franchising 
with the major airlines have developed. Other strategies developed have been block 
booking of seats on each respective airline for the other, wet leasing of aircraft to the 
ma or airline, schedule co-ordination and equity stakes in the regional airline by the j 
ma or. The reason for these agreements reflect the ability of the regional airline to j 
operate on shorter sectors and more marginal routes at a lower cost than the major, 
due to its lower comparative operating costs. Perhaps the best example of franchising 
is British Airways. It began in July 1993 when City Flyer Express re-painted its fleet 
in BA colours. In the next twenty months BA signed up TAT in France, Deutsche BA 
in Germany and Logainair, Manx Airlines, Maersk UK, GB Airways and Brymon 
Aviation in the UK. The strong image of BA has enabled these regional airlines to 
strengthen their market share and improve revenue as they benefit from the economies 
of scale of their large partner. Additional benefits of the system are that the regional 
airline is left to make a lot of its own decisions, as agreed in the franchise contract. 
They also arc expected to pay a fee for the services and equipment provided by the 
major airline, although one may argue at a preferential rate. Significant problems lie 
in the 'what if the agreement is withdrawn' scenario. Other cases like this include 
Lufthansa's agreements with British Midland, SAS, Lauda, Lufthansa Cityline, Adria 
Airways, Air Dolomiti, Cimber Air, Contact Air, Eurowings, and Business Air. Air 
France has also developed the strategy with Air Inter, Air Littoral, Brit Air, Crossair, 
Eurowings and Tyrolean as has KLM with agreements involving Northwest Airlines, 
Alitalia, Transavia, Martinair, Braathens Safe, Eurowings, and Air UK. 
Consolidation among the regional airlines has been limited unlike their major 
partners. Regarding European regulation, regional airlines welcome the liberalisation 
process but have been frustrated by the limited impact of it due to the imperfections 
within the system such as state aid to the major carriers and exploitation of the process. 
by the major airlines using their monopoly position to influence the direction of 
change. As a consequence the ERA warmly welcomed the Comite des Sages report in 
January 1994. Entitled, 'Expanding Horizons', the report was tasked with reflecting 
on the future of aviation in Europe as an essential tool for economic and social 
development. The report urged development of common legislation throughout 
Europe, removal of operating restrictions discussed in the previous sections of this 
chapter and a common European approach to external factors such as US application 
for open skies policies in Europe. The report concluded that the key to future 
development of aviation in Europe lay in changing old habits, or at least recognising 
that old habits existed and that the removal of infrastructure constraints was the single 
most critical problem in Europe at that time. 
The report was passed to the EC for them to consider and legislate upon if they felt it 
necessary. As for the regional airlines it showed a strong commitment to maintain 
regional services and ensure fair play in the liberated European market. 
With these issue resolved in favour of the regional airlines they now had to turn to 
other pressing issues. The implementation of JAA regulations, mandated by the end 
of 1997, has led to regional airlines facing large restructuring and procedure 
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standardisation costs. They also face problems reaching common agreements 
regarding new JAR OPS legislation for new flight crew licensing and duty limitations. 
Two final areas of concern to the regionals now are fleet modifications and coping 
strategies for the present infrastructure limitations. With the growth in average 
regional aircraft size in Europe as demonstrated in figure 4.16, regional airlines are 
now reaching the stage of considering whether to stay with turboprops or make the 
change to jet for some routes. 
FIGURE 4.16 
Source: EIU (1995) Regional Airlines in Europe 
The decision is being brought forward with the development of new regional jets with 
50 seats, namely the Canadair Regional Jet and the Embraer 145. The latter offers jet 
performance at considerably lower costs than normally expected. Ile decision is 
made more complicated with the development of new turboprops such as the Saab 
2000 and Dornier 328, which offer higher cruising altitudes, enabling the aircraft to 
climb above the worst weather and fly faster, offering performance closer to the 
regional jets but at turboprop costs. Whichever the regional airlines choose, it will be 
sure to significantly alter the existing service levels offered, and with the longer 
possible route stages they may well approach the lower end of the majors route 
service. This may lead to increased franchising from the majors, or increased 
competition. 
The infrastructure problems pose the regional airline with a more difficult problem 
than new aircraft types. They realise they must invest in new equipment to alleviate 
the existing constraints, however, there will be limited if no financial reward for this 
investment. In 1994 the ERA gave a conference in Brussels to discuss the use of 
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RNAV operating procedures and their potential impact on infrastructure capacity. 
The conference reaffirmed the airlines commitment to exploiting new ways to tackle 
capacity constraints, as well as pushing for the need to introduce RNAV procedures in 
the TMA environment. where it could be used to allow regional aircraft to efficiently 
enter and exit the area using their performance advantages. In addition to RNAV the 
ERA are also concerned with the increasing mandatory requirement for new avionics 
equipment such as WAS and MMR's. 
To conclude this section it is clearly evident, that regional airlines in Europe are 
rapidly evolving, but feel greatly threatened by the old existing major carriers. 
Agreements by some regionals with the majors removes this insecurity but leads to 
new challenges. Due to the tight cost margins in the regionals they are vulnerable to 
enforced changes but at the same time they must change to remain competitive. In 
addition this requires the regional airline to maintain access to the congested hub 
airport to deliver the feed traffic to the major airline. How the regional airlines cope 
with this change over the next few years as liberalisation stabilises in Europe will 
truly determine their role in the future. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has covered a wide range of topics but has presented the reader with a 
clear assessment of the current issues facing aviation operations in Europe and how 
these are likely to change in the future. Many of the problems with airport and 
airspace capacity have been discussed along with new ways in which the industry is 
reacting to them and attempting to find solutions. In addition to outlining the 
problems and their proposed solutions this chapter has also attempted to demonstrate 
the significant role that government and European regulation is placing on the system, 
both in a positive and negative light. 
This chapter completes the broad introduction to this thesis, and it is now time to look 
in depth at the regional aircraft special procedures proposed which offer a way around 
some of the infrastructure problems discussed here, for the regional airlines. 
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CHAPTER 5: Solutions to Airport Congestion for 
Regional Aircraft. 
5.1: Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to outline possible solutions available to reduce airport 
congestion using regional aircraft. In each case the theories will be put forward along 
with historical, current and potential applications at European airports. 
5.2: Separate Approach and Landing System, (SALS) 
SALS is a more general term for any special arrival routing, i. e. not along a pre 
defined STAR, into a congested airport. SALS utilises a number of the performance 
advantageous of the regional aircraft over the jets, identified in chapter three, namely 
better field performance, reduced turn radii, greater speed flexibility, faster engine 
response, smaller noise footprints and a steep approach capability. These factors 
allow initial high speed approaches followed by rapid descent and speed reduction 
with tight turns to line up with a short or stub runway. A 3D area navigation system is 
also required to provide accurate track positioning between arbitrary waypoints once. 
off the standard arrival. This was required for two reasons. Firstly, the routing would 
be close to conventional arrival routes requiring precision navigation to stop path 
confliction and, secondly, as the new routes would expose new built up areas to noise, 
tightly restricted flight paths were compulsory. The SALS routing aims to segregate 
the regional aircraft from the jets and bring them in on a separate or stub runway, 
ensuring that they stop short of a primary runway intersection. By accomplishing this, 
improvements in ATC approach flow management can be made enabling the 
controller to reduce wake vortex separation. Also improvements could be made in 
controller workload if the track keeping ability of the regional aircraft is proven to be 
high, with the use of area navigation equipment. 
SALS was first introduced in the United States in 1968 with a combined trial by 
McDonnell Douglas and Eastern Airlines. ' A Douglas 188 aircraft was used fitted 
with a Decca 3D Area Navigation System. Over 160 CAT I approaches to Boston, La 
Guardia and Washington National were carried out. Following these demonstrations, 
it was not until 1977 that Ransom Airlines, later to become Pan Am Express, then 
TWA Express and now USAir Express, took up the concept on a commercial basis at 
Washington National. Ransom turned to the idea following experience of excessive 
operating delays there. Together with Bill Hubbard, National's ATC tower chief, 
Ransome developed the discrete approach routing using the de Havilland Dash 7 
shown in figure 5.1. Each section of the route was defined by RNAV waypoints using 
vertical navigation, (VNAV), as well to control the descent profile. A DAC-7000 3D 
I Source: Williamson, K. (1989) Right of Way - Commuter World Oct-Nov 1988 pg 18-22 
de Havilland (1979) Hub Airport Access - An Air Traffic Alternative 
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FIGURE 5.1 
Source: Williamson, K. (1989) Right of Way Commuter World, Oct-Nov 1989 
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RNAV, coupled to a Sperry SPZ-700 automatic flight control system was used. The 
route was displayed to the pilot on a RCA Primus 400 digital colour radar screen. 
Deviations 
from course were displayed on the primary flight display flight director in the same 
fashion as with an ILS. Basically, the routing gave Ransome access to runway 33 at 
National, when the jets were using runway 36 and runway 21 when runway 18 was 
prevailing. The routing incorporated a steep final approach and tight turns to ensure 
the aircraft maintaining a safe flight profile. This was important in expanding 
capacity, as it removed the need for ATC to create gaps in the jet arrivals for the. 
regional aircraft, due to wake vortex and aircraft approach speed variations. The 
result was a creation of extra possible jet movements along the conventional routing, 
in addition to the regional aircraft movements on the SALS route. 
The initial missed approach point, (MAP), for the SALS route was set at the end of 
the downwind leg to the stub of runway 33. Operating limits were established at a 
1000ft cloud ceiling and three nautical mile visibility. These were later reduced to a 
MAP along the final approach path to runway 33, with a ceiling of 200ft and two 
nautical mile visibility. Without visual contact at the MAP, an immediate climbing 
turn to the right was mandated. This prevented any interference with missed 
approaches from runway 36. Special balked landing procedures were also created for 
runways 33 and 21 at National, specifically for the Dash 7. Using this procedure 
Ransome achieved over a 90% completion rate on runway 33. 
In 1984 Ransome presented results that demonstrated it was saving 15,000 gallons of 
fuel or 16% each month. It was estimated a saving of approximately 10% of block 
fuel per flight occurred. The route also lead to considerable time savings, due to 
reduced routing and reduced holding time. Benefits were also derived for the airport 
as the average hourly movement rate could be increased by one or two movements an 
hour. 
The success of this route, which was operational for over ten years, was also 
attributable to the enthusiastic approach it received from ATC at National. Due to the 
ability of ATC to achieve a more homogeneous traffic mix and a reduced need for 
radio communication required by the SALS route, not only controller workload was 
reduced, but airport capacity was dramatically increased. 
Due to the success of the Washington National routing and the rise of Ransome as 
part of Pan Am Express, a SALS procedure was drawn up for New York JFK. ' 
Ransome proposed to the FAA controllers an arrival procedure for runway 4L, 
holding short of runway 31L. This would involve simultaneous operations on 
intersecting runways, which was not previously available for this runway 
configuration. The procedure was built on the experience of Washington National and 
offered Ransome a 3,1 00ft landing strip on runway 4L for either its Dash 7 or ATR 42 
services. As at National, the FAA and ATC tower chief at JFK were involved from 
2 Source: Anderson, D. (1993) TW Express to Fly curved MLS for Separate Access to New York's JFK - 
Aviation International News, pg 69-75 
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the onset. In May 1992 the then TWA Express developed another arrival at JFK for 
runway 13R. This arrival normally conflicted with operations off runway 04-22 at La 
Guardia airport. Due to the addition of a dual Universal UNS-111 flight management 
system with VOR/DME, MLS and GPS sensors, however, an RNAV arrival route 
was defined as shown in figure 5.2. With the MLS they had to define what was 
known as an 'arc to fix', which described a pure arc in space. This was achieved 
using the EMS and enabled them to carry out CAT II approaches using this 
procedure, with an RVR of 1200 ft. As before the missed approach procedure 
was a climbing right turn to avoid conflict with existing jet traffic off runway 04L. 
Use of this procedure led to a partial exemption to the high density rule covering JFK 
at the time, and generated eight new slots for Pan Am Express between 15.00 and 
19.00 each day. At the time the FAA and JFK airport indicated their desire to 
increase this number of slot exemptions following proof of additional stub runway 
usage. 
Unfortunately neither of these procedures is still in operation today. Stephen Farrow, 
Vice President, Flight Operations, Piedmont Airlines told the author that the 
procedures had stopped due to a change in the FAA performance regulations, now 
demanding that the landing aircraft must complete the landing role in 6/10 of the 
landing distance available, a change from Dash 7 to Dash 8 aircraft, and increased 
problems with apparent noise sensitivity for the airports in question. 
It was not until 1989 that SALS was discussed in Europe. The ERA presented a paper 
outlining its possible implementation at Frankfurt airport. ' The full synopsis of this 
paper will be discussed later in this chapter. After the paper, Crossair began work on 
a separate STOL approach to runway 28 at Zurich airport. The work followed 
experience of significant inbound delays for runways 14 and 16. The procedure they 
proposed aimed to reduce the required aircraft separation both in trail and between 
runways. This would reduce the impact of wake vortex separations and runway 
occupancy times. 
The new routing was proposed for the Saab 340 and Dash 7 and 8 aircraft which, in 
collaboration with ATC, brought the aircraft over the Trasadingen VOR at FL065 
with a direct route to Zurich East VOR, (ZUE), passing above the standard arrival 
tracks for runways 14 and 10 A speed of 160kts is maintained during this stage. At 
ZUE, with the aircraft level at 6000ft, a turn onto a magnetic heading of 178* is made 
to intercept the 280 radial from the Zurich Kloten VOR located at the airport. During 
this base leg the speed is further reduced to 140kts and the flaps lowered to 15". The 
altitude is maintained at 6000ft. At 7.9nm from ZUE to final turn is made to intercept 
the 280 radial. Once the turn is complete the flaps are increased to 201 and the 
undercarriage lowered. A 6* glidepath is then followed to 2330ft. Speed is reduced 
to 120kts as the flaps are further lowered to 30". This gives an initial rate of descent 
of 1490ft per minute, which decreases to 1277ft per minute at 120kts. The 
requirement for the steep approach was not due to obstacle clearance, but to three 
3 Source: Mihlan, J; Williamson, K. (1989) Methods to Increase Airport Capacity - Frankfurt - ERA 
4 Source: Crossair Promotional Video (1994) STOL VOR/DME Approach Runway 28 - Zurich 
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villages located under the approach path. The measure was for noise abatement 
reasons only. Once at 2330R the rate of descent is reduced to give a 3" glidepath, and 
at 2nm out from the airport the ATC tower is called for landing clearance. Landing 
speed is 109kts with a required landing distance of 500m. The distance from the 28 
threshold to taxiway 'C', the last exit prior to crossing runway 16, is 900m, allowing a 
safe margin of error. The route is schematically presented in figure 5.3. 
In setting up this procedure, Crossair had to meet a number of conditions. Firstly the 
missed approach procedure had to be proven not to conflict with that of runway 14 or 
16. The procedure needed to be demonstrated to the authorities, and required a 
visibility of 5km or more horizontally and 500ft or more vertically with a dry runway 
and braking action described as good. In addition clear runway markings and 
appropriate buffer zones were also required. Even with these conditions, the 
procedure is restricted to 12 movements per day on runway 28, due to environmental 
restrictions and noise constraints imposed by the three villages the procedure 
overflies during the final approach. 
Although this was the first SALS application to be trialed and adopted in Europe, 
procedures had also been suggested at Heathrow with the use of runway 23, Gatwick 
with the use of runway 26L and Frankfurt using runway 25L. Unfortunately due to 
strong lobbying against these proposals, none were either trialed or implemented. 
The Manchester Special Arrival Procedure 
The only other attempt to develop this SALS concept was at Manchester airport with 
Business Air. In this case the author was directly involved with setting up and 
implementing an arrival trial for runway 24 at Manchester, whilst working for 
Business Air. 
During the summer of 1994 Business Air faced severe morning arrival and departure 
delays whilst operating through Manchester airport. Between 2 May and 31 July 
nearly 20% of all morning arrivals were delayed by 10 minutes. With the new 
interline agreement that Business Air had signed with Lufthansa to provide feed 
traffic for the German airline, these delays represented an unacceptable problem. 
Following analysis of Manchester traffic demand, it was clear that the delays were due 
to runway saturation as available runway capacity was exceeded by over 30% during. 
the peak morning hours. The problem for ATC was that to maintain safe runway 
operations, arrivals had to be held in the stack to ensure, firstly that the arrival flow 
did not exceed the handling capabilities of the controller, and secondly to help space 
arrivals later in the morning to allow sufficient time to release departures in between 
successive arrivals. In doing this, hourly runway movement rates were reaching 55 in 
the peak hours, 13 more than the published rate of 42. 
With this in mind, Business Air and the author approached Manchester airfield 
operations and ATC to discuss ways to overcome these problems. Four principle 
meetings were held to discuss the proposal of a separate arrival routing, during which 
time each of the parties involved gained an improved understanding of the others 
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problems and operating constraints. Initial approaches on the subject were not 
welcomed by ATC, who advised that the procedure would not be feasible during the 
morning hours. As ATC became aware of the speed flexibility of the Saab 340 and 
the rapid rates of descent possible, following jump seat trips, they became more 
willing to listen to the concept. The final route proposed is shown in figure 5.4. The 
principle aim of the route was to avoid the Bolin holding stack and, by using the speed 
and descent rate flexibility, integrate the Saab 340 into the outflow traffic from the 
stack at 6nm out from the runway threshold. A detailed description of the procedure 
can be found in appendix 5.1 which is a copy of the memo sent to John Evans, the 
ATC controller in charge of approving the routing. 
The proposed route was accepted with a few minor revisions and became effective on 
30th March 1995 as a trial during light traffic conditions. The approved route was a 
180 Radial from Pole Hill and aI Onm ILS intercept. 
The trial ran until November 1995 when it ceased following agreement from both 
Business Air and ATC. The reasons behind this will be returned to later. 
Potential SALS Application in Europe 
SALS works best at multiple runway airports. It does not necessarily require RNAV 
or FMS equipment, although it may require more accurate ATC approach radar and 
sequencing systems. The use of the steep approach is also optional depending on 
noise or obstacle restrictions. With these factors in mind SALS could be applied as 
shown in table 5.1. 
5.3: Steep Approach Procedure 
A steep approach is defined as any approach where the glideslope is greater than 3.51, 
which is the maximum for standard ILS transmitters. The principle of the steep 
approach was defined in chapter 3 and aims to modify the regional aircraft's power 
and drag ratio sufficient to allow descent rates of up to 1500ft per minute, Whilst 
maintaining an approach speed acceptable to ATC, i. e. 120-160kts. 
There are two primary reasons for conducting a steep approach: to enable straight in 
approaches to obstacle restricted airfields; and to reduce noise footprints on the 
approach due to the higher relative altitude along the approach path, compared to jets 
on a lower 3' approach path. 
Development of the use of the steep approach goes back to the late 1970's when the 
De Havilland Dash 7 was developed as a specific short field operator. At this time the 
steep approach concept was limited to obstacle limited airfields. As airport 
congestion rose during the 1980's, however operators began looking at introducing 
the concept to help them reduce arrival delays. Specific cases of application of the 
concept in the US are unfortunately not recorded anywhere, as they tended to be used 
as temporary trials or following specific agreements with local airports and ATC. 
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SALS Use'at European Airports 
Airport Runway Operation SALS Rwy Conditions 
SALS RWY Jet RWY Dist. (m) of Use 
Amsterdam 22/04 27/09 2014 Separate runway but app. 
Schiphol 24/06 and dept. sequencing 
required. 
Barcelona 25/07 20/02 2100 Arr/Dept on 07 O. K., 25 
requires co-ordination 
Brussels National 20/02 25R/07L 1450m Steep approach required 
25L/07R and co-ordinated missed 
approach. 
Copenhagen 30/12 22R/04L 1300m Needs co-ordination of 
Kastrup 22L/04R 3 0/12 with 22R/04L. 
Dublin 29/11 28/10 1356m Conflict with 16/3TIT 
34/16 operational. 
Dusseldorf 33/15 23/05 1630m Will need sequencing with 
23. 
Frankftut 25L/07R 25R/07L 2525m Requires Steep Approach 
18 
Hamburg 05/23 15/33 1800m Requires sequencing. 
15/33 05/23 2025m 
Helsinki Vantaa 04/22 15/33 1600m Requires sequencing if 
15/33 04/22 2200m operating on 15 and 22. 
London Heathrow 23 27R 1350m Requires steep approach 
Depts. and missed approach 
27L Arr. guidance. 
London Gatwick 26R 26L 1800m Requires steep approach 
08L 08R 1325m and missed approach 
guidance. 
Madrid Barajas 15/33 36/18 1350m 18/15 dept. co-ordination, 
33/36 arr. co-ordiantion. 
Marseille 32L/14R 32R/14L 1600m Requires steep approach 
and missed approach 
guidance. 
Paris Orly 20/02 25/07 1450m Requires co-ordination 
26/08 
Oslo Fornebu 19/01 ý24/06 650m Requires co-ordination 
Rome Fiumicino 34L/16R 34R/161, 1600m 34L independent arr., co- 
25/07 ordinated dept. 
Zurich 28 14 or 16 1375m As already specified. 
TABLE 5.1 
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The use of steep approach in Europe is currently limited to three airports, Zurich as 
already discussed, London City and Lugano. It is used at Lugano to permit direct 
arrivals from the north over the Alps, which would not otherwise be possible, due to 
the high terrain and obstacles surrounding the airfield. Crossair, who use the 
procedure, say it saves them considerable flight time by avoiding the need to enter 
Italian airspace and arrive to the south, as well as considerable fuel savings. 
Operations into London City STOLport began in the late 1980's following successful 
trial landings by Brymon Airways at the King George V Docks. Due to the 
many building and crane obstructions around the airport, a steep approach is required 
at 5.5". Aircraft types currently using this procedure at London City are Dash 7 and 8, 
Fokker 50, BAe 146 and Avro RJ's. Both the Fokker 70 and 100 have also completed 
landing trials there. 
Apart from these examples, the use of the concept at congested European airports has 
not been exploited. In 1989 the ERA proposed the use of the concept at Frankfurt'. 
The principle of the proposal was that by the use of a steep approach, the current 
restriction of independent arrivals to close parallel runway operations due to wake 
vortex drift constraints could be removed. Figure 5.5 demonstrates what the ERA 
proposed. The procedure uses the steep approach to keep the regional aircraft above 
the jets wake vortex on the other runway using the P ILS glidepath. The procedure 
outlined ensures the regional aircraft maintain I 000ft vertical separation from the jets 
throughout the whole manoeuvre, with the regional aircraft crossing the common 
threshold at 800ft and touching down 7905ft beyond the threshold of 25L and 8842ft 
from the threshold of 25R. This threshold displacement ensures that any possible 
effects of wake vortex from the jet runway are avoided. The ERA recommended with 
this procedure that the diagonal separation between the two runways could be 
reduced, although the exact limits would be determined by ATC radar accuracy, with 
benefits if a precision approach radar were used, and for missed approach procedures. 
Longitudinal separation could, the ERA argued, be reduced to 2nm in this case from 
3nm. Regarding the missed approach, due to the closeness of each aircraft, if a jet 
executed a missed approach, then the regional aircraft, being above, would also be 
forced to do so. Unfortunately this proposed procedure was never fully implemented. 
The conditions that must be met to carry out steep approaches are numerous. For the 
airline the aircraft will need to be fitted with a GPWS suppression device to avoid 
nuisance warnings, due to the increased rate of descent on final approach along with a 
strengthening of the undercarriage. Simulator training and proving flights are 
mandatory by the aviation authorities, revised minimum equipment lists are required,. 
and special runway markings, PAPI's and glidepath alterations are needed. " Using the 
procedure decision heights only permit CAT I operations, although benefits for 
published landing performance are possible as the revised screen height is 35ft instead 
of 50ft. 
5 Source: MihIan, J; Williamson, K. (1989) Methods to Increase Airport Capacity - Frankfurt - ERA 
6 See Appendix 3.4 
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In theory this procedure could be applied to any runway in Europe, single or multiple 
mode, where traffic level necessitates. 
5.4: Early Departure Turn 
This procedure is perhaps the simplest in both theory and implementation. The early 
turn envisages a turn at approximately 500ft after departure to remove the regional 
aircraft from the standard MNR and SID routing. The turn enables the ATC 
departure controller to release another departure behind the regional, sooner than 
would have been possible before due to wake vortex and speed card restrictions, 
(table 2.7). This procedure can help reduce departure delay and increase the hourly 
departure rate. Use of the procedure can also be beneficial for the regional airline if 
the turn reduces the total SID distance flown. This is especially true where there is a 
long initial departure track following runway heading to allow heavy jet aircraft to 
gain enough altitude before turning over more noise sensitive areas. 
Use of the procedure requires clear ATC instructions on which direction to turn after 
take off, and co-ordination between departure and area ATC to inform the latter that 
the next departure will be non-standard. 
Also this procedure can be extended to permit completely separate regional aircraft 
departures, although it is unlikely that these will be permitted without RNAV 
equipment. The advantage of these routes will be the same as SALS in that they will 
add to ATC departure route options, so removing some of the pressure on existing 
routes which may be operating at capacity during peak periods due to longitudinal and 
time separation requirements. 
Current use of the early turn at European airports is widespread. Manchester make 
significant use of the procedure to reduce departure delay, as does London Gatwick 
and Heathrow, where regional aircraft are turned at 500ft and then requested to 
parallel the existing SID track, reducing time separation limits placed on following jet 
aircraft. Paris CDG and Frankfurt use the procedure for the same reasons. Due to the 
success of this procedure it has now been incorporated into the APATSI manual. 
So far the early turn has only been considered using a single departure runway. 
Austrian Air Services, now part of Tyrolean Airways, in 1992-93 took this a step 
further and proposed early turns at 400ft and full RNAV SID's off runway 16/34 at 
Vienna airport. ' Fokker 50's with EFIS and FMS systems were used with the routes 
monitored by the airport's noise monitoring unit. Close co-operation between pilots, 
ATC and the local community ensured that the trials were a success. Use of this 
procedure reduced runway occupancy time for runway 16/34 as well as reducing the 
time required for co-ordinating traffic on the converging runway 29/11. The trial was 
postponed when Austrian Air Services and Tyrolean Airways merged. This type of 
approach is also currently used at Manchester for departures to the North via Pole Hill 
713eer, P. (1993) Report on the Test Run based on Specially Standardised Departure Routes for Turboprops using 
Area Navigation - Unpublished report to ERA Operations Committee 
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VOR. The early turn off runway 24 is followed by ATC radar vectors until north of 
Pole Hill. 
Application of the early turn procedure can be applied to any European runway where 
required, although the application of special SID's will depend on local noise 
regulations. 
5.5: Special Regional Aircraft Holding Stacks 
This procedure is a relatively new concept although it is beginning to be utilised by 
some ATC controllers in the UK. The basis of the idea is that current ATC stacks for 
inbound arrivals are located at quite a distance from the airport to avoid conflicting 
arriving and departing aircraft and reduce the noise impact of the airport. This idea, 
which has not yet been introduced even as a trial, looks at introducing unique holding 
stacks for regional aircraft closer to the airport than current stacks. The reason behind 
the concept is that at highly congested airports, where runway movement rates are 
commonly at their maximum, unless a regional aircraft is closely positioned to an 
airport, a small time slot generated due to departing aircraft missing their slot or 
arrivals executing a missed approach, will be lost. If the regional aircraft is close to 
the airport, ATC could feed it into the arrival track to make use of this unpredicted 
slot. 
Due to the nature of this concept it will be highly unpredictable and allowances must 
be made to provide standard arrival procedures when time gaps do not arise. Routings 
in and out of these new stacks will need careful construction not to'conflict with 
existing tracks and meet existing noise constraints. New ATC procedures would also 
need writing to help controllers make optimum use of the stacks. Finally, ATC 
principles of first come first served for arriving traffic will need re-assessment. 
In theory this procedure could be applied to any European airport where TMA 
airspace allows subject to demand. It is the intention to model this procedure with 
SIMMOD in an attempt to assess the likely impact on current operating delays. 
5.6: Use of Stub Runways 
The principles of this procedure have already been touched upon in the SALS 
discussion and relate to the use of existing runway surfaces at airports, which would 
not usually be used due to confliction with the prevailing runways in operation. 
Regional aircraft can make use of these runways in certain cases due to their short 
field performance. Within the concept it is expected that maximum use will be made 
of intersection departures, RETS and RATS, with the capacity gains they provide, 
outlined in the APATSI report. Use of the runways will be limited by many factors 
but especially flightpath confliction issues with the other runways, impact on noise 
sensitive areas under the approach and departure paths to the runway, ground taxi 
limits due to use of the new stub runway, location of new obstacles around the runway 
and ATC airspace integration problems with regional aircraft operating on this 
runway. 
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The procedures at Washington National and Zurich both demonstrate that these issues 
can be overcome by active participation of ATC, airlines, the airport and the local 
community. Further application will depend on how far technology can be developed 
in giving pilots and ATC controllers a precise picture in real time of aircraft location 
in relation to each other, the airport and restrictive obstacles. This may not be too far 
away with the development of DGPS and precision approach radar. Work done by 
Dr. Bernard Lister (1988) on dependent instrument approaches to converging runways 
demonstrated that simultaneous approaches could be made to converging runways in 
IFR conditions to a CAT I decision height. Tight controls were placed on missed 
approach tracks. Dr. Lister concluded that the capacity benefits of using this system 
would depend on: 
runway configuration, with runways intersecting close to the threshold 
of each being the worst; 
2 ability of ATC to precisely position aircraft on the approach path; 
3 pilot ability to precisely fly the required track in four dimensions. 
Work he carried out at many US airports demonstrated that capacity gains of 30-40% 
over existing levels were possible if the procedure was used to its optimum. Use of 
this type of operation by regional aircraft can be ftu-ther exploited by the use of steep 
approaches, early turns after take off, and tight turn radii to avoid any restrictive 
obstacles, which would preclude use of the runway in normal conditions. 
With the above in mind, application of this procedure in Europe will depend upon the 
ability of the airlines and airports to provide sufficient equipment, i. e. runway 
markings and aircraft performance figures, to allow ATC and pilots to achieve the 
accuracy and safety levels required to operate from the runway. Candidate airports 
include Amsterdam, Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Hamburg, Helsinki, 
Heathrow, Madrid, Paris Orly, Oslo and Zurich. It must be borne in mind however 
that the condition and current state of repair of the stub runway will significantly 
affect the associated cost of upgrading the facility. 
5.7: Short take off and Landing Runways 
This concept is now entering the expensive construction levels and considers the 
possible capacity gains that can be attained from constructing a STOL runway within 
the current airport boundary. The idea sounds quite dramatic, but the STOL runway 
could be constructed from old disused runways or taxiways, or other spare space 
which has limited value or use due to its location or physical shape. 
Obviously the concept would involve considerable design and construction 
challenges, not to mention airspace re-designs and possible new noise issues. Where 
an airport has a high percentage of regional aircraft operating within its the traffic 
pattern, and is forced to accommodate them on a single mixed mode runway 
operation, considerable capacity gains could be achieved by removing these regional 
aircraft from the existing traffic flows. This would be due to possible significant' 
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reductions in wake vortex and the departure separation requirements already 
discussed. 
In 1974 the Canadian government developed this idea in a new way. It funded a trial 
involving the construction and operation of two STOLports at Montreal and Ottawa! 
Each was equipped with MLS and served by initially Twin Otters and later Dash 7 
aircraft equipped with RNAV. The service could reduce commuting time between the 
two city centres by 15 to 30 minutes. Unfortunately, due to the many difficulties 
encountered during the trial and the huge investment costs, the project never made 
money and when the flight routing had to be extended following construction of the 
new Mirabel airport at Montreal, the service ceased. The government of the time did 
conclude however, that if the circumstances has been less severe the trial may well 
have been a success. 
Although use of this idea has not yet been exploited in Europe, application of the 
concept at some of the less site restricted European airports such as Paris CDG, 
Munich, Madrid and Rome Fiumicino would be feasible. The conditions of use 
would be the same as any new runway, and require full analysis of impact on existing 
operations and affect to the local community, even after the technical feasibility of 
whether aircraft could safely operate from the runway. In this case significant 
obstacle are likely to be airport and nearby buildings. As in the previous concept, use 
of the steep approach, early turn and tight turn radius could be used to overcome 
these. 
5.8: Reliever or Commuter Airports 
This is the last proposed solution to current airport congestion problems and envisages 
the removal of all regional aircraft traffic from the congested airport traffic flows to a 
nearby overflow airport capable of handling the smaller aircraft. By doing this it is 
the intention to be able to offer increased capacity at the major airport for the larger. 
aircraft. The solution, it is argued by its supporters, will increase passenger through 
put at the airport using fewer aircraft movements, so appeasing noise protesters. It is, 
however, the least favoured solution by the regional airlines as it immediately 
removes them from the hub airport, and significantly reduces their ability to provide 
effective feed traffic to the major airlines, due to the distance and journey time 
penalties that the separate airport enforces. This does appear to be the preferred 
option of regulatory bodies however, and moves have been made in Germany to 
provide a reliever airport for Dusseldorf. In the UK proposals for both Heathrow and 
Gatwick have been made. 
Neither of the scenarios proposed have yet been successfully implemented. CAP 570, 
(1990), examined the construction of a STOL runway at Heathrow, just to the north of 
the existing runways. The runway would operate separately from the existing airport 
with a separate manoeuvring area to avoid taxi congestion and runway crossing delays 
8 Plaignaud, J. (1974) An example of a City Centre/City Centre air link: The experimental STOL service of Air 
Transit Canada between Ottawa and Montreal 
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with 27R. Separate ATC tower and ground facilities would also be required. With 
the use of a 5.5* ILS glideslope, it was expected that all regional aircraft would be 
transferred from existing Heathrow traffic flows to this STOL airport. It was 
appreciated that ATC controller workload in the Heathrow sector would increase 
along with the regulated airspace around Heathrow. Northolt operations would also 
be affected. 
In 1993 considerable work was done to asses if Redhill airport, 3.5nm to the north of 
Gatwick, could act as a reliever airport. ' Redhill is currently a general aviation 
airfield situated in the gap in controller airspace between Heathrow and Gatwick. 
Proposed use of Redhill envisages segregated operation from Gatwick with separate 
traffic flows and ground facilities. To bring Redhill up to standard, a new VOR and 
ILS would be required, in addition to the runway being modified to exactly parallel 
Gatwick, (currently 4 degree difference), and the provision of aerodrome control. As 
with Heathrow the aim would be to remove all present regional aircraft from existing 
Gatwick traffic flows and move them to Redhill. Airspace modifications in terms of 
arrival stacks and existing SID and STAR tracks would also be required. 
The final attempt to make use of reliever airports hit the headlines in May 1996 when 
Dusseldorf airport banned all turboprop flights, irrespective of size, from operating 
from the airport. Instead they encouraged them to use the recently refurbished general 
aviation Monchengladbach airport, now majority owned by Dusseldorf airport and 
renamed Dusseldorf Express Airport. The move was quickly dammed by the ERA, 
Eurowings, Augsburg Airways and City Flyer Express, with the latter three airlines 
applying for an court injunction against the airport and seeking compensation. They 
argued that the 1200m reliever airport incurred a 50% payload penalty for the ATR 
72.10 Monchengladbach is in fact the first operational reliever airport in Europe. 
Application of reliever airports in Europe will be limited to those airports which have 
general aviation airfields close by, and where use of these airfields can technically be 
achieved, taking into account noise and obstacle limitations. Conditions of 
application include issues such as modification of SID's and STAR's, increased 
controlled airspace, restoration of existing airfield, upgrading of airfield navigation 
aids and ATC, and the necessary regulations to permit operation. Support of the 
potential users would also be advisable if possible. Finally it must be stated that this 
proposal represents the most expensive solution out of all those previously discussed, 
DM25 million was spent by Dusseldorf airport at Monchengladbach.. 
5.9: Summary 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to present the reader with the possible regional 
aircraft special procedures that may be used to alleviate current European airport 
congestion. In doing this it can be seen that they are quite varied requiring 
significantly different levels of investment from airports, ATC and airlines. It should 
9 Alan Stratford & Associates (1993) Apollo ATC Simulation Modelling Study - Draft Final Report 
10 Flight International (1996) Regionals will Challenge Dusseldorf ban in Court 1-7 May 1996, pg II 
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also be noted,, in, this summary, that at many airports a combination of special 
procedures are used to solve the problem. Alternative solutions such as reliever 
airports have also been discussed in order to present all the available options, 
concerning regional aircraft, that may be used to help reduce airport congestion. 
The purpose of the next chapter will be to define a methodology to evaluate these 
options with the results of that evaluation being presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: Evaluation Methodology. 
6.1: Introduction 
It is the intention of this chapter to define the methodology that will be used to 
effectively evaluate the theories presented in the preceding chapter. The evaluation 
process will be broken into two sections. The FAA airport and airspace simulator, 
SIMMOD, will be used first of all to model specific airport scenarios and traffic 
mixes that will test the proposals made in chapter five. Results from this work will 
then be combined with a cost benefit model to help assess the likely feasibility of the 
theory. The limitations of the methodology and possible solutions will be discussed 
throughout the relevant sections of the chapter. 
The testing of the theories was carried out at two principle airports, Manchester and 
Zurich. They were chosen for their prior implementation of some of the theories, and 
for representing two totally different runway configurations and operations. It is 
appreciated that the results from this approach will not be directly applicable to all 
airport types, but it is hoped that most of the implementation problems likely to be 
faced will be brought to light in these two case studies. 
6.2: Introducing SIMMOD 
History of Development 
SIMMOD, the airport and airspace simulation model, was developed from the original 
FAA airport/airspace delay model in 1978/79. An airfield, and fuel consumption 
model was added in 1980-82. Between 1987 and 1989 the model was used purely by 
the FAA before being released to the public sector during autumn 1989. It was 
marketed as a flexible and powerful tool capable of calculating travel time, delay and 
ffiel consumption. It simulates airfield and airspace traffic operations simultaneously, 
allowing the investigator to analyse, "what if' scenarios accurately, as well as more 
safely and cheaply than would be possible in real life. In conclusion it was expected 
to provide an improved decision making capability for airport planners by enabling 
examination of a variety of alternatives. 
Industry Usage 
SIMMOD is currently used at many major airports both in the US and Europe. It was 
extensively used at Manchester airport for assessing the effects of a second runway. 
Madrid Barajas is also using SIMMOD for the development of its third runway. 
Other European airports using SIMMOD are BAA airports in the UK, Frankfurt am 
Main, Rome, Milan Linate, Athens and ADP Paris airports. Airlines that have used 
SIMMOD include American Airlines, Northwest, British Airways, Qantas and 
Federal Express. ' 
I Data taken from 'The SIMMOD Flyer' - Information news for FAA SIMMOD Users 
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SIMMOD has also been used for researching future airport developments, such as the 
implication of using Redhill as a reliever airport for London Gatwick by Cranfield 
University', and examining new airspace structures and reliever airports for Frankfurt 
airport by DLR (1994). ' 
Recently there has been a move to consolidate this research from both industry and 
academia by the setting up of the European SIMMOD Users Group. 
SIMMOD then represents an industry wide accepted modelling tool, which also offers 
the author the flexibility required to effectively model the specific circumstances 
required to test the special procedures previously discussed. 
SIMMOD Operating Principle 
SIMMOD is basically an advanced queuing theory model and is classed as a 
stochastic simulation model using random variables to model random variations in 
phenomena encountered in the real world. This is accomplished using random linear 
variables based on user defined probability distributions. These probability 
distributions are applied to take off and landing runs to simulate pilot variation in 
performance for similar aircraft types. They are also used in the lateness distributions 
applied to aircraft entering the system. This randomness creates unique results each 
time the simulation is run, so to ensure viable figures are obtained, the simulation is 
run five times, with the combined average result being taken in the end. 
In addition to being stochastic SIMMOD is also a discrete event simulation model. 
This enables a system evolving over time to be simulated using a mathematical 
model, the state of which changes at discrete points in time. Each point in time is 
known as an event which is defined to be an instantaneous occurrence which changes 
the state variables. For example, every movement of an aircraft arriving and 
departing from a defined point, either on the ground, or in the airspace, is classed as 
an event. The simulation is also refereed to as event stepped as it moves from one 
event to another, bypassing an interval in which no events occur. The simulation 
cross checks each event running in chronological order to determine how it may affect 
current or subsequent events. The simulation ends once the last scheduled event is 
completed, or at a specific time defined by the operator. All these events function 
inside a user defined operating system which can be of any size or level of 
complexity. Obviously, the ability of the operator to accurately model the real life 
operating system will determine the validity of simulated results to reality. 
Defining the Operating Environment and its Limitations 
There are four main data files that are required to run a SIMMOD simulation: 
I Aircraft Data File 
2 Airspace Data File 
3 Ground Data File 
2 Alan Stratford & Associates (1993) Apollo ATC Simulation Modelling Study - Draft Final Report 
3 Platz, K.; Borkof, U. (1994) Optimising Air Traff ic Flows at Airports - In 'Advanced Technologies for Air 
Traffic Flow Management Winter, H.; and Nuber, II. G. (eds), pg 153-190 
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4 Events Data File 
An explanation of each of these can be found in appendix 6.1. These four data files 
are all written in SIMSCRIPT II, the computer processing language for SIMMOD. 
SIMMOD Logic 
Some of the logic regarding the landing and take off rolls has already been discussed 
in Appendix 6.1. The important logic relating to sequencing take offs and landings is 
known as the, 'interface logic', as it links the ground and airspace data. 
Arrivals require two pieces of information to carry out a landing. Firstly, the distance 
from the airport that departures on the same runway will be disallowed and secondly, 
a time for the aircraft to land, decelerate and clear the runway. Departures also 
require the same two pieces of information for a clear take off roll and ensure 
sufficient separation for wake vortex and radar requirements. 
This information is contained in the procedures section of the airspace data file. 
These procedures are often linked to others in the case of multiple, dependent runway 
operations or use of intersection departures. In addition the final approach links to 
parallel runways can be linked to allow either staggered or independent parallel 
approaches to be made. This is achieved by modifying the aircraft's approach speed 
and separation times. 
Throughout the research it was the procedures that proved the hardest part of the 
simulation to master as, unnecessary arrival blocking distances or take off and landing 
times would lead to unrealistic system delays. 
Simulation Results Validity 
As SIMMOD is a stochastic model, random variables are introduced into each 
simulation run or iteration, in an attempt to represent a realistic scenario instead of an 
ideal one. This random element needs to be taken into account when considering the 
validity of the simulation results and to achieve this a number of separate iterations 
need to be run to remove any one off results that may otherwise bias the results in the 
wrong direction. 
Due to the time available and the length of the later simulation scenarios, it was 
decided that five iterations would be used. This value was a compromise and would 
unavoidably still contain some variability, but at a level that would not dramatically 
change results if further iterations were run. The same number of iterations are also 
used by other SIMMOD users in their work. ' 
Allowances for the imperfections of the simulation system also need to be 
appreciated, although to remove these is not feasible nor the purpose of this thesis. 
The data validity is determined by all parts of the simulation model but is 
predominantly affected by the airspace speed vectoring, airborne holding strategies, 
4 Manchester Airport Plc. and Cranfield University Air Transport Consultancy also use 5 iterations for scenario 
modelling. 
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separation limits; en-route and final approach, take off and landing roll times and the 
poor ability of the simulation to think ahead and sequence traffic to prevent excessive 
separation distances. In this study we shall take the results given by SIMMOD at face 
value because as each simulation model is exposed to the same problem, by 
comparing gross results, the same errors can be ignored. Where the author feels that 
the SIMMOD simulation has been poor in representing reality, or where the results 
difference between two different simulations is very small, comments over the 
validity of the data will be made. 
Simulation Runs and Post Processing 
A considerable amount of time was also spent in correcting and re-running 
simulations that came up with error messages following runs. Most of these were 
related to inaccurate data entry, but were also required modification if the operating 
enviromnent, to prevent unrealistic operations taking place, such as simultaneous take 
offs and landings on the same runway, take offs before the preceding arrival had 
cleared the runway or vice versa. These usually involved modifying the procedures 
program in the airspace file, or restrictions on specific airspace links and nodes. 
Once the simulation was running correctly the reports were compiled and results 
derived. The author edited the data to pick out hourly variations in total, arrival and 
departure movement travel time, i. e. the time spent by the aircraft traveling through 
the system and the delay time, i. e. the extra time spent by the aircraft in the system 
due to congestion. In addition hourly arrival, departure and total runway movement 
rates were collated. 
With the operating methodology of SIMMOD now defined, it is time to look at the 
scenarios used in the research. 
6.3: SIMMOD Case Study Outline 
The first stage for each of the three airports used in this analysis was the construction 
of the airport ground and airspace lattice structure of nodes and links. Racal AERAD 
charts were used for this task, with the author calculating the latitude and longitude of 
each node to be entered into the simulation. This was then converted into co- 
ordinates of X and Y, in feet for the ground file, and nautical miles for the airspace 
file, from the point of origin, usually in the centre of the airfield. Once this process 
was complete the data was edited to ensure it would be acceptable to the SIMSCRIPT 
processing language. 
With the ground and airspace data entered the events data was inputted using an actual 
ATC movement log for events from Zurich, and planned summer schedules for 
Manchester and Gatwick. The aim in all cases was to give a typical busy day 
schedule. In the case of Manchester and Gatwick this was a Friday in the summer 
schedule when scheduled and charter flights were the greatest. 
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6.3.1: Manchester 
Manchester airport was chosen for this study for two principle reasons. Firstly, it was 
a good example of a single runway, (06/24), mixed mode operation beginning to feel 
the effects of congestion, shown by the airports current public enquiry for a second 
runway. This is supported by the information presented by APATSI and the 1990 SRI 
report already discussed. Figure 6.1 shows a typical busy Friday traffic demand 
during the 1995 summer season. ' The figure clearly shows that between 0700 and 
0900 the airport was operating at or beyond its optimum runway demand rate of 42 
movements per hour. An evening peak was also clearly visible, although to a lessor 
intensity than the morning peak. Regional aircraft traffic represented 24% of total 
traffic for this day, and 32% of scheduled traffic. " This information is supported by 
data supplied by Manchester Airport Plc., for maximum annual peak hour movement 
rates shown in table 6.1. It clearly shows that the peak hour movement rate, excluding. 
1991, has steadily increased from 49 to 52 movements per hour in 1993. This is way 
above the 42 movement per hour rate given as an industry benchmark by the SRI for 
optimum mixed mode, single runway operations. The 30th and 100th busiest hour 
figures also demonstrate that Manchester is consistently dealing with high movement 
rates from its single runway. 
Manchester Aircraft Movements - Peak, 30th and 100th Busiest Hour 1990-1993 
Year Peak Hour 30th Hour 100th Hour 
Date Hour Movts Date Hour Movts Date Hour movts 
1990 23/5 17.59 49 07/8 17.59 43 27/8 17.59 39 
1991 26/4 15.59 45 29/8 7.59 42 09/7 17.59 39 
1992 13/5 17.59 48 10/9 8.59 44 20/3 17.59 41 
1993 17/9 8.59 52 10/6 7.59 45 09/7 7.59 43 
Source: Manchester Airport Plc. 
TABLE 6.1 
Manchester airport, then, would be used as the primary airport in this study to develop 
a simulation methodology which could be applied to other airports at a later date. Ten 
scenarios were developed to test as many of the regional; aircraft special procedures 
as possible. Each case is defined next, highlighting the aim and problems encountered 
in setting it up. Figure 6.2 shows the modification to the existing SIDS and STARS 
for each case. All cases were based off runway 24 as this is the dominant runway 
operation at Manchester. 
1995 UK Airport Timetables 
6 Figures deduced from the traffic patterns given in appendix 6.2 
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Base Case Iý 
The aim with this case was to provide a basic operating system for the airport based 
on the current operation of arrivals and departures on runway 24, and the aircraft 
event data taken from the planned summer 1994 schedule shown in figure 6.1 and 
presented in full in appendix 6.2. The airfield chart and standard arrival and departure 
routings are presented in appendix 6.3. It was the intention to use the data received 
from this simulation as a base on which to judge the effectiveness of modifying the 
system in other scenarios by the change in delay times. Aircraft followed standard 
arrival and departure routes with no special attempts to sequence traffic, allow special 
regional aircraft procedures or intersection departures. The only modification was the 
setting of a 30% spread factor applied to arriving aircraft to generate sufficient gaps 
to help clear departures during peak times. 
The largest problem in setting up the scenario was determining the procedures. 
Case Two - Intersection Departures 
The aim of this case was to assess how beneficial in terms of delay reduction 
intersection departures would be., Two intersection points for runway 24 were 
inputted at links 'B' and T' equally spaced up wind of the 24 threshold. Link 'B' 
was used for larger regional aircraft such as the 146 whilst link T' was reserved for 
smaller turboprops due to effective reduction in TORA. For this scenario to work 
new departure queues needed to be set up at each of the intersections along with new 
routes specified for each of the intersections, even though the routes followed the 
same track once off the runway. 
Initially the results of this approach from the simulation runs were poor. Animation 
checking of the simulation showed aircraft simultaneously taking off from separate 
points on the runway at the same time. Conflicts also arose between the arrivals and 
subsequent departures. The solution to the problem lay in modifying the blocking 
times for aircraft take offs and landings in the procedures file. This caused increased 
separation times for aircraft taking off from the intersections compared to departing 
aircraft taking the full length of the runway due to wake vortex separation 
requirements. This occurred as intersection departures would be closer to the previous 
aircraft's wake vortex than another departure starting at the end of the runway. 
Case Three - Early Right Turn 
This was the first of the scenarios to assess the regional aircraft procedures, namely, 
the early turn after take off. Manchester Airport already had this procedure in 
operation so entering the required data into SIMMOD was relatively easy. The new 
airspace route required a right turn off runway 24 at 500ft onto an initial radar heading 
of 330*, with the aircraft then directed, by ATC, towards Pole Hill VOR and routes 
north and east as requested. For the simulation entry new departure queues were 
required for aircraft departing from links '13' or 'C', the airspace route was added, and 
the procedures modified as departure separation between a standard departure, 
preceded by an early turn departure could be reduced. In this scenario, separation 
limits for departing aircraft using the early turn were 45 to 50 seconds for the take off 
roll, with a blocking distance of 0.5nm from the end of the departure runway for 
departures following from runway 24 threshold, and 1.5nm for aircraft following from 
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the intersections. This maintained the departure wake vortex separation requirements 
and allowed the potential benefit of reduced departure separation to be exploited. 
The only problems in running this simulation were those associated with obtaining the 
correct procedure separation, which was a case of experimentation to obtain minimum 
delay. 
Case Four - Early Left Turn 
The aim of this case was to build on case three, by adding an early turn for south 
bound departing regional aircraft to assess how the combination of both early turns at 
500ft would reduce departure delays. The format was exactly the same as for case 
three, using the same departure procedures from the intersections. A new airspace 
route was added and the events file modified accordingly to allow regional aircraft to 
use the early turn. 
No problems were encountered with the simulation after the data modifications. 
Case Five - Early Turns to the Left ONLY 
The reason for introducing this case into the simulation scenarios, followed work by 
the author with Business Air, who were looking at ways to reduce operating delays at 
Manchester Airport at that time. Previously problems had occurred for Business Air 
in obtaining regular use of the early right turn, which they needed for their routes back 
to Scotland. Manchester ATC had indicated that the early right turn would only be 
offered where traffic sequencing permitted. Business Air felt that if they could carry 
out early left turns and continue all the way round to the north, this would alleviate the 
ATC problem. Setting up the simulation was straight forward with modification to 
the events data to change the early right turn aircraft to early left turns, and minor 
changes to the airspace route file. 
No problems were encountered after running the simulation. 
Case Six - Business Air Special Arrival Procedure (Northerly Arrivals Only) 
This scenario was developed to test the idea presented by the author and Business Air 
as described in chapter five. The scenario was modified to include easterly arrivals, as 
well as to capture all regional arrivals that would normally use the Bolin holding 
stack. The procedures used were not altered to accommodate the change in arrival 
structure, as they were just to be integrated into the existing arrival flow. 
Without pre-empting the discussion of this case in the results, considerable problems 
were encountered in trying to remove problems of runway fouling, where departures 
and arrivals were both active on the runway at the same time. This will be discussed 
in more depth in the next chapter. 
Case Seven - Special Arrivals from the South 
The aim of this case was to expand on case six, to segregate all arriving regional 
aircraft in an attempt to reduce arrival delays. The new routing placed all regional 
aircraft on a direct join from Dayne to the ILS at 7run out. It would, as before, offer 
regionals a shorter arrival track, and hopefully delay reduction, whilst not greatly 
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affecting existing jet traffic. Only the new route string needed adding to the existing 
model, with the procedures remaining unchanged. 
No problems were encountered during the simulation runs. This case was further 
developed, however, by the introduction of regional aircraft holds close to the final 
approach path, in an attempt to provide the ATC controller with more sequencing 
flexibility, as discussed in chapter five. A number of combinations were examined 
due to problems with simulating the holds correctly. The problems discovered will be 
discussed in greater depth in chapter seven. 
Case Eight - Steep Approach Concept for Runway 24 
The idea of this case was to assess how the introduction of a steep approach for 
regional aircraft onto the existing single runway would affect operating delays. The 
idea was based on the Frankfurt steep approach idea discussed in chapter five. 
Setting this scenario up in SIMMOD posed a considerable challenge. Firstly, a STOL 
runway had to be added just next to the existing runway, as SIMMOD would not 
allow more than one arrival point on a runway. This STOL runway was intended to 
represent regional aircraft use of the existing runway 24, landing beyond the 
touchdown point of the jet aircraft to avoid wake turbulence problems. Once this was 
complete, airspace routes were added connecting the STOL runway to the existing 
arrival routes used in case seven. The final change was in the procedures file, where 
modification of the blocking arrival and departure times was required to allow safe 
operation of the jet and regional arrivals and subsequent departures. The blocking 
time for a regional landing was set at 45 seconds, due to the shorter runway length 
required, and the use of rapid exit taxiways. Separation between regional arrival and 
jet arrival was 40 seconds blocking time and I nm blocking distance. This would give 
the minimum separation requirement, assuming no wake vortex separation 
requirement, i. e. minimum radar separation of 2.5nm taking into account that the jet 
would be at an average approach speed of 150kts and so catching the regional aircraft 
up all the time, approaching at an average of 140kts. 
Initial results of the simulation runs were poor, with numerous missed approaches. 
Initial problems showed that as well as simultaneous landings, departures were also 
commencing before arrivals cleared the runway. The use of the STOL runway also 
complicated the matter as SIMMOD treated it as an entirely separate runway 
operation, so arrivals were landing and holding, whilst departures occurred on the 
other runway. This was solved by increasing the blocking time between STOL 
arrivals and standard departures. Obviously, this would impact unrealistically on 
departure delays. The simultaneous landings were solved by the use of final approach 
stagger control on the last three arrival links for both runways. Other problems were 
excessive runway occupancy times, which were overcome with increased runway taxi 
speeds and relocation of the rapid exit taxiways for the STOL runway. Additional 
nodes were required along the final approach path as these served as update separation 
controls for the simulation, and enabled correct separation requirements to be 
maintained. Separation between successive jet or regional arrivals were set at 5 run, 
to allow the gap between jet versus regional arrival to be maintained. The next stage 
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of the solution was to increase the time delay that could be absorbed on each airspace 
link, which aimed to introduce more effectively the ability of the ATC controller to 
control aircraft speed and maintain separation. 
Even with all the modifications applied, above, missed approaches still occurred, 
albeit less than five for the day's events. At this stage the author decided that any 
attempt to remove these from the simulation would have imposed excessive delays on 
the other movements, and rendered the scenario untenable. As a result, a missed 
approach procedure was introduced, to ensure the aircraft carrying out the missed 
approaches did so as realistically as possible. With this final change the simulation 
ran correctly. The principle limitation encountered with SIMMOD in this scenario, 
was in its inability to properly represent the ATC controller's ability to think ahead 
and sequence traffic along the arrival track. 
Case Nine - Selective Use of Steep Approach 
This case modified case eight. The use of the steep approach procedure was limited to 
peak hours of operation by modifying the events file, and also to re-introduce specific 
regional aircraft holds to aid traffic sequencing. 
The same problem of unavoidable missed approaches were found, as in case eight, but 
otherwise no problems occurred with the simulation run. 
Case Ten - Separate Independent STOL Runway Operation 
This was the final case studied. It aimed to simulate the construction of a parallel 
STOL runway to the south of the existing runway 24. The operation of the STOL 
runway was classed as independent for arrivals, only using the steep approach concept 
to remain above the jet aircraft's wake as in the two previous cases. Regional aircraft 
departures from the STOL runway were not modelled due to the problems that would 
occur with sequencing departures from both runways and between successive STOL 
arrivals and departures, as well as crossing delays with aircraft crossing the existing 
runway 24. Obviously, the procedures file needed modifying to allow independent 
arrivals on both runways as well as changes to the events file. 
No problems arose following the simulation run. Further simulations were also 
carried out using regional aircraft holds to see what benefit, if any, these would 
generate. 
6.3.2: Zurich Kloten 
Zurich Kloten airport was developed as the second case study in the SIMMOD 
simulation strategy for a number of reasons. Firstly, it represented another congested 
European airport. Figures provided by Zurich Airport Authority for total scheduled 
movements during the years 1983-93, (figure 6.3), show continued growth, with the 
exception of 1991, which demonstrate that pressure caused by congestion is likely to 
get even more serious in the future. Data also provided by the Airport Authority show 
that 24% of total annual aircraft movements were regional aircraft during 1993. This, 
as with Manchester, represents a significant proportion of the total traffic, where the 
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impact of introducing special procedures should yield definitive results as to their 
effective ability to reduce operating delays. 
Considering the planned movements used in the simulation, (figure 6.4)', with the 
APATSI recommended maximum of 60 movements per hour at Zurich, it can be seen 
that for three hours, from 10: 00 to 13: 00, Zurich is operating at its maximum. 
The fmal reason for using Zurich in the study was that it represented as good contrast 
to Manchester, with three runways instead of one, which by default offered a much 
more complex TMA structure, where introduction of the special procedures would 
pose more of a problem. It was hoped that the comparison of results from both Zurich 
and Manchester would broadly cover most TMA structure difficulties that may be 
found at other European airports. 
The evaluation strategy for Zurich incorporated six scenarios, which will be explained 
below in the same format as used for Manchester. Figure 6.5 shows the modifications 
to the arrival and departure routes for each scenario, whilst the relevant aerodrome 
chart and SID and STAR routings can be found in appendix 6.5. 
Base Case 
As with Manchester, the aim with this case was to set up and simulate the current 
operation at Zurich. After discussing with Zurich Airport Authority, and looking at 
runway usage figures for 1994, the system was set up for arrival traffic on runway 14, 
with departing traffic predominantly using runway 28 for noise abatement reasons, 
although runway 16 was used as an overspill for departures during peak hours. Each 
runway in this case would be operating in single mode, with only departures from 28 
and 16 requiring co-ordination. Each of the appropriate SIDs and STARs were 
incorporated into the system and the traffic data for the events file was generated from 
an ATC log for 16th July 1994 provided by Zurich Airport Authority, (appendix 6.4). 
Standard separation for arrivals was set using the ICAO recommended wake vortex 
separations. Departures were from the threshold of runway 28 only. Initial 
simulation problems were encountered due to incorrect events data entry and incorrect 
landing roll distances for the aircraft categories. Arrivals and departures were 
independent, with no blocking times applied to departures by arrivals. 
Following initial de-bugging of data and slight modification of the procedures file, the 
simulation ran without error. 
Case Two - Intersection Departures on Runway 28 
The aim of this scenario was to assess how departure delays could be affected by the 
introduction of intersection departures from runway 28. Two intersection departure 
points were added, called, 'Bravo', and, 'Charlie'. As with Manchester, new 
departure 
queues and associated routes were inputted. The restrictions on the use of the 
intersections were the same as links V and 'C' at Manchester. The procedures file 
7 See full schedule breakdown in appendix 6.4 
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was also modified to control the departures from the intersections in relation to 
departures from the threshold. The intersection departures had to wait longer than 
threshold departures when following a previous threshold departure, due to their 
closer location to the wake vortex trail. 
Due to the experience gained from the Manchester case, no problems were 
encountered with the simulation runs. 
Case Three - Early Turns off Runway 28 
This scenario represented an early right turn at 500ft off runway 28, and was applied 
to all aircraft departing to the north or east of Zurich, through ZUE VOR. Departures 
to ALBIX, HOCHWALD, MOROK, WILLISAU, EBOTO, TEBRI and RESIA were 
not affected, as no saving in track distance was feasible and rc-integration of early 
turn traffic, back into existing SID tracks, would only increase delays, not reduce 
them. For those affected, the procedures file was modified to reduce departure 
separation for jet aircraft following the regional aircraft, after carrying out an early 
turn, from 2.5nm to 0.5nm. 
No problems were encountered during the simulation runs. 
Case Four - STOL Arrival Runway 28 
The aim of this case was to simulate the current Crossair procedure used for runway 
28, discussed in chapter five, but without movement restrictions. To simulate this 
scenario case, three airspace data were modified to include a new arrival route for 
runway 28, incorporating the steep approach. The events file was modified 
accordingly and then the procedures file. Through experimentation and experience 
from the Manchester work, the separation used between departures and arrivals for 
runway 28 was 55 seconds, and a blocking distance of 3 nm. Separation of arrivals on 
28 and departures on 16 was not required, as the regional aircraft would stop short of 
the intersection with the two runways. Finally, a 20% spread factor in arrival 
separation on runway 28 was introduced,, to allow increased departures during the 
peak hours of the operation. 
Results of the first simulation runs presented missed approach problems and 
departures commencing before the arrival had cleared the runway. The solution lay in 
adding new RET's to minimise runway occupancy, increasing runway taxi speed and 
designating standard taxi paths for certain arrivals. A lot of the problems were 
associated with the simulation variation in landing roll length, which became quite 
critical when aircraft just missed one RET and then slowly taxied to the next one. In 
addition ground nodes needed adding just off the runway, along the RET link, as these 
were used to tell the simulation the aircraft had cleared the runway, so releasing the 
next departure. The same process had also been applied to the Manchester scenario. 
Case Five - New Runway Operation 
The aim here was to determine if a change in the pattern of runway operation would 
reduce delays. The new scenario continued with jet arrivals for runway 14 and 
regional aircraft arrivals on runway 28, but this time all departures were set on runway 
16. Runway 16 was modified to introduce one intersection departure and early turn. 
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Runway 28 had two intersection departures, but otherwise runway 16 provided a 
common comparison. It was expected that a delay reduction would be made due to 
the removal of any need to increase separation requirements for runway 28 arrivals to 
allow out departures on 28. 
Following the modifications to the airspace, ground and events files as required, the 
initial simulation runs worked well. 
Case Six - Case Five with Regional Aircraft Departures on Runway 28 
Following on from case five, the aim of this scenario was to segregate the regional air 
traffic onto runway 28, with jet departures on runway 16 and jet arrivals on runway 
14. It was expected that this segregation of regional aircraft would help traffic flows 
by reducing wake separation requirements and so reduce operating delays. 
The data changes were fairly simple, given the current status of the system following 
case five. The events data was modified to allow regional departures on 28, but from 
the threshold only. This was to allow the departures to operate with just blocking 
times for each runway. No blocking distances were applied after departure for 
departures from the other runway, due to the early turn off runway 28 and diverging 
track from runway 16. Associated with this was a modification to the procedures file. 
The simulation runs gave no problems. 
6.4 SIMMOD Summary 
The previous section has outlined all the simulation problems encountered in running 
SIMMOD and the limitations encountered with the system. In summarising the 
section it must be mentioned that in addition to the work for Manchester and Zurich, a 
model for London Gatwick was also developed, following a proposed project for the 
BAA to look at possible runway capacity improvement options. 8 Initially eight case 
studies were planned to assess intersection departures; early turns after take off, steep 
approach for the emergency runway 26R, and the use of an independent STOL 
runway within the existing airport boundary. Unfortunately, due to time pressures in 
setting up and running the SIMMOD system, completion of this part of the evaluation 
was not feasible. The first stages concerning the use of intersection departures and 
early turns was completed however, and will be used in the next chapter as a 
comparison to the Manchester results. 
The next stage of the evaluation methodology involved the development of a cost 
benefit analysis system to assess the overall affect, in monetary terms, of each of the 
SIMMOD cases outlined above. 
6.5: Introducing Cost Benefit Analysis 
Up to this point this thesis has focused on the technical theories related to reducing 
airport congestion with specific relevance to regional aircraft. As the reader will be 
aware, however, in today's operating environment, every proposed modification to the 
8 For traffic schedule see appendix 6.6 and aerodrome and SID and STAR routings in appendix 6.7 
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existing status quo requires some sort of validation process, and this process is 
becoming more and more financially critical. In recognising this point, the author 
deemed it an integral part of this thesis to attempt a cost benefit analysis, (CBA), of 
the proposed solutions. 
Cost benefit analysis was developed in the 1960's as a way to help investors decide 
whether or not a specific project would make a financial return on the initial 
investment. In a way it helped take some of the uncertainty and risk out of the 
decision. Unfortunately this method focused on purely quantifiable monetary 
processes, assessing what, the costs would be and how quickly a return on that 
investment would be made, once the project began generating revenue. Returns on 
investment were calculated using pure accounting methods, whilst attempts to 
quantify broader implications of the project were not tackled. During the 1960's and 
70's, CBA was modified and expanded by all areas of industry and government, as a 
tool to justify specific projects. Many attempts were made by industry and academia 
to provide realistic monetary values for such factors as environmental disruption, 
value of a person's time and other induced effects of a project. Further ties with 
economic theory were attempted, by putting a value on the multiplier effect of the 
investment. This related to the knock on effects of a project to the local area industry 
and community, as well as on a larger scale with effects to the national economy. 
The culmination of research, and the trial and error use of CBA over the years, has led 
to the assessment of costs and benefits under three separate areas: direct, indirect and 
induced. Direct costs and benefits are those generated directly by the project. Indirect 
effects are those which are generated to support or accommodate the project. Finally, 
induced impacts are the economic effects generated in the local and national economy 
due to the project. 
In aviation, the use of CBA has been predominantly used by airport and government 
bodies in aiding the planning process for construction of new or modified airport 
facilities. In November 1992 ACI Europe published a document entitled, 'Airports - 
Partners in Vital Economics'. The aim of the document was to outline the positive 
benefits to local communities, regions, countries and Europe of the airports. The 
document also sought to put airports in context, to outline what an airport should and 
should not be expected to provide.. The strategic significance of airports was assessed. 
along with their ability to act as economic generators. Paris CDG for example 
employed 2,648 people, whilst supporting 377 other companies at the airport. These 
companies paid Ffr 9 million in salaries and spent Ffr 7.1 billion on goods and 
services. Geneva airport calculated that 300 million Swiss Francs were spent in 1980 
by passengers staying in hotels around Geneva. The induced impact of Copenhagen 
airport was calculated in terms of job generation: 14,500 jobs were directly 
attributable to the airport, 11,500 jobs were indirectly associated with the airport, 
whilst a further 16,000 were induced in the local community due to the airports 
presence. 
This document led to the publication in March 1993, by ACI, of, 'The Economic 
Study Kit'. It was developed to help airports accurately present and justify airport 
developments. Each of the direct and indirect airport impacts were outlined, but the 
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document argued that the induced impact was best calculated by nitiltiplying the sum 
of the direct and indirect benefits by a Cactor. This is basically the multiplier ei'llect 
explained previously. The document warned airports to use Caution With using this 
multiplier in monetary terms due to tile difficulty in providing accurate values I'm 
some of the effects. Instead it recommended airports outline the el'i , ects to show 
appreciation of the issue, whilst refraining from placing an absolute figure Oil then). 
Finally, the document presented further qualitative effccts of' in airport such as 
reputation, marketing, innovation and skills effects. 
A good summary of the factors contributing to the total economic impact of tile ail, 
transport system and their relationships are given by ATAG (1993) and presented in 
figure 6.6. 
FIGURE 6.6 
Source: ATAG (1993) The Economic Benefits of AirTransport 
The discussion above has highlighted the principles ol'('13A, as well as demonstrating 
its application to the aviation industry. It must be stated that although CBA is used 
often, many of the actual monetary values lor each ot'the indirect and induced C11'ects 
are limited at best. 
ATAG took this one step further and produced a flow diagram, reproduced ill figure 
6.7', which defines the repercussions ofinvesting in additional int'raStHICUll-e CallaCity. 
The diagram presents a clear cut picture of' the consequences flor not investing ill 
infrastructure, which help in the determination of' the costs and benefits of' zurport 
congestion. 
9 Source: ATA(; (I 993)'Flic FC0110mic Benefits ol'Airl'ransport 
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ý-Effects of the Air Transport Industry 
6.6: CBA Criteria and Costings 
Taking the above discussion into account, this thesis is specifically concerned with the 
comparison of separate case studies, using different regional aircraft special 
procedures, to assess how they effect operating delays. The use of CBA will be to 
assess if the benefits of introducing the system will cover the costs. The aim will be 
to detail each of the costs and benefits for each of the SIMMOD case studies, 
comparing the results to the initial base case of doing nothing. If the new case 
demonstrates a better benefits to cost ratio than the base case, it will be judged worthy 
of implementation. 
Th e Case for In vesting in A viation 
FIGURE 6.7 
Source: ATAG (1993) The Economic Benefits of Air Transport 
Specific use of CBA for analysing implementation of new procedures is relatively 
new and scarce. In looking into the issue, the author first began with determining the 
direct, indirect and induced effects. Help was given from ATAG in this area, who had 
produced a table assessing, to a limited degree, the penalties of inadequate 
infrastructure, (Table 6.2). 
Although the information in the table is useful, it only presents a general picture of the 
costs and benefits. The next stage was to outline in as much detail as possible, all the 
specific costs and likely benefits which would appertain to each special procedure. 
would make. The results of this phase of the work are shown in appendix 6.8, ranked 
as direct, indirect and induced costs. 
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Infrastructure 
The Penalties of Inadequate Infrastructure 
AFFECTED NATURE OF 
GROUP IMPACT ON 
AFFECTED 
ECONOMIC COST ECONOMIC 
TO AFFECTED BENEFITS (TO 
GROUP OTHERS) 
GROUP 
1. Airlines Delays Higher Operating Gains by 
Curtailed Growth Costs. substitutes 
Loss of Business, to air travel 
(revenues, profit, 
employment). 
2. Airports Curtailed Growth Loss of Revenues 
3. Air Delays 
Travellers 
Loss 
especially to business 
people. 
Higher costs passed 
on by airlines (loss in 
real income). 
4. Tourist Loss of revenue due Loss of inbound Increased revenue 
Industry to curtailed growth business. for other national 
economies when 
tourists change 
country of 
destination 
5. Labour Pool Fewer jobs due to Loss of income; 
curtailed growth personal and social 
disruptions 
6. Business and Loss of revenue Loss of profit to Increased business 
Industry Higher operating businesses activity elsewhere 
costs when businesses 
relocate 
7. Governments Decreased tax and fee Loss of revenues 
income 
8. Aircraft Decreased passenger Loss of production as Gain as more 
manufacturers demand resulting fewer aircraft are aircraft are needed 
from congestion required in a severely to offset moderate 
constrained congestion 
environment 
TABLE 6.2 
Source: ATAG (1993) The Economic Benefits of Air Transport 
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Seven cases were developed as follows: 
Case I Base Case - no change 
Case 2 Maximise current use of existing runway 
Case 3 Use of early turn after take off 
Case 4 Use of discrete arrival procedure (SALS) 
Case 5 Use of steep approach procedure 
Case 6 Construction of a STOL runway with existing airport 
Case 7 Development of a separate Reliever Airport. 
For each case there are common figures which relate to the costing of delays. Value 
of time is a controversial issue, which attempts to place monetary value to a person's 
time. In almost all cases it is broken into business time and leisure time. The use of 
value of time figures has created much debate within users of CBA, as whilst no one 
doubts that delays during transportation do present a cost to individuals involved, the 
exact amount of money involved will vary with every individual, depending on their 
circumstances Value of time is an intangible quantity relating to issues such as time 
spent with friends and family. Relaxing. It must also take into account time spent in 
preparing, conducting and reviewing business. Obviously delays during transport 
will prevent some of these activities taking place or disrupt them. It is this disruption 
that is used to help assess value of time. The UK CAA values business time at E67 
per hour and leisure time at LIO per hour. The figures are corrected to 1996 values 
take from the RUCATSE report, but date back to work first done for the Roskhill 
commission examining a site for a new runway in the South East of England. Due to 
the current application of these figures by the UK CAA, these will be the ones used in 
this thesis. It must be stated that although these figures represent an industry 
standard, they do not account for individual variation. A leisure passenger taking his 
first holiday from work in two years, may value his time much more highly than the 
business person sat next to him. A business person about to clinch a multi-million 
pound deal will also value his time at a higher rate than that specified if the plane is 
delayed and he misses his deal. 
The other costs are presented in the appendix, and will be used in examining each of 
the SIMMOD simulation cases. In each case the author has attempted to provide a 
source for the figures given, mainly generated through discussion with airlines and 
airports, or an explanation for the figure or statement written. 
6.7: Integrating SIMMOD and CBA Methods 
Following the previous explanation of both SIMMOD and CBA, they now need 
combining to provide meaningful results. From the SIMMOD simulations, data on 
travel time and delays for each case are recorded by hour. Changes in the runway 
movement rate are also recorded. Due to the extent of the statistics available, 
averages are used to help collate the data and make it useable. These average changes 
in arrival and departure delays for each case are then used in the CBA figures for 
value of time and airline operating costs. The focus will be on the peak hours, as this 
is generally where reductions in delays are most significant and effective. 
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With the SIMMOD delay results entered into the CBA tables for each case, a 
comparison of available cost and benefit totals is made. Judgment on the accuracy 
and amendment of these figures will be made in chapter eight, along with whether or 
not the procedure has positively improved the airport access or not. 
6.8: Limitations of Methodology 
In general this thesis assumes that each of the procedures trialed is technically feasible 
using existing levels of navigation equipment, unless otherwise stated. It also 
assumes that ATC will make sufficient corrections to prevent collisions, except where 
expressly stated. As the focus is on how can these procedures reduce operating 
delays, the work does not provide detailed collision risk assessment of each case 
study, as the author is not an expert in this field. Neither does it provide detailed take 
off performance assessments of each procedure for each regional aircraft type, to 
assess its acceptability, due to the same reason as given before. The use of SIMMOD 
does impose limitations on the accuracy of representing real world scenarios, as 
previously discussed, however it also represents the best tool available to the author in 
this work. 
Finally, as can be seen by examination of the CBA tables in appendix 6.8, many 
values are missing. The focus of the work was to provide as detailed a listing of the 
factors involved as possible, rather than complete monetary values. The author feels 
this lies with those more experienced in that field. 
6.9: Questionnaires" 
6.9.1: Regional Airline Views on Special Procedures 
Due to the limited information that was available regarding the use of these special 
regional aircraft procedures, the author decided to send a questionnaire to European 
regional airlines in an attempt to determine exactly what procedures were being used, 
where and with what success. In addition, a second part was added to the 
questionnaire to help gauge how regional airlines felt about making use of these 
procedures. Both parts of the questionnaire are included in appendix 6.9 to this 
chapter and, as can be seen, the first part is a series of structured questions with space 
for the airline to express its view directly. It is broken into five sections in an attempt 
to cover all possible use of the special procedures. Section one asks for basic 
information on the airline fleet and airports where operating delays are prevalent. 
Sections two, three and four ask if the airline has ever used special procedures in the 
past, is using them now, or intends to use them in the future. The final section asked 
the respondent to give general views on special procedures, how they thought the 
procedures would ease congestion in the future, and what would be the greatest 
obstacle to the implementation of possible procedures. 
10 See Appendix 6.9 
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The second part of the questionnaire was a structured and controlled questionnaire 
asking the respondent to rate how important he felt a number of statements relate to 
the use of special procedures. 
The questionnaire was mailed to operations directors or chief pilots at 46 European 
regional airlines making use of the ERA mailing lists. Sixteen were returned 
representing 37% of the total and are listed below: 
Air UK 
Avianova 
British Midland 
Brymon European Airways 
Business Air 
Crossair 
Finnaviation 
Gill Aviation 
Hamburg Airline 
Interot 
Jersey European Airways 
KLM Cityhopper 
Loganair 
Lufthansa Cityline 
Olympic Aviation 
Regional Airlines 
Although the return rate seems low, the response does cover operations from nine 
separate European countries, especially France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and 
the UK, where most of the congested European airports are located. The response 
also covered a broad variety of regional airlines in terms of size and scope of 
operations. 
6.9.2: Major Airlines view on Regional airlines 
This was a brief questionnaire aiming to assess the scale of current regional airline 
franchises or agreements by the major airlines, and how they valued them. This 
followed an appreciation by the author that major airlines are increasingly using 
regional airlines to operate their shorter routes which are thin on passenger traffic. 
This is due to the latters lower operating costs. A high level of commitment to protect 
these feeder or franchise services would further validate the use of special procedures 
at major airports. 
The last three questions in the questionnaire attempted to evaluate how the major 
airlines saw the development of these franchises and agreements in the future, and 
what they felt would be restrictive to their use. 
The questionnaire was mailed to 18 of the major European airlines and is included in 
the appendix. 
6.9.3: European Airport views on Special Procedures 
This final questionnaire aimed to determine which European airports were currently 
using any form of special procedure and how they felt special procedures would affect 
their operation. 
Initial questions attempted to evaluate to what extent hub feed traffic affected the 
airport, and whether the airport viewed the regional aircraft as an asset or liability. 
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The latter point was forced in question 6 when they were asked to say how they 
expected regional aircraft traffic to change in the future. The remaining questions 
asked specific questions on special procedures and how they felt they would or could 
be used, and why they might be restricted. 
The questionnaire was mailed to 24 European airports and is included in the appendix. 
6.10: Practical Projects 
The aim of this part of the evaluation was to give the author enough exposure to the 
aviation industry, in order to place the SIMMOD and CBA work in context, adding a 
realistic element to the theory. The projects also helped cover some of the areas 
involved with special procedures, not directly covered by previous research. This 
move was deemed as crucial by the author to help provide results which would be of 
use to the aviation industry. There were seven separate practical projects undertaken. 
APATS1 Contract - In March 1993 the author was asked to help the Department of 
Air Transport, Cranfield University, on a contract for the ECAC APATSI working 
group. The contract exposed the author to the many procedures that APATSI is 
examining and involved an in depth review of pertinent articles from Cranfield 
Library. 
SIMMOD Contract - In October 1993 the author again became involved with a 
Cranfield contract. This time the work was for a group examining the feasibility of 
developing Redhill airport as a reliever for Gatwick airport. The author was involved 
in setting up the SIMMOD datafiles to assess the new traffic and airspace patterns 
proposed by the project. The work enabled the author to gain valuable work 
experience with SIMMOD. 
European Regional Airlines Association (ERA) - From February 1994 to 
September 1995 the author was asked to represent the Department of Air Transport, 
Cranfield University, at the ERA operations and maintenance committees. These 
were held three to four times a year and exposed the author to current concerns and 
issues of regional airlines operating in Europe, as well as current changes occurring in 
the European aviation arena. 
Business Air Work Experience - Full time for three months in 1994, and for up to a 
year part time, the author worked at Business Air in Aberdeen in operations planning. 
This enabled practical experience to be gained in regional airline operations, seeing 
problems develop and subsequently resolved. 
Manchester Airport Project - Whilst working with Business Air, the author was 
involved with an attempt to reduce arrival and departure delays for the operations of 
that airline through Manchester. Discussions were held with ATC and the airport and 
a new trial developed. The work was an excellent opportunity for the author to see at 
first hand the problems associated with implementing regional aircraft special 
procedures at a congested airport. 
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Gatwick Airport Project - The BAA airport authority sponsored the author in 1995 
to help provide support for the thesis, looking specifically at Gatwick. Discussions 
were held with Gatwick and London ATC in addition to the BAA, to evaluate a series 
of options for use of regional aircraft special procedures. Part of the work was backed. 
up with SIMMOD simulations, specifically the evaluation of the early turn after take 
off. 
This project enabled the author to compare results with Manchester, the same runway 
configuration and operation, but with differing traffic patterns. 
Supplementary Information - In addition to the specific projects outlined above, the 
author also had the opportunity through Cranfield and the ERA, to gain a general 
consensus of opinion on regional aircraft special procedures, by discussing the 
principles with external lecturers at Cranfield and key regional airline personnel, 
including airline, airport, aircraft manufacturers and associated support industries. 
6.11: Summary 
This methodology provides the reader with the basic framework used for evaluating 
special procedures. Whilst appreciating that many gaps still exist in the more detailed 
aspects, such as take off performance, collision risk assessment and CBA values, the 
author has attempted to combine the theory with practical advice from the many 
practical projects covered during work for the thesis. With the above in mind it is 
now time to examine the results produced and to begin answering the aims of the 
thesis set in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER 7: Evaluation Results. 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will combine the methodology defined in the previous chapter with the 
work carried out by the author to define the results. The results will be presented in 
three sections. Firstly, the SIMMOD analysis and results in terms of delay variation 
from the base case, with comments observed from the simulation, followed by the 
results of the combined SIMMOD and CBA process. Secondly, an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of each scenario at reducing congestion will be given. Finally, the 
results of each questionnaire will be presented. The results of the practical projects 
will be used to help the discussions on regional aircraft special procedures in the next 
chapter. 
7.2 Manchester Airport 
7.2.1: Base Case 
As pointed out in chapter six, the purpose of this case was to provide a control level 
against which to monitor the effect of additional changes in procedures to operational 
delays and peak hour runway movement rates. Due to the nature of the cases, this 
case was specifically set at an operational level below that currently used at 
Manchester. It was assumed that all departures left from the same point on the 
runway with minimum effort taken to sequence arriving traffic. In addition, no 
passing was allowed within the departure queue to optimise departure traffic 
sequence, and arrival spacing was allowed to be increased up to 30% above that 
scheduled, to help provide sufficient space to let departures out between successive 
arrivals. Five iterations of this case were run to remove simulation errors, and the 
results achieved are presented in table 7.1. 
Principle points to note, are the delay figures for arrivals and departures and the 
maximum peak period movement rate per hour. The rest of the cases will be judged 
by their ability to improve on these figures. The maximum rate of just over 41 
movements an hour relates well to the APATSI proposed optimum of 42 movements 
an hour for a single runway. For this reason and the lack of any undue simulation 
problems observed during the animation, the author decided to accept this model as a 
good base to build upon. 
The peak period mentioned in the table refers to that outlined in appendix 7.1, which 
provides more detailed tables of the SIMMOD results in an hour by hour listing. 
Table I gives the movement figures, along with the summary tables, whilst table 2 
gives the same information for the delays. From the first table for Manchester, the 
movement rates demonstrate that the planned and simulated movement rates are 
greatest during the early morning, from 0700 to 1100 hours. Looking more closely at 
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the peak period movements versus the planned movenicrits, it can he seen that this 
case achieved 95% of planned movement,,. 
Base Case Arrivals Depal-filres Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 7723.80 4710.10 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (mins) 28.90 17.00 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 976.80 2828.00 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 3.70 1 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 18-1900 10-1 W() 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 23.00 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 11.84 
PEAK PEiZI-OD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 41.10 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. "1 8,3 8 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /lir (iniiis) 17.02 
Average Peak Period Delay per n1ov. /hr (mins) 1 13.521 
TA13LE 7.1 
Moving to the delay figures given in the second table Ilor Manchester in appendix 7.1, 
it can be seen that departure delays per movement are oil average double that of tile 
arrivals during the peak period, with the maximum average delay per departure being 
22.2 minutes between 0800 and 0900. From the aniniation it could be seen that this 
delay led to the development of a substantial departure queue, which was causing 
taxiway and apron blockage at peak times, especially around tile domestic pier and 
stands. 
Turning to the cost benefit analysis, no tables are given in appendix 7.2 1'()r tile base 
case, as the author felt that the f0CUS Of this thesis Should be to look at ]low costs 
varied from this base case. Obviously, it' tile airport decided to renlaill in tills base 
case position, there would be associated costs and benefits as outlined in appendix 6.8 
in the previous chapter. 
7.2.2: Case Two - Intersection Departures 
This case built on the base case, by allowing regional aircraft to carry out intci-scction 
departures from links 'B' and 'C". No additional týIXINN'ay Construction NUS I-CLILlil-C(l. 
Two additional departure queues needed sctting tip in Ilic SIMMOD ground Ii1c, along 
with two additional procedures in the aIrSpICC Ille. '111C PI-OCC(ILII-CS IIZIII to ýICCOLIIIt lor 
the different departure separations that applied to intersection departures. Departures 
from link '13' had a 50 second take off blocking time, and a 2nni airspacc blocking 
143 
distance following departures from the 24 threshold. The ligurcs fi-oni link '(" \kere 
50 seconds and 2.5nm respectively. 
Case Two Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 77-1-1.90 4630.60 
Average Travel Tirne/Mov. (inins) 29.90 16.90 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 929.00 2496.10 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 08-0900 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 23.70 
Peak Hour for delays 09-0900 09-(), )()() 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 11.74 21.22 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 41.50 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 38.63) 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per niov. /hr (inins) 16.48 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per mov. /lir (mins) 
1 
1-1.74 
TABLE 7.2 
Table 7.2 gives the SIMMOD summary results for this case. It' these figurcs are 
compared to table 7.1, it can be seen that the eftect oil arrivals has been minimal with 
no real detrimental effect. The effect on the dcpartures, however, has been 
substantial. Average travel time per departure has reduced slightly with, oil average, 
an additional minute reduction in delay for departures during the peak period, as well 
as the whole day. 
Looking at simulated movements, it can be seen that the peak 110111- maximum 
departure rate has increased from 23 to 23.7, with tile average peak hour rate 
increasing by 0.25. By looking at appendix 7.1 table 1, we can see that as well as tile 
increase in the maximum rate, between 0900 and 1000, the movement rate 1`61- 
departures has increased by 1. Overall, during the peak period 1.01 extra total 
movements were recorded. This analysis Was supported by the aniniatioii whicli 
showed that, whilst departure delays were reducing, significant departure queues still 
existed, partly due to the fact that the departure L111CUe logic in SIMMOD had not been 
changed to allow aircraft passing in the queue. The author had purposely left tile 
restriction in as SIMMOD was unable of' assessing which aircraft to move in tile 
queue to provide an optimum departure sequence. In hindsight howevel-, inti-oduction 
of passing may have further reduced departure delay. 
When the above information was put into tile cost benct'it analysis, (appendix 7.2), it 
was calculated that the introduction ot' the procedure would cost C5 1,5 14 and yield a 
benefit of E25,027, not taking into account the Multiplier 1'01- tile I-CISOIIS given ill tile 
table. As this cost represented start LIP Costs Only, With 110 I-CCLIrrcnt costs, this 
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procedure would pay back the initial investment in two days. thereafter providing it 
benefit to the system. 
Taking all the above information into acCOUIIt it can be seen that tile introduction ol 
this procedure would benefit the systern and substantially improve oil tile existing 
base case. 
7.2.3: Case Three - Early Right Turn to Pole Ifill 
This case built onto results of case two, and required tile addition of two procedures 
and four routes to the airspace file. The routes were defined to Pole 11111 VOR and tile 
second for Stock departures. The routes roughly shadowed tile radar vectors given to 
regional traffic by ATC after the early turn, which was a right turn onto 330' with 
further right turns to 360' and 020'. As departures were commencing froill two 
intersection departures on runway 24, four routes needed defining, two for each 
intersection departure point. The two new procedures were introduced to allow 
reduced separation restrictions for departures following the early turn departures. 
Distance blocking was reduced from 2nm to 0.5nin for departures froill tile threshold 
following departures from link '13', and from 2.5nni to 1.5nni I'Or departures following 
from link 'C'. The second procedure applied similar rcstrictiotis for departures 
following departures from link *C'. 
Case Three Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel'I'li-ne (inins) 7711.70 4-5822.60 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (nnns) -18.80 16.70 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 943.20 17 7 5.20 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (inins) 3.5 0 O. S() 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 08-0900 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 25.80 
Peak Hour for delays 09-1000 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/inovement (inins) 12.80 10.11 
PEAK PEITIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 41.10 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per inov. /lir (mins) 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr (inins) 10.04 
TABLE 7.3 
Table 7.3 shows that like case two, little reduction in operating times and delays for 
arrivals are achieved. Departure delays this time are further reduced by a greater 
magnitude than with case two. Average delay per departure is 3.9 minutes in this 
case, less than the base case, with similar reductions in the peak period delay figures. 
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Average peak period departure delays per movement have decreased from 19.8 
minutes in the Base Case to 12.8 minutes, a saving of seven minutes. , 
Movement rates have also improved for departures. The maximum hourly peak 
period movement rate has increased from 23 in the base case to 25.8, an additional 2.8 
movements. In fact during the peak period 4.5 additional movements were achieved' 
compared to the base case, with improvements achieved for each hour during the peak 
period. 
The cost benefit analysis predicts a cost of E158,665 to introduce this procedure 
against a perceived benefit of E71,562 per day. This gives a pay back period for the 
initial investment of 2.2 days ignoring the multiplier effect, and the benefit of 
additional slot generation. The latter was left out, as the author did not know what 
value an additional slot at Manchester would fetch. Obviously, if this were included, 
the pay back period would be much sooner, if not instantaneous. In addition to this 
there is a daily recurrent cost of E670 reflecting the additional ATC controller 
workload generated by using this procedure, which will need to be taken into account 
when calculating benefits once the investment costs are covered. 
Given this information, it can be easily concluded that the introduction of this 
procedure will significantly improve the base case, and case two, with a similar pay 
back period to case two. As the overall improvement is greater than case two, this 
represents the optimum solution so far. 
7.2.4: Case Four - Early Turns Stage 2 
Given the similarity of this procedure to case three, no changes were required to the 
existing ground files from case three. The events data was altered to allow additional 
early turns for south bound departures, and two new routes added to simulate the early 
left turn direct to Conga. 
From table 7.4 it can be seen that virtually all the figures are the same as case three. 
Average total peak period delay per movement is 0.1 of a minute less than case three. 
This being stated, the reduction in delay compared to the base case is by default the 
same as case three. 
Peak period movement rates are also very similar to case three, although during the 
peak period an extra 0.2 of a movement is achieved compared to case three, bringing 
the total to 4.7 additional movements compared to the base case. This improvement is 
so small that no account should really be made of it, due to the simulation 
inaccuracies built into the system that are impossible to remove. 
The cost benefit analysis for this case shows that costs remain the same, whilst 
benefits increase by E195, representing the marginal delay reduction. The pay back 
period is also 2.2 days. Although not included in the cost benefit table, this procedure 
is likely to cause greater ATC workload than case three. If, for example workload 
was now 20 hours per day, this would double the cost from E670 to L1340. This 
would then need taking out of the daily benefits as a recurrent cost. 
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Given the basic information for this case, it represents no significant iniprovcnicrit 
from case three, whilst remaining sigmficantly better than the base case. IC the 
workload costs are taken into account however, this case represents a worse case. In 
the long term, if ATC controllers get used to this procedure, flic additimial %-ý-orkload 
may reduce, at which time this case will become the optimum. Until t1lat time case 
three still represents the optimum solution. 
Case Four Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 7710.70 4571.90 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (inins) 28.90 10.70 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay'rime (mins) 941.10 1772.40 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 3.5 0 6. ýO 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 08-0900 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 25.80 
Peak Hour for delays 09-1000 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 1-105 16.11 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 41-10 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 13.65 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 1 9.951 
TABLE 7.4 
7.2.5: Case Five - Early Turns Stage 3 
This case was built on cases three and four and followed results ofearly discussions 
with Manchester ATC and Business Air. Business Air had I'Mind that their aircraft 
were not always being allowed early right turns by ATC. ThiS \VlS due to concern by 
ATC that tile aircraft would interfere with standard departures to tile north in heavy 
traffic conditions, and lack ofspace beneath the Bolin arrival stack, under which tile 
route passed. Business Air wondered it' tile carly turn was to tile left, with tile turn 
continuing right back over the airlield, this problem would be removed. ATC 
indicated that it may, although they could not guarantee tile result. 
Taking this information on board, the author designcd this casc to only permit early 
turns to the left, with north bound departures continuing to turn ovcr tile airfield. It 
was intended to check what effect this would have on cxisting delays and niovc111c1it 
rates. Little change was required to the cxisting SIMMOD filcs excclit tile addition of 
the new north bound early turn route. 
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Table 7.5 shows that whilst average departure travel 61111C PCr Movement increases 
slightly, it is offset by a corresponding decrease in average delay linic 11cr movement. 
Other figures in the table remain very close to case four. The case provides .1 total 
delay saving during the day of 18.49 hours compared to 18.15 hours 1`61- case 1`6111'. 
During the peak period the most significant change in avcrage departure delay per 
movement is from 1000 to 1100, when the figure reduces from 10.22 minutes in case 
four to 9.7-3) minutes. As with the movement rate variation mentioned in case COM-, the 
validity of this change is subýject to discussion and should not be greatly enipliasiscd. 
Case Five Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total TravelTime (mins) 7710.70 4616.80 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (nuns) 18.90 16.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 943). 10 1752., () 
Average Delay Tirne/Mov. (mins) 3). 50 6.40 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 08-0900 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 25.80 
Peak Hour for delays 09- 1000 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 1-1.08 10.01) 
PEAK PERIOD FIGITR_ ES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 4 20 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. '). 60 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per nioN. / lit- (in 11.64 
Average Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (inins) (). () I 
TABLE 7.5 
Changes in the movement rates rellect the same as case I'OUI-. The hourly departure 
rate is increased between 1000 to 1100 by 0.2 of'a movement to 21.6. '['his is 0.4 of a 
movement greater than case three, but is still not great enough to nierit serious 
consideration. During the peak period this now relates to in additional 4.9 average 
movements per hour compared to the base case. The other movement figures do not 
vary from those for cases three and four. 
The extra delay savings relate to an increased benefit from 01,757 in case t'our to 
E73,103. This does not affect tile pay back period. I Inlike case I'mir. tills case should 
not lead to extra ATC workload over that accounted I'Or in case three. For this rcasoll 
and the additional benefits, this case presents a greater optimum position than case 
three and is now the preferred solution. 
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7.2.6: Case Six - Direct Arrival from Pole II ill 
This case shifted the emphasis from departures to arrivals. 'I'lic aiin oftlic case Nvas to 
represent the work of the author and Business Air into tile direct arrival procedure 
discussed in chapter five. New arrival routes were added to the airspace file, and tile 
events file altered accordingly, to allow regional aIrcral't arrivals From Pole I lill and 
Stock in the west to use the new routing. The procedure,, and arrival spacing 
separation were left the same, although the latter was varied initially to assess its 
likely impact on delays. Unfortunately it did not improve the overall result so was lett 
unchanged. 
Case Six Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 6715.40 4614.00 
Average Travel Tinie/Mov. (mills) 25.20 16.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 1273.60 2355.80 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mills) 4.70 8.60 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements ()8-()9()() 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 24.80 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 
Peak hour del ay/nlo vernent (mills) 20. ')6 20.58 
PEAK PERIOD FIG tJRES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 41.00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 18.95 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per inov. /hr (ninis) 20.47 
lAverage Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (inins)____ I 11 13.321 
TABLE 7.6 
The figures given in table 7.6 above clearly indicate that whilst average arrival travel 
time has reduced by 3.7 minutes, average delay time per movement flor arrivals has 
increased by 1.2 minutes and by 2.2 for departures. Combined these delay increases 
all but cancel out the travel tirne reduction. During tile peak period average delays per 
arrival increased from 7.3) minutes in case Ilive to 8.9 minutes in case six, with the 
figures for departure being 12.6 and 17.8 respectively. The niaxiiiiiiin delay per 
movement for the peak period has increased by 6.8 InillUteS. 
In addition this case did little to improve peak hour movement rates. Although tile 
maximum peak hour rate shown in table 7.6 does show 0.8 ol'a movement increase, 
during the peak period all departure movement rates are reduced by a total of 2.6 
movements, whilst arrival totals remain the same Compared to Case six. The I-)CIlCt-It in 
movement rate for arrivals, is that during tile peak period the movelliclit rates hoween 
0800 and 1000 are 21 per hour greater than any prcvious case. 
149 
Whilst studying the animation, it was noted that as well as increasing the (1cpal-Wre 
queues, this simulation also did not acCUrately represent the ability of'ATC controllers 
to sequence arriving traffic From the new direct arrival routc, and the existing standard 
arrival traffic. This inability to prior plan the arrival sequence led to nussed departure 
opportunities, as optimum use of the wake vortex separation requirements were not 
made. 
Due to the reduced delay saving this case made in comparison to the base case, tile 
benefits were reduced to f 11,504. In addition costs of' introducing tile procedure 
increased to El 14,146. This would require a pay back period of 9.9 days, with 
additional recurrent costs of f 1340 per day. 
Taking the preceding information into account it is clear that this procedure, whilst 
marginally improving arrival traffic flows during the peak period, does not improve 
on case five and therefore does not represent the optiniurn solution. 
7.2.7: Case Seven - Discrete Arrivals from Dayne and Pole Hill, with and 
without holding 
This case built upon case six with the addition of a direct arrival procedure flor 
regional aircraft from the south. The route was a direct routing from Dayne to 611ill 
out on the ILS for runway 24. The routing would mean that whilst tile regional 
aircraft were subject to the same holding restrictions other aircraft taced at Daync, 
once out of the hold, the routing was a direct one. Apart frorn the addition of tile new 
routes into the airspace file and the required changes to the events 1-ile nothing else 
was changed. 
Case Seven 'a' Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 6640.20 4617.80 
AverageTravel Time/Mov. (mins) 24.90 16.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 12310 50 1 11.9 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 4.60 8.10 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-0900 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 24.80 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/movement (mms) 20.21 20.67 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate'lir. 42.40 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. ). 25 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mo\,. /hr onims) -'(). 45 jAverage Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (inins) 13.3 6 
TABLE 7.7 
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Due to the sequencing problems discovered in case six, this case was simulated firstiv 
in the same format as case six, and secondly with tile addition of' regional '111-crah 
holding stacks, just to the north and south of' tile ILS intercept path. This was 
achieved in the simulation with a simple alteration to the node holding logic for the 
specific nodes. For ease of discussion, the results for CýIsc Seven kvill be presented as 
seven 'a' and seven 'K The latter will rci'cr to the introduction of' rcgional urcraft 
holds. 
The SIMMOD results are presented in tables 7.7 and 7.9. 
Looking at travel times first, both seven 'a' and 'b' show a reductimi iii arrival travel 
time, but only on average 0.3 of a minute. Case seveii 'a' shows a inargiiial reductioll 
in average arrival delay time, whilst seven 'b' shows a slight hicrcasc compared to 
case six. Both are still higher thaii case five. 
Case Seven W Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 6647.60 4616.00 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (inins) 24.90 10.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 1100.1 2186.60 
Average DelayTirne/Mov. (mins) 4.90 8.00 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-1000 10-1 WO 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 24.40 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/movernent (niins) 19.08 1 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 44.00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. -1 (). -1) 
S 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per inov. /lir (inins) -1 0.6 1 jAverage Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr (mins) 13.461 
TA13LE 7.8 
The average arrival delays per movement during the peak period are 9.4 minutes l'or 
seven 'a' and 10.0 minutes for seven 'b". Both are greater than case six and . 11 least 
two minutes greater than case live. Average dcparturc delays during tile peak are 173 
and 16.9 minutes for seven 'a' and W respectively. Again both exceed case live by 
up to 4.7 minutes, but are both less than case six. The total delay saving comparCd to 
the base case for seven 'a' is just 0.17 minutes with the figure reducing to 0.06 
minutes for seven 'K 
In terms of movement rates it can be seen by comparing table 7.7 and 7.6 that no 
change to peak hour movements occurs, and niaxiinum peak penod illovenlent rates 
decrease for case seven 'a'. Case seven W does give a higher pcak period rate ol'44 
movements though. Total peak period departure rates are also higher than case six by 
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1.2 and 1.6 movements for case seven"a' and V respectively compared to case six. 
Neither case however equals the rate achieved in case five for the peak period. The 
increase in movements to case seven V is to departures, which increase to 23 and 
24.4 for the last two hours of the peak period. According to the planned movements 
however, it is during the first two hours of the peak period that most movements are 
scheduled. This indicates a reduced ability of this case to provide capacity when 
required. Total increases in the peak period movements when compared to the base 
case are 3.5 for seven 'a' and 3.9 for seven V. Both less than case five but greater 
than case six. 
By examining the animation for these cases, the author realised that seven 'a' 
portrayed similar problems to those outlined in case six. Seven V also disappointed 
the author, as the simulation imposed holding for all regional aircraft, which led to the 
reduced ability of regional aircraft to be released as and when traffic flows allowed. 
This raises potential problems for the use of this idea in real life. 
Needless to say, as the movement rate and delays were greater than case five, the cost 
benefit analysis results also give poorer results. According to the figures in appendix 
7.2, the pay back period for case seven 'a' is 4.8 days and 5.7 days for seven V. The 
increase for seven V being due to increased ATC workload costs and lower delay 
savings compared to seven 'a'. 
Due to the above comments, case seven 'a' and V do not provide better results than 
case five which remains the optimum. 
7.2.8: Case Eight - Steep Approach for Arrivals 
Following on from the disappointing results of case seven, this case aimed to combine 
the direct arrival procedure with a steep approach to see if together they could reduce 
operating delays. It was the intention to simulate the introduction of a steep approach 
for arrivals onto a STOL runway section of the main runway, between links 'C' and 
'D', a distance of approximately 1600m. The production of this aim posed a few 
problems for SIMMOD. The largest problem was that the current runway defined in 
the simulation had just two interface nodes, which meant that arrivals and departures 
could only enter and leave the ground at those specific nodes. This would not allow 
two separate arrival points on the same runway. To overcome this, the author had to 
add an additional runway right next to the existing one in the position the STOL 
runway would be on the real runway. With this complete, another problem arose. 
The movements on the two runways had to be coordinated to represent a single 
runway operation. Departures on the main runway could not occur whilst STOL 
arrivals were taking place and neither could standard arrivals. This was overcome 
with the use of the procedures section in the airspace file. A time blocking of 40 
seconds for standard arrivals and 45 seconds for departures was introduced, along 
with a distance blocking of 3nm for departures and Inm for standard arrivals. The 
restrictions enabled the simulation to accurately represent the scenario. With 
additional arrival routes, taxiways for the new STOL runway connecting the rest of 
the taxiways, and changes to the events file, the simulation was ready. 
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Table 7.9 gives the results of tile simulation. The travel times Show the arrival times 
-illen froin have increased from case seven, however the average delay per arrival has 1'. 
4.9 minutes in case seven to 1.2 minutes. This is boter than any previous case. 
During the peak period the average arrival delay only increases to 2.0 minutes, again 
better than any previous. Unfortunately when attention is turlicd to tile departure 
delays the true picture emerges. Average delay per departure has Increased by 4 
minutes from case seven alone, and by 5.7 minutes compared to case live. Peak hour 
delay per departure is a substantial 19 minutes greater than case five, which when 
compared to the corresponding 8.8 rninute decrease in arrival delay, dcrilonstratcs the 
real result. Combined peak period delay per movement is now L') minutes greater 
than the base case. 
Case Eight Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 6771.80 4610.70 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (inins) 25.40 16.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 308.90 3123.10 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (niins) 1.20 1 -1.1 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 08-0900 10-1 W() 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22.00 25.50 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/movernent (inins) 
PEAK PERIOD FIG URES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 41. -I 
A\,, erage Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 1 8.79 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (iiiins) 19.16 
Average Peak Period Delay per mov. /lir (niii1s) 14.85 
TA13LE 7.9 
As with previous cases, movement rate figures closely follow tile delay results. The 
peak hour arrival movement rate is one greater than previous CISCS With 37 arrivals 
occurring within the first two hours of the peak period, compared to ') I Ill case five. 
Departure movements however, show tile reverse withJust 403 being achieved Ill the 
first two hours in case eight, compared to 47 ill case live. When collibilled tile 
iriovement rate provides 1.7 extra movements compared to the base case. 
The benefits of introducing this procedure are calculatcd to be C 11,465 per day 
compared to costs of 013,585. The latter is high due to the capital investment 
required by airlines to equip the aircraft to carry out steel) approac lies. The figures 
relate to a pay back period ot'62.2 days and recurrent costs of-tIOI 0a day. 
Given the cost inf'ormation for this case, it can be seen that although dramatically 
improving arrival delays and movenicnt rates, it has all even gi-cater (Icti-iniental ei'lect 
on departures. Tills is due to the fact that the steep appi-oach ct'llectively reduces 
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arrival separation, which in turn reduces the time gap between successive arrivals to 
permit departures to take place. This tends to escalate during peak penods i-esulting in 
excessive departure delays. For this reason case eight is not the optinium for 
Manchester. The results do merit consideration by those airports Opel"ating a singIC 
mode runway operation for arrivals however. 
7.2.9: Case Nine - Steep Approach and Regional I lolds 
This case aimed to take case eight one stage lurther by adding regional holds to tile 
arrival tracks as in case seven. The aim was to help ease the departure congestion 11v 
adding the holds, which would increase the arrival separation that we discovered in 
case seven *b'. This was achieved with minor alterations to the airspace I-11c. s. At tile 
same time, the events file was altered to remove tile use ol' the steep approach 
procedure outside of the peak periods. Again it was hoped that this measure would 
help improve the departure flows. 
Table 7.10 demonstrates that these aims were not achieved. Average arrival delays 
per movement remained unchanged, whilst average departure delayS InCrCaSed. 
Maximum hourly departure delay per movement increased by 5.8 ninuites compared 
to case eight. The difference between the two cases for average departure delay 
during the peak period was also a5 minute increase flor case nine, v"1111st arrival delay 
figures remained the same. Total average delay figUres per movement were 1.8 
minutes greater than the base case. 
Case Nine Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 6792.80 4ý71.40 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (mins) 5.40 10.70 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 2 1.00 1987.40 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 1.20 14.00 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-0900 10-1 WO 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 26.00 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/movernent (mins) 3.7 8 4(). Sl) 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 40.80 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per inov. /hr (min. s') 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr (mins) 17.3,4 
TABLE 7.10 
Movement rates SLIpport the delay figures. Average peak period hourlý dCj%IrtLIrC 
movement rates decreased frorn case eight to nine. The total departure movements 
achieved during the first two hours of the peak penod were 18.2 coniparcd to 40.3 I'or 
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case eight and 47 for case five. Tills led to the spreading o I' depart tires to off peak 
periods when arrival flows decreased. Miring the peak perlod tills case achieved 0.5 
less movements than the base case. 
The cost benefit table clearly indicates that therc are no perceived beiiel-its of' this 
procedure, so costs will never be recuperated. For this reason this case reprcsents tile 
least desirable solution. 
7.2.10: Case Ten - Use of STOL runway for Regional Aircraft arrivals 
As with case seven, this was split into two separate sections. Case tell 'a' looked at 
the construction of a STOL runway to the south of tile existing ruilway, which 
commenced parallel to link 'C' and continued to parallel link 'D'. It gave a runway as 
specified in case eight of 1600m. The two runways were separated by 120 inetres. 
This was less than that specified irt the ICAO regulations I'Or irideperldcilt rullway 
operations, which required a minimum of 640 nietres separatioii due to the 700111 
runway stagger. The separation was chosen, as it allowed tile rie\\ runway to remain 
within existing airport boundaries and although theoretical, it could he M-gUed that use 
of the steep approach to the STOL runway would remove wake vortex dril't problems, 
which were the cause of the parallel separation limitations in tile first place. Case tell 
'b' was a repeat of ten 'a" but with regional aircraft holds. The ground SIMMOD tile 
was modified to show the new runway layout froni that entered ill case eight, \0111st 
the airspace file was altered to remove the procedure limitations at'i'ectiilg independent 
operations from the two runways. 
Case Ten 'a' Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 6795.00 456 1). 1 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (mins) 25.40 10.70 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (nims) 24 1.20 1298.40 
Average Dclay'l'ime/Mov. Onins) 0.90 4.70 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements ()8-()()()() 07-0800 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22.00 25.80 
Peak flour for delays 07-0800 
Peak hour delay/movement (iiiins) . 43 
PEAK PEiU-OD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 40.00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 40.10 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per n1ov. /hr (iiiiiis) 8.80 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr 5. ý -) 
TABLE7.11 
Fables 7.11 and 7.12 show the results offliese cascs. 
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The travel times for this case are no greater than previous cases, whilst departure and 
arrival delay times are slashed. Average arrival times are 2.6 minutes less than case 
five, the optimum up to this point, whilst departure delays are reduce(] by a 1,111-thcr 1.0 
minutes. Average arrival delay during tile peak period is 1.7 inkiLites I'm case ten 'a I 
and 1.6 minutes for ten 'b'. The figures lor average dcparaire delay (hiring the peak 
period are 9.4 and 9.5 minutes rcspectivcly. These figures reprc. sent a saving of' 5.6 
minutes for arrivals when cornpared to case live and 1.1 minutes lor departures. 
When comparing the maximum combined average peak period delay pcr inowinent, a 
delay saving of 4.8 minutes is achieved in this case over case I ive. 
Movement rates are also increased in this simulation. Whilst the arrival movement 
rates remain fairly static, the total peak period departure movements increased by 2.8 
when compared to case five and 7.7 movements compared to the base case. Between 
cases ten 'a' and W, it can be seen that the latter case has a slightly reduced peak hour 
departure movement rate which relates to the higher departure delay IIgUrCS in this 
case. Both cases produced a combined maximum peak hour movement rate ol'46,1.8 
movements greater than in case five. 
The costs benefit analysis clearly demonstrates that although movement ratcs and 
delays have improved significantly in this case, it has been achieved at substantial 
cost. The major costs represent the costs of constructing the new runway and 
taxiways although the author did keep this to a minimum, with taxiways Just being 
added at each end of the runway, connecting to the existing links 'C alid 'D'. Total 
costs for both cases were calculated to be f8.3 million excludiiig the addition of 
optional extras 
Case Ten W Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 0797.00 4568.80 
AverageTravel Time/Mov. (illins) 16.70 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 214.90 1 1) 10-10 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 0.90 4.80 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 08-0900 08-0900 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 21.00 2 ý. 00 
Peak Hour for delays 08-0900 07-0800 
Peak hour delay/movemerit (iiiiiis) 2.14 15.5 3, 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1100) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. lZate/hr. 40.00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 40.10 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 5 
TABLF 7.12 
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such as RNAV or DGPS. As case ten 'a' produced greater overall delay savings, its 
benefit were expected to be greater than ten V. Total benefits were calculated as 
E149,446 and E149,05 respectively. Although this was by far the greatest benefit 
figure of any of the previous cases, due to the substantially higher costs, the pay back 
period, ignoring the multiplier effect was 56 days. 
7.2.11: Manchester Summary 
In conclusion, case 10 represents the greatest benefits for expanding airport capacity, 
but does so at a large start up cost. If the land were available to the airport and it was 
felt that regional traffic would continue to play a large part of the airport's traffic mix, 
this solution may well be the optimum. 
If not however, and the airport was looking for quick, short term solutions, case five 
represents the best solution for Manchester, given the figures used in this thesis. 
Figure 7.1,7.2 and 7.3 summarise the delay savings for combined totals, arrivals and 
departures. It is interesting to note that in cases six, seven and eight the total time 
savings are due more to reductions in travel time than delays. It can also be clearly 
seen that each cases three, four and five had the largest effect on departure delays, if 
we exclude cases I Oa and I Ob. This pattern will be interesting to compare to Zurich 
with its different pattern of traffic. 
7.3: Zurich Airport 
7.3.1: Base Case 
As with Manchester, this case was set up to be the control against which the 
subsequent cases would be judged, and was set below the current operational situation 
at Zurich. It assumed that all departures left from the 28 threshold, with all arrivals 
occurring on runway 14. Aircraft were allocated routes built in the airspace file, and 
the procedures were set up for arrivals runway 14, which required no co-ordination 
with runway 28 departures, and also certain departures from 28 which required co- 
ordination depending on aircraft type. Arrival and departure procedures were split 
into three types, with different blocking times and distances to reflect the controllers' 
use of arrival and departure time restrictions for wake vortex and aircraft speed 
variations. For arrivals a blocking time of 45 seconds was programmed for regional 
aircraft, with additional blocking distance separation of 2nm. The figures for small 
jets were 55 seconds and 2run, increasing to 65 seconds and 2nm. For departures, the 
separations were a blocking time of 45 seconds and distance blocking of 2nm for 
regional aircraft following regional aircraft, increasing to 55 seconds for small jets 
following regionals, also with a 2nm blocking distance. For regionals following the 
largerjets, a time separation of 50 seconds was imposed with 2nin distance blocking. 
Initial results of the simulation showed that substantial arrival airspace congestion was 
occurring during peak period. This related to arriving aircraft being directed into 
holding stacks at Schafhausen and Ekron and subsequently sequenced for arrival 
along the final approach path, which was a converging path from each holding stack 
157 
co 
(n E cu U) 
(n 
C%S o E3 1: 1 c -j 
110 ;m 
7; (wu 
4--o 
C. ) 
q tv), I, ý)s u, 
SI) 
II 
E 
(F) 
===C==== 
=C=CC= 
C 
(suqAj) Jl'. ) S)SPH 1110.11 II0! )!. 1(I 
N 
158 
C 
Zu 
-=2 
41-1 
gj OJ 
4-o 
C. ) 
cu 
ch 
m a) C 
QC) E M, cu U) 
co 13 1: 31 
I 1, ýJ. wn. v)s )sý 
cJ- 
== 
==C. = 
CCCCC 
CCCC CC 
--I-- 
(SUIR) '. )%*I', ) tuo. 1) 
13 1: 3 
159 
iý 
0) ' 
a) cu cn a) 
E a) L) E> cu I U) 
d) cn C 
13 13 
0 
*Z 
z2 
-Z Gn 
0 ýW 
J2 
Z- ce 
aw 
C. ) 
a, " 
r 
I- 
E - 
"r) 
- 
(sill Jj) 5J 5I IUO. lj UO! )l!! t(I 
I (A) 
onto the ILS intercept. In an attempt to help the simulation overcome sonic ol' these 
congestion problems, the metering logic within SIMMOD was invoked. I'llis 
defined certain airspace nodes as meter nodes, m points \Nlici*e the incter control logic 
could successfully initiate the control ot'downsti-cani logic and a metcr post [lode \\as 
set up at the critical ilierge point, in this case the point where tile mo arrival paths inct 
at the ILS intercept. 
The use of this meter logic improved the arrival situation and led to the rcstills given 
in table 7.13. It can be seen from the appendix 7.3 tables I and 2 that the peak period 
for Zurich was between 0900 and 1400. During tills period the peak arrival delay per 
movement was 33A minutes, although a maximum arrival delay per movement was 
achieved between 0600 and 0700 at 5.6 minutes. The corresponding departure delay's 
were 3.1 minutes in the peak period and 8.8 minutes between 0800 to 0900. Froill 
table 7.13 it can be seen that the average delay per movement oý'cr the whole 
sin-iulation are very similar for arrivals and departures. Average arl-l\'al delay per 
movement during the peak period was 2.2 Minutes and 1.6 minutes 1`61- departUrCS. 
Close examination of the delay figures in the appendix, show that whilst arrival delays 
are reasonably contained within the peak period, significant departure delays are 
incurred before and after the peak period. 
Arrival movement rates are on average 26 per hoLir during tile peak period and 27 I'or 
departures giving a combined average of 53) per hotir. Whilst this is well below tile 
APATSI recommended level ot'60, it is noted in table 7.11 that the niaxinnini peak 
period movement rate was 59, whilst maximum arrival and departure movement rates 
were 31 and 36.2 per hour respectively. 
Base Case Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 977-1.00 Q, 74.80 
AverageTravel Time/Mov. (rnins) 1.90 1-10 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 747.50 71)8. ()() 
Average Delay Tirne/Mov. (mins) 2.44 2.00 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 11 100 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 111.00 
Peak Hour for delays 06-0700 
Peak 110Ur delay/inovement (mins) 5.5 8 8.70 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0900-1400) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Ratc/hr. ýS. 00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Ratc/hr. 1). -1 () 
MaxMIL1111 Peak Period Delay per nim., hr omin, ý) -1 , 74 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr (inins) 1.921 
TABLE7.13 
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These figures set the standard on which the fOllowing cases almed to improve. As 
with Manchester, a cost benefit analysis ol' the base case was not tindcrtakcil, as the 
focus is with variations from this case. 
7.3.2: Case Two - Intersection Departures 
As with Manchester, this case was developed From the base case \\ Ith tile introduction 
of two intersection departures for runway 28. One additional taxiway needed adding 
300m from the 28 threshold, along with a new departure queue Mid ýISSOCIItCd routes. 
The second intersection departure was for regional props Only and Utilised part ol'the 
existing taxiway link '13' taxiway, from the apron to runway 12 threshold. This 
taxiway placed the props 550m upwind ofthe 29 threshold. As before tills required a 
departure queue adding and associated routes. Tile final Illod I ficat loll required was to 
the procedures file. Related procedures for these new intersection (1cpartures were set 
up so that departures from link '13' were blocked t1or 50 seconds and 2.5nni following 
a departure from the 28 threshold, and 50 seconds and 2.2nin fL)r departures froill tile 
first intersection following threshold departures. Departures froin link '13' blocked 
threshold departures by 55 seconds and 2nni, tile same as departures froill tile first 
intersection followed by threshold departures. These procedures \vould ensure that 
wake vortex and speed variation separations were observed. In addition to these 
procedures, a limited number of departures were allowed froin runway 10 during tile 
peak periods to help ease congestion oil runway 28. As runways 28 and 16 
intersected, a time blocking of 50 seconds was introduced I'Or departurcs from either 
runway following a departure from the other runway. As tile departure paths di\'crged 
once airborne. no distance blocking was used. 
Case Two Arrivals Departure Totals 
s 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 9774.40 9264.50 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (niins) 31 . 90 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (rnins) 736.47 701). 60 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (inins) -1.40 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 12-1 100 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 11 1.00 17.00 
Peak Hour for delays 00-0700 08-0900 
Peak hour delay/movenictit (Inins) 5.56 7.40 
PEAK PEZIOD FIGURES (0900-1400) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Ratc/hr. 4 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 8 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per nim-Air (mins') I 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per rilov. /hr (inins) 141) 
TA It 1, F 7.14 
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The results for this simulation are given in table 7.14, which show that average total 
delay times per movement for arrivals and departures have marginally improved. 
These improvements are unfortunately very small, being around 0.2 of a minute. The 
greatest delay reduction appears to be for departures, which also show a reduction in 
average travel time per movement. Maximum peak hour departure delays per 
movement have fallen by 1.3 minutes whilst remaining the same for arrivals. Average 
peak period delay figures support those already given. 
The movement figures ftu-ther support the delay figures. The peak hour movement 
rate for arrivals compared to the base case has remained the same, whilst the departure 
rate has increased by 0.8 of a movement. Departure movement rates during the peak 
period are marginally higher for the hours of 1000 to 1100 and 1200 to 1300 
compared to the base case. 
Given the above results, it can be seen that the improvements are focused on 
departures and relatively insignificant, especially when the SIMMOD validity issue is 
considered. A cost benefit analysis was undertaken, (see appendix 7.4). Costs were 
calculated to be E157,204, higher than Manchester due to the construction costs of the 
new intersection. Benefits were only E8,063 which gives a pay back period of 19.5 
days. 
Whilst this case appears to improve on the base case, the very marginal differences 
outlined may well be due to programming errors. In which case this simulation would 
represent no improvement. 
7.3.3: Case Three - Early Turns After Take Off on runway 28 
Following the poor results of case two, early turns after take off were introduced for 
regional aircraft departing from runway 28. As with Manchester, the introduction of 
this procedure in SIMMOD required the addition of new departure queues and 
airspace routes. The procedures file was altered to reduce the blocking distance for 
threshold departures following early turn traffic, from 2nm to 0.5nm. Obviously 
departures, following previous early turn departures along the same routing, were 
restricted to the same 2nm departure separation requirement. 
Table 7.15 clearly shows that total average departure delays per movement have 
decreased by 1.5 minutes. The arrival figure remains unchanged from the base case 
however. The maximum peak hour departure delay is 6 minutes less than the base 
case. The difference between the average departure delay per movements for this case 
and the base case was 0.8 of a minute. This reduction hides the fact that departure 
delay per movement during the peak period was less on all occasions than the base 
case. 
Movement rates for departures are also increased during the peak period in this case. 
The peak hour figure given in table 7.15 shows an increase of 1.8 movements over the 
base case. Arrival movement rates remain the same however. Outside the peak 
period the hourly departure rate between 0700 and 0800 increased by 2.8 movements 
compared to the base case. Finally by looking at the tables in appendix 7.3 it can be 
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noted that this case has achieved more departures during the peak times, with less 
spreading of departures until later, as was seen in prc%'IOLIS CýISCS. 
Case Three Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 9770.70 9201,80 
Average Travel Tirne/M_ov. (nims) 1.90 30.70 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 743.90 338.60 
Average Delay Tirne/Mov. (irims) 2". 4 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 12-1-100 
Peak Hour Movement Rate -31.00 3 8.0 0 
Peak Hour for delays 06-0700 07-0800 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 5.54 -1.76 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0900-1400) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 59,00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per ii-ioN. /hr (niiiis) 3-04 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per. mov. /hr (mins) 1.48 
TABLE 7.15 
Not Surprisingly the cost benefit analysis reflects this improved system efficiency. 
Whilst total costs increase fl, 340 from case two to allow IOr increased ATC 
controller workload, to E158,544, the benefits increase by f29,436 to . 
07.499. This 
gives a pay back period of just over 4 days. 
The results of this case clearly show an improvement over the base case unlike case 
two, and as such represents the optimum solution for Zurich so I'ar. 
7.3.4: Case Four - Case 3 with Steep Approach runway 28 
The airn of this case was to simulate the STOL arrival procedure at /Lll-lCI1 dISCUSSC(I 
in chapters five and six. In addition to this scenario ncw RFT's wcrc added to runway 
28 before the 28/16 intersection, to help reduce the arrival runway occupancy time. 
The results given in table 7.16 make interesting reading. Average arrival travel times 
increased by 0.5 minutes per movement, which relates to tile longer routing I'Or 
arrivals using runway 28. Unfortunately arrival delay per movement also shows an 
increase of I minute compared to tile base case. Departure delay per movement has 
also increased compared to case 3 by 0.5 minutes. Peak liour delays for arrival are 
greater than the base case by 2.3 minutes. whilst departure figures show a slight 
improvement over case three. Maximum combined peak period delays were 1.6 
minutes greater than case three. During the peak pcnod hourly movement delay's lor 
arrivals were greater than the base case for the whole period, with departure figures 
being greater than case three t1or the whole period. 
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Case Four Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME, 
Total Travel Time (mins) 9908, S0 1) 199.1 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (initis) 3 2.4 0 0.7 0 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 1047.3)0 
-504.50 Average Delay Time/Mov. (niins) 3.4 1.68 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 12-1300 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 110.00 
-3,7.2 0 Peak Hour for delays 11-1200 12-1100 
Peak hour delay/movement (niins) 
- 
7.87 2.41) 
101) FIGURES (0900-1400) PEAK PEW 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 4, o2 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr (inins) -1.67 
TABLE 7.16 
Hourly arrival movement rates were less than the base case flor the I irst till-cc hours of 
the peak period and greater for the last two, as the simulation attclliptcd to compensate 
for the earlier lower movement rates. A similar situation is found t'Or tile departure 
movement rates. The maximum peak period combined movement rate shows a slight 
improvernent over case three, but a lower average rate over tile whole peak period. 
Due to the fact that this case resulted in increased delays from tile base case, tile 
author felt that there was no point in conducting a cost benefit analysis, as tile costs 
would have been even greater than case three due to tile need to add steep approach 
modifications to the regional aircraft. What is very interesting to note Froill this case 
is that the aim of reducing arrival delays was not achieved in spite ofintrodUCIng this 
new procedure and RET's. In addition departure delays were increased. which call be 
explained by the need to increase departure separation to permit arrivals. This 
problem was also noted with Manchester. I Int'Ortunatcly due to tile inflexibility of'thc 
SIMMOD take off run and landing roll variation, the blocking time that is applied to 
movements may be excessive. but is required to account Ior tile time a movement uses 
excessive landing roll or take off run time. This may well account for tile lack of' 
apparent movement rate increase, even t'ollowing tile addition ol'the RFT's. 
7.3.5: Case Five - New Runway Operation Pattern 
This case was an attempt to assess il'a new runway operation pattern would 1111provC 
operating delays. The new operation envisaged all Jet arrivals oil runway 14, as 
previous, but this time with all departures offrunway 16 in(] regional aircraft arrivals 
on runway 28. This case was to represent the new hase case with lisc of Intersection 
departures on runway 16 From link 1" flor regional aircraft, Which Would then carry 
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out an early turn. In setting up the SIMMOD t-ilcs, altcration was rcLitfircd to tile 
procedures file. The new operation allowed lndcpcndcnt arrivals for 14 and 28 to 
continue. as in case four, but now also allowed independent departures Frolil 11111W. IV 
16. Blocking times and distances for intersectlori departtires following threshold 
departures on 16, were 50 seconds and 2nin 11or sinaller. 1cst aiid 55 seconds and 2.511111 
for larger jets respectively. Threshold departures were blocked by 55 seconds and 
0.5nm following intersection departures carrying out tile elrly turn. In addition to 
these changes, a new departure queue was added at the 16 intcl-scctioll and new 
departure routes off 16 added forjets and early turn trall-ic. 
From table 7.17 it can be seen that this case has reduced average arrival travel time by 
3 minutes compared to case four, and 2.5 minutes from the base case. Dcparturc 
travel time has unfortunately increased by 3.3 llIillLltCS oil average from the base case, 
due to the longer taxi distance now involved. Total delay times per movement are no 
better for arrivals, whilst departures have increased frorn case I'Mir and are now 0.8 
minutes greater than the base case. The peak hour departure dclay per movement is 
now 14.4 minutes, a massive 5.6 minutes greater than tile base case. This in turn 
relates to greater combined peak period delays, on average 2.6 minutes greater than 
the base case, all related to increased departure delays. 
Departure movement rates also failed to meet the base case standard. The peak hour 
departure rate was 4 movements below the base case and 5.8 movements below case 
3. Arrival peak hour rate was also one movement below the base case. During the 
peak period 2 less arrivals and 4 less departures were achieved compared to the base 
case. The consequence of this lower movement rate was increased movement spread 
into the off peak periods. 
Case Five Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 9007.40 1 () 16 1,10 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (niins) 29.40 3 4. 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 1029. ý() 1062.90 
Average Delay Tirne/Mov. (nuns) 3.4 0 3. 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 1, -14()() 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 110.00 -1 -1. -1 () Peak Hour for delays 11-1200 13-1400 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 7.90 14.41 
PEAK PEiTIOD FIGURES (0900-1400) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. ýýQ. 00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 52.00 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per nim'. /hr 7.74 
jAvcrage Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (nims) 4.45 
TA13LE 7.17 
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As with case four, due to the lack of delay savings over tile base case there was no 
point conducting the cost benefit analysis. It is clear that 111 111 cases, cxcclit tile 
arrival travel time, this case represents tile worst so Car. The I-C(ILICtIOll of intcrscctioii 
departures from three to two and the condensing ofall dcparttires to dic saille runway 
may account for this increased departure delay, but tile rest must be due to tile 
SIMMOD operation restrictions. 
7.3.6: Case Six - Case Five with Regional Departures on runway 28 
As a follow up to case five, the author decided to see what woLild happen 11'reglonal 
aircraft departures were now permitted oil runway 28 along with regional ill-rivals. 
Departures were scheduled to go from the 28 threshold to mininilse their effect oil tile 
arrivals and used the existing procedures, including the early turn, froin case flour to 
prevent conflict with existing runway 16 departures. 
Table 7.18 shows that compared to case five, the average arrival travel times have 
increased by 3 minutes whilst departure figures have decreased by 1.4 minutes. 
Average arrival delay times remain the same as case five, but departure delays have 
decreased by 1.8 minutes. If these travel time and delay variations are added lip tile 
result is no gain at all. Peak hour figures do show a distinct improvement ill average 
delay per departure of 8.8 minutes over case five, 3.2 minutes better than tile base 
case. Arrival delay for the peak hour increased from tile base case by 2.4 minutes. 
All these results are supported by the peak period delay figures, whicli show a 
reduction from case five but still above the base case. 
Case Six Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 9907.60 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (mins) 32.40 1 
DELAY TIME 
Total DelayTime (mins) 100.50 511 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 3.43) 1.70 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 12 -I 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 30.00 . 
11 
Peak Hour for delays 11-1200 13-1400 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) 8.02 ýI . 0- 
1 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0900-1400) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr (inins) 4.62 
Average Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 
TA It 1, El 7.1 
Movement rates show that arrivals are tinaftectcd during tile peak hour whIlSt 
departures increased by one movement compared to case five, but still were three 
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movements short of the base case. During the peak period the combined movement 
totals for this case were 3.8 short of the base case. 
Case six then, whilst improving on case five departure movements, still under 
performs in all other areas and therefore provides no 'tangible financial benefits 
compared to the base case. 
7.3.7: Zurich Summary 
As with Manchester, the combined results for each case discussed above are given in 
figures 7.4,7.5 and 7.6 for total, arrival and departure delay variation from the base 
case. Looking at figure 7.4, it can be clearly seen that case three represents the 
optimum solution in terms of delay time reduction. Figure 7.5 indicates that all the 
cases did not significantly improve arrival delays, with the last three making the 
situation worse. Figure 7.6 on the other hand does show that departure delays 
fluctuated depending on the case quite substantially. Case five is clearly the worst 
case, as both travel time and delay times increased, whilst the improvement of case six 
on this is clearly evident. 
If we compare figures 7.4 and 7.1, we can see that the magnitude of the base case 
variations between Manchester and Zurich are quite different. The maximum time 
improvement for Zurich is case three at approximately 600 minutes. The best 
Manchester scenario however achieves improvements of approximately 3300 minutes. 
From this, it can be seen that use of regional aircraft special procedures at Manchester 
gives greater time benefits than at Zurich. It does not mean that Zurich cannot 
achieve the larger time savings, just that the results of the case studies in this thesis 
would not permit this. 
7.4: Gatwick Airport 
As mentioned in chapter six, SIMMOD work was also carried out for London 
Gatwick, but to a lesser extent than the previous airports studied. Results from this 
work will be presented very briefly as a comparison to the first Manchester cases. As 
demonstrated in chapter four, Gatwick represents the busiest single runway, multi 
mode operation in Europe. This simulation began with the setting up of the current 
Gatwick airfield and airspace layout, taking information from the British Airways 
AERAD charts. Once this was constructed the events data was added, using the same 
source as Manchester. 
Three cases were completed for Gatwick. The base case assumed the same as 
previous ones, with departures all commencing from the beginning of the starter strip 
for runway 26L, with no arrival or departure traffic sequencing. Case two introduced 
intersection departures for regional traffic from holds 'B' and 'C', 300m and 700m 
respectively from the beginning of the starter strip, with changes to the procedures file 
to maintain separation requirements. Case three was split into three sub sections 
looking at the effect of introducing early turns after take off for regional aircraft. Case 
three 'a' introduced an early right turn for all Gatwick departures with southbound 
departures turning back later on, climbing above the standard jet departure routes. 
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The case only allowed regional turboprops to carry out the early turn. Case three 1), 
allowed regional jets to carry out the early turn and case three V licrinitted carly left 
turns for all regional aircraft departing Gatwick to the south. 
Base Case Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 112 50.00 7088.50 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (mins) 3 6.1) 0 1. X, 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 2611.00 8949.00 
Average Delay Tinie/Mov. (niins) 8.56 27. ý4 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-1000 10-1 WO 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22.67 21.17 
Peak Hour for delays 09-1000 1')-14()() 
Peak hour delay/movement (mins) _3 
5.02 64.7 
PEAK PEKI-01) FIGURES (0700-1300) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 41.00 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. -19.30 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mo\!. /hr (mins) 4.15 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (mins) 
TABLE 7.19 
Results for each of the cases are given in tables 7.19 to 7.23. with a detalled 
breakdown of the figures given in appendix 7.5 
Case Two Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 11249.90 7094.70 
AverageTravel Time/Mov. (mins) 36.90 21.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) -5 6 
8. 693-1.70 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 8.42 21.. ) 3) 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-1000 13-1400 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22.4 0 -1-I. oo 
Peak Hour for delays 09- 1000 1 -)-1 -, ()() 
Peak hour delay/movemcnt (mins) ')5.07 -ý0.00 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1300) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Ratc/hr. 43.40 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 19.80 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (im I 1.,, ) 1-1.82 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per_niov. /fir (mins) I ) 
TABLE 7.20 
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Comparison of the base case and case two show that whilst arrival dclavs I-cmalil 
fairly static, average departure delay per movement has dccreased by 6.2 11111111te. "', 
with a reduction in peak hour departure delay per inovenicilt of' 8.2 niffltites. These 
delay savings come between 1000 and 1200, at the peak departure times. 
Movement rates also reflect this story with little change to arrival rates. departure 
movement rates during the peak hour have increased by 1.4. During the peak period .1 
total of 2.8 extra departure movements are achieved. 
The cost benefit analysis figures for Gatwick in appendix 7.6 clearly show that tills 
case caused an increase in costs compared to the base case of C52,204. Bellefts 
gained however are just over three times the cost at C161,798. Compared to 
Manchester, the total delay figures for arrivals and departures 11-C gl-Cýltcr' but the 
increase in movement rates during the peak period are also greater, with greater total 
time savings from the base case, which consequently relates to the greater bcilct-Its. 
This is the first case where benefits have been greater than costs and relates to a paN 
back period of just under a third of a day! 
Case Three 'a' Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) 112 ý 1.00 7075.10 
Average'l-ravel Time/Mov. (mins) 3 6.9 0 -11.80 
DELAY TIME 
Total Dela-yTirrie (mins) 2546.60 6164.80 
Average Delay Tirne/Mov. (ruins) 835 11). ý8 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-1000 1')-1400 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22.40 22.80 
Peak Hour for delays 
1 
09-1000 12-1 100 
Peak hour delay/moverne nt (mins) 14.8 1 55.60 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1300) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 4 1. 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 119.90 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per mov. /hr (truns) 
Average Peak Period Delay per inov. /hr (mins) 
TA13LE 7.21 
'File results presented for case three indicate furtlicr improvements from the base case. 
Within the three sub sections to this case, it call be seen Croin the tables that little 
variation occurs between each, with no overall improvement in peak period delay or 
movement rates. Combined to the base case however, tills case has further 1111111-oved 
delay per movement for arrivals and departures oil average, althoLigh the peak hour 
figures remain the same as case two. Total 111OVeillClItS ýICIIICVCCI LiLlring the peak 
period are also an improvement oil case two, although only by 0.5 of' a Illoveillelit. 
Again this raises the concern of data validity from SIMMOD. The collibillcd total 
delay and travel time variations for the Gat-vN-ick cases are prcscnted in figure 7.7. 
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This supports the preceding findings. The cost benclit figul-cs also show tills case to 
present the optimum solution with a new pay back penod of. just OVC1' a LIUMICI- 01' il 
day. 
Case Three W Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVEL TIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) I 125 1.70 7()7-. ()() 
Average Travel Time/Mov. (mins) 30.90 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 25 5 6.4 0144. 'ý() 
Average Delay Time/Mov. (mins) 8.38 1 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09-1000 1.1-1400 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22-40 -)) 80 
Peak Hour for delays 09- 1000 1 -, -1 
Peak hour delay/movernent (mins) 34.91 ý0.18 
PEAK PER-IOD FIGURES (0700-1300) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 90 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per rnov. /hr 
(mins) 
jAverage Peak Period Delay per niov. /hr (inins) 
TABLE 7.22 
Compared to Manchester. the lower increase in magnitude of' tinic saving and 
movement rate improvement can probably be explained by examining thc trat'fic mix 
during the peak period for both airports, which shows that more regional departures 
occur at Manchester in this time than at Gatwick. 
This therefore allows the simulation more opportunity to reduce c1cparturc separation 
and consequential delays. ]'his being stated, tile magnitude ot'llic time saving I'or case 
three at Gatwick is still greater than Manchester. Reasons 1,01. tills Illay lie (tile to the 
intensity of congestion at which both airports opcratc. NVIIII. St Manchester is 
congested, it is not as congested as Gatwick. This Is clearly visible I'l-0111 tile tral, fic 
schedules. As both airports operate a very similar runway olicration, the delay 
variations must be due to these differences in traffic delliand. 11' I'l-0111 this we 
speculate that Gatwick is at a higlicr level than Manchester Oil tile congestion line, and 
that the line shows a tendency towards exponential growth, as call be see 1'1'0111 
figure 7.8, which has been derived from figurc 2.5, then small clizingcs to lielp case the 
intensity of congestion for Gatwick will have a greater el'lcct Oil dekly reduction thall 
at Manchester, due to the sensitivity ofthe system. In the diagram. reduction in tile 
intensity of congestion is achieved by impicillenting procedures to lielp provide more 
capacity during peak times, or by erilorcing capacItY 111111t. s. Oven the nature of' the 
diagram it can be applied to any airport system. t'or instance a S11111lar Comparison to 
that given could be made For Zurich and I Icathrow, both multiple 1-111may, single 
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mode operations, but Zurich at the lower end of' the congestion scale to I Icatill-oNN. 
Further implications ol'this diagram xvill he returned to III tile Ilext chapter. 
Case Three V Arrivals Departures Totals 
TRAVELTIME 
Total Travel Time (mins) I I-, ý 1.00 7004.00 
Average TravelTime/Mov. (nuns) 30.90 
DELAY TIME 
Total Delay Time (mins) 2555.90 03 10.00 
Average DelayTime/Mov. (ruins) 8.38 NAS 
PEAK HOUR FIGURES 
Peak Hour for Movements 09- 1000 11-1400 
Peak Hour Movement Rate 22.40 -1 1). -1 () 
Peak Hour for delays 09- 1000 1 -)-1 
Peak 110Ur delay/movement (nuns) 34.91 5o. 18 
PEAK PERIOD FIGURES (0700-1300) 
Maximum Peak Period Mov. Rate/hr. 41.80 
Average Peak Period Mov. Rate/lir. 90 
Maximum Peak Period Delay per nim. /lir (nmi,, ) N 
Average Peak Period Delay per mov. /lir (in i ns) og I 
TABLE 7.23 
Impact of ChangeN ill Airport CongeNtiOll to , 11(lilgeS ill 
Total DelaYN 
LGW 
MAN 
1111se ( 'Ilse 
011fillmill ('Ilse 
Intensity of Congestion 
FIGURF 7.8 
This concludes the presentation ofthe SIMMOD and cost I)CIICI-lt analysis rcsults 1,01, 
the airports in question. The tinal section of this chapter will present (lie findings of 
the questionnaires. 
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7.5: Questionnaire Results 
7.5.1: Rcgional Airlines Questionnaire 
The results of this questionnaire are contained in appendix 7.7. The results will be 
presented in two sections. 
The first section will analyse the tables listed in the appendix. Of tile 21 airports 
listed as causing operational delays, 14 have been highlighted by the regional airlines 
as ones which they feel could make use of special procedures. Ofparticular note are 
Amsterdam, Gatwick, Heathrow, Manchester, Milan Linate, Rome Fitirnincino and 
Zurich. which also were outlined as having both inbound and departure delay 
problems. The three UK airports and Amsterdam also, reinforce the issue by being 
mentioned by more than one airline in their responses. 
Figure 7.9 shows the current percentage use of special procedures by the respondents. 
Intersection departures and early turns are clearly the favotiracs. commanding over 
two thirds of the total usage. Three of the airlines currently use steep approach 
procedures, whilst use of STOL runways and separate arrival and departure tracks are 
of limited use. In addition to this it was noted that none ofthe procedures had been 
certified. 
Percentage Breakdown of Special Procedures Currently in Ilse 
Combination 
Separate Arr/Dept. 7 
Path 
7% 
STOL/Scpar: 
RWY 
4% 
Steep Approach 
11% 
FIG tI RE 7.9 
, rSeCtion DLpt 
When the airlines were asked to give their opinion oil tile ability of tile procedures 
described to help solve airport congestion. they seemed uncertain as to whether tile 
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Early Turn 
33% 
procedures represented a short term or long term improvement, although a slight 
majority for short term did prevail. 
Finally, figure 7.10 gives the percentage breakdown of which obstacles the airlines 
felt existed to special procedures. Responses were fairly well spread, although airport 
and/or government restrictions, and ATC restrictions, were the largest. It is 
interesting to note that the problem of poor communication between affected parties, 
rates nearly as high as problems with local pressure groups. This confirms results 
discovered by the author whilst working with Business Air and the arrival trial mto 
Manchester airport. At the other end of the scale, the respondents did not really teel 
that they were being blocked in terms of their entry and exit to congested airports bN 
the major airlines. 
Percentage Breakdown of Factors Restricting Use of Special Procedures 
Poor 
Communication 
171/6 
Local Pressure 
Groups 
19% 
Dominant Major 
Other Airlines 
FIGURE 7.10 
Airport/ 
Government 
Restrictions 
3 1014 
The second section of the results relates to the second part of' the (I I lest iollnM I, e. 
Appendix 7.8 shows the questionnaire oil which are marked the most common answer 
in each case, along with a breakdown of responses per question. Fo make sense of 
these results, the questions have been grouped to cover certain issues. ATC issues are 
covered by questions 1,18,19,30 and 33. For question I the 1'ecling was that A VC, 
workload would not increase with the introduction ofspecial procedures. This leads 
onto question 18, where they also f'eel sufficient spare airspace exists to introduce tile 
procedures. They were uncertain whether or riot these routes should be self-sufficient 
from ATC or not, which fits with the response given to question 30, where they would 
like to see co-ordination of the procedures between themselves, the airport and A R'. 
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ATC Restnctions 
25% 
With all this being said, they did feel that ATC controllers were not given the 
flexibility to use special procedures. The overall conclusion to make from this is that 
ATC operating restrictions are not thought to be a problem and it is felt that sufficient 
slack exists in the system at present to absorb regional aircraft special procedures, if 
required. 
The need to maintain access to congested airports was covered by questions 4,11,17, 
23,26,29, and 38. From the responses given to these questions came a strong feeling 
that regionals should maintain access to the congested airports, and strongly resist the 
attempt to move them to reliever airports. 
General perceptions of special procedures were covered with questions 2,6,16,20,22 
and 27. From the responses, it can be concluded that they do not expect the regional 
aircraft size to grow and remove the potential of special procedures. They indicate 
that not enough use of the regional aircraft performance capabilities are made, which 
is related to lack of knowledge. The issue is seen as a runway capacity problem, but 
not limited to airports with more than one runway. Finally the procedures are seen as 
a long term solution to congestion. 
Comparing the results found in part I to the factors restricting the use of the 
procedures, major airlines are not seen as a block to their use. Environmental 
restrictions, whilst recognised as a potential restriction, are not expected to 
significantly increase operating costs for the procedure. Problems with regulations do 
arise however. It is felt regulators are too short sighted when it comes these 
procedures, whilst perceived safety implications are seen as low. Attempts to move 
regional airline operations to off peak periods are not welcomed, as it is felt larger jet 
traffic and regionals can operate safely, without making special allowances in 
commercial operations. Questions 35 and 37 make interesting comparisons as, whilst 
the regional airlines would like to see more done at European airports to implement 
special procedures, they recognise the fact that regulators need to take every users' 
interests into account. 
Finally this section asked for opinions on landing charges, accuracy of navigation and 
costs associated with the use of the procedures. There was a strong response 
indicating that landing charges were unfair to regionals. A feeling also comes across 
that they felt that introduction of GPS and RNAV would be a major part of the new 
procedures. The costs to introduce the procedures however, were not expected to be a 
limiting factor. 
Discussion on the implications of these results will be made in the next chapter. 
7.5.2: European Airport Questionnaire 
50% of mailed questionnaires were received with a total of 13, (appendix 7.9). The 
varied types of airports that responded is reflected in the answers given. The variation 
in figures given for the percentage of regional traffic in the total traffic mix was high, 
from 4% to 50%. As it was the purpose of this questionnaire to target airports with a 
high percentage of regional aircraft movements, the author was partially successful. 
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The type of regional traffic the airports received though showed a split between point 
to point and hub feed. Airports which did receive the regional hub traffic were 
Copenhagen, Stockholm Arlanda, Heathrow, Amsterdam and Frankfurt. Airport 
charges were all very similar. All the airports used aircraft weight related charges for 
landing, but did not for passengers. Parking charges were also predominantly aircraft 
weight related. This would indicate that differences in regional aircraft weights 
compared to larger jets was accounted for, although how the exact fees vary during 
peak operation periods was not discussed. This shall be returned to in the next 
chapter. 
The second aim of the questionnaire to target congested European airports was 
successful with 8 out of 13 showing they were congested. 7 of the 13 airports detailed 
runway and taxiway enhancements, but only Manchester and Stockholm planned to 
build new runways. Most of the airports expected regional traffic to increase in the 
future, but three did expect it to decrease. 
Of the airports using special procedures, the majority were early tums after take off, 
Nearly all felt these procedures helped improve capacity, although Zurich indicated 
that use of the STOL arrival procedure on runway 28 increased departure delays. The 
largest concern over the use of these procedures was environmental and political. 
Comments attached to this expressed concern over the future environmental problems 
with the conflict being well expressed by Manchester's statement which highlights the 
concern over possible environmental restrictions hindering large scale future use of 
regional aircraft special procedures. 
Of those airports not using special procedures, the primary reasons were no demand 
and environmental. From this group only two felt there was a need to develop special 
procedures. 
Finally and in apparent contradiction to the regional airlines, the airports felt these 
special procedures represented a short term solution. However Frankfurt does openly 
support the procedures as long term. The other comments attached to this response do 
make interesting reading, especially those which point to the removal of regional 
traffic to reliever airports. It seems in conclusion that the use of special procedures 
will be determined by the airline demand and their relative importance at the airport in 
question. 
7.5.3: Major European Airline Questionnaire 
Although this questionnaire was targeted, the response rate was still low, (appendix 
7.10). The aim of discovering the importance the major airlines placed on the 
regional hub feed can however be speculated from the responses. 
Six out of the seven respondents had a franchise agreement with regional airlines, 
with the majority of these rating the importance of their agreement highly. Problems 
with German airports were highlighted, along with Oslo Forriebu, Copenhagen and 
Stockholm Arlanda. The airlines appeared uncertain over the question of future 
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changes in regional aircraft size, although they felt it unlikely that regionals would be 
moved to reliever airports. Their expectation was that improved technology would 
enable regional aircraft to remain at the primary airport. Finally a few comments were 
made which have been added at the end. These appear to be fairly abstract with some 
airlines expecting high speed trains to replace some regional traffic, whilst others 
expect technological advances to remove some of the current congestion problems. 
Increasing aircraft size is also anticipated which may render the regional aircraft 
special procedures antique. 
7.6: Summary 
This chapter has made some interesting discoveries by the looking at the results 
produced. Interesting comparisons between the SIMMOD results for Manchester, 
Zurich and Gatwick were made, with brief speculations as to the cause of these 
variations. 
The questionnaires, whilst all having a fairly low response rate, have nevertheless 
brought to light some interesting points, and helped the author to appreciate the 
intricacies of applying special procedures from other points of view. They have also 
given the author a feel for the perceived importance of regional aircraft special 
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CHAPTER 8: Research Recommendations. 
8.1: Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the extent to which the regional aircraft special procedures, 
outlined in chapter five, are applicable for implementation in Europe. The arguments 
put forward will, whilst taking into account the results evaluated in the previous 
chapter, take a wider view when considering potential application. This will be based 
on the experience gained by the author during the pmctical projects undertaken at 
Manchester and Gatwick airports. This is to take account of factors the specific 
research could not cover. 
8.2: Intersection Departures 
The SIMMOD results presented in chapter seven for Manchester, Zurich and Gatwick 
airports, all showed that the introduction of this procedure reduced operating times 
and especially departure delays. Table 8.1 below provides a summary of the 
SIMMOD results. The figures given reflect changes from each airport's base case and 
use the best simulation results for the particular special procedure. 
Time and Movement Changes due to introduction of Intersection Departures 
Airport Travel Time 
Saving 
(mins) 
Delay Time 
Saving 
(mins) 
Total Time 
Saving (mins) 
Chg. in Peak Hour 
Dept. Rate from 
Base Case 
Manchester 80.6 379.7 460.3 +0.7 
Zurich 107.9 99.4 207.3 +0.8 
Gatwick -6.0 2059.7 2053.7 +1.4 
TABLE 8.1 
As can be seen in this table, whilst improvements for all the airports are visible, 
compared to their respective base cases, there is a marked difference in the magnitude 
of the changes between the airports. Zurich shows the lowest improvement, with a 
total time saving around ten times smaller than that of Gatwick, and roughly half 
Manchester's total. Changes in the peak hour departure movement rates whilst almost 
identical for Manchester and Zurich, are nearly double for Gatwick. 
The reasons for these differences are due to two factors, level of runway congestion 
and runway operation mode. Whilst Manchester and Gatwick are both mixed mode 
runway operations, Zurich is single mode. As the mixed mode runway reaches 
saturation with a heavy arrival traffic flow, the number of required time gaps is 
reduced between successive arrivals to allow a departure out. This leads to increased 
departure delays, as aircraft wait for an appropriate time gap to appear. If the situation 
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gets sufficiently congested, ATC restrict arrivals to allow departures out. At 
Manchester for example, arrivals are spaced at 6nm intervals, which relates to 
approximately 160 seconds. Allowing 60 seconds for an arrival to land and exit the 
runway, and 60 seconds for the following departure to go, this spacing allows for a 40 
second buffer to account for slower than expected reaction times and exit times from 
the runway. ' The actual use of this procedure however, will be affected by the number 
of pending arrivals, current size of the arrival holding stacks, and level of traffic 
congestion in the surrounding TMA airspace. If for instance there are a large number 
of arrivals over a short period of time, the ATC controller will tend to clear the 
arrivals in with minimum spacing, which will restrict departures, but then allow a 
longer gap before the next arrivals, to allow out more departures. Departures may also 
be left restricted by arrivals if the departure routes are congested. The effect on a 
mixed mode runway is to lead to an increased departure delay per movement in 
comparison to a single mode runway, as if an aircraft does not have a sufficient time 
gap between two arrivals, then it must wait until after the next arrival has landed and 
cleared the runway. A single mode runway only has the restriction of the departure 
speed tape explained in chapter two, which although it enforces dead time restrictions 
where no runway movements occur, it will guarantee departure clearance once the 
wake vortex time separation expires. This helps explain the reason behind Zurich's 
relatively low reduction in departure delay as all departures go off the same runway, 
along with the fact that the total system is operating at a lower level of saturation than 
either Manchester or Gatwick. At lower levels of system saturation, it is much harder 
to further reduce delays than at higher levels. This was discussed in figure 7.8 in 
chapter seven. 
The use of intersection departures was closely witnessed by the author at both 
Manchester and Gatwick from the ATC tower, through discussions with the airport 
authorities and on the flight deck with Business Air at Manchester. The following 
discussion reflects the experience gained during this time. 
Manchester 
At Manchester, the author undertook many jumpseat trips with Business Air in and 
out of the airport. Departures from both 06 and 24 runways were experienced from 
both the runway ends and intersections. Each runway had two possible intersection 
departure points, link 'B' and 'C' for 24 departures, and 'F' and 'E' for 06 departures. 
The distance of each of these intersections from the runway ends are listed below: 
Link'B'= 300m from 24 TORA 3 
nmway end 
2700m (Same as threshold dept 
for wake vortex 
separation) 
Link'C'= 810mfrom24 TORA 
runway end 
2186m 
Source: NATS (1994) Reduce Delays by Not Wasting Time on the Runway - Briefing Paper on Manchester 
Runway Occupancy for Pilots operating at the airport. 
2 For reference refer to the Manchester aerodrome chart in appendix 6.3 
3 TORA = Take Off Run Available 
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Link 'F' = 250m from 06 TORA = 2793m (Same as threshold dept. 
runway end for wake vortex 
separation) 
Link'E'= 580m from 06 TORA = 2456m 
runway end 
It was standard practice for all aircraft departures to go from the runway ends due to 
noise abatement restrictions, although departures from 06 were more restricted by this 
than 24. Intersection departures were given to Business Air, both when traffic levels 
were high in the morning and also in lighter periods in the afternoon. The move was 
welcomed by Business Air, which had 47.5% of its departures from Manchester 
delayed 10 minutes or more between 2 May -31 July 1994. The absolute effect of the 
intersection departures was not always a reduction in departure delay. On bad days, 
when the weather was poor and the airport limited to full IFR procedures, departure 
delays for Business Air were recorded at around 30 minutes, even with the 
intersection departure. On these days aircraft were stacked up at all three departure 
points for the runway, as well as queuing up along the taxiway. Start up clearances 
were also delayed to prevent aircraft departing from stand and further blocking the 
taxiways. As the taxiways became more congested, it became harder for the controller 
to sequence departing traffic due to the lack of passing places. This was more 
significant for runway 06, which did not have a departure sequencing pad at the time, 
unlike runway 24. The consequence of this was to hinder the controller's ability to 
sequence departures depending on the departure SID. Due to the configuration of 
Manchester's SID's, north and south bound departures followed the Pole Hill and 
Conga SID's respectively, which diverged from the other departure tracks by 90" at 
2nm from the departure point. This enabled controllers to release the next departure 
sooner than would have been possible if both aircraft had been following the same 
SID. Unfortunately when the taxiways were blocked, this sequencing was not 
possible and departure time separations increased, so increasing delays. 
In addition to the jump seat rides, the author also discussed the use of intersection 
departures with the ground and tower controllers at Manchester, and the ATC 
management staff there. Following the discussions, three further concerns were raised 
over the use of intersection departures at Manchester. As was discussed previously, a 
40 second time buffer was placed on arrival separations to allow for slow pilot 
reactions either by the arriving or departing aircraft. In the briefing paper ATC issues 
to pilots using Manchester, it was noted that a reduction of 7-8 seconds in average 
arrival-departure-arrival spacing, through reduced runway occupancy, would allow 
one extra arrival and departure per hour on Manchester's runway. The paper went on 
to explain that this could be achieved by arriving aircraft targeting the earliest suitable 
exit and expeditiously vacating the runway, whilst departures should line up promptly 
and start the take off roll immediately when cleared. The departure case was the most 
frustrating for ATC controllers, as once they cleared the aircraft for take off, it was 
taking on average II seconds before the aircraft started to move. This was due to 
pilots completing final checks, but that affected the tight time separation between the 
next arrival. In certain cases, delay times between clearance and roll were as much as 
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30 seconds. Relating this problem to intersection departures, if Business Air took off 
from link 'C' on runway 24, the company operations manual dictated that the take off 
engine power must be applied, whilst remaining on the brakes, to ensure maximum 
acceleration. The restriction was directly related to take off run availability, which 
from this intersection was limiting. This process of increasing engine power whilst on 
the brakes, meant slower response times to the take off clearance than would have 
occurred had the aircraft departed from link 'A' or 'B'. Assuming similar restrictions 
applied to other airlines, depending on aircraft performance, there would be an 
unavoidable time delay between ATC clearance and commencement of the take off 
roll. 
ATC also raised two ftirther problems that they had with intersection departures. In 
order for ATC to provide a fair service, they are obliged to deal with aircraft on a first 
come first served basis. With intersection departures, it can occur that an aircraft at an 
intersection can fit into a slot between two successive arrivals, but is restricted from 
doing so by ATC, as it would place the aircraft ahead of other aircraft at the threshold 
that had arrived there earlier, therefore having a greater priority for departure. This 
conflicts with the departure sequencing plans of ATC, with the solution being an 
unquantified compromise. If for instance the intersection departure aircraft is not 
excessively down the departure list compared to the aircraft waiting at the threshold, 
and the threshold departing aircraft will be cleared for take off shortly after the 
intersection aircraft, then the intersection departing aircraft can be cleared first, for 
take off. If these conditions are not- met, then generally, the intersection departure 
must wait its turn. The situation is also affected by the direction each aircraft wishes 
to go, as was previously explained. Finally it was pointed out to the author, that the 
ability to accurately separate arriving traffic by 6nm depended very much on ATC 
controller experience. Due to the nature of the shift working patterns of controllers, it 
would be impossible to avoid situations where relatively inexperienced controllers 
were on in high traffic levels. This would affect the efficiency of the runway mixed 
mode operation, as inexperienced controllers tended to increase separation above 6mn 
to avoid possible go-arounds, and give themselves an increased margin of safety to 
play with should anything go awry. A lot of this was due to the controllers lack of 
confidence in the pilot's ability to consistently deliver minimum runway occupancy 
times. 
The final restriction on the use of intersection departures was due to a time problem 
for Business Air. When taking intersection departures from link 'C' for runway 24, 
there was insufficient time for the cabin attendant to complete the pre-flight safety 
brief to the passengers, before the aircraft was ready for take off, assuming no delays 
from ATC at the intersection hold. This was due to the fact that Business Air parked 
at the end stands of the domestic pier at Manchester, right next to link 'C'. 
In summary intersection departures, whilst used at Manchester where applicable, are 
restricted by a number of factors which tend to be of a human nature and hard to 
remove. These factors, generally, could not be accounted for in the SIMMOD model, 
which would tend to suggest that the SIMMOD figures for intersection departures at 
Manchester were overly optimistic. Business Air's departure delays did however, 
appear to improve in 1995 compared to 1994 as delays of 10 minutes or more only 
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affected 41.5% of departures between I April - 13 August 1995. This will be returned 
to when early turns after take off are discussed, as the improvements were not due to 
the use of intersection departures alone. 
Gatwick 
The same problems with the use of intersection departures at Manchester, were also 
faced at Gatwick but on a greater scale, as the airport was operating at its peak 
capacity for a longer period than Manchester. In addition,, Gatwick faced much 
greater restrictions on the airspace surrounding it. The need to sequence traffic from 
Heathrow, Stansted, Luton, as well as Gatwick, through the same airspace, meant that 
often departures from Gatwick would be held up until the airspace, through which the 
aircraft wished to fly, was able to take an extra movement. This required much tighter 
co-ordination between the tower controller at Gatwick and the area controller at West 
Drayton, which would handle the departure almost as soon as the aircraft left the 
ground at Gatwick. 
The author had the opportunity to discuss the use of special procedures at Gatwick, as 
part of a project sponsored by the BAA Plc. Discussions were held with Ian McBean, 
Manager ATC at Gatwick, and Mike Wildin, a group supervisor at NATS, West 
Drayton and previously an ATCO at Gatwick. Visits were also made to the visual 
control room at Gatwick and the CCF control room at West Drayton. 
As with Manchester, Gatwick has intersection departure points at both ends of 26L 
and 08R. Departures from 26L have the option to depart from either link 'A' at the 
end of the runway or link '13'. Link 'C' can also be used for smaller aircraft when 
traffic permits, but is not generally used in heavy traffic periods. For 08R links 'D' 
and 'E' can be used. The distances of these intersections from the runway end, and 
associated TORA values are as follows: 
Link'A'= Om from end of 26L TORA= 3098m 
Link'B'= 280m from end of 26L TORA= 2894m 
Link'C'= 580m from end of 26L TORA= 2438m 
Link'D'= 400m from end of 08R TORA= 2786m 
Link'E'= Om from end of 08R TORA= 3159m 
Due to the relative closeness of links 'A" and '13', ATC can treat departures from both 
intersections as the same point for wake vortex separations. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case for links 'D' and 'E', although an additional intersection is expected to be 
built for 08R to allow the same concession as 26R by Spring 1997. At the time, the 
author visited the visual control room, Gatwick was conducting a wake vortex 
avoidance trial for departures. This enabled the controller to reduce the departure 
separation between successive departures from a minimum of 2 minutes, to 40 
seconds if the wind was either a 7kts crosswind or more, or greater than 15kts in any 
direction. This was allowing for the effect of the wind in dispersing the wake 
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vortices. The benefits for departures are obvious with a 80 second time saving if the 
procedure could be applied, i. e. an extra movement. In addition the ATC controllers 
also demonstrated frustration with pilots runway occupancy on landing, especially on 
runway 08P, mirroring the problems faced at Manchester. 
The effectiveness of tight co-ordination between the tower and area controllers, was 
also observed by the author at Gatwick. This being said, gaps were still present in the 
system when runway occupancy time was lost due to either departure restrictions or 
poor consolidation of arrival traffic. This latter problem was more apparent as traffic 
levels began to ease in the early afternoon and arrivals began to arrive at a lessor rate. 
This led to the removal of the need for large holding stacks, with a direct arrival route. 
Unfortunately, for the tower controller, this coincided with the peak departure period, 
which was harder to control with arrival separation being more variable. Although not 
considered in this study, it may well be worth considering, if it is not already the case, 
holding arrivals for an additional period to help aid the area arrival controller in 
providing optimum separation, by consolidating arrivals and helping minimise 
departure separation. Obviously, there would be a compromise in terms of arrival 
versus departure delay to be made in this case. 
As can be seen from this look at Gatwick, many of the problems found at Manchester 
are repeated, as are the attempted solutions which focus on departure sequencing 
depending on departure route; north bound versus south bound at Gatwick; use of 
intersection departure points close enough to the runway end to prevent increased 
separation requirements; and a shaky trust by the ATC controllers in the pilots to 
maintain required separation distances. More detailed developments are used at 
Gatwick which reflect its greater level of congestion. In both cases the intricate 
methods employed by ATC in this area, were not modelled in the SIMMOD 
simulations, which suggest the time savings achieved by SIMMOD may be either an 
over estimate of actual conditions, or even possibly an under estimation, if actual 
controllers can more accurately predict traffic flows and adapt accordingly. SIMMOD 
does though give a general picture of any possible outcome. 
Use of Additional Systems 
Taking the above examination into account, possible system additions that could help 
improve some of the problems highlighted now merit discussion. The principle issue 
concerning the use of intersection departures, is the accuracy with which ATC 
controllers can separate arriving aircraft, with the associated problems of poor pilot 
reaction to clearances leading to unnecessarily high runway occupancy times. 
To help the ATCO's accurately separate aircraft, many approach sequencing aids have 
been developed, as discussed in chapter four. When these are linked to precision 
runway monitors, they should enable the controller to more confidently know the 
exact position of each aircraft. The success of this will depend on improving 
controller confidence in the systems, and provision of sufficient monetary funds to put 
the systems into operation. The aim of the introduction will be to reduce the buffer 
applied to arrival separation. 
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The ability to solve the problem of controller mistrust in a pilot's ability to precisely 
follow speed and altitude restrictions within a set time frame is harder to achieve. In a 
busy arrival stream, the controller will have a mental plan of how they see the traffic 
arriving. The largest concern for the controller is with speed reductions as aircraft 
slow at variable rates. This could be due to either high cockpit workload at the time of 
the request, adverse weather orjust slow reactions. With the consequence of reduced 
separation between the aircraft ahead, assuming the previous aircraft reacted quickly 
to the speed reduction, the importance of improving the reaction time is evident. The 
best solution probably lies with greater education between the controllers and the 
pilots. The pilots need to appreciate the necessity to quickly and accurately respond to 
the controllers' requests, and the controllers need to appreciate the demands on the 
flightdeck at certain stages of the flight. Hopefully with increased co-operation from 
both sides and possible procedural modifications, the problem could be reduced. 
The final area where the author feels that improvements could also be made, is in the 
ATC tower and ground controller co-ordination, as regards sequencing traffic for the 
DSP. Solutions to this could be recommended by a computer traffic optimising 
system and displayed to both controllers to help them sequence traffic. This would 
need accurately updating with aircraft departure routes and current status of the 
departure queues, as well as arrival traffic patterns. 
Restrictive Regulations 
As was seen at Manchester, the largest restriction on the use of intersection departures 
is from noise restrictions. In using intersection departures, aircraft will take off further 
up the runway, resulting in the aircraft being lower over the first built up areas upwind 
of the departure runway, than it would of been had the aircraft departed from the end 
of the runway. 
The use of noise preferential routes also adds to the problem, as they restrict the 
number of departure options available to ATC, so reducing their ability to make use of 
reduced separation based on diverging aircraft tracks. 
Given the current focus on environmental issues in Europe, the relaxation of these 
regulations is very unlikely. Instead it is more likely that the restrictions become more 
stringent at existing airports and applied to airports currently unrestricted. 
Other Concerns with the Procedure 
For airlines to use intersection departures, new performance figures are required to 
account for the reduced TORA and the fact that the aircraft will be closer to the. 
departure obstacles. With changes in take off techniques, crew training is also 
required, as discussed with Business Air at Manchester. From discussions with 
airlines at the ERA operations meetings, attended by the author, there was a mixed 
response to intersection departures. Some welcomed the idea, while others were more 
cautious, especially if they had many young and inexperienced flight crews. Concern 
was also expressed with engine fatigue, as intersection departures generally required 
higher engine power settings compared to departures from the threshold. 
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Finally, airports generally welcomed the use of intersection departures in reducing 
departure delays but expressed concern over any increases in noise emissions. - 
Applicability to Europe 
Taking into account the above discussion and the figures provided by the SIMMOD 
simulation itcan be stated that the use of intersection departures does reduce departure 
delay without significantly increasing arrival delays. The procedure has been 
demonstrated to be applicable to both single and multiple runway operations and 
could be applied relatively cheaply to all European airports with sufficient traffic 
demand and taxiway construction. Table 8.2 breaks the applicability into two 
sections, those airports which currently have runway intersections less than 300m 
from the departure threshold and those that do not and would require additional 
taxiway construction to do so. 
Applicability of Intersection Departures at European Airports 
Intersections Available Intersections Requiring Construction 
London Heathrow Barcelona 
London Gatwick Madrid (Rwy - 33) 
Mancheste Palma 
Glasgow Marseilles 
Birmingham Nice (Rwy - 23L) 
Alicante Paris Orly 
Madrid (Rwys - 36,15,18) Lisbon 
Lyons (Rwy - 18R) Athens 
Nice (Rwy - 05R) Munich 
Paris Charles de Gaulle Milan Linate 
Amsterdam (Rwys -01L, 24,22) Milan Malpensa 
Brussels (Rwys- 25R, 02) Rome Fiumicino 
Cologne Bonn (Rwys- 14,32R) Geneva 
Dusseldorf (Rwy - 23L) Zurich 
Frankfurt (Rwy - 18) Helsinki 
Hamburg (Rwys - 23,3 3) Stockholm Arlanda 
Vienna (Rwys - 29,16,3 4) 
Copenhagen (Rwys - 22R, 04R, 12) 
Oslo (Rwys - 24,16) 
Source: Derived from British Airways AERAD Charts 
TABLE 8.2 
As can be seen from the table the scope for application is significant. Application of 
the procedure could be expanded if use of the land after procedure was employed,. 
mentioned in the APATSI report, with arrivals being given landing clearance based on 
the aircraft currently completing its take off roll. This would work well if the time 
gap between successive arrivals was too small to permit a departure from the 
threshold, but may also work if a regional aircraft, with a shorter take off roll time, 
commenced departure from an intersection further up the runway. 
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To summarise, application of intersection departures will be most advantageous for 
currently congested, mixed mode, single runways due to the sequencing restrictions 
explained. The application on single mode, multiple runway, systems will be 
dependent on the runway usage, configuration and traffic pattern. In all cases 
simulation of the system will be required to determine if the potential time saving will 
justify changes to the system. Finally, in it's favour it represents the most heavily 
used special procedure currently in use with regional airlines in Europe at 37%. 
8.3: Early Departure Turn 
The combined SIMMOD results are given in table 8.3. It can be clearly seen that all 
airports achieve an improvement in delay time saving and improved peak hour 
movement rates compared to both the base case and the results for the intersection 
departure, with the use of this procedure. As before though, considerable variation 
exists in the improvements between the three airports. 
Compared to the base cases, Gatwick reaps the largest reward, twice the time saving 
of Manchester and over four times greater than Zurich. The total time savings for 
Gatwick are around 600 minutes, (10 hours), when compared to the intersection 
departure results with the figures for Manchester and Zurich being around 750 
minutes, (13 hours), and 420 minutes, (7 hours), respectively. So whilst the largest 
delay time saving occurs at Gatwick for the use of the early turn procedure, the 
greatest improvement compared to the intersection departure case goes to Manchester, 
which also achieves the best peak hour movement rate improvement. Finally, for 
Manchester and Gatwick the best of the variations in use of the early turn, are cases 
four and three V respectively. 
Time and Movement Changes from Base Case due to introduction of 
Early Turns 
Airport Travel Time 
Saving 
(mins) 
Delay 
Time Saving 
(mins) 
Total Time 
Saving 
(mins) 
Chg. in Peak, 
Hour Dept. 
Rate from Base 
Case 
Manchester Cs3 139.8 1086.4 1226.2 +2.8 
Manchester Cs4 151.5 1089.3 1240.8 +2.8 
Manchester Cs5 106.6 1109.4 1216.0 +2.8 
Zurich 174.3 463.0 637.3 +1.8 
Gatwick Cs 3a 12.4 2649.2 2661.6 +1.6 
Gatwick Cs 3b 14.8 2659.7 2674.5 +1.6 
Gatwick Cs 3c 22.9 2674.7 2697.6 +2.0 
TABLE 8.3 
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The reason for these time savings and increased movement rates reflect the operating 
systems increased flexibility to deal with departures as defined in chapter five. The 
results clearly support this theory although the variations mentioned above are 
interesting. It is clear that the improvements on single, mixed mode runways exceed 
those on single mode runways. This is for the same reasons as discussed for 
intersection departures. Differences between Manchester and Gatwick are due to the 
differences in traffic patterns. Gatwick has a higher concentration of traffic and a 
reduced arrival time gap as more of the arriving aircraft are of the same wake vortex 
category. This means that standard separation between two successive arrivals is 
more commonly 3nm than at Manchester, which leaves too little time to release an 
early turn departure after an arrival, before the next arrival reaches the threshold. It is 
these factors which explain the lower peak movement rate improvement than at 
Manchester. The larger reductions in delay times at Gatwick than Manchester are due 
to the situation explained in figure 7.8. 
Variations between the Manchester and Gatwick early turns prove that the more 
flexibly the early turn is used the greater will be the time delay saving, as was proven 
at Manchester in the changes between only early turns in one direction for cases three 
and five and turns in both directions after take off in case four. This enables ATCO's 
to maximise the use of the departure sequencing speed tape reductions. At Gatwick 
case three 'c' also reflects the use of early turns left and right after take off whilst the 
previous cases had restricted use of the procedure to right turns only. It should, 
however, be noted that the difference in the time saving between these sub cases is 
very small, so if restrictions do exist with turns in one direction, use of the turn in the 
opposite direction may not significantly reduce the procedure's ability to reduce 
delays. This will be expanded on below. 
Manchester 
Use of the early turn at Manchester was discussed in chapter five. Following the 
author's experience of the procedure at Manchester and further discussion with ATC 
there, additional points of interest were found. Firstly, for operation of the early turn, 
close co-ordination was required between the tower and area controllers, due to the 
radar vectoring the aircraft required to stay clear of existing departures and arrival 
traffic vectoring from the Bolin holding stack as shown in figure 8.1. Once clear of 
conflicting traffic zones direct headings were given to position the aircraft back on 
track to the north of Pole Hill. Due to the traffic conflicts this procedure caused at 
times of high traffic demand, each departure would have to receive special ATC 
clearance prior to being released. 
Discussions with the Business Air pilots indicated that the procedure did not generate 
any undue problems for them or the aircraft. This being said, the instruction to the 
pilots from ATC in carrying out the early turn was, 'Cleared to turn at your 
discretion.... ', which did tend to cause pilots to turn a heights above 500ft. Much of 
this was due to the need to carry out immediate cockpit checks and raise the landing 
gear before commencing the turn, during which time the aircraft was often climbing 
above 500ft. The turn was then completed with flaps at the take off setting to prevent 
stalling should an engine fail, with a full clean up once clear of the turn. 
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Due to noise complaints the procedure was restricted to turboprop aircraft snialler than 
the BAe ATP, and only permitted for right turns at ATC instruction. In addition, it 
would only be used by ATC during heavy trallic Periods where its II. SC would help 
reduce departure delays. 
Early Turn Track. ftoin Manchewer 
4 Pole Hill 
Bolin SID Track 
A rrival Stock SID 
Slack 
ý. 4*1"/ 
Track 
Arrival 
Trat-A 
T Tr 
Early Turn 
rack 
\V - El ýkrcas of, 
Conflict 
FICAIRE 8.1 
Gatwick 
Due to existing exemptions to the NPR's for turboprop aircraft with MTOW's less 
than 17,000kgs, (i. e. Jetstrearn 31 and 41, Dash 8, Donner 229 and '129, Banderante, 
Brasilia, Saab 340 and Shorts 360) and the Dash 7 in tile I JK Al llý the use of' early 
turns has been used for some time at Gatwick. Unf'ortunatcly tile most common 
regional aircraft movement at Gatwick today is the ATR 42 aild 72 of' CIty Flyer 
Express. Neither of these aircraft are exempt from tile NIT's \\hich means they have 
to follow the published noise routes. 
An allowance for the A, rR 42 has been made by ATC to pCI-IllIt a turn 01'50' OITOIC 
runway centreline track after take offat 0.5 nin oil the ILS DMF. Aftcr tile turn tral, fic 
is handed to LATCC and radar vectored as required to intercept ItS HIMICICd 1111,11 
track. Use of the procedure is limited to title weather Conditions its tile pilots must 
maintain separation Visually. Use of' tile procedure saves 2-1 minutes [it departure 
delays the Gatwick tower controllers argue. 
The procedure could not be applied to the ATR 72 although ATC wish this it could. 
This is due to vociferous and influential airport 1101se canlpalgilcrý'.;. I'llere are three 
key built up areas that restrict possible operations, Charl\ýood, (North West of' 
Gatwick), Crawley, (South West ot'Gatwick) and I lorlev, (North Fast of'( iat\\ ick). 
Uril'ortunately these three areas account flor 75'/`(') of' optimum carly lurn options at 
Gatwick. Off runway 261, turns and headings of' -'10' or 2230') are gi\ cn or 040' or 
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030* off runway 08R. The aim after the turn is to climb to 3000ft as soon as possible 
to extradite the aircraft from the NPR restrictions and allow radar vectors to be given. 
Due to the number of departures from Gatwick heading north and east, the restriction 
at Charlwood is the most significant. Two trials were conducted by ATC with the. 
first turning the aircraft onto a heading of 300% flying to the west of Charlwood 
before continuing the turn north. Unfortunately due to weather conditions this often 
led to aircraft drifting back onto the extended runway centreline track. The second 
option on trial was to turn the aircraft after take off to fly to the east of Charlwood. 
Problems this time occurred with the tightness of the turn for pilots and the drifting of 
aircraft over Charlwood. 
In addition to the early turn, Gatwick have also introduced new SID's for high 
performance jets. They are specified for LAM, CLN, WIZAD, and SFD departures 
and route via Mayfield VOP, over the top of inbound traffic, hence the need for high 
rates of climb once airborne. The SID's give ATC increased departure route 
flexibility and the ability to quickly depart the faster jets instead of having them fly at 
reduced speeds behind heavier, slower jets. The use of the SID's are limited to ATC 
discretion however, dependent on the arrival traffic flows. 
In the future Gatwick ATC are pursuing the ability to authorise early turns for ATR 
72's and easterly departure clearances to climb above the Biggin Hill stack for 
Heathrow. Restrictions on the Southampton departure flows are also being sought, 
currently limited by route saturation from Heathrow at peak periods. 
Additional Improvements 
As can be seen from the questionnaire results and preceding discussion, the use of 
early turns is currently fairly limited. To help increase their use more accurate and 
reliable track keeping will be required from the aircmft to help overcome some of the 
noise issues. This will require PRNAV to be fitted to the aircraft and improved radar 
accuracy. Track making could be given using a DGPS system integrated into the 
PRNAV system. Whilst this sounds expensive and a long way off, as was mentioned 
in chapter 4, BRNAV will be mandated in Europe by 29 January 1998, which should 
permit improved use of early turns up to a point. Finally, some account of the weather 
is required due to the problems discussed at Gatwick. Improved radar updates will 
also enable controllers to see and respond to apparent aircraft deviations from track 
sooner than at present. 
Restrictive Regulations 
Obviously noise is once again the primary issue stopping use of this procedure. Also 
of concern is the flight safety aspect, with the presence of built up areas or significant 
terrain under the early stages of the turn. This will require a full performance analysis 
prior to use of the procedure by each aircraft type, to assess the critical effect of turns 
at low level with an engine failure at the crucial moment. At multiple airport systems 
such as London and Paris, airspace restrictions will also need taking into account as 
mentioned at Gatwick to prevent aircraft infringing other airport's airspace. 
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Other Concerns 
Effective use of this procedure will require airline crews to be trained to carry out the 
procedure, while ATC controllers will need clear guidelines as to the available and 
likely times to use early turns. Accurate definition of these operating procedures will 
take time, but are the best way to ensure optimum use under the current regulatory, 
operating environment in Europe. Any procedure that is drawn up must be careful to 
provide enough flexibility in it, to allow the early turn to be used at the spur of the 
moment when sufficient gaps in the arrival traffic permits. 
Applicability to Europe 
Results of the SIMMOD simulation and current use prove that use of the early turn 
does significantly reduce departure delays and in doing so provides the best solution 
to improve operating delays during the peak periods short of building or operating a 
STOL runway. Unforturiately its use is tightly restricted and the absolute effect of the 
procedure is largely dependent on traffic mix and flows, with greatest benefits 
accruing for mixed mode runway operations. 
With these points taken into consideration, this procedure could be applied to any 
European airport without the need to alter either the current airport infrastructure or 
aircraft avionics initially. Optimally the use of this procedure would be combined 
with intersection departures. In addition if the early turn in one direction can not be 
made, it is worth considering a turn in the opposite direction that continues all the way 
round to the desired flight heading. This was discussed at both Manchester and 
Gatwick. 
Finally where restrictions do block use of the early turn in one direction, the 
possibility of turning the other way, with a continued turn back over the airfield, 
should also be considered. Whilst it may increase the total track distance compared to 
a standard departure, the departure delay savings should be more beneficial. 
8.4: Discrete Arrivals (SALS) 
As before the combined SIMMOD results are given in table 8.4. This time it can be 
seen that whilst time savings were made for both airports compared to the base case, 
excluding cases 5 and 6 for Zurich, they are nowhere near the magnitude of the 
previous procedures. It is also clear that of the two airports, Manchester clearly 
achieves a more significant time saving than Zurich. In addition the predominant time 
saving was the travel time, reflecting the shorter arrival routings for regional aircraft 
that this procedure permits. For Zurich the delays are even greater than the base case, 
with the maximum peak hour arrival rate reduced by one. Peak hour departure rates 
are reduced for both airports compared to the early turn case, with significant 
reductions in delay time savings using SALS compared to just early turns, as a 
consequence of the departure movement rate reduction. The figures for the revised 
runway usage at Zurich clearly demonstrate that use of SALS has not helped ease the 
congestion there. 
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Time and Movement Chang, es from Base Case due to introduction 
of SALS 
Airport Travel Time 
Saving (mins) 
Delay Time 
Saving (mins) 
Total Time 
Saving (mins) 
Chg. in Peak flour Rate 
Arrival Departure 
Manchester Cs 6 1104.7 175.4 1280.1 0.0 +1.8 
Manchester Cs 7a 1176.1 360.5 1536.6 0.0 +1.8 
Zurich Cs 4 39.2 -6.3 32.9 -1.0 +1.0 
Zurich Cs 5 -221.9 -546.9 -768.8 -1.0 -4.0 
Zurich Cs 6 -756.0 -15.1 -771.1 -1.0 -3.0 
TABLE 8.4 
The reason for these poor results is due to the interaction of a less optimised arrival 
sequence on a mixed mode runway, resulting in a reduced number of required 
departure intervals between successive arrivals. This could clearly be seen during 
both Manchester and Zurich animation's, which showed increased departure queues. 
The greater time savings for Manchester compared to Zurich, reflect the higher 
percentage of regional aircraft in the total traffic mix for the airport, with greater flight 
path reductions Possible at Manchester. 
The limitation of modelling this procedure in SIMMOD was the inadequacy to 
represent the ability of the ATC controller to predict and sequence arrival traffic, 
accounting for the new procedure. This will need accurate modelling in order to 
determine the exact effect of this procedure, as better sequencing would reduce the 
effect on departing traffic. By how much, will depend on how optimally the arrival 
traffic can be sequenced and how the procedure will effect controller workload. 
Practical Studies 
The results discussed above, reflect those found at Manchester with the Business Air 
direct arrival procedure as discussed in chapter 5. The largest area of concern to ATC 
in this trial was the lack of time the procedure gave them to sequence the direct arrival 
with aircraft arriving along the standard route. In addition, introduction of this 
procedure during peak times was ruled out, due to the results of the trial and 
expectations of significant increases in controller workload in arrival sequencing due 
to the increase in arrival points on to the extended ILS that needed resolving. The 
consequence of this ATC predicted was a reduction in the runway movement rate 
during peak times. 
They suggested that if Business Air had been able to conduct steep approaches, the 
procedure may have been more successful, as the SALS traffic and remaining traffic 
could of remained separated like the Frankfurt procedure described in chapter 5. 
Unfortunately this was not feasible, so it was agreed in November 1995 to cease the 
trial. %ilst the trial had not proved a success, during the time spent at Manchester, 
both ATC and the airport became more appreciative of the need for Business Air to 
maintain punctual arrival times, due to its interline commitments, as well as the 
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performance capabilities of the Saab 340. This is clearly visible in figure 8.2, which 
shows the reduction in the percentage of departures from Manchester delayed over 10 
minutes, for the 1994 and 1995 summer period. The overall result then, whilst 
disappointing in the fact that the trial could not be applied during peak periods, was, 
in the author's opinion, a success. It became apparent during the project at 
Manchester that ATC were already offering as flexible a system as they could, with 
minimum separations and direct routings to the ILS as soon as traffic levels permitted. 
If the SALS procedure had been formalised it may have limited the previous 
flexibility of the controllers. This does not negate the attempt however, due to the 
improved knowledge everyone involved gained of each others operation, which 
hopefully will be considered by each in future proposed procedure developments. 
Similar results to Manchester were found at Zurich, where ATC stressed to the author 
that use of the STOL arrival for runway 28 had led to a drop off in the departure 
movement rate, due to the need to increase the time interval between successive 
departures to permit arrivals to land and clear the runway. Case 5 and 6 figures 
indicate that even if runway 28 was reserved purely for regional aircraft, the situation 
does not improve where you have arrivals and departures off the same runway. 
The use of SALS at Manchester and Zurich did not lead to a significant improvement 
in system efficiency, in fact it led to a reduction. SALS was successful at Washington 
National and New York JFK though. The problem was that Manchester and Zurich 
were both attempts to introduce SALS onto existing operational runways, whilst the 
examples in the US had been using previously closed runways, which had no 
conflicting approach paths. At Manchester and Zurich a degraded departure 
movement rate was the result both times, due to the complexity of fine tuning a 
sensitive mixed mode runway operation. It is the author's opinion that for SALS to 
be a success in Europe, a separate or purely single mode arrival runway is needed. 
Improved ATC approach sequencing aids and RNAV equipped aircraft will also aid 
successful implementation of this procedure, as was the case in the US. The other key 
to look at with the use of SALS is to examine where the regional traffic is segregated 
to commence it's approach. Must all traffic go through the same holding stack? If 
traffic is segregated earlier, will this affect other airport's arrival and departure routes? 
These are questions that still require answers and it is the authors belief that where 
you segregate traffic will be specific to each airport due to local operating restrictions. 
Finally, as has already been touched upon, the use of the steep approach may also 
benefit the procedure, but this will be discussed in more depth next. 
Operational restrictions will be noise based and careful evaluation of new built up 
areas being over-flown will be required. 
With these points taken into account, application of SALS in Europe, whilst relatively 
cheap to implement has relatively limited application at present and will require a 
change in operating philosophy by ATC and encouragement from the airlines before 
much ground is gained. It is also dependent on airports operating a single mode 
arrival runway. 
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8.5: Steep Approach Concept 
Table 8.5 indicates that the introduction of the steep approach procedure at 
Manchester, whilst improving on the base case results, does not provide the time 
savings offered by the early turn procedure. Delay time savings are even down on the 
SALS case. Arrival peak hour movement rate has increased as has the departure 
figure. Unfortimately the increase in the latter figure occurs later in the morning at 
10-11.00, reflecting the reduced ability to move departures during the peak morning, 
hours. 
A study of the animation for these cases verified the development of large departure 
queues during the morning peak period. This was due to the reduced arrival 
separation, down to 3nm for all arrivals as the regionals avoided the wake vortex 
separation penalties. This can be seen by comparing the arrival delays for Manchester 
between cases five and eight. A three-fold reduction in the steep approach arrival 
delay figure can be seen. If the departure delay figures are compared for the same 
cases, the cost of this arrival delay reduction can be seen. 
Time and Movement Changes from Base Case due to introduction 
of Steep Approaches 
Airport Travel Time 
Saving (mins) 
Delay Time 
Saving (mins) 
Total Time 
Saving (mins) 
Chg. in Peak Hour Rate 
Arrival Departure 
Manchester Cs 8 1051.6 172.8 1224.4 +1.0 +2.5 
- Manchester Cs 9 1079.9 -503.6 576.3 +2.0 73 0 
TABLE 8.5 
From the following analysis it can be concluded that for a mixed mode runway 
operation, the introduction of steep approaches for arrivals will increase peak hour 
movement rates compared to the base case, but not related to the early turn after take 
off case. More importantly though, it significantly increases operating delays for 
departures. In addition there will be a consequent spread of departure traffic to less 
congested periods of the day. This was also pointed out at Zurich with the results of 
case 4. 
Although the author was not involved in any practical studies of steep approaches, 
discussion with Zurich ATC regarding their STOL procedure did support the 
SIMMOD results. The introduction of steep approaches to runway 26R at Gatwick 
was also discussed with ATC there. In this case, the steep approach would be needed 
for obstacle clearance of the terminal buildings within the obstacle approach cone of 
26R, as well as wake vortex avoidance. The concern for ATC at Gatwick was the 
scenario of an arrival on 26L exiting the runway and infringing 26R. In addition 
buildings close to 26R would prevent full instrument procedures being certified. Use 
of 26R would also restrict the use of some of the domestic gates at the terminal, and' 
use of the taxiway to the north of 26R due to limited wing tip clearance. The 
combined result of these problems was a reduction in capacity at peak times according 
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to studies previously done by ATC. They showed more interest in developing the 
steep approach for 26L in combination with existing arrival streams. The need for a 
separate landing aid, probably MLS or GPS with PAPI's was crucial though and 
interference issues between the two landing aid signals would have to be overcome. 
Very accurate controller approach sequencing aids and precision approach radar 
would also be a prerequisite for this type of operation. Finally, missed approach 
procedures would also need very careful definition to make it clear to pilots what each 
aircraft must do, depending on which aircraft executed the missed approach. 
Generally, it would be the regional aircraft that must go-around if the aircraft on the 
lower approach path commenced the missed approach. An indication to the controller 
of possible conflict and likely resolutions would also be useful, similar to that being 
developed with the precision runway monitor systems and non-transgression zones. 
Due to these strict limitations, the procedure would not work well in poor visibility 
and would probably be restricted to visual flying conditions. Much more work is 
required to be done with this procedure before significant benefits can be made to 
runway capacity and it must be bome in mind that as more and more technical 
monitoring systems are introduced to validate the procedure the benefits of 
introducing it may be overcome by the costs. 
To summarise, the application of the steep approach procedure in order to avoid wake 
vortex separation restrictions will only be successful if the arrivals occur on an 
independent single mode runway at major airports. Use of the procedure on a mixed 
mode runway could be applied if sufficient bunching of arrival streams occurred with 
later departure streams, but not if both streams occur at the same time, i. e. Manchester 
case 9. 
With this in mind, application will be limited to those European airports meeting this 
requirement, which are not many, and those that are feasible like Amsterdam, then 
tend to have significant environmental limitations which may kill the implementation 
altogether. Further research with SIMMOD at different airports is required in addition 
to a list of what extra monitoring equipment will be demanded by ATC to operate the 
procedure. Collision risk modelling of the likelihood of go-around problems is also 
necessitated to accurately deduce realistic runway capacity benefits of using steep 
approaches. All these current issues relating to this procedure explain it's current 
limited use. 
8.6: Regional Aircraft Holding Stacks 
Analysis of this procedure, as previously mentioned, was undertaken by the author 
following discussions with ATC at the London ATC centre, (LATCC). Table 8.6 
shows the results of the SIMMOD work at Manchester. 
As previously explained, the application was based on the direct arrival case 7a and 
the STOL runway case 10a of regional aircraft holds for Manchester SIMMOD 
simulations. In both cases the aim was that through introduction of the holding stack 
regional aircraft could be more optimally sequenced with existing arrival traffic, thus 
helping to reduce arrival gaps. Table 8.6 clearly shows that whilst savings were made 
compared to the base case, in reality the introduction of the holds made the system 
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less efficient in both operating time reduction and movement rate improvement. The 
effect on movement rate was more severe for case 10 than case 7, whilst the effect on 
operating time was greater for case 7. 
Time and Movement Changes from Base Case due to introduction 
of Regional Aircraft Holding Stacks 
Airport Travel Time 
Saving (mins) 
Delay Time 
Saving (mins) 
Total Time 
Saving (mins) 
Chg. in Peak Hour Rate 
Arrival Departure 
Manchester Cs 7b 1170.5 318.1 1488.6 0.0 +1.4 
Manchester Cs 7b* -5.6 -42.4 -48.0 0.0 -0.4 
Manchester Cs I Ob 1068.3 2259.7 3328.0 0.0 +2.0 
Manchester Cs I Ob* -1.5 -5.5 -7.0 - 1.0 -0.8 
*Figures show difference in results from cases 7a and I Oa respectively. 
TABLE 8.6 
The explanation for the greater effect on movement rate for case 10, is due to the fact 
that the holds would restrict the regional aircraft arrival flow onto the separate STOL 
runway. In this scenario, regional aircraft holds would not provide a benefit as the 
arrival flow has already been segregated. The increased operating times incurred in 
case 7b reflect SIMMOD's inability to accurately model the controller thinking when 
using holding stacks and sequencing arrival traffic. In reality the regional aircraft 
holds would be located close to the ILS approach path and as a gap in arrival traffic 
appeared, the controller would release a regional aircraft from the stack to fill the 
arrival gap. In order to achieve this, the controller must have placed a regional aircraft 
in the hold, while appreciating that an arrival gap would form by observing the flight 
progress strips and the radar screen. By default, the production of these arrival gaps 
would be unpredictable and thus require rapid response from the regional aircraft to 
ensure effective use of the gap. SIMMOD failed to permit rapid exits from the holds 
or adequate sequencing of the regional aircraft release from the hold. More complex 
modelling techniques will need to be applied before a satisfactory answer to the use of 
regional aircraft holds is determined. Results here can only be used to say that this 
modelling technique did not prove their usefulness, but this does not rule out their' 
potential. 
As far as the author is aware, regional aircraft holds are not currently used in a 
published procedure at any European airport, there are instances where they have been 
used by ATC however as and when traffic conditions allow. This tends to be very 
difficult to track though and if the procedure is to be applied more successfully, clear 
written instructions and transparency of use is required. Successful implementation 
will also depend on investment in controller approach sequencing aids, along with 
RNAV equipped regional aircraft capable of holding at any point required by ATC. 
Noise related issues of the new holding stacks and arrival routes would also nced 
evaluating. Obviously in a more complex arrival airspace system, such as London or 
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Paris, location of these holding stacks would require very careful consideration and 
studies into their likely impact on existing traffic flows would be required. 
Mindful of the above discussion, it is clear that further research into regional aircraft 
holds is required to validate their ability to help improve runway capacity. From the 
work here, it is clear that they are best suited to unsegregated regional and jet arrival 
traffic, and will be strongly dependent on the ability of the ATC controller to 
effectively recognise arrival gaps and exploit them. Help with sequencing aids will be 
required to achieve this. Applicability of the procedure in theory is unrestricted by 
any current European airport operation, assuming the preceding points are taken into 
account and can be introduced at a relatively low cost reflecting the time spent 
designing any airspace alterations to accommodate the new holds and subsequent pilot 
training. 
8.7: Use of STOL Runways 
As indicated in chapter 7, this option represents one of the most expensive in terms of 
required investment by the airport. Due to this, significant time savings and 
movement rate improvements will be expected. Table 8.7 shows the results for 
Manchester case 10a, which modelled the use of a STOL runway for regional aircraft 
arrivals operating independently from jet arrivals, with all departures from the main 
runway. 
Time and Movement Changes from Base Case due to introduction 
of a STOL Runway 
Airport Travel Time 
Saving (mins) 
Delay Time 
Saving (mins) 
Total Time 
Saving (mins) 
Chg. in Peak Hour Rate 
Arrival Departure 
Manchester Cs I Oa 1069.8 2265.2 3335.0 +1.0 +2.8 
TABLE 8.7 
As can be seen, a significant increase in the operational time saved has occurred. A 
total of 55.6 hours less total time than the base case. In addition both arrival and 
departure movement rates are increased in comparison to the base case. Compared to 
Manchester case 5, the optimum early turn simulation, the arrival movement rate has 
increased by I and the total operating time reduced by 2119 minutes or 35.3 hours. 
Clearly then this STOL runway has significantly improved the operating system at. 
Manchester, but is that not to be expected? The question to ask here, is does the 
improvement achieved merit the investment and construction disruption costs 
involved in building the STOL runway? For Manchester this would involve the 
demolition of listed buildings, disruption to current operations during building works, 
destruction of wildlife habitats, service road rc-routing and a host of other associated 
costs. The answer lies in how the STOL runway will alleviate Manchester's runway 
capacity problems in the longer term. By its very nature and length, it will only be 
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able to handle the current generation of regional aircraft. Will this be satisfactory, or 
will the type of aircraft flown by regional airlines in the future change? Will this 
change reduce the ability of the STOL runway to handle regional air traffic? If the 
answer to this last question is yes, then the construction of the STOL runway in the 
first place must be seriously questioned. 
In addition to the preceding questions, the level of investment in landing aids for the 
STOL runway will need defining, as they will tend to vary for each proposed location. 
The cost benefit table in appendix 6.8 could be used as a base for this. In complex 
airspace structures, the need for accurate flight paths within a limited space will 
require aircraft to be fitted with RNAV, precision approach radar and an MLS or GPS 
landing system. Covering the costs of these aids may not be possible from the 
benefits of introducing the runway. Success will depend on long term sustainable 
regional aircraft traffic demand, in sufficient numbers to cover costs. Obviously this 
will depend on each airport in question. For current European airports, the largest 
problem of introducing STOL runways, even if they could be justified, lies in the lack 
of physical space around the airport site. Noise issues related to increased noise 
footprints over new areas will also need addressing. 
Given the above discussion, the use of STOL runways to reduce airport congestion 
forces the airport and probably the regional airline to make much more serious 
financial commitments and offers an unpredictable benefit. Taking this into account, 
the use of this procedure is not recommended, unless the return on investment can be 
satisfactorily resolved. Additional research is also required in this area, to help define 
what level of improvement in operating time and movement rate must be achieved to 
enable successful application. 
In this discussion the author has assumed that the candidate airport does not have a 
suitable landing strip currently not utilised. If this were the case then the procedure 
could succeed, as the level of investment would be much lower. This was the case at 
Washington National. For European airports, there are runways not utilised but this is 
due to strict operational rules which would have serious cost implications to remove. 
Examples include those outlined in table 5.1, all of which could technically be made 
into STOL runways with the introduction of steep approaches, sequencing aids, MLS 
or GPSýand RNAV equipped aircraft. However, the author believes that, due to the 
political and environmental constraints at these airports, combined with the possible 
effect introduction of the STOL runway would have on existing traffic flows, they 
may not, realistically, be viable. 
8.8: Use of Reliever Airports 
Although no simulation work was carried out on reliever airports by the author, there 
has been a push in recent years in Europe to make increased use of them for regional 
air traffic. For this reason they merit discussion here. 
In 1993 Cranfield University, and the author, participated in a consultancy project 
evaluating the likely effect of introducing up to 15 million passengers per annum. 
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through a reliever airport called Apollo for Gatwick! In fact this Apollo airport 
simulated the possible development of Redhill. 
A SIMMOD simulation was set up using the current Gatwick operation as a base with 
improved departure routes from Gatwick. Movements to the reliever airport were 
based on new traffic, as opposed to relocation of existing regional traffic at Gatwick. 
Three scenarios were run using the reliever airport with 4,8 and 15 million passengers 
per annum. Results of the simulations showed that average air travel times for 
Gatwick in each case increased by about two minutes for arrivals and departures. 
Average departure delays however reduced by 3.3 minutes. These changes were 
largely attributed to London TMA re-organisations rather than the Apollo 
development. Average flight times for the Apollo operation varied depending on the 
variety of traffic mix, but had average flight delays comparable or less than Gatwick. 
The report concluded that on the basis of the results derived, Apollo did not create 
significant problems in terms of extra airspace delays to Gatwick traffic. The 
simulations were based on westerly operations, so further work would be required to 
determine the impact on easterly operations. In addition, it was recognised that use of 
Apollo would increase ATC controller workload, although it was felt that this would 
be offset by technical advances such as RNAV and MLS. Finally, it is significant to 
note that Gatwick peak hour movement rates were not greatly affected by the use of 
Apollo. 
It can be argued that as reliever airports are situated further away from the main 
airport than any STOL runway, their impact on the main airport of increasing regional 
traffic will be relatively small, as approach and departure paths will have less chance 
of conflict. This in turn should reduce controller workload in two ways. Firstly, the 
traffic mix at each airport should be more homogeneous, thus helping reduce wake 
vortex separations; secondly segregated traffic flows should be more easily 
manageable. Unfortunately in a highly complex, multiple airport TMA, the ability to 
provide conflict free traffic flows will be virtually impossible which, consequently, 
could lead to increased controller workload. In many cases, movements from the 
reliever airport will need coordinating with the primary airport. This will remove the 
potential benefits of the reliever airport if its movements are slot restricted by the 
major airport. This would be necessary at Redhill and Gatwick for instance. 
Additional dangers exist with the use of reliever airports in restricted airspace areas. 
The addition of another arrival and departure point, with associated connecting routes 
to the airways, will add to the complexity of the system and possibly increase the risk 
of flight path conflicts. Further research is required to validate the seriousness of this 
issue. The other issues relating to the use of reliever airports have already been 
mentioned in chapter five, which includes the reduced ability of regional airlines to 
satisfy passenger demands to carry them to and from the primary airport; reduced 
ability of regional airlines to meet their interline agreements with major airlines due to 
connecting passengers arriving at the wrong airport; and lastly environmental issues 
relating to the operation of a new airport. 
4 Source: Alan Stratford and Associates (1993) Apollo ATC Simulation Modelling Study - Draft Final Report 
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Taking the preceding discussion into account one must ask the question, will reliever 
airports help solve airport congestion in Europe and if so by how much? The answer 
to the first part of the question is a reserved yes, with the absolute affect on present 
congestion depending on the ability of the reliever airport, to relieve traffic from the 
major airport and not overly increase TMA airspace complexity and controller 
workload. Theoretically then they could work but practically all attempts so far 
within Europe have not been successful'. This reflects the current economic climate 
affecting regional airlines, which are being used more and more by the major airlines 
to provide feed traffic to their long haul services as was proven by the returned 
comments in the questionnaire. This is not possible from a reliever airport. In the 
longer run however, it is the author's opinion that reliever airports will develop in 
Europe to serve those regional airlines that have decided to set up hub bypass routes 
and specific point to point routes, either independently, or on behalf of a larger carrier. 
Incentives from local or national governments may also be used to entice regional 
airlines to use them, along with higher operating charges to remain at the principle 
airport. This last point will undoubtedly cause much outrage from the independent. 
regionals still requiring access to the hub airport. The largest practical problem will 
be firiding the space to accommodate these reliever airports on the ground and in the 
air. Further research is needed to define solutions to this problem. 
Finally it must be stated, that whilst the author feels that reliever airports will develop, 
he feels more can be gained by focusing at the hub airport, as even if radar and 
landing aid upgrades are required, this still adds up to less than effectively building a 
new airport. In this area much more research is still required. 
8.9: Summary 
This chapter has consolidated the results presented in chapter seven, with the author's 
experience at Manchester, Gatwick and Zurich airports, European regional airlines 
and discussions held with ATC. A number of practical implementation problems have 
been identified which are very airport site specific. It is clear that runway usage, 
location of other airports within the same TMA, specific traffic mixes and patterns are 
the dominant controlling factors on congestion. The interrelation of these factors 
determines which special procedures can be applied to optimally improve the 
situation. Table 8.8 is an attempt to summarise and aid airports to decide which' 
special procedures they should apply. 
Prior to discussing the implications of table 8.8 it is worth taking the reader through 
one line of the table to ensure a clear understanding of what has been presented. If 
SALS are used, as the example, it can be seen that initially their use is preferred on a 
single mode runway operation, as opposed to a mixed mode runway operation, for the 
reasons discussed in section 8.4. They also better suit operations in a single airport 
TMA, than a multiple one, due to the reduced possibility of arrival and departure track 
confliction. Finally, the real benefit of introducing SALS will occur during peak 
periods with a large traffic mix than during quieter periods. By this example it can be 
5 Referring to the attempt by Dusseldorf airport to re-locate regional traffic to Monchengladbach airport - See 
Chapter 5. 
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seen that where a, 'no, is written in the table it does not necessarily mean the 
procedure can not be applied. Instead it indicates that there will be difficulties in 
introducing the system and use of the procedure, in this situation, may not yield the 
optimum improvement in current airport capacity. 
Special Procedure Application Matrix 
Special Procedure Runway Usage TMA Structure Traffic Mix and Pattern 
Mixed 
Mode 
Single IMode Single Airport Multiple 
Airport 
Large + 
Peaky*** 
Small + 
Stable"" 
Intersection 
Departures 
Yes I Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Early Turns Yes Yes Yes No Yes 0 
TALS** No Yes Yes No Yes No 
Steep Approaches No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Regional A/C Holds No Yes Yes No YS No 
STOL Runways* Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Reliever Airports* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Note serious cost implications 
Responses based on a single mode runway operation 
Peaky traffic flows represent distinct periods where traffic is at or beyond the current airport 
capacity limit 
Stable traff ic patterns represent a constant drip feed of traffic below the current airport capacity 
limit 
TABLE 8.8 
In general then, table 8.8 demonstrates that in simple airport/airspace environments, 
like Manchester, all procedures can be applied so long as a sufficient traffic mix exists 
to make use of the variations in wake vortex separations. Maximum restrictions on 
the use of special procedures come into play with multiple airport, mixed mode 
runway environments such as London Gatwick. London Heathrow, Paris CDG and 
Paris Orly come in between as single mode runways in multiple airport TMA's. In 
these cases early turns, SALS and regional aircraft holds may well be overly restricted 
by lack of free airspace and path conflictions with nearby airports. 
The absolute effect each of these procedures has on reducing congestion and delay 
depends on the intensity of the congestion as previously explained in figure 7.8 in 
addition to specific operating restrictions imposed at each individual airport. 
In closing, it must be stated that whilst this work has produced recommendations on 
which special procedure to use where, and the possible savings that can accrue from 
using them, much more work is required to define boundaries on the three principle 
influencing factors outlined above. What level of traffic mix and percentage of 
regional traffic movements will produce the best reduction in congestion, and how 
will this vary depending on each airport's specific operating circumstances? What is 
not in question however, is that regional airlines want to make more use of the 
procedures and this thesis has demonstrated that the procedures can help reduce 
current operating delays. 
205 
CHAPTER 9: Conclusions. 
9.1: Introduction 
In concluding this research, it is the author's intention to address three issues. Firstly, 
to answer the hypothesis set at the beginning of the work; secondly to define a 
methodology for applying this work on special regional aircraft procedures; and 
finally to define the potential next steps that need research in this area. 
9.2: Answering the Hypothesis 
In chapter one the author set the scene for this work, by posing the question over 
whether the ability of regional aircraft special procedures could help to reduce airport 
congestion at major European airports. The next chapter set out to inform the reader 
that, due to the complexity of the operating environment within which airlines 
operate, and the conflicting interests of airports, ATC and airlines, airport congestion 
was a highly complex and inter-related problem. In addition, the problem is 
heightened by legislative and regulatory bodies, which restrict the ability of the 
system to flexibly respond to the problems of congestion. Chapter three examined 
aspects of aircraft performance which permit the regional aircraft to carry out the, 
special procedures. 
Chapter four was the last of the scene setting chapters and focused the reader on the 
European operating environment. The chapter was broken into four principle 
sections, which assessed forecast growth potential for the industry, current status of 
European airports, highlighting those facing congestion problems now and those 
likely to suffer congestion in the future. A review of recent developments in ATC and 
European airlines made up the second part of this chapter. It soon became clear from 
this chapter, that within Europe there was a marked development of airline alliance, 
which either had or was likely in the future to encourage the development of key hub 
airports. This was directly tied to the liberalisation in Europe, but was likely to cause 
significant congestion problems, especially at 16 European airports by 2010, as 
highlighted by the 1990 SRI report. The author then expanded the work, 
demonstrating a revised forecast of 9 congested airports by 2010. Closer examination 
of this problem, revealed that the primary cause of lack of airport capacity in Europe 
was due to the lack of physical space, as well as environmental and political 
expansion restrictions. This lack of capacity was highlighted during peak periods 
around the early morning and evening. Focus of the thesis on the peak hour reflected 
airline need to match aircraft supply to passenger demand. The nature of passenger 
demand in Europe for regular frequencies at the right time had only put further 
pressure on limited airport capacities, as all the airlines attempted to fly in and out of 
the airports at the same times. In certain cases, the poor ability on the part of ATC to 
handle high peak hour movement capacities, compared to other airports in Europe 
with the same runway configuration, made congestion at the airport artificially worse 
than it need have been. The APATSI report had been developed to address this latter 
problem specifically. The chapter closed by examining a number of technical systems 
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that could be used by the airlines and ATC in an attempt to remove some of the 
limitations currently placed on their operations. 
Thus the first four chapters were aimed at explanations on the complexity of problems 
causing airport congestion, together with a discussion on the current congestion 
situation in Europe. The main purpose was to demonstrate that many of the changes 
occurring there, would have a significant potential to make the congestion problems 
worse. What was clear from this evaluation was that, whilst attempts had been made 
to apply certain mature ATC procedures, little had been done to exploit the 
differences in aircraft performance and flight techniques that existed between the jet 
and regional aircraft types. 
Chapter five defined a number of special procedures which could be used by regional 
aircraft to possibly help reduce the impact of airport congestion. Given the severity of 
congestion within Europe defined previously, it was felt that these procedures more 
than warranted serious study to determine their specific ability to reduce operating 
delays. Due to the limited availability of resources available to the author, the 
evaluation of these special procedures was initially relatively theory based, using 
computer simulation techniques with associated application of a cost benefit analysis 
model. The latter model was used to reflect the increasing industry need to justify any 
infrastructure investments on monetary grounds. 
It was always appreciated by the author, however, that application of these special 
procedures could only really be achieved by practical studies. This was achieved 
thanks to the generous help of Business Air, Crossair, Manchester, Zurich and 
Gatwick airports and the European Regional Airlines Association. The experience 
gained from the practical exposure to the implementation problems associated with 
these special procedures, enabled the author to re-evaluate certain parts of the initial 
computer modelling process to validate the results presented in chapter seven. It also 
made the author aware of the limitations of the computer model which was also 
highlighted in chapter seven. Chapter eight placed the theoretical modelling results in 
context, with the limitations imposed by the real world which culminated in a matrix 
summary table of special procedure against three airport operating variables. It was 
argued that this table could be used by airport planners to help them decide which 
special procedure could be applied to their airport. 
The first question posed, 'Can these special procedures reduce airport congestion in 
Europe? ' The answer is yes! The scale of each special procedures impact on an 
individual airport's delay figures is, however, highly variable. Evidence, from the 
simulation models and practical studies, does indicate that the use of early turns after 
take off and use of intersection departures has a more substantial impact on reducing 
departure delays; whilst use of steep approaches, SALS and regional aircraft holds 
does not greatly improve arrival delays and often hinders departure delays off a mixed 
mode runway. This conclusion is represented in the current application of the 
procedures, from the airport questionnaire, with eight cases of early turn against only 
three arrival procedures. The search for an optimum application of special' 
procedures has not produced a simple answer, as an optimum solution is airport site 
specific, due to subtle variations in operating restrictions such as noise preferential 
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routes, density of built up areas, terrain limitations and effect of other airports, all of 
which was explained in chapter two. 
The next question asked, 'If the special procedures can theoretically reduce 
congestion at an airport, will they practically be used, and if not, why not? '. The 
answer to this question depends on a number of factors. Application of the cost 
benefit analysis is a primary determinant, as previously explained. For an airport 
however, the weighting given to specific factors may well vary from those given in 
this research. More emphasis will probably be placed on the ability of the procedure 
to increase peak hour runway movement rates, due to their ability to more accurately 
place costs and benefits on extra movements, instead of time savings. The approach is 
also more likely to focus on pure market economics as opposed to welfare economics, 
as the airport must satisfy any shareholders that a satisfactory return on investment 
can be made in monetary terms. Expanded multiplier effect benefits to the local 
economies may be all well and good in theory, but will not directly help the airport 
pay for the investment made. This same rational will apply to required investments 
for ATC and airlines. The significance of regional aircraft traffic at the airport will 
also affect the likelihood of a procedures application as, where regional aircraft 
represent a higher percentage of total traffic, they are likely to produce a more 
favourable outcome, especially if the regional airlines involved co-operate together. 
The level of technology required to carry out the procedure, compared to the existing 
aircraft and ATC systems, will also have an affect. Again this returns to the cost 
problem. Finally, and perhaps most important, either airlines, ATC or the airport will 
need to be aware that special procedures are available, can be applied, and if necessary 
must communicate this to the other parties. 
The final question asked, 'Would these special procedures represent a short term or 
long term solution to airport congestionT. To answer this question, one must look 
towards the future and the likely changes that will occur in airlines, airports and ATC. 
For the regional airlines, there has been a recent tendency for increasing aircraft size 
and a switch from turboprops to jets on the hub feed routes. Jets are also being used 
more frequently on the thin point to point routes. Many of these newjets, such as the 
Embraer 145 and Canadair regional jet, do not have the performance characteristics 
required to carry out these special procedures. Airports also are changing, with the 
improvement of current runway capacities being achieved as ATC adopt the APATSI 
recommendations. Plans for new runways in Europe are still limited however, so 
congestion must still be expected. Within ATC much has been done in recent years to 
improve the en-route traffic flows, with more recent attempts to integrate this en-route 
traffic into the TMA. New approach and conflict resolution systems are also 
increasingly helping ATC. To surmise then, regional airlines are reducing the ability 
of the special procedures to work in the long term, whilst airports still need them and 
ATC are becoming more capable of dealing with them. It is the author's opinion that, 
as the systems develop, special procedures, whilst effective in the short term, will 
eventually be replaced by new procedures along similar lines to those discussed, but 
more applicable to all aircraft types. What is definitely certain, is that this problem of 
maintaining access to airports during congested peak periods will only get worse 
unless new procedures can be implemented! 
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9.3: A Methodology for Application 
Tbroughout the research it was evident that, whilst the use of special procedures had 
been known about for a while, little attempt had been made to implement them, or 
where they had been implemented, there had been no exchange of information with 
other airports. This, the author believes is due to lack of evidence to validate the 
claims, combined with no recommendations or definitions given on how the 
procedure might be implemented. It has been the purpose of this thesis to answer as 
far as possible these two issues. The first part has been discussed already, from which 
can be deduced the following six step plan for introducing special procedures. 
Step 1: Determine cause of airport congestion. 
Use of these procedures will only help a runway and TMA congestion problem where 
there is a significant percentage of regional aircraft operations. Modelling of the 
current airport operation will help assess the main congestion points. A distinction 
should be made, however, between arrival and departure congestion problems, which 
will help to determine the correct special procedures to apply. 
Step 2: Decide which special procedures will be of use. 
Table 8.8 should be used as a guide here, backed up with modelling of the procedure, 
focusing on possible delay time improvements and increased peak hour movement 
rates. 
Step 3: Discuss ideas with relevant Airlines and ATC. 
The purpose here is to assess how feasible the procedures evaluated in step 2 can 
practically be achieved. For effective discussion, all parties must be fully briefed and 
understand the procedures and results of the modelling studies. The aim will be to 
decide which procedure to implement, if any. 
Step 4: Carry out a detailed costAbenefit analysis of chosen procedure. 
This will have to take account of any investment required by the airport, ATC or 
airline and then compared to the opportunity cost of remaining at the present position, 
whilst of course being prepared to accept increased congestion problems. 
Step 5: Develop detailed Implementation Plans. 
Provision of a trial period will probably be required, with the need to define specific 
success criteria, time periods, lines of communication between all parties and clear 
boundaries of responsibility. In the case of system up-gmdes, flexibility in terms of 
cancelling the procedure will need defining to prevent unnecessary investment. Initial 
plans should be passed to all parties for comment and revision before fixing the final 
schedule. 
Step 6: Maintain regular review and feedback meetings. 
This is the most important part of the process to ensure that a successfully introduced 
special procedure remains in operation. All parties must communicate any operating 
problems that they discover, attempting to solve them wherever possible. , It is 
essential that the use of any relevant changes and up-dates to systems or procedures 
must be passed on to all those involved, as it may affect the ability of the procedure to 
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achieve its goal. With this pro-active and constructive feedback the procedure should 
remain a success. 
This six step guide has universal applicability, and is recommended as a result of the 
work carried out and experience gained by the author during the course of this thesis. 
A seventh step should also be added which involves the dissemination of information 
regarding the use of the procedures to other airports. 
One of the largest constraints involved with this guide, however, is the time and 
manpower it requires to function effectively. Following practical experience, the 
author is well aware that both of these resources are limited at the best of time, 
however, given the potential reward, the author feels, it is justifiable. 
9.4: Limitations of Research 
The majority of these have been discussed within the preceding chapters, however, 
there are larger underlying limitations that need raising. Due to the limited resources 
and time available to this study, a truly comprehensive answer has not been possible 
to all the questions that were asked in the introduction. Through researching this 
problems, the author has become aware that the scale of the problem is much larger 
than first appreciated, which is only made more complicated because application of 
the procedures is unique to individual airports. This work focused primarily on 
Manchester, Zurich and Gatwick airports, taking the lessons learnt from these and 
generalising as to their applicability to other European airports. Much further work is 
required on other specific airports to validate the conclusions made here. This is 
especially true when looking at varying runway configurations. How effective are 
steep approaches on parallel runways? For crossing and converging runways is there 
an optimum configuration to maximise the benefits of introducing special procedures? 
How will future traffic patterns vary and how will this affect the use of the special 
procedures? 
The cost benefit analysis employed during this research is also in need of a more in 
depth study and evaluation. The importance of getting this area correct can never be 
understated, given the very tight cost structures of regional airlines and an ever 
increasingly cost conscious industry. Airline operating costs need better definition, 
along with specific monetary benefit figures for increasing the peak hour movement 
rate. Both of these costs will be airport specific, but are crucial to accurate cost 
benefit analysis. 
Thirdly, the routes studied in the modelling exercises were not examined from a 
technical aircraft performance feasibility point of view. This remains to be 
comprehensively assessed, but is crucial to prove the procedures feasibility. 
Considerable work is also required to define specific procedures for engine failure 
during execution of a special procedure, missed approach and balked landing, as well 
as restrictions for wet and contaminated runway operations. Will special procedures 
be permitted in the case of an engine failure, if not can different single engine SID's 
be developed for regional aircraft? 
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The final area mentioned regularly in this thesis is system accuracy requirements. It is 
beyond the capabilities of this work to define these, but they must be able to ensure 
safe operation of the procedure and set any necessary route boundaries required in 
already limited TMA airspace. It requires navigational track keeping accuracy 
definitions, from which individual system accuracy can be deduced for landing aids, 
RNAV equipment and approach radar. Within this, redundancy requirements also 
need accurate definition, as this is likely to significantly affect any procedure costing 
if duplication of systems are required. A lot of the system requirements will depend 
on whether the procedure is defined for VFR or IFR operation. The former will 
require less investment but provide a less reliable tool for effective use. 
These are the principle limitations that the author believes exist with this work and 
prompt a number of areas of future research mentioned. There are further areas 
however which the author feels require analysis. 
9.5: Areas of Future Research 
There are seven ftirther areas of research the author has identified following work on 
this thesis. The first concerns the effect of current changes occurring in regional 
airlines in terms of increased use of larger aircraft and regional jets on thin longer 
routes and alliances with major airlines. Research is required to determine how these 
changes will affect the applicability of special procedures. Can new procedures be 
developed or will the use of turboprop aircraft cease in the longer term? Will the 
alliance with the major airline restrict the regional airline's flexibility to accommodate 
special procedures? 
The second area of required research, concerns how the new technologies such as 
GPS, RNAV, 4D ATC approach aids, and aircraft FMS systems can be integrated to 
help optimise and improve the special procedures. It is the author's feeling that 
success in this area is critical to the success of many of the arrival special procedures 
discussed. As part of this as well, the current philosophy used by ATC of first come, 
first served, must be reassessed to determine if improvements in final arrival 
sequencing can be made and so reduce the impact of wake vortex arrival separations. 
Finally, finther research into wake vortices must be encouraged wherever possible, as 
it is the single largest restriction on runway capacity. 
Research into the effect of liberalisation in Europe on peak hour airport capacity 
demands also merits attention. There is currently a conflict between the aim of 
liberalisation to increase competition between airlines and an airport's duty to provide 
adequate capacity. The only way for effective competition for airlines is to provide a 
comparable number of flight frequencies and timings. Unfortunately this leads to 
bunching of arrivals and departures at an airport around peak periods. The dilemma 
for the airport, is that if they expand to accommodate traffic demand during the peak 
period, they face large time periods outside the peak, where resources are signiflcantly 
under utilised. The current proposed solution is peak period charges to operators 
wishing to operate during the busy times. Is this the best solution or are there 
alternative solutions? Should competition be limited to help match airport capacity 
with traffic demand at congested airports? To what extent should airports build to 
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accommodate the peak period demand? How far do special procedures go into 
reducing the requirement for airports to expand capacity? 
The limitations discussed above raised the issue of track accuracy requirements. In 
addition, and especially, in multiple airport TMA's, there is a need to assess any 
safety risk associated with increasing the number of arrival and departure options. 
This requires collision risk modelling which has been used widely by the UK CAA' 
and attempts to assess the number of times ATC controllers will not spot a possible 
collision induced by either pilot error or failure of a navigation aid to provide accurate 
guidance. The model uses both standard deviation distributions and decision event 
tree methods. Questions such as what are the tolerances within which potential 
collision risk occurrence may occur using special procedures and the optimum 
number of separate arrival and departure paths allowed per airport system need 
answering. 
The human factors for both ATC controllers and pilots in using these special 
procedures also needs evaluating. How far will the special procedures increase 
present workload for both parties? Is there an optimum solution to minimise 
workload? This could be combined with the collision risk modelling. 
Political and environmental issues and their effect on airport congestion has been 
touched upon in this research, but the author believes much further research into the 
influence these factors have, both now and in the future, is required. In the political 
arena, issues as far and wide as airline state aid, planning permission procedures, 
airport operating restrictions and political bias, all need assessment to determine their 
effect on airport congestion. From an environmental point of view, it appears that all 
forms of air transport should be stopped due to noise and air pollution damage. How 
far is this justified? It has already been proven that compared to road transport, air 
transport's environmental impact is minimal. Noise impact has also been 
significantly reduced in the last 20 years, with increased usage of chapter three 
aircraft. What is the opportunity cost of restricting air transport? How far will 
environmental restrictions go in the future? Will they prevent usage of special 
procedures, or will they welcome special procedures as a way to increase flexibility in 
arrival and departure routes? All of these questions need answering. 
The final area of research to consider is perhaps the largest. This concerns the 
potential application of the results of this work, and special procedures in general, to 
the Asia/Pacific air transport market. An ATAG report in 1991 highlighted the 
potential problems in airport capacity that may occur in Asia by the turn of the 
century. With predicted growth rates of 7.5% p. a. between 1995-2000, the regions 
share of worldwide scheduled passenger traffic is expected to grow from 25.2% in 
1995 to 51.1% in 2010. It is also expected that the ability of airlines to respond to 
increased passenger demand by increasing load factors, aircraft seat densities and 
aircraft size will be limited. More of the new capacity, ATAG predict will come from 
an increased number of flights. Traffic will be focused at seven hub airports, namely 
Seoul, Tokyo-Narita, Osaka, Taipei, Bangkok, Singapore and Hong Kong, which, 
Source: CAA (1991) CAA Paper 91010 - Outline of a method for the determination of separation standards for 
future air traffic systems. CAA 
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with current curfews, will lead to significant increases in congestion during peak- 
hours. Given that, in addition to the above, short haul traffic is cxpcctcd to grow 
faster than long haul routes, can special procedures be effectively employed to help 
reduce peak period congestion at the seven hub airports? How will application 
methods vary from those employed in America and Europe, if at all? 
9.6: Summary 
This research has successfully answered the questions posed at the start of this work 
by closely scrutinising the existing and potential future operating conditions in 
Europe. Application of special procedures can significantly help reduce delays during 
peak periods relatively cheaply, although changes to the peak hour movement rates 
are limited. Much still requires to be studied however before a complete answer can 
be given to application of individual procedures to individual airports. In addition 
there is much more work to be done to fully evaluate all technical and safety issues 
related to special procedures. Finally, there is a significant potential application of' 
this work in the Asia/Pacific area. 
In closing it must be stated that the author feels that many of the obstacles presented 
with the use of special procedures resulted from either fear of change or ignorance of 
the possibilities. Only with clear and effective exchange of information between all 
parties can real success be obtained. 
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AppendLy ZI 
Runway Operating Limits in Poor Visibility 
Runway Category RVR Limits Other Comments* 
Non-Instrument Runway >260011 Can only use in VFR Conditions 
Instrument Approach Runway >2600ft Visual and non-visual aids for straight in 
approach guidance 
Precision Approach Runway - Down to 2600ft ILS and Visual Aids with decision height of 
Category I 200ft 
Precision Approach Runway - 2600ft to 1200ft ILS and Visual Aids with decision height of 
Category II loon 
Precision Approach Runway - 1200ft to 700ft ILS and Visual Aids with decision height of oft 
Category IIIA using visual aids to land 
Precision Approach Runway - 70011 to 150ft ILS and Visual Aids with decision height of Oft 
Category IIIB using visual aids in taxiing 
Precision Approach Runway - l5oft to Oft ILS and Visual Aids with decision height of Oft 
Category HIC I I No reliance on visual cues for landing or taxiing 
Source: Ashford, N., et al. (199 1) Airport Operations 
Appendix 2.2 
The ATC Operational Systeni 
A country's airspace is restricted in its si/c and usc to accommodatc kicimind i0F 
general aviation, military training aiid commercial operations. ConsequCild. \, the 
airspace is broken up into a series of sections to I'licilitatc its nianagcniew. I he 
vertical structure ofthe UK's airspace is given I)cloN\ 
The Vertit-al Divkioit qI', Air. -vjwce 
; %Ifitude 
Upper Air%pace 
24,500ft T 
11ý 1-crimnal Manom cring A rea 
\inýav I NIA) 
1, ree Airspace 
(, ("11 1-ol 1, I-Ce Airspace 
ZOIIC 
0 ft 
(Source: CAA ( 1993) London Air Traffic Control Centre) 
The combined grey areas represent tile controlled airspace. which is nianaged by A VC 
for licensed aircraft and pilots, and is primarily used 1,01. Commercial aircraft. I'lle 
surrounding free or uncontrolled airspace Is used I`Or private fiving and 111111tarv 
traffic, although some of this airspace is restricted purely for military traffic. 
The integration of the controlled airspace can lie demonstrated by looking it a 
standard arriving aircraft. Due to tile complexity ofthe ý\ hole A VC sý stem, tile focus 
will be in handling aircraft within the terminal manoeuvring area. ( FNIA), N\Iiicli is 
the focus of this thesis The arrival \vould appear en-route to its (test I nat ion. cither ill 
the upper airspace, or oil ail airway. Ifon tile upper all-space descent guldance \\()111(1 
be given to the pilot onto the most appropriate 10\\, Cl. 1,01. Ills (Icstillatioll. I lie 
pilot would then be given further descent ilild IlCadIIlg ýLýLll&IIICC 1101lg tile illl*\ýýI\. OF 
corridor, to join the standard ari-IN-al routc(STAR), to tile destination I NIA. As file 
aircraft approached the TMA boundary speed would be reduced, mid it' VNIA capacity 
was full, the aircraft would be put in a IlOIdIIIg stack \\ ith other mi-crah, \\ ith the arca 
controller handing over to tile TMA controller. File all-cral't \\OIIld thell be requirco. 1 to 
fly a circular race track to allow tile controller tillic to dcal \\ill) C\Isllllg fraffic III the 
TMA. Descent within the stack NVOUId OCCIII- In 1000h Steps IS I'llial 
release would be on a first come first sci-VCd 1)ýISIS. Once five ol'the stack, file ali-cralt 
would be radar vectored by one or more TNIA controllers ()I- directors. mill Speed, 
heading and descent guidance to line the aircral't 111) Oil the C\(Cll(IC(l Centrellne (11' the 
runway for final approach. Control of' tile all-cral't would he II; IIIdcd m cr here to the 
tower controller at the airport, who would Issue tile aircraft's landing clearance. ( )IIcC 
on the ground, guidance would be gi\-en, by tile ground Colitrollel. it) tile aircraft, it) 
find its alloted gate at the terminal building. For this thesis the sections of airspace 
that are relevant are the terminal manoeuvring area and the control zone which are 
closest to the airport. The need for close ATC controller liaison between separate 
sections of controlled airspace is crucial to ensure optimum traffic flows. 
When considering departures the situation is basically the reverse of the above 
situation. Firstly a departure slot needs to be acquired which defines a speciric time 
interval during which the aircraft is able to depart. The purpose of this is to help ATC 
manage the traffic flow and limit demand during peak hours to the airports sustainable 
capacity. At congested airports the peak of departures is very important in relation to 
arrivals, as it will affect runway utilisation. Considering a single mixed mode 
runway, the optimum runway usage is arrival, departure, arrival. The traffic demand 
may not allow this operation however due to airline commercial pressures a situation 
of, 'bunching' may occur, with a number of successive arrivals followed by 
successive departures. This will reduce runway capacity due to separation 
requirements. Slots then, are used in an attempt to restrict demand, and remove some 
of the problems associated with bunching. With a departure slot the aircraft requests 
clearance to depart with ATC. This is required by ATC for them to inform separate 
ATC airspace sectors of the aircraft's impending departure, and ensure it can be 
accommodated by them. Additionally, it is used for the flight crew to obtain their 
flight routing. The clearance will initially give the departure runway, the standard 
instrument departure (SID), routing along the preferential noise routing, and primary 
altitude and speed restrictions. On receipt of clearance the aircraft taxies to the 
runway for take off. Once airborne the aircraft is handed from the tower controller to 
departure controller, who monitors the aircraft as it follows the SID restrictions for 
noise reasons. The SID will take the aircraft to the edge of the TMA, and altitude is' 
usually restricted to 6000ft until clear of the inbound arrival stacks. The controller 
may instruct the pilot climb or increase the speed of the aircraft along the SID to 
expedite the departure, or help traffic flow, but can not deviate the aircraft off the SID 
track until above 6000ft. Once the aircraft reaches the end of the SID, either in 
altitude or track, it is passed on to the area controller who is responsible for aircraft's 
climb to its assigned en route cruise level along the airway and up into upper airspace 
if appropriate. 
Source: Derived from Paylor, A. (1993) Air Traffic Control Today and Tomorrow - 
Ian Allen 
Ap pendix Z3 
Tools Available to an Air Traffic Controller 
System Description 
Radio Used to communicate with the aircraft. There are two types, VI IF 
and HF. The former is of higher quality and used over land, the latter 
used over sea. 
Primary Radar Uses reflected radio beams to highlight dense objects. Provides 
spatial location of aircraft to controller on a screen. This primary 
radar was a line of sight instrument that could not positively identify 
aircraft without them turning at ATC instruction. 
Secondary Radar Updated the primary radar. Requires a transponder on an aircraft to 
interrogate for identity, and with a mode C transponder, altitude 
information is provided as well. Both types of radar are required in 
busy airspace to identify all aircraft with or without transponder. 
Multi radar Tracking The use of many radars has resulted in areas of overlap. Multi radar 
tracking combines radar returns of the same aircraft to remove 
irregular returns, and improve location accuracy. 
Precision Approach Radar This is a high accuracy radar which is used to talk aircraft down a 
final approach path for landing - azimuth and elevation. It is used 
infrequently when ILS systems are not available or feasible due to 
terrain. 
Datalink/Mode S Transponder Mode Select, (Mode S), is an advanced aircraft transponder that is 
selectively addressed and can improve overall surveillance accuracy 
by a factor of up to four. In addition messages can be passed from 
ATC to aircraft and between other Mode S equipped aircraft. 
Radar Display Screen Displays the radar images. Aircraft arc identified using the secondary 
radar. Modem screens use computers to generate the radar image, 
which improve resolution and allow additional information such as 
airspace boundaries, airways, weather, separation requirements, 
aircraft performance data, etc., to be added. 
Non-Directional Beacon The most basic navigation tool regularly used in controlled airspace. 
(NDB) It provides a continuous radio signal which, when identified by an 
aircraft's automatic direction finder (ADF), provides a direction 
indication of the aircraft from the beacon. They are not limited by 
line of sight. 
Very High Frequency Omni- A more sophisticated and accurate navigation tool used for airway 
directional Radio range, guidance in controlled airspace, runway centreline guidance and 
(VOR) position reporting. It provides 360* bearings from its location with 
radial tracks for aircraft to follow. This information is presented to 
the pilot on the horizontal situation indicator (IISI), in the cockpit. It 
is line of sight restricted. 
Distance Measuring Normally co-located with the VOR it provides slant distance of the 
Equipment, (DME) aircraft from itself. It is basically a transponder on the ground that the 
aircraft interrogates and uses the Doppler effect to convert the time 
delay into distance. Accuracy decreases as cruise aircraft pass 
overhead with the slant distance measurement. 
Runway Visual Range, (RVR) Provides runway visibility information to ATC and pilots. 
Runway Lighting Provided in varying levels of sophistication depending on the 
visibility limits of the runways operation. Defined in Annex 14 to 
ICAO Chicago Convention. 
System Description 
Visual Approach Slope Three symmetrically positioned banks of lights at the runway 
Indicators, (VASI) touchdown point. Lights are angled to give the correct glidepath for 
aircraft approaching the runway. Further defined in Annex 14 ICAO. 
Precision Approach Path Single row of four lights satisfying the same job function as VASIS, 
Indicators, (PAPI) which they are replacing. 
Instrument Landing System, This is a high precision approach system. It provides a localiscr bcarn 
(ILS) indicating the horizontal direction of the runway centreline and a 
glideslope or rate of descent indicator to the runway. It is usually 
calibrated up to 10nm from the airport, although the tolerance of both 
beams is greater at this distance. Two to three locator markers are 
placed along the ILS localiser path. The outer marker is located 3.5 
to 7 nm from the runway threshold, often with an NDB, the middle 
marker 3500ft from touchdown and the inner marker closer still. 
Calibration can allow CATHIC landings. It is presented to the pilot as 
two cross bars, usually on the flight director, which if kept crossed in 
the centre indicate correct heading and glidepath. The glideslope is 
normally 3" or 800ft per minute but can be recalibrated to any setting 
required. It is a costly system to install and run. It requires an 
unobstructed path, limited ground movement nearby and a straight in 
approach for aircraft. 
Microwave Landing System, Developed to replace the ILS. Provides precision landing guidance 
(MLS) over an angle of 80" to 120" from the runway centreline with 
glideslope angles of 0.90 to 15". It allows curved approaches to be 
flown to the runway, so getting round some of the ILS problems. 
Currently on trial throughout Europe. 
Global Positioning System, 24 satellites operated by the US Dept. of Defence primarily for the 
(GPS) military. Service provided for civil operations with downgraded 
accuracy. Position guidance is achieved with three/four satellites 
reporting to the aircraft from different locations. Currently used in en 
route trials especially over oceans, it can also be modified for 
precision approach guidance and could replace existing navigation 
systems if proven dependable. 
Area Navigation Systems This is a system on board the aircraft which will enable the aircraft to 
(RNAV) fly between any two points defined by latitude and longitude by 
taking references from existing ground based navigation aids. It 
offers the controller complete flight path routing flexibility but 
currently has limited applicability due to aircrafVATC interface 
problems. 
Flight Strips Paper stripes providing the ATC controller with information for each 
flight from the ICAO flight plan, filed by the airline. Additional 
flight clearances added by controllers handling flight. Currently 
looking at ways to provide flight strips on the computer screen. 
Source: Paylor, A (1993) Air Traffic Control Today and Tomorrow - Ian Allcn 
Appendix 24 
Determining Radar Separation Minima 
In developing the separation minima there are a number of factors that nccd 
considering. The ICAO Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, (1984), brcaks d1cm 
into four sections: position factors, control factors, human factors and the buffcr. 
Position factors refer to the accuracy of position indication and the accuracy with 
which flight progress can be maintained. Errors can occur in any part of the air or 
ground navigation equipment, in estimating position by dead reckoning, or in 
operational tolerances of the flight path allowed without ATC notification. Control 
factors are either communication delays in position reporting for whatever reason, or 
clock errors either on the ground or in the air. Human factors of the pilots and 
controllers can also induce errors due to lack of experience or familiarity with the 
environment, mental attitude, or reaction time. Finally there is the buffer which is 
defined by the ICAO manual as follows: 
"The buffer is a minimum physical distance of defined dimensions to 
accommodate: 
a) Variations in an aircraft'sflight path due to air movements, etc.; 
b) The size of the aircraft; 
q) An additional miss distance. 
Once all the separation standards are established, the ICAO manual then discusses the 
prospect of reducing those minima. Four possibilities are discussed. It is argued that 
if the navigational accuracy of ground or air equipment, or the pilot, has clearly 
improved with no increased safety risk, then minimum's could be reduced. Also, if 
the time interval between position reports can be reduced, the controller will be more 
certain of the aircraft's exact position and hence capable of reducing minima. This 
will only be possible if rapid and reliable air to ground communication exists, which, 
in congested airspace with many aircraft being controlled by the same person, is at 
present limited. The third possibility is the optimisation of traffic mix along the same 
track and concerns the rate of closure of a faster aircraft following a slower one. If the 
faster aircraft can be placed ahead of the slower aircraft, or the rate of closure reduced, 
then separation could also be reduced. Lastly the way traffic information is presented 
to the controller significantly limits separation minima. The higher the rate that 
information is updated the better are the chances of reducing separation between 
aircraft, as the controller has a more accurate picture of the traffic flows. This remains 
true up to the point that the display becomes so complex that the ability of the 
controller to observe, analyse, and make a decision about a situation is reduced. 
Source: ICAO (1984) Air Traffic Services Planning Manual 
Appendh Z5 
Controller Workload 
The job of an ATC controller can be broken into four sections as shown below. 
A TC Controller Job Functions 
Information Derivation of 
Gathering 
I 
Mental Model 
Feedback 
ImpIementation Decision 
Making 
The diagram is relatively straight forward. Information is gathered by the controller 
from the radar screen, flight strips and communication with aircraft under their 
control. The next step is the construction of a mental picture in the controller's mind 
of aircraft position, terrain, airspace structure, etc. The success of the next stcp 
depends on the effectiveness of this mental picture in representing reality. The model 
will be limited by the controllers training, experience and preconceived belief of what 
the system is supposed to do. ' 
Once the mental model is finalised a decision is made on any action required. In 
doing this the controller must decide what plan for the air trafflic he wishes to follow, 
and how it can be done with least disruption to other aircraft, within operating laws. 
Once the decision is made it is implemented. Following implementation, information 
is fed back to the controller to update the present situation and enable him to 
formulate the next model and plan. 
Obviously, as the level of traffic handled by the controller increases, the time 
available to the controller to think through decisions will reduce, leading to increased 
levels of stress. This relationship is shown as follows% 
Mogford, R. (1991) Mental Models in Air Traffic Control - Paper in, 'Automation and Systems Issues In Air 
Traffic Control -NATO AST Series 1991, p235-242 
Concept of Controller Workload 
Efficiency 
of Work 
UNDER WORKED OVER WORKED 
10 
optimu 
Elfficienc 
Increasing Decreasing Nc 
iaesn cy Ecicrircile1snicy 
Amount of Traffic Handled 
Note: Efficiency of Work can also be interpreted at Stress Level 
This indicates that initial increases in stress are beneficial to the system as efficiency 
is increased, however, once the traffic passes a certain point the stress on the 
controller becomes detrimental leading to a reduced ability to efficiently handle 
traffic. If extreme levels of traffic occur safety may be compromised. Joma, P. 
(199 1) provides a good examination of operator workload as a limiting factor in ATC. 
They indicate that each person will have their own optimum level, due to their 
individual personalities and work experience. This level however, will represent the 
fixed capacity of the airspace under the controller. Intensity and duration of high 
levels of traffic will also reduce total capacity as controllers tire more rapidly. Ile also 
discusses the problem with modem, high technology, systems and the break down in 
the, 'man-machine interface'. This occurs when a technological advancement in 
mechanical systems reduce the ability of the worker to do their job. They become, 
'out of the loop', or lose touch of the situation. The consequence of this is serious to 
ATC, as the controller must have clear situational awareness to make decisions. 
There is concern with present controllers that the increasing demands being placed on 
the airspace, and technological advances in aircraft systems, which exceed the ability 
of those on the ground, will force increased technology onto ATC, which may 
degrade their ability to do their job. What is certain, however, is that the increased 
level of traffic will only be allowed to operate, if controllers can do so without 
increasing the safety risk. Careful management of controller stress, workload, and 
technical aids will be the key to a sustainable ATC system in the future, capable of 
satisfying traffic demand. 
Appendix -7.6 
Multiple Runway Operating, Restricimus 
Simultaneous departures from parallel or diverging, rtin\\ays are alloý\cd ifthe trlck ()I' 
two successive departures diverge by 15' or more, and the parallel run\\ays are 
greater than 2500ft apart. It' the parallel rLinv, -ays are less than 25001't apart, tile 
departures must be separated by I mile in addition to the above restrictions. 
Is Deg. SI NI U 1, F%N FM S 250011 or more 
0I 
.* 
more DIA'All II Ill. 's .,,:, 
: ri 
P* 
15 Deg. 
or more 1) FP %R FUR FS 
250011 or less 15 Deg. Is I%(. '(. 'I-'R Fill 
oi- more 1) FP%RIIR FS 
l Mile 
(Source: ICAO AirTrat'lic Services Planning Manual) 
Simultaneous arrivals and departures to airports xýith more than onc nin\\ay are 
limited depending on the runway separation, staggcr and nussed appl-oach I)[. OCCLIIII-e. 
The exact limits are defined below. For tile staggel-ed example C\Cl-ý 
reduction in runway separation of' 1001`1 I-CLIUires a staogel- of' 5001't hct\\ccn active t, 
thresholds. The diverging runway example only applics it' tile two till-eshold" (10 not 
touch. 
The final scenario is using multiple runways for arrival", only. Separation standards 
already discussed apply with additional ones due to the close P1,0\111111. \ of the 
runways. The final diagram details some ofthese restrict lolls. III addition to (Ills, the 
missed approach procedures Must not Conflict 111(1 dllrlllýtý OIC tIII'II Oil it) IIIC l"AP 
aircraft separation must be maintained at cither 100011 or 3nni. As the all-Cralt 
descends, with the ILS, controllers must ensure 111C all-Craft (10 not IlIIpIIIgc the no- 
transgression zone, which is the area betvveen the two approach paths. 
Noissed, 11 ) wMIC I( ourse 9* -A M; S' 
2500ft Or more 311 Deg. ARRIVAL's AND 
(it' 11101T DIAIA RTI iRFS 
Depal-IIII-C 
('re 
Coul-sc 
Nli%sed approach Course 
SIN I I: I. IANFOVS 
15 Deg. 30 Deg. ARRIVALS AND 
or more or more 1) F PA RTI IRFS 
Departure 
Course 
Missell Approach 
( 'Oki I-se 
350 Deg. sl Nit ýI TAN F( )l s 
2400ft 
'00 
ARRIVALS AND 
1) F PA RTVR FS 
ft 
Departure 
Course 
(Source: ICAO AirTraffic Services Manual) 
Simultaneous arrivals to parallel runways will only bC I)CI-InItICLI NOICII dIC mo 
runways are separated by 4300ft or more. 
Finally. if the above restrictions are not met then tile 1-111mays call Only be Operated 
Under the single rUnway rules. 
I 
-fleavv -4 
SFI'%RA FION BF I %% FFN 
2nn 
. 
2nn' 3000ft SNIAI 1, kIR( R%FI 
I leavv I. OITMN I N(. ' I N% () 
It I. k% N 
6nn it 
go 
Direction ofTmel -000%; 
Sil-TAR %I ION BF IN SNI %1 1 
72//9r 2nin 3000ft %111( It kFII. M I()%% I N(ý 
R. SNI %I I %IM 14 %1,1 
3.5nm 
(SOLirce: ICAO Ali-Trallic Scr\ ices Maimal) 
Appendix 2.7 
European Regulation Bodies 
Air transport regulation In 1, LII-OPC Carl be broken into I'Mir principal. Intcr-rclatcd 
groups. The first, the European Civil Aviation Conference, (FCAC), Is tile largest and 
oldest group with 36 member countries which startcd in 1955. It \\as conceived bý 
the Council of Europe to achieve the greatest possible degree of' co-ord Mat loll of 
intra-European air transport. It works in close lialson \\itll WAO and has scparatc 
economic, technical and facilitation committees. The organisat loll has no legislltl\c 
powers but provides a service to Furopean gove I'll 111clits sinillar to that of WAO. 
Since the 1970's the more technical aspects of I-VAC's N\ork has been taken o\ cr by 
the Joint Aviation Administration, (JAA). x, \hich defines joint lir\\ol-1lIlIICss 
requirements. (JAR's), on all areas of aircraft operation. I'lle lllitiilti\C behind tile 
JAA came from industry, which was suffering frolli high Certification costs. (file to 
differing standards in separate countries. Current colil parl Solis call be 111ade \\lth tile 
Federal Aviation Administration, (FAA), in tile t IS. and tile cost advantages of' lia\ Ing 
common certification procedures for a large number of' countries t`61- both all-craft 
manufacturers and airlines can be signiflicant, as it allows casier operation and transler 
of aircraft between participating countries. Many of' tile JAR's, have no\\ been 
completed, although problems with flight cl-e\\ licensing standards still remain. In 
addition, the JAA has not yet attempted to hal-1110111se rev Illat lolls Oil III-ports or AIC. 
ECA C (36) LiOluallia Armenia 
L. W. ia Moldo'. a 
Estonia Mace (I on ia 
JAA (27) Monaco 
POLInd 
EUROCONTROL (26) 
Malta EU UK Austria 
Cyprus France SNNetlell 
Ilungary Germany Ireland 
Finland 
Switzerland Nelherlands Denmark 
Slovenia Belgillul 11: 11) 
Czech Republic Portugal Spain 
Rep of Slovakia Greece 
Turkey I't j xe m bo u rg 
Norway 
Romania Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Source: ATM MSc Com-sc Notcs 1996197 
The third largest country co-operation in Furope is Furocontrol, L-onsisting of )0 
members. Eurocontrol was developed in 1960 to providc ATC in the upper airspacc 
above 2500011. Currently Lipper airspace control is only pro\ ided I'Or the Nctlierlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the northern half of Germany by its centre in Masstricht, 
Netherlands. The issue of ATC integration in Europe is not an easy one as there arc at 
least 51 air traffic control centres in the ECAC area using 31 different systems, using 
18 different computer types, with 22 different operating systems and 33 different 
programming languages. This compares to just 22 fully integrated ccntrcs in the US, 
an area of equivalent size. Eurocontrol is attempting to develop a standard operating 
system for Europe to overcome this problem, which undoubtedly increases congestion 
problems. Finally, it is attempting to co-ordinate separate flow management ccntrcs 
in Europe through its headquarters in Brussels. In conjunction with this work 
Eurocontrol is required to analyse and propose future development recommendations 
of ATC systems, which it does through its experimental centre at Brctigny-sur-Orge 
in France. 
The final and most powerful regulatory group in Europe is the European Union, (EU), 
which consists of 15 member states and was formed to crcate a common trading 
market in the 1970's. Aviation regulation is controlled through DG IV and DG VII of 
the EU. Currently they have adopted the JAR's and recommended adoption by 
member states governments to harmonise regulations. A number of environmental 
regulations on air and noise pollution have also been passed for adoption by members 
affecting airport and aircraft operations. 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.1: Aircraft Performance Characteristics 
3.2: Jet Operating Speeds - BAe 146-300 and Boeing 737-200 
3.3: Turboprop Operating Speeds - Fokker 50 and ATR 72 
3.4: Turn Radius variations with Speed 
3.5: Extract of Air UK BAe 146 Operations Manual on Steep Approaches 
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APPENDIX3.2 
BAe 146400 OPERATING SPEEDS 
TAKE OFF LANDING MANOEUVRING SPEEDS 
CONFIGURATION SPEED LIMIT 
FLAPS 18 FLAPS 33 FLAP 0 V"o + 15 kts 
FLAP 18 Vmr 33 + 30 kts 
AIRCRAFT WEIGHT vit V2 VFTO VVI VPREF FLAP 24 Vw 33 + 20 kta 
(KGS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) FLAP 33 Vwp 33 + 10 kts 
25000 99 ill 141 151 97 Min Manoeuvoring Spe*d wth flops zero 
26000 102 113 144 155 98 is V"o + 15 
27000 104 115 147 157 100 
28000 106 117 150 160 '102 
29000 108 119 153 163 104 
30000 110 121 156 166 106 
31000 113 123 158 169 108 
32000 115 124 161 171 109 
33000 117 126 163 174 ill 
34000 120 128 166 176 113 
35000 121 130 169 179 114 
36000 123 131 171 181 116 
37000 125 133 174 184 118 
38000 128 135 176 186 119 
39000 129 136 179 189 121 
40000 131 138 181 191 122 
41000 133 139 184 194 124 
42000 135 141 186 196 125 
43000 137 143 189 199 127 
44000 139 144 191 201 128 
45000 140 145 
. 
193 204 129 
VR = Take off rotation speed 
V2 = Take Off Safety Speed 
VF. ro Final Take Off Speed - Final Flap Retraction 
VER En Route Safety speed - Final Climb Out Speed 
VMP Landing Safety Speed 
Source: Air UK BAe 146-300 Operations Manual - Take Off Speed Cards 
Boeing 737-200 OPERATING SPEEDS 
TAKE OFF LANDING MANOEUVRING SPEEDS 
CONFIGURATION SPEED LIMIT 
FLAPS 5 FLAPS 40 FLAP 1 210-190 kts 
FLAP 5 190-170 kts 
AIRCRAFT WEIGHT vit V2 VFTo Vp" FLAP 15 150 - Vm1w 
(KGS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) FLAP 25 140 - Vmp 
30000 127 135 190 FLAP 30 vmw 
32000 190 106 FLAP 40 Vmp 
34000 190 110 bank angle limit 15* until Vv+20 
35000 127 135 190 
36000 190 113 
38000 ISO 116 
40000 127 135 190 119 
42000 ISO 122 
44000 190 126 
45000 136 143 190 
46000 190 129 
48000 190 132 
50000 146 151 190 135 
52000 190 138 
55000 154 159 200 
60000 162 167 200 
VR = Take off rotation speed 
V2 = Take Off Safety Speed 
VPTo Final Take Off Speed - Final Flap Retraction 
VRV Landing Safety Speed 
Source: Boeing 737-200 Quick Reference Handbook 
APPEAWIX3.3 
TURBOPROPS 
FOKKER 50 OPERATING SPEEDS 
TAKE OFF LANDING MANOEUVRING SPEEDS 
CONFIGURAIION SPLEDLIMIr 
FLAPS 5 FLAPS 25 FLAPO 140 kts 
FLAP 10 130 kta 
AIRCRAFT WEIGHT VR V2 VFTO VER vitep FLAP 20 120 kts 
(KGS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) FLAP 25 110 kIs 
15000 93 96 101 105 94 bank angle limit 15* below bOU ft 
15500 94 97 103 107 94 Normal turns are rate I with a maximum 
16000 95 97 104 108 94 bank angle of 30* 
16500 97 99 106 110 96 Normal manoeuvnng speed after take off 
17000 98 100 107 112 97 is V2 + 10 after ftap retraction 
17500 100 102 109 114 98 
18000 101 103 110 115 99 
18500 103 105 112 117 101 
19000 104 106 113 118 102 
19500 106 107 115 120 104 
20000 107 108 116 121 105 
20800 110 1 110 1 119 124 107 
VR = Take off rotation speed 
V2 = Take Off Safety Speed 
VFTO Final Take Off Speed - Final Flap Retraction 
VER En Route Safety speed - Final Climb Out Speed 
VREF Landing Safety Speed 
Source: Air UK Fokker 50 Operations Manual - Take Off Speed Cards 
ATR 72 OPERATING SPEEDS 
TAKE OFF LANDING MANOEUVRING SPEEDS 
CONFIGURATION SPEEDLIMIT 
FLAPS 15 FLAPS 30 FLAP 0 180 kts, 
FLAP 15 150 kts 
AIRCRAFT WEIGHT VR V2 VFT0 VREF FLAP 30 135 kts 
(KGS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) (KTS) Minimum turn speed with bank 
14000 10; 107 112 90 angle greater than 151 w Vrro +10 kts 
15000 104 107 116 94 
16000 104 107 120 97 
17000 104 107 124 100 
18000 104 107 128 103 
19000 104 107 132 106 
20000 107 110 135 110 
21000 110 112 138 113 
22000 112 1 115 1 142 115 
VFt = Take off rotation speed 
V2 = Take Off Safety Speed 
VFTO = Final Take Off Speed - Final Flap Retraction 
VREF = Landing Safety Speed 
Source: Air UK ATR 72 operations Manual 
APPENDIX3.4 
Effect of Turning Speed on Turn Radius 
Aircraft Speed 
(Kts) 
Aircraft Speed 
(ft/s) 
Bank Angle 
(deg) 
Turn Radius 
(ft)* 
Circular Path 
Distance (nm)** 
80 135 25 1216 1.26 
90 152 25 1539 1.59 
100 169 25 1900 1.98 
110 186 25 2299 2.38 
120 203 25 2735 2.83 
130 220 25 3210 3.32 
140 236 25 3723 3.85 
150 253 25 4274 4.42 
160 270 25 4863 5.03 
170 287 25 5490 5.67 
180 304 25 6155 6.36 
190 321 25 6858 7.09 
200 338 25 7599 7.85 
210 355 25 8377 8.66 
220 372 25 9194 9.50 
230 388 25 10049 10.38 
240 405 25 10942 11.31 
250 422 25 11873 12.27 
260 439 25 12842 13.27 
270 456 25 13848 14.31 
280 473 25 14893 15.39 
290 490 25 15976 16.51 
300 507 25 17097 17.67 
TABLE 1 
Calculation is made using formula presented in Chapt. 3 
** Calculated using the formula C=2 Trr assuming I nm = 6080ft 
APPENDIX3.4 
Effect of Turning Speed on Bank Angle assuming a Fixed Turn Radius 
Aircraft Speed 
(Kts) 
Aircraft Speed 
MIS) 
Bank Angle 
(deg) 
Turn Radius 
OW 
Circular Path 
Distance (nm)** 
80 135 4.1 8000 8.27 
90 152 5.1 8000 8.27 
100 169 6.3 8000 8.27 
110 186 7.6 8000 8.27 
120 203 9.1 8000 8.27 
130 220 10.6 8000 8.27 
140 236 12.2 8000 8.27 
150 253 14.0 8000 8.27 
160 270 15.8 8000 8.27 
170 287 17.7 8000 8.27 
180 304 19.7 8000 8.27 
190 321 21.8 8000 8.27 
200 338 23.9 8000 8.27 
210 355 26.0 8000 8.27 
220 372 28.2 8000 8.27 
230 388 30.4 8000 8.27 
240 405 32.5 8000 8.27 
250 422 34.7 8000 8.27 
260 439 36.8 8000 8.27 
270 456 38.9 8000 8.27 
280 473 41.0 8000 8.27 
290 490 43.0 8000 8.27 
300 507 44.9 8000 8.27 
TABLE 2 
Calculation is made using formula presented in Chapt. 3 
** Calculated using the formula C=2 7C r assuming 1 nm = 6080ft 
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2.9.1 GENERAL 
1.1 BAe 146 aircraft are permitted to land from an ILS approach 
with an approach angle between 4.51 and 6.0* provided all 
operational requirements are met. 
1.2 LIMITATIONS 
The following limitations must be observed. 
a) The procedure has only been cleared for landing with 33* 
nap. 
b) The decision height must not be less than 200 feet or the 
OCA/H, if greater. 
C) The autopilot may remain engaged down to a height of 
160ft RA 
d) Landing with a tailwind component is not permitted. 
NOTE: Maximum tailwind component for the 100 series 
aircraft Is 5kts 
e) Steep approaches with two engines inoperative have not 
been demonstrated. 
f) BAe mod. HCM50016 (Steep Approach Monitor System) 
must be fitted. 
g) Visual Precision Approach Path Indicators (VASI's of 
PAPI's) must be serviceable. 
2.9.2 LANDING PERFORMANCrz 
2.1 In order to maximise landing performance, a steep approach 
procedure has been developed. 
2.2 The benefit of the steep approach procedure Is that aviation 
authorities have recognised that a reduction in screen height 
from 50ft to 35ft is appropriate. This reduction will provide two 
performance benefits. 
1. Less touchdown scatter due to the steeper approach 
angle. 
2. A geometric reduction in airborne distance due to the 
reduced screen height. 
NORMAL PROCEDURES Sedlon 2.9 
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2.3 The actual performance benefit Is determined through a 
number of tests carried out by the relevant civil aviation 
authorities and result In a correction to the landing distance 
required (LDR). 
2.4 In the case of the UK CAA, the wet runway landing 
performance benefit has been certified as an increase in 
landing field length available of. 
BAs 146 - 300 143m 
BAs 146-100 82m 
2.9.3 APPROACH PROCEDURE 
3.1 Tuns and identify the ILS frequency, select the Steep Approach 
selector to ON by depressing the switch and check the S. APP 
white annunicator is lit 
3.2 When establishing on the approach select IS* flap and reduce 
speed VREF 33 + 30 knots. Arm G/S and S. APP (PNE to call 
'LOCALISER GREEN, GLIDSLOPE AND STEEP APPROACH 
ARMED" PF to acknowledge. 
3.3 After localizer capture, and when glideslope Indicator becomes 
live, select 240 flap and allow speed to reduce to minimum of 
VREF 33 + 20 knots. 
3.4 Approach the glideslope from below. At 1.1/2 dots select 
landing gear DOWN, select 330 flap and allow the speed to 
reduce to a minimum of V, ýý 33 +5 knots. Confirm the S. APP 
green annunciator Is lit. (PNF to call "STEEP APPROACH 
GREEN", PF to acknowledge). s 
3.5 On Intercepting the glideslope select airbrake OUT and 
maintain speed at a minimum of VREF 33 +5 knots. 
Initiate the LANDING CHECKUST. 
, 
3.6 Aim to cross the threshold at VREF 33. Commence the landing 
flare and reduce power to flight Idle. 
3.7 Do not prolong the landing flare and after touchdown lower the 
nosewheel to the runway without delay. Select lift spoilers and 
commence braking. 
NOTE: Approach Profile Is at 2.8.1 page 12. 
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2.9.4 BRIEFING NOTE 
4.1 It Is essential to maintain the correct speed on final approach. 
4.2 Be aware that the more rapid changes of altitude on a steep 
approach can increase the effects of WINDSHEAR. The 
higher drag configuration and lower power settings Increase the 
need for anticipation and windshear awareness. 
4.3 When gusts are reported, Increase approach speeds by up to a 
maximum of 10 knots. When icing conditions require an 
increase of all speeds by 7 knots. this speed plus the gust 
factor must not exceed the basic VREF + 10 knots threshold 
speed. 
4.4 Avoid flying above the glideslope but if this occurs quickly 
change the attitude to regain the glideslope. With the high 
drag configuration any resulting Increase in speed can soon be 
corrected. 
4.5 On a steep approach, aircraft nose down attitude approximates 
to glideslope. 
4.6 At decision altitude, when achieving visual reference. Is, runway 
and PAPI's In sight use the PAPI Indications to maintain the 
correct glideslope. Before commencing the flare transfer to 
normal visual cues for flare and touchdown. 
4.7 The lower attitude on a steep approach necessitates a slightly 
larger change in attitude both to achieve the landing or to 
initiate a missed approach. 
4.8 An early flare can result in an unnecessary Increase In landing 
distance due to float A very late flare can result in a heavy 
landing. 
4.9 Landing limitations are changed. For a steep approach, 
Landing Distance Available may be Increased by 143m for the 
BAe 146 - 300 series and 82m for the 100 series when using 
Flight manual landing charts. 
NOTE Check OM Part C2 as some airports e. g LCY have 
specific landing weight charts. 
4.10 In the event of a go around, pilots mug check that the airbrake 
is retracted as unlike a normal approach, the sirbrake will be 
open at minima. 
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2.9.5 Steep ADDroach Monitor System We mod. hcm 50016) 
5.1 This modification prevents nuisance sink-rate warnings from 
the GPWS system during steep approaches. 
5.2 The warnings are inhibited when the following conditions ere 
met 
. Aircraft in landing configuration (gear down, flap 33). 
- Steep Approach Monitor Select Switch 'ON'. 
- Vertical speed IeS3 than 1500 fpm. 
5.3 The select svAtch has a white 'S. APP' legend and a green 
'S. APP'legend. 
When first selected ON, the. white legend will illuminate. 
When the following conditions are achieved the green legend 
will also illuminate. 
Gear down and locked.. 
- Flaps set to 33. 
- Weight OFF wheels. 
If the switch is selected ON ifta the conddions are achieved, 
only the green legend will be illuminated. 
5.4 The select switch Is mounted either 
Immediately below the Flap Overdde switch - analogue ac. 
or 
Immediately to the right of Flap Overnde svAtch - EFIS ac. 
Section 2.9 NORMAL PROCEDURES 
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Appendix 4.1 
Uombined Fercentage I rallic (frowt1i ucate I, orecasts III N1.1jol, X11,1111t, N1.111'ets 
Market Segment Airbus Forecast Ilocing Forecast NIc 1) 4) 11 n 01 
(1995-2014) (1995-2014), l Douglas 
Forecast 
(1994-201, I)l 
Intra-Africa 5.2 
Intra-Asia/Pacitic 6.3 
Intra-Europe 4.3 
Intra-l-atin America S. 5 
Intra-Middle F. ast 5.2 
Aiý,, ru-i 
1 17 
Asia-Africa 7.3 
Asia-Europe 7.5 
Asia-Indian Subcontinent 5.9 
Asia-Middle East 6.4 
Asia-North America 7.4 
Asia-Pacific 6.5 
Europe-Africa 4.3 
Europe-Indian Subcontinent 6.4 
Furope-Latin America 4.7 
Furope-Middle Fast 4.2 
Europe-North America 4.3 
Indian Subcontinent-At'rica 3.9 
Latin America-Africa 4.5 
Latin America-Pacific 5.2 
Middle East-Africa 7.2 
Middle East-Indian 
Subcontinent 
6.0 
Middle East-Pacific 4.4 
North America-Africa 4.4 
North America-Latin 
America 
15.3 
North Arnerica-Middle East 3.9 
North Arnerica-Oceania 3.7 
Pacific-At'rica 3.2 
Pacitic-Indian Subcontinent 4.7 
Intra-CIS 
CIS-Rcst ol'World 
Charter Airlines 6.4 
* Boeing and McDonnell Douglas higures \\erc 
6.5 
5.4) 
4.8 
4.2 
1 0.0 
5.7 
6.5 
thL. II1,01cc; Ists III 1,0111k, CA. "C', 
under dill'emit region names although lllcý I-Clatcd to 111C "mlic 
** Figure ignores former I J. S. S. R. donicstic market. 
Source: Airbus, Boeing and McOonnell DouglAS ( HOIXII IndtlStl'. \ 1'0I'CCASt! lý 
Appentlix-4.2 
Fokker Forecasts of Intra-Regional Scheduled Available Scat Mile 
(1984-2014) 
Geographic 
Region 
Average Groi% Ili p. a. 
Percentage 
1984-1994 199-5-2004 2005-2014 
North America 2.4 2.7 2.6 
Europe 6.8 3.6 2.0 
AsiaiPacific 9.0 7.3 5.8 
Latin America 4.0 3.7 2.9 
Africa & Middle 
East 
0.4 3.0 2.0 
World 4.2 4.2 3.8 
Jetstream Regional Market Outlook of Forecast Capacit) Groii th 
(1995-2004) 
Geographic Growth Rate in Forecast Capacitý ('Y") 
Region 19 seats 30 seat 50 seat io seat 70 seat 70 Combined 
T/prop T/prop T/prop Jets T/prop seat Al Crage 
Jets 
North -1.8 6.2 7.0 15. S 17.1 5.3 
America 
Europe -1.1 5.2 -5.3 21.3 10.6 1 0.0 
Asia, Pacific -0.2 15.7 4.3 n/a 17.7 6.0 9.3 
and China 
Central and -0.6 6.4 3.9 II/a 10.8 1 4.3 
South 
America 
Africa & the n/a 9.8 3.3 II/a 11.2 5.2 5.2 
Middle East 
Australasia -0.8 1.8 11.3 11/. 1 n/a 5. o 5.7 
World -1.5 6.1 5.6 20.8 15.2 5.2 6.3 
Ap 
_ 
Vend& 4.3 
Summary offindings by 1987 AEA Report on Capacity of Aviation Systems in 
Europe 
Hourly Ruairay C Forecast Comiefdoe Your 
Airport Normal capacity Th Cal Capacity urn, Growth Moak" Growth 1110 Urvink 
Vienne 
DeporL 
t5 
Ardvals 
15 
Total 
30 
Departi. 
Is 
Antvals 
is 
Total 
J6 
Se--a- 
3-ZOOO 
se"arle 
3-2000 
Scosurso 
MW, 
Salzboull - 1986 
20" 
Brussels 
6 
is 
20 
6 
18 
20 
12 
36 
40 
10 
30 
10 
30 
20 
60 
3-Zooo 
1998 
3,2000 
1994 
3-2000 
1"1 
Helsinki - 1986 
1995 
15 
is 
15 
is 
30 
36 
is 
22 
is 
22 
16 3.2000 2000 19% 
Pariz-Orly 32 32 64 3.. 2000 1999 1991 
Pmris-CDG 36 32 68 ý2000 2-2000 1991 
Marlowe 14 14 23 ý-Zooo 1994 1992 
Nice 30 2.1000 ýZooo i 9911 
Lyon 15 Is 30 5--2000 2-2000 1 iozooo 
Frankfurt 49 35 64 3,2000 1"5 1"1 
Duneldorf 35 1993 1991 1989 
, M=kb - 1"6 
1"2 
24 Z4 32 
64 
19% 1"3 
H-mbom 36 ý200() 1995 1993 
Stummart 10 to 20 1986 1996 1986 
Elmonever 54 2-. 2000 A-2000 3.2000 
Athem 16 14 30 39 1991 19" 1999 
Budapest - 1"6 
1988 
a 
17 
8 
t7 
16 
34 
10 
20 
10 
2 
20 
40 
P2000 : OZOOO 3-2000 
Keflavik u/s. 3. ZOOO X2000 ý2000_ 
Dablin - 1986 
1909 
18 
22 
17 
21 
35 
43 
20 20 40 : OZOOO zooo L"S 
Rome 25 25 50 3-2000 L4 7 - - i i 
1"1 
Mum Llbnkt* 12 12 24 ý2000 0 0 0 7000 24000 Milan MEXP 15 15 30 Coitibined vnth Linato 
Luxemburg Wit ý2000 I-Zooo W2000 
ZM-AWIW= 35 30 65 
- 
42 36 78 2000 1997 1993 
Llab" - 1986 
1990 
14 
n1s, 
13 25 17 
21 
13 
20 
30 
39 
2-2000 V-1.000 3,1000 
Porte 5 4 7 13 11 22 ý2000 1998 1997 
Copenhagen - 1986 
1"9 
40 
44 
33 
36 
60 
66 
36 66 3-2000 1"s 1994 
Stockholm - 1986 24 30 34 62 212000 2000 
19% 
Gothoubmij ft/4 2.2000 ý2000 A-2000 
0210 17 13 1 35 1 2-. 2000 19" 1991 
Beruen n/a '-, 2000 ý2000 2,2()t)O 
Stavanger n/s. ý2000 ý2000 W2000 - 
MaArld 16 to 34 19% 1 1992 1990 
Falms do Mallores 30 40 3.2000 ý2000 V.? OOO 
25 30 1998 19% 
Bwteloom is :I 
_ 
20 1986 1986 1996 
- i; ýb 35 32 67 ý2000 1999 199S 
Geneva 15 15 30 i989 1988 1980 
London - Heathrow J7 33 72 Under Review 1996 1916 
1986 
London - G*Wck 40 41 
1996 1991 1919 
London - Stansted - 1986 
1991 
25 
40 
40 
40 
2000 1997 19% 
Mambeltor 19 is 37 3.2000 *2000 3-2000 
Biraditidtam 19 is 37 'o2000 *1000 VZOOO 
Glasgow, 19 is 37 V-2000 ý2000 2000 
Aberdeen 19 is 37 ý2000 ý12000 19" 
LOAmbid - 1986 
1988 
7 
12 
13 
is 
20 
30 
). Zooo 3-2000 
1 
2000 
Ankara - 1986 
19881 
4 
6 
6 
10 
10 
16 
zooo 
1 
2000 1 1000 
TabIe Notes: 
1. CDG = Charles de Gaulle, MXP = Milan Malpensa 
2. Theoretical capacity figures refer to AEA expectations of future airport 
development, and the resultant capacity increase. 
3. Three scenarios relate to different market growth rates of 3.2%, 5.1% and 7% 
respectively. 
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SRI 1990 European Airport Development Summary 
Forecast Declared 
Airport Capacity Limit Capacity Development Plans and 
Without With (1990) Recommendations 
Mods. Mods. 
With independent parallel operations 
Amsterdam Schiphol 2000 >2010 70 runway capacity could increase to 84 by 
1995. Plans to build a 5th runway if 
demand is suflicient giving capacity of 
100 mov. per hour. 
No planned capacity improvements. 
Athens 1993 2000 30/32 Need to improve ATC operations to 42 
movs. per hour to accommodate demand 
till 2000. 
ATC improvements would allow mov. 
Barcelona 1995 2010 28 rate of 50 to 55. No planned capacity 
increases. 
Computer aided ATC centre for 1990 
Brussels Zavantem. 2001 >2010 45 plus taxiway enhancements should 
accommodate demand. 
Expect mov. rate of 62-65 by 1990.70- 
Copenhagen Kastrup 1997 2007 60 80 mov. per hour possible with runway 
configuration and improved ATC 
management and training 
ATC improvements possible to give 40- 
Dublin 1994 >2010 25 45 mov. per hour. Need to divert general 
aviation, (GA), traffic. 
New runway planned for 1991. Mov. 
Dusseldorf 1992 >2010 34 rate increases to 64. Very politically 
sensitive location. Reliever airports for 
GA and traffic diversion to 
Cologne/Bonn considered. 
Capacity limit of 120 movs. in 2 
Frankfurt 1991 1992 64 consecutive hours. 70 mov. per hr. 
possible with runway config by 1995,80 
mov. per hr. by 2000 with 
procedural/cquip. enhancements. GA and 
commuters to reliever airport would help. 
Severe expansion restrictions. 
42 movs. per hr. possible. I ligh GA and 
Geneva 1995 1995 35 business traffic restrict growth; relocation 
suggested. French ATC traff ic 
integration problems. 
45 mov. per hr. possible if ATC 
Hamburg 1990 1990 36 improves. 55 movs. feasible with runway 
config. GA traffic relocation suggested. 
Growth limited by physical space. 
Istanbul 2005 >2010 40 700m runway extension. Rate of 50 mov. 
per hr. possible if ATC_improve 
Best in class for single runway. 48 mov. 
London Gatwick 1992 1996 41 per hr. possible if use is made of 2nd 
runway. 
Best in class. 85 mov. per hr. possible if 
London Heathrow 1991 1997 72 independent parallel operations on 
runways were allowed. 
If ATC constraints were filled 42 mov. 
London Stanstcd >2010 >2010 20 per hr would be possible. Diversion 
traffic from UIR and LGW could cause 
capacity problems later. 
Madrid Barajas 1992 1997 30 ATC limits runway capacity. 42 mov. per 
hr. possible. 
42 mov. per hr. possible. Capacity by 
Manchester 1997 2000* 39 1997 unless second runway Is built. If 
not traffic will need reliever airport. 
Marseille 1996 >2010 28 ATC and stand improvements would 
allow 52 mov. per hr. 
Capacity limited by poor use of slot 
Milan Linate 1994 2001 26 allocation, physical space and GA traffic. 
Plan to move traffic to Malpensa in 1993. 
Milan Malpensa >2010 >2010 30 Increase mov. rate to 50-54 required to 
handle Linate traffic. 
Munich late >2010 34 Capacity problems will be absorbed by 
1980's (72 Muc2) new Munich 2 airport in 1992. 
72 mov. per hr. possible with improved 
Palma de Mallorca 1996 >2010 30 ATC, taxiways, and independent parallel 
operations on runways. 
82 mov. per hr. possible with improved 
Paris Charles de Gaulle >2010 >2010 72 ATC management. Room for 3rd and 4di 
runways. No real capacity problem. 
Paris Orly 2006 2007 66 No expansion plans due to highly 
developed land surrounding airport. 
ATC improvements expect 70 mov. per 
Rome Fiumicino 2000 >2010 50 hr. Should reach 80 movs. eventually. 
No airport expansion plans at present. 
Third runway 1994 will give 84 mov. per 
Stockholm Arlanda 1993 >2010 57-60 hr. 4th and 5th runway under 
consideration. No real capacity problems. 
Vienna 2004 >2010 35 45 mov. per hr. possible on taxiway and 
runway improvements. Airport plan will 
prevent lack of capacity. 
Zurich Kloten 2002 2003 60 62 mov. per hr. possible with reduced 
longitudinal separation. GA/Business 
traffic relocation suggested. Expansion 
very limited by political and 
environmental pressures. 
Source: SRI International (1990) A European Planning Strategy for Air Trail ic to the 
Year 2010. 
Note: The second and third columns in the table indicate the year wlicn SRI cxpcct 
the airport to reach capacity. The second column is without and changes to the 
present system whilst the third column indicates differences following changcs to the 
system. 
A pp en dix 4.5 
SRI Action Plan Recommendations 
* Continue current efforts to improve ATC and airport functions. 
* Undertake ATS Capacity Enhancement Program. 
* Convene European Air Traffic Assembly. 
* Evaluate economic impacts of commercial aviation. 
* Provide airport development subsidies to foster economic development. 
* Expand Data Bank Eurocontrol. 
* Develop comprehensive airport master plans. 
* Implement best in class enhancements. 
* Seek Heathrow Terminal 5 and an additional London runway. 
* Seek Frankfurt airport expansions. 
* Seek reliever airports. 
Appendix 4.6 
Summary of European Airport Development 1990-1995 
Airport Development up to 1995 and future plans 
Plans to extend runway 06/24 by 250m. Othcr work focuscd on 
Amsterdam terminal modifications and extensions, including a rcgional 
Schiphol aircraft pier completed in 1994. Rail link to high spccd rail 
station expected to be complete by 1995. 
Planning a new, $2.3bn private, airport 25km from Athens to 
Athens begin operation in 1998 with two runways and a capacity of 16 
million. Existing airport, Hellenikon, will be closcd and rc- 
developed. 
Declared capacity of 28 exceeded by ATC improvements. 
Barcelona Terminal expansion to 17 million was made by 1992 for 
Olympic Games, further expansions planned. Considering a 
new parallel runway to 07/25 to allow closure of 02/20 which 
causes flights to cross a densely populated area on approach. 
Brussels Zavantem All work has focused on new terminal work which was opened 
on II th December 1994. 
Copenhagen Due to severe lack of space, airport noise and environmental 
Kastrup issues are very sensitive. No new runways planned. All 
development has been to upgrade and expand terminal capacity. 
Runway 10/28 opened in 1989 following soil dctcrioration on 
Dublin previous main runway. Airport operates to single runway 
levels even though it has four. New mastcrplan set in 1993 to 
the year 2000 outlines terminal and apron expansions with a 
300m extension to 10/28 to handle long haul traffic. Work 
expected to be complete by 1997. Political limitations on Aer 
Lingus long haul traffic having to route via Shannon. 
Airport operation severely regulated by local government. All 
modifications must have state authorisation. A 2700m reserve 
Dusseldorf runway to 05/23 was built in 1993. Motonvay and rail links 
have also been put in place. Regulations limit aircraft 
movements to approx. 150,000 a year with encouragement for 
traffic to use Cologne/Bonn airport. Considering rclocation of 
regional traffic to reliever airport, either Monchengladbach or 
Essen-Mulheim both 20-30km outside Dusseldorf. Move 
resisted by regional commuters. 
Second most important airport in Europe severely limitcd by 
physical space, USAF base on south side of airport, vcry 
effective local opposition to any growfli and political ownership 
Frankfurt of airport causing constant conflict between what the airport 
needs and local residents want. Large usc of tcclinology 
including Departure Co-ordination systcm, (DEPCOS), 
Computer Orientated Metering Planning and Advisory Systcm, 
(COMPAS), Precision Runway Monitoring, (PRM-EScam) and 
I MLS replacement of ILS. Significant work also done on wakcj 
vortex and SALS trials. Taxiway modifications carried out 
where DEPCOS indicates the need for them. Relaxation of 
night curfew also sought. Hoped these approaches will 
Frankfurt increase annual movements to 366,000 a year by 2000 
(Cont.. ) increasing declared capacity to 80. Removal of regional traffic 
to Weisbaden-Erbenheim also considered. 
All airport developments need to meet approval from strict, 
Geneva environmentally conscious, Swiss law courts. Noise 
restrictions prevent increases in aircraft movements. 5 
movements an hour given to GA restrict growth even further. 
Subsequently, all recent work focused on terminal 
enhancements. 
Restricted runway operations due to noise. Capacity limited by 
Hamburg apron stands and lack of space to expand. Runway expansions 
not feasible. Plans to build a new airport at Kaltenkirchcn 
failed in 1984. Recent developments have been in the terminal. 
Relocation of GA to Finkenwerder suggested. 
Istanbul Proposed extension of runway 06/24 to 2700m. Ten remote 
stands added in 1994 with second terminal proposed to enter 
service in the late 1990's. 
Much work by RUCATSE and UK CAA has been carried out 
on a proposed second runway, north and south of existing 
London Gatwick airport boundary. Significant land purchase costs, local council 
agreements and strong local opposition have prevented 
permission for new runway. CAA work also carried out 
regarding regional services and possible relocation to Redhill 
reliever airport. Actual airport developments include terminal 
redevelopment and expansions and taxiway modifications. 
Government policy encouraging traffic redistribution to 
Stansted limiting further expansion. 
Site for a new runway outlined by RUCATSE report although 
construction and relocation costs prohibited development. 
Currently in planning enquiry for a 5th terminal for operation in 
London Heathrow two phases from 2002 and 2016. Runway capacity increased to 
377,000 movs. by mid 1992.2.5nm arrival separation trials in 
use. Discussion of mixed mode runway operation still 
unresolved. 1992 runway capacity enhancement group set up. 
Report in 1994 indicated mixed mode could raise declared 
capacity to 92 although problems of ground capacity would 
arise and also the noise footprint of LHR has decreased 
significantly. Currently use peak period pricing to regulate 
demand during peak pcriods. MLS trials are also being carried 
out. Future plans include terminal redevelopment and taxiway 
and RET extensions. 
Currently under-utilised. Fastest growing UK airport. 
London Stansted Expansion of terminal capacity completed in 1994. Currently 
attempting to remove movement limit on the airport of 78,000 
per year. Expects to handle 8 million pax's by 2000 and 15 
million by 2007 due to redirection of LIIR and LGW traffic. 
32% of all flights were affected by delays during 1991. All 
aspects of the airport lacked capacity. ATC problems existed 
Madrid Baraj as from lack of experience and staff. AENA was placed in charge 
in 1991 and developed a new masterplan incorporating in depth 
simulation of future traffic demands with the FAA. From this a 
plan to add three parallel runways to the existing 36/18 was 
made. The runways will be built in phases with the first 
expected to be completed by 1997,4000m long and used 
mainly for take offs. The plan is expected to satisfy demand till 
2030. Increasing use of intersection departures on 36 is 
planned following a shortening of runway 33 and taxiway 
construction. 
Declared capacity increased to 42 through additional It T's E. s 
Manchester and holding bays for single runway. Current plans include an 
additional passing bay for 06, an additional RET for 06 and a 
second runway. Public enquiry for last plan complete during 
late 1995, still awaiting response. Terminal redevelopment and 
extensions also planned. Also being trailing SALS procedures 
and FMS departures. TMA re-structured in 1995/6. 
Capacity limited by French ATC. Two plans for runway 
extension were under consideration, 14RJ32L could be 
Marseille extended to 3000m increasing declared capacity to 52, or a new 
runway increasing capacity to 60-72. The latter faces severe 
environmental problems and neither have planning permission. 
Current terminal expansion expected to be complete by 1996. 
Constrained in all areas of the airport and lack of space to 
Milan Linate expand or allow a second runway. Capacity restricted by 6 
reservations for GA activity an hour. Plan is to divert all 
international and intra, Europe flights to Malpcnsa, with a 50: 50 
split in traffic by 2000. 
Seen by SEA, the operating authority, as Italy's new hub 
airport. Consists of two parallel runways, one principal one, 
Milan Malpensa one for GA. Malpensa 2000 project sees upgrade of GA 
runway to CATIII and dependent parallel operations for 
commercial traffic, new road and rail links and a new terminal. 
First phase of terminal expected to be open by 1998. Changes 
to the design and fraud charges delayed project by two years. 
Bergamo airport being developed as a possible reliever airport 
1 to Malpensa and Linate in the future. 
Congestion problems at Munich Reim were removed when it 
Munich shut in 1992, following the opening of the new Munich2 airport 
which provided an extra runway and much needed terminal 
space. New airport took 30 years from conception to operation. 
Lack of ATC experience means the independent parallel 
Palma de Mallorca runways can not be used. Instead the airport is restricted to one 
runway. Airport receives support of local populatioril Work in 
the last few years has focused on completion of the first 
terminal in 1995 and start of work on the next one the same 
year. 
Master plan for CDG already has provision for 3 more runways 
Paris Charles de and another terminal. 1994 saw the completion of a high speed 
Gaulle rail interchange at the airport. Third runway expected to be 
operational by 1997 although delays occurred in getting 
government approval. Integration of traffic from Orly and 
CDG can cause some problems for ATC. 
Paris Orly Originally the French domestic airport it was opened up to intra 
European flights in 1993. Expansion limited by available 
space. As CDG develops it would be expected to handle more 
of Orly's traffic. 
Rome Fiumicino Terminal, apron and taxiway extension made in 1994. Airport 
not capacity limited by space, more by ATC ability. 
Stockholm Third runway and parallel taxiway planned to begin in 1996 
Arlanda and complete by 1999. Rail link to Stockholm also scheduled 
to open in 1997. 
Vienna Focus has been on terminal development rather than runway 
changes. 
Faces same severe restrictions as Geneva. Also as arrivals 
cross German border, a restriction that a third off all landings 
Zurich Kloten have to be on runway 16 exists. Airport 2000 mastcrplan 
details taxiway and apron extensions. A special SALS arrival 
procedure has been used with limitations by Crossair since 
1990. Severe noise and environmental restrictions, as well as 
lack of space limit runway extensions and additions. 
Source: Homer, M (1993) Congestion in Europe - An Opportunity or a Threat 
to Regional Jet Operations - Msc Thesis Cranfield. 
Airports International - World Development Surveys December, 
Edition various years. 
Flight International - Airports Special - Flight 19-25 October 1994 - 
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Appendix 4.12 
Recommendations of EC Proposal on Airport Slot Allocation 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of January 18,1993) 
A carrier may apply for new entrant slots at an airport provided it has less than four 
on any one day. Above this limit new entrant status will be lost unless the carricr 
applies for slots on a non-stop service between two Community airports where, at 
most, two other carriers operate a direct service between die two Community 
airports or airport system. However, if the carrier holds more than 3% of total slots 
available at that airport or more than 2% of the total slots available at an airport 
system, the carrier shall not be entitled to any new entrant status. 
If a member state designates an airport as coordinated', it is responsible to ensue 
that the coordinator provides to all concerned, all die relevant information 
regarding co-ordination and to ensure that the principles of transparcncy, neutrality 
and non-discrimination are met. Member states are also obliged to carry out airport 
capacity analysis when air carriers or the airport authorities consider that capacity 
is insufficient for actual or planned demand or when new entrants encounter 
serious problems in obtaining slots. Recogniscd mctliods must be used conforming 
to recognised industry standards. All fully coordinated airports must have 
undergone a capacity analysis by 1995. 
A coordinator for the previous regulation shall be appointed and act in accordance 
to the regulation, attend international scheduling conferences, be rcsponsible for 
slot allocation and monitor the use of slots. The coordinator shall also cnsure that 
in that airport, a co-ordination committee is set up to assist and consult the 
coordinator. This committee must represent all the air transport scrviccs as wcll as 
local residents and users of the system. 
Airport capacity shall be determined by a competent authority as derincd by flic 
member state. This may be the airport assisted by ATC, the airlines or a third party 
organisation with the appropriate skills and knowledge for this task. 
The IATA scheduling procedures guide is to remain the baseline for slot allocation. 
Grandfather rights remain valid although permission is given to freely exchange 
slots between air carriers on a one to one basis. Slots may be exchanged with other 
slot holding airlines at an airport, without hindrance from the coordinator. 71c 
transfer of slot does not restrict the route or level of service that can be offcrcd Nvith 
the traded slot except in the case of slots given to a new entrant on speciric routes. 
lAt a coordinated airport the coordinator facilitates the operation of the air carriers. Scheduled Movement 
Advises are required to be sent to the coordinator. The coordinator will not allocate slots and airlines do not 
have to obtain cleared slots for their schedules. A fully coordinated airport has an appointed coordinator and 
requires Scheduled Clearances Requests to be sent to the coordinator. In pcriods where demand exceeds 
capacity all the schedules shall have slots allocated by the coordinator. 
EU members may declare certain routes to an airport scrving periplicral or 
development regions within the member state as vital for the ccononlic 
development of a region. In this case slots at fully coordinatcd airports will bc 
reserved for the designated routes. 
Grandfather slots are defined as slots the carrier operates in a similar fashion and 
on the same day of the week for a number of weeks. With evidence of this the 
carrier may claim historical precedence to the slot so long as the slot was operated 
by at least 80% of the time during it's allocation period. Allowances to this 80% 
rule are made for grounding of aircraft types, ATC, adverse weather and strikes by 
ATC or handling agents. Failure to meet these criteria will result in the slot being 
taken from the carrier and placed in a slot pool. This pool will supply slots to 
carriers applying for extra 
slots and at least 50% will go to new entrants although this may bc rcduccd if ncw 
entrant demand has been satisfied. 
A carrier at a fully coordinated airport may not exchange it's own slots to permit 
increased operation on a particular route between two EU member states or operate 
new routes. 
No discrimination must exist between treatment of foreign, (non EQ, and 
Community carriers at any airport. Action to take if this rule is brokcn is not 
clearly explained. 
The European Commission must report to the European Council and Parlianicnt on 
the implementation of this regulation three years after its cntry into forcc. Final 
responsibility for continuation and revision of this regulation lies with thc 
European Council of Ministers. 
Source: Taken from Ligi, F. (1995) Airport Slot Allocation in Europe. MSc Tlicsis, 
Dept., Air Transport, Cranfield University. 
Appendly 4,13 
APATST Mature ATC Procedures 
1. Reduction of Radar Separation on Final Approach 
This procedure recommends the reduction of final approach radar scparation bct%vccn 
aircraft, without wake vortex restrictions, from 3nm to 2.5nm. The procedure rcquircs 
runway occupancy time of 50 seconds or less and turnoff points visible from the ATC 
tower. Capacity gains of 3 to 5 arrivals per hour for a single mode runway operation 
are envisaged following reports of similar procedures in the US. Most major 
European airports will be candidates for implementation of this procedure. 
2. Reduction of Diagonal Separation on Final Approach 
For aircraft established on parallel final approach paths to runways scparatcd by at 
least 760m, diagonal separation may be reduced from 2nm to 1.5nm. The proccdure 
is subject to weather and non conflicting missed approach paths. Capacity gains of 4 
arrivals per hour on single mode runways are expccted. Candidatc airports arc 
Amsterdam Schiphol, Hanover, Heathrow, Berlin Schocncfeld, Colognc-Bonn and 
Rome Fiumicino. 
3. Reduced Runway Separation on the Same Runway 
This procedure envisages that under specific conditions of aircraft tmffic mix and 
visibility, aircraft may be cleared to land or depart while a preceding aircraft is 
landing or departing from the same runway. Specific minimum scparation distanccs 
along the runway are specified for each case. Capacity gains of two movcnicnts pcr 
hour are expected off a single runway during peak- hours of operation. Candidatc 
airports are Alicante, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Istanbul, Lyon, 
Amsterdam, Bordeaux, Geneva, Helsinki, Lisbon, Madrid, Malaga, Marseille, Nice, 
Paris CDG, Rome Fiumicino, Manchester, Milan Malpensa, Palma de Mallorca, Paris 
Orly and Stockholm Arlanda. 
4. Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting/Converging Runways (SINIOPS) 
Under specified weather and visibility conditions an aircraft will bc pcrmitted to land 
whilst another aircraft is simultaneously taking off or landing on an intcrsccting or 
converging runway. The procedure is referred to as SINIOPS. Specific ATC 
clearances are required along with clearly publislicd landing distanccs nnd good 
braking conditions. Use of SIMOPS at Sydney Kingsford Smith airport in Australia 
has led to an almost complete removal of the need to hold aircmft prior to scqucncing. 
Candidate European airports are Stockholm Arlanda, Hamburg, Arnstcrdain, 
Barcelona, Zurich, Dublin, Helsinki, Rome Fiumicino, Lisbon, Madrid and 
Edinburgh. 
5. Visual Approaches 
This is an approach by an IFR flight where either part or all of the instrumcnt 
approach procedure is not completed. Instead the pilot elects for an approach using 
visual reference to the ground. Obviously, the procedure is dependent on cloud 
ceiling. Visual approach capacity gains come by reducing aircraft spacing and tinic to 
complete the approach in a non-radar environment. I'lic procedure is currcntly uscd in 
Germany and the UK, but could be applied to all ECAC states. 
6. Intersection Take Offs 
This procedure can be requested by ATC or the pilot. It makes use of runway access 
points to reduce departure delays by improving traff"ic sequencing and avoiding 
unnecessarily long taxi times to the end of the runway. Use of the procedure requires 
publication of reduced take off distances from the intersections. Specific minimum 
visibility limits are also applied along with the need for specific marking and lighting 
aids to ensure safe control and guidance of aircraft towards take off intersections. 
Specific capacity gains will be dependent on traffic mixes, location of the 
intersections, and type of traffic demand. This can be applied to any European airport 
with a fully developed taxiway system. Paris Charles de Gaulle has used this 
procedure since January 1988. It is also used effectively at Manchester. 
7. Multiple Line Ups 
This procedure is an 'extension of intersection take offs. It permits more than one 
aircraft to line up on the active runway at any one time. By using the procedure 
runway occupancy time can be reduced due to the lack of any time required for 
aircraft to move from the holding point to the runway. It can only be used during 
daylight hours and the aircraft must be within visual range of the ATC tower. 
Capacity gains of two movements Per hour have been put for%vard by ATC 
controllers. The procedure can be applied to any European airport with appropriatcly 
placed runway intersections. The procedure is currently used widely at Paris CDG 
and Manchester. 
S. Landing Based on Anticipated Separation 
This applies where runway separation between an arrival and a preceding arrival or 
departure does not yet exist, but is expected to exist by the time the arriving aircraft 
reaches the runway threshold. Landing clearance is given if the controller judges tile 
situation to be acceptable. Capacity gains will come from closer aircraft spacing and 
the reduced number of missed approaches. All major European airports arc 
candidates for this procedure. The procedure is actively used at Heathrow and 
Gatwick, with the, 'Land After', procedure being used in France. 
9. Modification of Application of Wake Vortex Constraints for Departing 
Aircraft 
This procedure places the responsibility for wake vortex avoidance, on departure, with 
the pilot of the aircraft. ATC will clear the aircraft to depart indicating the type of 
aircraft that departed ahead, the time since it departed, surfacc wind and possibility or 
wake vortex turbulence. Application of the procedure at Amsterdam Schiphol has 
demonstrated that invariably the pilot reduced the required separation. The procedure 
could be applied to any European airport. 
10. Displaced Threshold 
On intersecting runways, when one is used for arrivals and the other for dcparturcs, a 
reduction in landing and departure clearance can be achieved if the landing or take off 
threshold is displaced. The displacement will mean that the landing or dcparting 
aircraft will cross the intersecting runway earlier than was previous. Obviously, the 
runway in question will need to be long enough to allow such a displacement. 
Displacement of the take off runway will only be permitted if the obstacle clearance 
procedure does not unduly penalise operators. The procedure has been uscd at Madrid 
Barajas where the landing runway threshold was displaced towards the intersection. 
The results were a reduction in the time it took for aircmft to clear the intersection 
from 35-40 seconds to 10-15 seconds. The procedure will have limited applicability 
to European airports with sufficiently long intersecting runways. 
11. Strategic Deconfliction of Arrival and Departure Routes 
This procedure encourages the development of improved SID and STAR co- 
ordination to promote better traffic flow in the TMA and reduced controller workload. 
Full exploitation of RNAV equipment is encouraged to avoid unnecessary investment 
in ground based aids. Obviously, specific implementation of this procedure will be 
dependent on local operating restrictions and TMA airspace structure. Whilst quite 
well developed at most major European airports, this procedure can be considered for 
any European airport where TMA traffic levels warrant. In the London TMA 
substantial work was done in this field with the development of the Central Control 
Function, (CCF). This procedure has now ccntraliscd all London airport ATC 
approach controllers with their companion area controllers at West DMyton. In 
addition stand alone tunnels for arriving and departing aircmft from each airport havc 
been developed to reduce controller workload in climbing or descending aircraft 
through the busy TMA. The Terminal Radar Approach Control, (TRACON), system 
has also been developed in the US. Similar approaches have been carried out in the 
Paris and Madrid TMA's. 
12. Operational Factors Affecting Runway Capacity 
This procedure focuses on reducing runway occupancy timc. It promotcs the 
construction of adequately located departure scqucncing pads, rapid cxit taxiways and 
rapid access taxiways. It also encourages pilots to nominatc in tlicir approach bricf 
which RET they intend to use, which will minimise thcir landing run. For departurc 
pilots are requested to complete departure checks prior to lining up and cxpcctcd to 
commence their take off roll immediately upon receipt of their take off clearance. Ilic 
procedure also focuses on the ATC controller, requiring them to improvc their final 
sequencing separation. This is expected to come from improved precision approach 
radars. Modifications to runway lighting and markings may be required. At Gatwick 
runway marking were painted as a series of strips with the number of co-locatcd strips 
decreasing as the next RET was approached. The aim was to help the pilot gauge his 
speed and distance to the next RET to assist in braking. 
The combination of these individual projects was tcrmcd, Iligh Intcnsity Runway 
Operations'. Monitoring of the effectiveness, by both airports and airlincs, of tllc 
procedure was recommended to help set standard ROT's. The application of the 
procedure is most relevant to single mode runway operations such as Gatwick and 
Manchester who now achieve hourly declared runway movcment capacitics of 42. 
Source: ECAC APATSI (1993) Document on Mature Air Traffic Control 
Procedures. ECAC Air 
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Appendix5.1 
Cranfield Universio 
Memo: 19th September 1994 
To: John Evans, 
ATC Ops 1, 
NATS, Manchester. 
From: Andy Jefferson, 
Dept. Air Transport, 
Cranfield University. 
C. C. Bill Hanton, 
Chief Pilot, 
Business Air, 
Aberdeen. 
Subject: Definition of preferred arrival procedure into Manchester Airport for the 
Saab 340A. 
PREFERRED ROUTE. 
1. Horizontal Profile. -Direct to Pole Hill -To be level at Flight Level 100 
(See attached chart) overhead the POL. Then out of POL on RI 83 direct to 
intercept ELS RWY 24 at 6nm out. Then follow the ILS. 
2. Vertical Prorde. - FLIOO at the POL. Then continuous descent at approx. 
2000 fpm, to be level 2nm from the ELS intercept to bring 
speed back. 
Vertical Flieht Prorile Of Proposed Route for Manchester Special 
Arrival. 
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3. Speed Profile. - Along R183 at 220kts. Then 2nm before ILS intercept 
reduce speed to 200kts. Then further reduce to 170kts by 
the outer marker. From then on down to V. /of I 15kts by 
the threshold. 
FLEXIBELM. 
Obviously Business Air appreciate the complex and busy airspace that exists Urithin the 
Manchester TMA and understands that what is proposed above and on the attached 
chart represent an idealistic situation. As such the following information is added to 
help plan a realistic routing. 
1. Horizontal Profile. - As required by ATC with the caution of GPWS warnings if 
diverted too far to the East at low level. 
2. Vertical Proffle. - Step descent is quite feasible but again caution over rates of 
descent greater than 2000fpm at 220kts due to GPWS warnings and problems of 
reducing speed at a later date. If continuous descents are not feasible then descent 
as soon as possible would be appreciated to help reduce pilot workload and keep 
within speed ranges at a latter stage. The point 2nm from the ILS intercept is the 
critical point, beyond which, speed reduction to 200kts Will not be possible before 
intercepting the ILS. Obviously, this point can be made greater than 2nm out, if 
required. 
3. Speed Prorde. - a) Intermediate approach - Speed ranges ftom 220-200k-ts. 
b) ELS - Speeds defined are max. possible with the ability 
to either speed up and slow down very quickly once 
below 200kts. 
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION. 
Business Air's Saabs are not currently equipped to carry out steep approaches, 
although this may change if critical to success and if Business Air management fed the 
costs involved will be recouped. 
Business Air are currently undergoing a period of new crew line training as such the 
best time for them to begin running the trial wiU be at the end of October. 
TRUL DEFIMTION. 
Assuming it is decided to go ahead with the trial two areas of concern will need to be 
satisfied: - 
a) Trail start date, length of duration and definition of safety proccdures for the 
new route. 
b) Definition and monitoring of success criteria. 
Understandably, the latter will vary between the airline, air traffic and the airport, 
however, to reduce future problems it will be useful to establish these for the next 
meeting in October. 
Best Wishes, 
Appendix to Chapter 6 
6.1: Characteristics and Properties of the SIMMOD Data Files 
6.2: Manchester Airport Typical Busy Day Arrivals and Departurcs - 30th Junc 
1995 
6.3: Manchester Airport Aerodrome Chart and Standard Routings 
6.4: Zurich Busy Day Schedule - 16th July 1994 
6.5: Zurich Airport Aerodrome Chart and Standard Routings 
6.6: Gatwick Airport Typical Busy Day Schedule - 30th June 1995 
6.7: Gatwick Airport Aerodrome Chart and Standard Routings 
6.8: The Costs and Benefits of Implementing Special Regional Aircraft Proccdurcs 
6.9: Regional Airline, European Airport and Major Europcan Airline 
Questionnaires. 
233 
Appendix 6.1 
Characteristics and A-operdes of theSIAMOD Data 1-71es 
Aircraft data rile 
This file provides the simulation with a number of aircraft models each with various 
takeoff weights depending on trip length. The take off weight is also used to 
determine the aircraft's weight category. SIMMOD uses four categories dcrincd 
below: 
1. < 10,0001b 
2.10,000lb-100,0001b 
3.100,000lb-300,0001b 
4. > 300,0001b 
Small Engine/GA 
Tvvin Engine /Small 
Commercial Jeutarge 
Wide Body/I leavy 
These categories are also used to determine the aircraft's wake vortex category, 
enroute minimum separation requirements, holding strategy, speed puformance in the 
air, take off and landing roles and gate servicing times. 
This file also contained the aircraft group maximum, nominal and minimum speeds and 
minimum holding time and speed. Obviously, this grouping of aircraft types into four 
categories causes limitations by generalising in each of the cases although it is difficult 
to overcome without making the model impossibly complex. 
Airspace data rile 
The airspace routes are defined as a set of nodcs, or points and links, or lines. These in 
turn are combined to create routes for arrival and departure. The nodes all have a 
specified altitude and are also used to check aircraft separation. As an aircraft passes 
the node its separation is checked and either held at the node until minimum separation 
is re-established and capacity of the next link is not exceeded, or released at reduced 
speed to ensure separation is maintained between a slower aircraft in front. The node 
holding strategy is specified as one of three possibilities: 
a) Hold if aircraft are holding at next nodc in route. 
b) Hold if the capacity of the next node's holding queue is full. 
c) Hold if capacity of next node's hold is cxcccdcd by aircraft at hold and those 
approaching it. 
This check will only take place if holding at the next node exists when aircraft arrive at 
the preceding node. Where more than one link joins a node aircraft speeds arc 
modified to provide separation at the node. This applies to either merging routes on 
arrival or crossing routes at the same node. In addition to this specific nodcs can be 
defined as holding stacks with maximum capacity, and minimum entry and exit times. 
The final node in the airspace file is the interface node which links the airspace system 
to the ground system. 
Links in the airspace file have recommended speeds for aircrall although these can be 
varied to optimise separation and traffic flow. This is used to modcl path Stretching 
concepts applied by ATC in real day situati , 
ons. Links on final approach to the runway 
can be linked to simulate paired or staggered approach control for close parallcl 
runway operations. 
SIMMOD defines three levels of movement control: 
a) Node Arrival Control 
Metering Control 
C) Flow Control 
Node arrival control is the basic level and broken into three types. Queue first in, first 
out, (QFIFO), places every aircraft at the back of an arrival queue based on distance 
from the node. This can lead to large back logs in the system and poorly optimiscd 
aircraft flow, especially for wake vortex separation. This problem is attempted to be 
solved by the next type of control in the base level, namely speed fit node arrival 
control. Individual aircraft are allowed to modify their speed within the range spccifled 
in the aircraft data file to prevent multiple arrivals at a point at the same timc. its 
effect is optimised if a number of links join one node with many varying aircraft types. 
SIMMOD will always only adjust the speed of the aircraft by the minimum amount 
required to achieve the necessary separation. Speed fit also modifics the aircraft's 
speed when modifying its location in a queue. Multi fit node arrival control is the final 
modification available in the base level. This extends the previous speed fit system by 
attempting to fit an aircraft at a specific point by adjusting other aircraft in the queue. 
As this last strategy most closely resembles real life ATC, it is the one used in this 
thesis. 
The final two levels of movement control build on the base level expWned above. The 
metering strategy provides the option to model the effect of looking ahead, along the 
route network and modifying present traffic to reduce possible congestion further 
down track, Flow control strategy aims to provide the optimum control of air traffic in 
the system by modifying separation distances at nodes on the boundary of the defined 
airspace. This aims to balance the flow of air traffic into the system to prcvcnt tile 
development of congestion points in the airspace system that cannot reason3bly be 
resolved by node arrival or meter control levels. 
In this research the last two levels of movement control were only added Into the 
simulation if excessive congestion occurred. This was due to the processing tinlo 
penalties that were incurred by adding them to the simulation. 
The final section required for this file is the airport infortnation. This data is fairly 
basic but does also have a spread list which basically gives a percentage figure by 
which arrival spacing can be increased to help increase departure flow once the 
departure queue reaches a certain size. Excessive pmentage sprcad will lead to 
significantly reduced departure delay but increased arrival delay. A healthy balance is 
needed, which is only determined by experimentation. 
Ground data rile 
As with the airspace file, the airfield is composed of a series of nodes and links. Links 
are defined as either taxiway or runway sections, whilst nodes can either be departure 
queues, or terminal gates. Ground links have a variety of data associated with them to 
determine their characteristics. These include, passing rules and limitations, length, 
reservation for arriving or departing traffic, or both, aircraft capacity and maximum 
aircraft size allowed on the link. In addition taxi links from the runway to the taxiway 
system can be classed as rapid exit taxiways, if required. Specific taxi paths can also 
be defined to allow preferred routings from the runway to the gate or vice versa. If 
these preferred routes are not defined the simulation will aim to move the aircraft from 
the runway to the gate along an optimised taxi path relating to minimum time. 
Two final points to consider in the ground file arc departure queues and take off and 
landing rolls. Departure queues are positioned at the end of the departure runway and 
have defined capacity, beyond which arrival separation is increased to allow more saps 
for departures. They also contain a unique departure route list, and passing strategy. 
The program models well the problems the controller would face in trying to optimise 
traffic in this departure queue by limiting the ability of aircraft to pass on another. For 
simulating take off and landing the simulation picks a random distance for the role 
bounded by the maximum and minimum limits set in the aircraft data file. Again this 
brings a touch of realism to the model. Limitations with this approach lie in the ability 
of the operator to accurately input realistic maximum and minimum values, Time for 
the take off and landing is calculated using the selected distance and the average 
velocity during the roll. 
The final part of the ground Me relates to the airport gatcs and rcstrictions on thcir 
use. As this is not relevant to this thesis it was not utilised in the simulations. 
Events data rile 
This file holds all the data concerning the aircraft that will operate in the systcm. Data 
inputted includes, time of entry into the simulation, airline flight number, aircraft modcl 
number from the aircraft data file, destination of the flight, route the aircraft will take 
through the system, taxi path if required, and turnaround data if required, including 
scheduled re-departure time. Regarding the turnaround again random timcs are 
generated within set limits to simulated real day turnaround cases. 
The events file also sets all the environmental conditions for the simulation such as 
runways in use, weather, if inputted and any changes to any of the existing data at set 
times. Although the runway in use option was used in this research, the other variables 
were not experimented with for two reasons. Firstly, the case studies had to be run 
with exactly the same conditions each time to allow effective comparisons to be made, 
and secondly, it would of significantly increased the simulation time. 
APPENDIX 6.2 
Manchester Airport Typical Busy Day Arrivals - 30th June 1995 
Arr. Time Fit No Aircraft Type A/c Code From Turnaround Dc%L 
0.20 AMM301 734 84 ACUFAU 
0.45 MON5651 AB6 31 ACE 
1.10 ANW273 757 51 DLM 
1.30 AMM123 757 51 N11-A 
1.30 AT5220 732 42 TNG AT5221 TNG 
1.50 LEI7348 734 84 ALC 
2.25 DP029 757 52 LCA 
4.05 BY536B 757 51 KOS 
4.10 LEI7682 734 84 LCA 
4.50 BY529B 762 32 POP 
4.55 MON1803 A320 87 LCA 
5.05 BY039B 762 32 ALC 
5.10 BY305B 757 51 HER 
5.10 EXC136 A320 87 ORO EXC103 MAI 1 
5.20 AIM78 M83 50 LPA 
5.25 BY081B 757 51 PNH BY439A All 1 
5.30 MON3541 A136 31 AGP 
5.35 ULE832 763 33 MCO 
5.40 AlH176 M83 so AGP A111251 IBZ 
6.10 BA183 763 33 JFK 
6.35 BY144B 762 32 PM BY215A MAI 1 
6.35 CKTI 16 757 51 MCO/GLA 
6.40 CMM4837 757 52 YVR/YYC CMM4838 YYC/YVR 
6.55 AMM1531 757 51 Phu AMM384 AGP 
6.55 AMM034 757 51 BKK/DIlA AMM106 TFS 
6.55 Tfullo 757 52 KOS 
7.10 AA092 757 52 JFK 
7.25 BA7841 J41 99 RTM BA7841 ORK 
7.30 SQ338 744 83 SIN/BOM 
7.35 BA4402 734 84 LIM BA4423 LI IR 
7.40 11551 J31 98 CWL 9R501 MXIE 
7.45 MON3969 A320 87 ZTI I MON3124 MAI I 
7.45 AA054 Mil 85 ORD 
7.50 5W621 J31 98 NWI 5W622 NWVRTM 
7.55 BA5017 732 42 BRU 
7.55 CX261 744 83 IlKG/CDG 
8.00 BA7600 ATP 67 BIlD BA7603 III ID 
8.00 EI202 143 15 DUB E1203 DUB 
8.05 JE321 ATP 67 IOM JE322 IOM 
8.05 11370 SF340 72 A13Z U371 ABZ 
8.05 513600 J31 98 EIN/RTM 5E601 RThVEIN 
8.05 AF984 735 84 CDG AF923 CDO 
8.05 LH4034 735 84 DUS L114055 DUS 
8.05 BAS731 AT? 67 GLA BAS732 GLA 
8.10 11330 SF340 72 BFS 11331 US 
8.10 11390 SF340 72 GIA 11391 GLA 
8.15 9C712 SH6 68 NCL 9C713 NCL 
8.15 11380 SF340 72 DNDIEDI U381 EDYI)ND 
8.15 TIHO42 763 33 MCO/GLA 
8.15 LH4058 732 42 FRA Ll 14103 rRA 
8.15 LH5204 F50 89 HAM LI 15205 IMI 
8.20 1 BA5761 ATP 67 EDI DA5762 I rMl 
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8.25 BA2002 732 42 L(jw BA2OU3 LUW 
8.25 CB301 D08 100 AMS CB004 CBG 
8.35 BA4412 757 51 LIM DA4433 LIM 
8.35 CLI410 742 2 YVR/BFS 
8.35 BA5791 ATP 67 ABZ 13AS734 GIA 
8.40 FR550 732 42 DUB FR551 DUB 
8.45 DLO64 L1015 23 AIL 
8.50 CB003 D08 100 CBG CB302 AMS 
8.55 E1661 735 84 ZRII E1661 Dtn3 
8.55 OOE485 732 42 zml OOE486 DLM 
9.00 E1622 735 84 DUB E1622 CPH 
9.05 WA421 J31 98 BLL WA421 BI DUBLL 
9.15 9RI 15 J31 98 BOI= 9RI 16 EXT/13011 
9.15 AC840 762 32 YYZ ACS41 YYZ 
9.20 FU520 EIýU 101 LYS FU521 LYS 
9.25 VM131 J31 98 BODINTE 
9.30 BA7731 J41 99 sou DA7750 GCI 
9.30 BA7602 ATP 67 MID BA7723 NOC 
9.30 9R502 J31 98 MNE U552 CWL 
9.30 TS257 L1011 22 GLA TS257 YYZ 
9.30 BA5281 AIP 67 BFS BAS294 BFS 
9.35 BA4422 757 51 LIIR BA4443 Ll IR 
9.45 BA7822 J41 99 STN BA7823 STN 
9.45 MON5023 757 51 TFS MON3972 TFS 
9.45 BA5763 ATP 67 EDI 
9.45 BA5608 ATP 67 GLA BA5608 Iw 
9.55 LJKI 51 F100 88 AMS UK152 AMS 
10.00 TZ721 757 52 JFK/GLA TZ721 JFK 
10.15 BA2004 732 42 LOW BA200S LGW 
10.20 SN7816 732 42 BRU SN7616 BRU 
10.25 BA5025 732 42 AMS 
10.30 AA120 762 32 ORD 
10.30 SK1541 D94 46 ARN/FBU SK1542 FBU/ARN 
10.30 KM202 A320 87 MILA KM203 MA 
10.35 BA4432 763 33 UIR BA4463 Ll IR 
10.40 SU249 TU5 90 svo SU250 svo 
10.45 AY687 M82 49 IMUARN AY688 ARNA IEL 
10.50 BA5003 732 42 CDG BAS026 AMS 
10.50 SK539 D94 46 CPH SK540 cri I 
11.05 BA7842 J41 99 ORK BA7835 SNN 
11.20 AIHI 12 M83 50 BVA All 1113 NnA 
11.30 11332 SF340 72 13FS H333 BFS 
11.30 FR552 732 42 DLn3 FR553 DUB 
11.30 D36916 M87 86 MADIBCN M6917 BCN/NIAD 
11.35 BAS129 732 42 DUS BA5130 DUS 
11.40 BA7604 AT? 67 1311D BA7764 JER 
11.50 BA5147 732 42 FRA DA5004 CDO 
11.55 CKT1397 L1011 22 MAII CKTI 396 MAI 1 
12.00 BA2006 732 42 LGW BA2007 LGW 
12.00 OK660 735 84 PRO OK661 PRO 
12.15 AMM129 757 51 VRN AWM22 TFS 
12.20 BA5011 732 42 CDG DA5028 AMS 
12.30 LEI7684 734 84 MAII LE-17693 MAI 1 
12.35 BA5139 732 42 muc BM060 LIN 
12.40 BA4452 757 51 LIM DA4493 Ll [it 
12.45 1 BY068B 757 51 FAO I BY124AF I NCL 
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12.45 EXCIO4 A320 87 NWI "CIU7 Ivim 1 
12.45 BAS285 ATP 67 BFS BAS286 13FS 
12.50 BA8774 SH6 68 LDY DA8775 LDY 
12.55 CLI411 313 34 LGW CL1411 YVR 
13.00 AUU80 A320 87 MAI I All 1279 MAI I 
13.05 11382 SF340 72 LSI/EDI 11383 ml 
13.05 LEI7602 734 84 MAII LE17267 GRO 
13.05 BA5060 ATP 67 GIA BAS764 EDI 
13.10 JY574 F2E 67 JER/GCI JY577 GCI 
13.15 BA7751 J41 99 GO BA7754 GCI 
13.15 AlHI44 M83 50 NAP 
13.20 JE325 ATP 67 lom JE326 lom 
13.25 AF914 735 84 CDG AF907 CDO 
13.40 AMM385 757 51 AGP AMM372 NAP 
13.40 TIH178 757 52 PM AI 1179 rm 
13.45 BA5059 732 42 LIN 
13.45 BY201B 762 32 PNH BY446A CFU 
13.50 BA7763 ATP 67 JER 
13.50 BY257B 757 51 PW BYI 17A IBZ 
13.50 AMM151 734 84 WE AMM28 AGP 
13.55 CB303 D08 100 AMS 
13.55 ALT257 A320 87 PVK AL7754 DLM 
14.00 BA118 742 2 ISB BAIIS LGW 
14.00 BA7724 ATP 67 NOC BA7605 BI ID 
14.05 MON3549 A320 87 NAP MON3772 AGP 
14.20 BA5735 ATP 67 GLA DA5736 GLA 
14.25 EI623 735 94 CHI E1623 DUB 
14.25 FR554 732 42 DUB FR555 DUB 
14.30 EAF2307 B15 37 ME 
14.35 BA4472 763 33 LIM BA4503 UIR 
14.35 BY215B 762 32 MAII BYI 59A NAP 
14.40 LTK155 MOO 88 AMS UK156 AMS 
14.40 BWL512 143 15 CIA BWL303 VGO 
14.45 BA7836 J41 99 SNN BA7845 ORK 
15.00 SN7812 732 42 BRU SN761 9 BRU 
15.10 BA5058 732 42 GVA BAS006 CDO 
15.10 LG445 EM2 101 LUX LG446 LUX 
15.15 9C714 SH6 68 NCL 
15.20 E1206 143 15 DUB M07 DIM 
15.20 BA5795 ATP 67 A13Z BAS796 ABZ 
15.25 BA7733 J41 99 sou BA7734 sou 
15.25 11334 SF340 72 BFS 11335 BFS 
15.30 BA2012 734 84 LGW TIA2011 LGW 
15.30 BA5027 732 42 AMS 
15.45 AMM309 757 51 CFU AMM339 MAII 
15.50 BA7765 AT? 67 JER DA7607 BUD 
15.50 BA5131 732 42 DUS BM020 13RU 
15.50 BA5611 ATP 67 IIAJ BM611 GLA 
16.05 BY439B 757 51 ATII BY075A RNH 
16.20 MON3107 AB6 31 TFS 
16.20 BA5287 ATP 67 BFS BM288 BFS 
16.25 E1668 735 84 DUB E1668 ZRI 1 
16.30 BA5005 732 42 CDO DA5134 DUS 
16.30 BA5765 ATP 67 EDI BAS766 E. DI 
16.35 BA4492 757 51 TJ IR DA4513 LI tR 
16.35 1 BA5797 ATP 67 LSI/ABZ I BAS798 I ATIZ 
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16.50 FU526 EM2 101 LYS k U527 LYS 
16.55 11555 J31 98 CWL 9R505 MME: 
16.55 OOE217 1,1011 22 TFS OOE21 8 MAI 1 
17.00 BA7755 J41 99 GCI BA7736 sou 
17.00 BA7824 J41 99 STN BA7825 STN 
17.05 11392 SF340 72 GLA 11393 GLA 
17.05 FR556 732 42 DUB FR557 DUB 
17.05 LH4044 735 84 FRA L114075 FRA 
17.10 BA5029 732 42 AMS BAS008 CDO 
17.15 SK541 M87 86 CPll SKS42 CPI 1 
17.20 BA5019 732 42 FCO/BRU BAS022 BRU 
17.25 AF920 732 42 CDG AF917 CDO 
17.30 BA7606 ATP 67 BIlD BA7609 BI ID 
17.30 AWD349 A320 87 isi 
17.35 BA4502 757 51 111R BA4523 LJ IR 
17.35 BA5737 ATP 67 GLA DA5292 BFS 
17.45 9C716 SH6 68 NCL 9C717 NCL 
17.45 WA425 J31 98 BLLMIIX WA425 BLL 
17.50 BY263B 762 32 MBA 
17.55 5W623 J31 98 RITANM 5W624 NWVRTM 
17.55 9RI 17 J31 98 BOIL= 9R118 EXT/BOI 1 
17.55 DP031 757 52 PFO 
17.55 NG6228 CRJ 94 VIE NG6229 VIE 
18.00 LH4052 735 84 DUS Ll 14057 DUS 
18.00 LH5200 CRJ 94 muc L115249 muc 
18.00 LH5226 F50 89 STR LI 15217 STR 
18.00 LH5248 CRJ 94 1 LAM LI 15203 1 IAM 
18.00 NG6274 CRJ 94 hw NG6275 NW 
18.05 BA2008 732 42 LGW BA2009 LGW 
18.05 CBOII D08 100 CBG CDO06 CBG 
18.15 11396 SF340 72 LSIlGLA U397 GLA 
18.15 11376 SF340 72 ABZ 11377 A13Z 
18.15 11336 SF340 72 BFS 11337 BFS 
18.15 11386 SF340 72 DND/EDI 11387 EDVDND 
18.20 BA5767 ATP 67 EDI BAS769 EDI 
18.25 5E602 J31 98 EINIRTM 5E603 RTh4lEIN 
18.30 BA7846 J41 99 ORK BA7846 RTNI 
18.30 AMM107 757 51 TFS ANIM204 ITS 
18.35 UK157 F100 88 AMS UK158 AMS 
18.45 9R506 J31 98 MME 13556 CWL 
19.00 JE329 ATP 67 lom JE330 lom 
19.00 EAF2309 B15 37 LDE 
19.05 BA5061 732 42 LIN 
19.10 BA7608 ATP 67 BIlD 
19.10 BA5799 AT? 67 ABZ 
19.20 BA5289 ATP 67 BFS BA5061 OLA 
19.25 T111202 757 52 ACE TII 1203 1 IER 
19.30 BA2010 734 84 LGW 
19.30 BA5007 732 42 CDO 
19.35 BA4522 757 51 11 IR 
19.40 EI208 143 15 DUB E1209 DUB 
19.40 SN619 732 42 BRU SN622 IlRU 
19.45 EXCIO8 A320 87 MAI 1 
19.45 CKT259 L1011 22 TFS 
19.45 FR558 732 42 DUB FR559 DUB 
19.50 1 LEI7268 734 84 GRO I L M-353 All I 
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19.55 SBE487 722 24 DLM SBL18c) 11-S 
19.55 OOE487 732 42 DLM OOE488 I IER 
19.55 BA5769 ATP 67 EDI 
20.00 BA7826 J41 99 STW 
20.00 BY530B 757 51 LCA BY433A MLA 
20.00 MON5041 757 51 TFS 
20.05 BA7737 J41 99 sou 
20.05 BA5739 ATP 67 GLA 
20.10 MON3973 757 51 TFS 
20.15 AIHI 14 M83 50 MLA All 1285 TFS 
20.20 LE17352 734 84 AGP LE17271 I IER 
20.20 LH5202 CRJ 94 muc 
20.20 SK1539 M87 86 CPII 
20.25 BA5153 732 42 FRA 
20.25 SR842 M81 48 ZRII 
20.40 BA5021 732 42 BRU 
20.45 AIF1284 M83 50 CIIQ AM 1147 SKO 
20.45 AF942 735 84 CDO 
20.45 BA5293 ATP 67 BFS 
20.50 BA7610 AT? 67 BIR) 
20.50 BA5031 732 42 AMS 
20.55 BA5135 732 42 DUS 
21.05 AMM373 757 51 NAP AMM352 ADD 
21.05 AIH180 757 52 PNH 1111315 DLM 
21.25 MON3125 A320 87 MAII MON3524 TFS 
21.25 MON3773 A320 87 AGP MON3718 cru 
21.30 BA5009 732 42 CDG 
21.35 BA4542 757 51 LIM 
21.35 BA5054 732 42 MAD 
21.40 AAN228 313 34 TFS AAN229 TFS 
21.45 BWL304 143 15 VGO 
21.45 ANM29 734 84 AGP 
21.50 BYI 17B 757 51 MZ BY166A PNH 
21.55 AIM52 M83 so IBZ AD1253 IBZ 
22.00 CY456 A320 87 LCA CY457 LCA 
22.10 BY159B 762 32 NAP BY250A PNH 
22.20 UK159 FIOO 88 AMS 
22.20 SN7814 732 42 BRU 
22.25 BA7847 J41 99 RTM 
22.25 MON7713 757 51 LXR/LGW 
22.25 BY446B 762 32 CFU' BY229A mz 
22.40 NP401 SH5 68 AMS 
22.40 AMM23 757 51 TFS AMM42 CFU 
22.50 BY075B 757 51 RNH BY145A CFU 
22.50 AAN206 M83 50 TTS AAN205 TFS 
23.00 AMM339 757 51 MAI I 
23.15 1 SPP3127 M83 50 Phfl 
Note - Aircraft Code relates to SIMMOD a/c Data file. 
Source: UK Airport Timetables 1995 
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Manchester Airport Typical Busy Day Departures - 30th June 1995 
Dept Time FIL No. Aircraft Type A/c Code Dest Turnaround 
0.30 MON5022 757 51 TFS 
0.30 OOE484 732 42 ZTI 1 
0.40 BY144A 762 32 PMI 
1.00 AMM1530 757 51 PMI 
2.40 AT5221 732 42 TNO y 
3.00 NP400 SH5 68 AMS 
6.00 ALT256 A320 87 PVK 
6.05 BY068A 757 51 FAO 
6.35 LIK150 MOO 98 AMS 
6.40 BA4403 757 51 LIM 
6.40 OOE216 LIOII 22 TFS 
6.45 BA2001 734 84 LGW 
6.45 AIH143 M83 50 NAP 
6.45 SN7620 732 42 BRU 
6.55 BA7730 J41 99 sou 
6.55 BA7821 J41 99 STN 
6.55 SK1540 M87 86 CPI 1 
7.00 EXC103 A320 87 MAI I y 
7.00 BY439A 757 51 ATI I y 
7.00 AMM384 757 51 AGP y 
7.00 BA7601 ATP 67 BHD 
7.00 BA5016 732 42 BRUTCO 
7.00 LEI7601 734 84 MAI 1 
7.00 LE17351 734 84 AGP 
7.00 MON3106 AB6 31 TFS 
7.00 AMM128 757 51 VRN 
7.00 BA5280 ATP 67 BFS 
7.00 BA5760 ATP 67 EDI 
7.00 BA5790 ATP 67 ADZILSI 
7.05 BA5730 ATP 67 GLA 
7.10 MON7712 757 51 LOW/LXR 
7.10 AF947 735 84 CDO 
7.15 BA5024 732 42 AMS 
7.15 BA5002 732 42 CDO 
7.15 MON3548 A320 87 NAP 
7.15 DP030 757 52 PFO 
7.25 BA5146 732 42 FRA 
7.30 BA4413 757 51 Ll IR 
7.30 AMM308 757 51 CFU 
7.30 IIH177 757 52 rml 
7.30 AIH251 M83 50 IBZ y 
7.40 BA5128 732 42 DUS 
7.40 BA5138 732 42 muc 
7AO BY257A 757 51 PMI 
7.40 BY20 IA 762 32 rmi 
7.45 SR843 M81 48 ZRI 1 
7.55 AIHIII M93 so BVA 
7.55 LIB251 CRJ 94 muc 
7.55 BA7841 J41 99 ORK y 
8.00 9R501 J31 98 MME y 
8.00 BWL5 11 143 is CIA 
8.15 AWD348 A320 87 Jsl 
8.20 BA5058 732 42 UN 
8.20 AMM106 757 51 TFS y 
8.25 CMM4838. 757 52 YYC/YYR v 
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8.30 BY215A 762 32 MAI I y 
8.30 BA4423 734 84 LIM y 
8.30 5E601 J31 98 RTNVEIN y 
8.35 5W622 J31 98 NWE/RTM y 
8.35 E1203 143 15 DLn3 y 
8.35 AMM150 734 84 LDE 
8.35 BA5732 ATP 67 GLA y 
8.40 BA5010 732 42 CDO 
8.45 JE322 ATP 67 iom y 
8.45 9C713 SH6 68 NCL y 
8.50 AF923 735 84 CDO y 
8.55 MON3124 A320 87 MAI I y 
8.55 LH4055 735 84 DUS y 
8.55 LH4103 732 42 FRA y 
8.55 CB004 D08 100 CBQ y 
9.00 BY530A 757 51 LCA 
9.00 U371 SF340 72 ABZ y 
9.00 11331 SF340 72 BFS y 
9.00 11391 SF340 72 GLA y 
9.00 U381 SF340 72 EDI/DND y 
9.00 LH5205 F50 99 HAM y 
9.00 BA5762 ATP 67 EDI y 
9.10 BA7603 ATP 67 MID y 
9.15 BA2003 732 42 LOW y 
9.15 CB302 D08 100 AMS y 
9.20 FR551 732 42 DUB y 
9.25 BA5734 ATP 67 GLA y 
9.25 E1661 735 84 DUB y 
9.30 EAF2306 B15 37 LDE 
9.30 BA4433 757 51 UIR y 
9.30 E1622 735 84 CPl I y 
9.30 WA421 J31 98 BI LXJB LL y 
9.45 SQ337 744 83 BO, %VSlN 
9.45 9RI 16 J31 98 EXT/B011 y 
9.50 U552 J31 98 CWL y 
10.00 BA183 763 33 JFK 
10.00 TIH201 757 52 ACE 
10.00 SBE486 722 24 DLM 
10.00 CX260 744 83 CD(MIKO 
10.00 FU521 ENU 101 LYS y 
10.00 BA7750 J41 99 Ocl y 
10.10 BA7762 ATP 67 JER 
10.15 CKT127 757 51 BORMCO 
10.15 CKr258 L1011 22 TFS 
10.15 BA5284 ATP 67 BFS y 
10.15 BA7823 J41 99 STN y 
10.20 BA5048 732 42 OVA 
10.25 BY152A 762 32 mco 
10.30 MON5040 757 51 TFS 
10.30 BA7723 ATP 67 NOC y 
10.30 BA4443 757 51 UIR y 
10.30 BA5608 ATP 67 1 lAJ y 
10.35 CLI411 742 2 YVR 
10.40 UK152 F100 98 AMS y 
10.45 TIHO51 763 33 mco 
10.45 AA093 757 52 JFK 
10.45 OOE486 732 42 DLM y 
10.55 MON3972 757 51 TFS y 
11.00 AC841 762 32 YYZ v 
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11.00 TS257 L1011 22 YYZ y 
11.00 BA2005 732 42 LGW y 
11.15 SN7616 732 42 BRU y 
11.20 HY238 IL6 9 TAS 
11.25 ULE833 763 33 mco 
11.25 SK1542 D94 46 FBU/ARN y 
11.25 AY688 M82 49 ARNAIEL y 
11.30 AIH283 M83 50 CIIQ 
11.30 TZ721 757 52 JFK y 
11.30 KM203 A320 87 MLA y 
11.35 DL065 L1015 23 AM 
11.35 SK540 D94 46 CPI I y 
11.35 BA7835 J41 99 SNN y 
12.00 SU250 TU5 90 svo y 
12.10 FR553 732 42 DUB y 
12.10 BA7764 ATP 67 JER y 
12.20 BA5130 732 42 DUS y 
12.30 BA5792 AT? 67 ABZ 
12.30 BA4463 763 33 LI IR y 
1230 BA5026 732 42 AMS y 
12.30 IB6917 M87 86 BCN/MAD y 
12.35 AM 113 M83 50 MLA y 
12.45 BA2007 732 42 LGW y 
12.50 OK661 735 84 PRO y 
13.00 U333 SF340 72 BFS y 
13.00 BA5004 732 42 CDO y 
13.15 AMM222 757 51 TFS y 
13.20 BA8775 SH6 68 LDY y 
13.25 LE17683 734 84 MAII y 
13.30 AA121 762 32 ORD 
13.30 EK036 313 34 ZRII/DXB 
13.30 BA5286 ATP 67 BFS y 
13.45 CKT1396 L1011 22 MAH y 
13.45 BY124AF 757 51 NCL y 
13.45 BA7754 J41 99 GCl y 
13.50 BA5060 732 42 LIN y 
13.50 BA5764 ATP 67 MI y 
14.00 EAF2308 B15 37 LDE 
14.00 EXC107 A320 97 MAII y 
14.00 JE326 ATP 67 lom y 
14.10 BA5028 732 42 AMS y 
14.10 CLI411 313 34 YVR y 
14.10 JY577 F2E 67 OCI y 
14.10 AF907 735 84 CDO y 
14.15 LE17267 734 84 ORO y 
14.25 9C715 SH6 69 NCL 
14.30 BA4483 757 51 LIM y 
14.30 11383 SF340 72 M-1 y 
14.30 AMM372 757 51 NAP y 
14.35 BY446A 762 32 CFU y 
14.55 AIH279 A320 87 MAI I y 
14.55 AlH179 757 51 rml y 
14.55 ALT754 A320 87 DLM y 
14.55 BA5736 ATP 67 GLA y 
14.55 E1623 735 84 DUB y 
14.55 FR555 732 42 DUB y 
15.00 BAI 18 742 2 LOW y 
15.00 BA7605 ATP 67 BIID y 
15.05 AMM228. 734 ACIP 
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15.05 MON3772 A320 87 AUP y 
15.20 LTK156 MOO 89 AMS y 
15.20 BA7845 J41 99 ORK y 
15.40 BY117A 757 51 IBZ y 
15.40 BY159A 762 32 NAP y 
15.40 SN76 18 732 42 BRU y 
15.45 LG446 EM 101 LUX y 
15.50 11335 SF340 72 BFS y 
15.50 BA5042 732 42 MAD 
15.55 BWL303 143 15 VGO y 
15.55 BA7734 J41 99 sou y 
16.00 BA5152 732 42 FRA 
16.00 BA5006 732 42 CDO y 
16.00 -BA5796 ATP 67 A13Z y 
16.15 CB304 D08 100 AMS 
16.15 BA2011 734 94 LGW y 
16.30 BA4503 763 33 LIIR y 
16.40 BA7607 AT? 67 1311D y 
16.50 AMM338 757 51 MAI I y 
16.50 BA5288 ATP 67 BFS y 
16.55 VM136 J31 98 NTFA30D 
16.55 EI207 143 15 DUB y 
16.55 E1668 735 84 ZRII y 
17.00 BA5611 ATP 67 GLA y 
17.00 BA5766 ATP 67 EDI y 
17.10 BY075A 757 51 RMI y 
17.10 BA5134 732 42 DUS y 
17.15 9R505 J31 98 MME y 
17.20 BAS020 732 42 BRU y 
1730 BA4513 757 51 UIR y 
17.30 FU527 EM2 101 LYS y 
17.30 BA7736 J41 99 sou y 
17.30 BA7825 J41 99 STN y 
1735 FR557 732 42 DUB y 
17.40 BA5798 ATP 67 ABZ y 
17.45 BA5030 732 42 AMS 
17.45 LH4075 735 84 FRA y 
17.50 11393 SF340 72 GLA y 
17.55 BA5008 732 42 CDO y 
18.10 AF917 732 42 CDO y 
18.10 9C717 SH6 68 NCL y 
18.15 SK542 M87 86 CPI I y 
18.15 BA5292 ATP 67 BFS y 
18.15 WA425 J31 98 BLL y 
18.25 5W624 J31 98 NWI/RTM y 
18.25 CB006 Doa 100 CBQ y 
18.30 OOE218 LIOII 22 MAI I y 
18.30 BA4523 757 51 UIR y 
18.30 9RIIS J31 98 MIMI I y 
18.35 BA2009 732 42 LGW y 
18.45 11397 SF340 72 EDI/DND y 
18.50 BAS768 ATP 67 EDI y 
18.50 5E603 J31 98 RTWEIN y 
18.55 BA5022 732 42 BRU y 
18.55 LI-14057 735 84 DUS y 
18.55 LH5249 CRJ 94 muc y 
18.55 LH5217 F50 89 STR y 
18.55 LH5203 CRJ 94 1 [AM y 
18.55 BA7846 J41 99 RTM v 
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19.00 BA7609 ATP 67 BI lu y 
19.00 NG6229 CRJ 94 Vic y 
19.00 11397 SF340 72 CLA y 
19.00 11377 SF340 72 ABZ y 
19.00 11337 SF340 72 BFS y 
19.05 11556 J31 98 CWL y 
19.15 NG6275 CRJ 94 MXP y 
19.15 UK158 MOO 88 AMS y 
19.30 AMM204 757 51 TFS y 
19.40 JE330 ATP 67 lom y 
19.45 AWD324 A320 97 HER 
19.45 BA5061 AT? 67 CLA y 
20.00 AMM1526 757 51 ADB 
20.10 EI209 143 15 DUB y 
20.15 FR559 732 42 DUB y 
20.20 SN622 732 42 BRU y 
20.50 LE17353 734 84 ATI I y 
20.50 SBE 186 722 24 TFS y 
20.50 OOE488 732 42 HER y 
20.55 nH203 757 52 HER y 
21.05 BY082A 762 32 IBZ 
21.20 MON3164 AB6 31 ATI 1 
21.25 LEI7271 734 84 1 IER y 
21.30 BY453A 757 51 MLA y 
21.30 AIH285 M83 50 TFS y 
21.50 CKT1288 LIOII 22 DLM 
21.50 AIH147 M83 so SKO y 
22.20 EXC147 A320 87 CF`U 
22.20 AMM352 757 51 ADB y 
22.20 TIH315 757 52 DLM y 
22.25 MON3718 A320 87 CFU y 
22.35 MON5608 757 51 ALC 
22.45 MON3524 A320 87 TFS y 
22.50 CY457 A320 87 LCA y 
23.05 AIH253 M83 50 IBZ y 
23.10 AAN229 313 34 TFS y 
23.30 BY166A 757 51 PMI y 
23.30 BY250A 762 32 rml y 
23.30 AMM242 757 51 cru y 
23.40 AAN205 M83 so TFS y 
23.45 BY229A 762 32 IBZ y 
23.59 BY145A 757 51 CFU v 
Note - Aircraft Code relates to SININIOD a/c Dats file 
Source: UK Airport Timetables 199S 
APPell(li-Y 6--' 
u u (D 
LLJ 
<I 
I 
/I/ 
-4 -cm 
10 ''1 
MANCHESTER 
TAXI 
El 
[it", 
ýI 
1 
U 
Source: RACAL Al- RAI) Act odi ome Chal ts 
A 
Appendix 6.3 
Manchester Airport Standard Routings 
Arrivals 
BOL IA From DCS direct to BOLIN (Holding Stack) and then radar vcctors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals from the North and North West 
BOL 113 SETEL direct to BOLIN (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals front the North 
BOL IC POL direct to BOLIN (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals from the North and North East 
BOL ID DENBY direct to BOLIN (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals from the East 
BOL IE REXAM direct to BOLIN (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals front the Soutli West 
BOL IF WAL direct to BOLIN (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals from the West 
DAY IA TNT direct to DAYNE (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals front the South East 
DAY IB LIC direct to DAYNE (Holding Stack) and then radar vectors for 
runway 24 - Covers arrivals front the South 
Departures (From runway 24) 
POL 5R After take off, ahead to MCT 3d, then right onto track 345M to NICT 
8d, then right again onto POL 221R to POL - Covers departures to 
the north and north east 
STO IR After take off, ahead to MCT 3d, then right onto track 345NI to NICT 
8d, then right again onto WAL 085R to STOCK - Covers departures 
to the East 
CON IR After take off, ahead to MCT 2d, then lcft onto I ION 343 R to Conga - 
Covers departures to the South and South East 
WAL IR After take off, ahead to MCT 2d, then right on track 275NI and thcn 
left to intercept MCT 258R to MCT 19d, then right onto WAL 130R to 
WAL - Covers departures to the West 
Source: British Airways AERAD Charts 1994 
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Zurich Busy Day Schedule - 16/7/94 
Arrivals 
Time FlightNo AircraftType A/CCode Destination Furnaround 
600 VIM 601 TU5 90 SOF VIN1602 
605 SA 274 747 83 CPT SA274 
605 SR 2321 MD81 48 IST 
605 SR 2323 MD81 48 IST 
605 SR 2327 MD81 48 IST 
605 TSW 3515 B737-300 35 AEY TSW8616 
610 BB 3723 MD87 86 ESB 
610 BB 3727 MD87 86 ADD 
610 BB 5353 MD83 50 SCQ 
610 LX 5703 MD81 48 SCQ 
615 BB 3721 MD82 49 ADA 
615 SR 195 MDIl 85 DEL 
615 CX 291 747400 83 IIKG CX291 
620 LX 9717 146-300 15 VRN LX9056 
620 SR 171 747-300 82 SEL 
620 SR 183 MDIl 85 SIN 
620 SR 2089 MD81 48 IST 
625 SR 265 MDIl 85 ACC 
630 LX 580 SF340 72 DSL LX570 
635 SQ 328 747400 83 SIN SQ328 
635 SR 145 MDIl 85 EZE 
635 SR 6971 ARJ85 92 BSL LX900 
640 SR 921 17100 88 GVA SR506 
645 LX 870 ARJ85 92 LUG 
700 BB 3661 A310 34 MIA 
700 TK 4913 A310 34 IST TK4914 
705 SR 6745 SF340 72 SXB 
710 UA 964 767 33 IAD 
720 TG 908 747-200 2 BKK TG908 
730 AOJ 650 Caravell 97 SIR AOJ650 
730 PMK301A 17100 88 SKP PNIK302 
750 SR 923 MD81 48 GVA 
800 BB 3671 A310 34 PUJ BB3672 
800 LX 7011 SF340 72 HAM LX9134 
800 LFA 427 A300 31 IST LFA428 
805 AA 064 767 33 JFK 
805 VER 917 M80 48 HER VER918 
810 OS241 F50 89 SZG OS242 
815 AA 038 767 33 ORD AA037 
820 AZ 1236 M80 48 LIN AZ1237 
835 LH4851T A320 87 FRA L114951 
845 GA 976 747-200 2 DPS GA976 
845 LH 5524 F50 89 DUS L115525 
845 RS 410 SF340 72 BTS 
845 FUA 904 737-400 84 PNII FUA907 
850_ 
__ 
LH 5592 F50 89 CGN 1.115557 
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850 AEA 629 757 51 I'MI ALA629 
855 OS201 M80 48 VIE OS202 
855 TK 4907 727 24 IST TK4908 
855 FUA 964 737400 84 PMI FUA965 
900 SN 361 737-200 42 BRU SN362 
905 OU 460 737-200 42 ZAG OU461 
905 SR 559 17100 88 MUC 
905 AEA 591 737-300 35 LPA AEA633 
910 AF 2890 A320 87 CDG Ar-2885 
915 KL 301 737-300 35 AMS KL302 
915 SR 6571 MD81 48 STR S1090 
915 TK 719 737-200 42 IST 
915 TCT 6911 727 24 IST TCT6912 
920 DI 216 SF 340 72 BRE D1217 
920 RO 351 BIl 37 OTP R0352 
920 TW 890 767 32 GVA TW891 
925 LX 953 Citation 57 SIR 
925 LZ 7521 TU5 90 VAR LZ7522 
925 OHY 611 A320 87 IST OIIY612 
930 LH 5574 CRJ 94 1 [AM LI 15543 
930 OS217 F50 89 LNZ 
930 TK 989 A310 34 AYT TK990 
930 AEA 676 757 51 PMI ACA677 
935 LX 903 ARJ85 92 LUG LX9012 
940 AC 878 767 33 YYZ 
940 LH 4586 A 320 87 FRA L114389 
940 LO 291 737-200 42 WAW LD292 
945 CY 472 A310 34 LCA CY473 
945 OS223 DH8 64 GRZ 
945 SR 6775 SF340 72 MRS 
950 SR 125 747-300 82 ORD 
955 LX 571 SF340 72 NUE LX904 
955 SR 139 MDIl 85 YMX 
955 SR 6425 SF340 72 KLU 
955 TK 919 737-200 42 ESB TK920 
1000 AY 862 M80 48 GVA AYS62 
1000 SR 101 747-300 82 JFK 
1005 JP 1662 DC9 40 uU JP1663 
1005 LZ 491 A320 87 SOF LZ492 
1005 OK 774 737-200 42 PRG OK775 
1010 SR 665 MD81 48 BCN SR486 
1015 SR 121 747-300 82 ATL 
1015 SR 651 F100 88 MAD SR1690 
1015 SR 6771 SF340 72 LYS SR6974 
1020 MA 564 737-200 42 BUD NIA565 
1020 SR 6631 F50 89 GOA 
1025 BA 710 757 51 LIIR BA711 
1025 SR 3961 MD81 48 BSL SR426 
1025 SR 6611 F50 89 TRN SR6574 
1030 FV 552 737-300 35 AGP FV553 
1030__. 
_ 
SR 129 747-300 82 nos 
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1035 SR 421 MD8I 48 IIEL SR554 
1035 SR 6873 SF340 72 SM) SR6992 
1040 SK 601 M80 48 CPI I SK602 
1045 SK 609 M80 48 FBU SK610 
1045 SR 431 MD81 48 VIE SR320 
1045 SR 443 MD81 48 PRG S11662 
1045 SR 843 A310 34 MAN SR692 
1050 SK 605 M80 48 ARN SK606 
1050 SR 591 MOO 88 TXL 
1050 SR 925 MD81 48 GVA SR686 
1055 SR 511 17100 88 DUS 
1055 SR 701 MDSI 48 CDG SR432 
1055 SR 801 A310 34 LIM SR324 
1100 SR 507 ROO 88 HAM 
1100 SR 551 ROO 88 muc SR592 
1100 SR 883 MD81 48 BRU SR704 
1105 SR 307 MD81 48 ATI I SR792 
1105 SR 469 MD81 48 BUD SR622 
1110 SR 333 A310 34 TLV SRS02 
1110 SR 621 A310 34 LIN 
1110 SR 791 MD81 48 AMS 
1110 TU 8600 A320 87 MIR TU8601 
1115 OS225 DH8 64 INN 
1115 SR 533 MD81 48 FRA 
1120 DL 122 A310 34 CV0 DL123 
1120 SR 401 MD81 48 CPI I SR308 
1125 LX 861 ARJ85 92 Blix SR6964 
1125 SR 6963 SF340 72 BSL SR6616 
1130 El 664 737-300 35 DUB E1667 
1130 KL 303 737-300 35 AMS KL304 
1130 OS243 F50 89 SZG OS244 
1130 SR 601 MD81 48 FCO SR649 
1135 IB 3464 M80 48 MAD IR4475 
1140 LX 583 SF340 72 LEJ SR6422 
1140 ILX 905 SF340 72 LUG LX906 
1140 TSW 3607 737-300 35 MAI I TSW3600 
1145 CY 352 A310 34 LCA CY353 
1145 SR 168 MDIl 85 GVA SR168 
1150 SR 6573 MD81 48 STR SR318 
1150 TK 907 A310 34 IST TK908 
1150 AAN 406 M80 48 PNII AAN409 
1155 SR 927 MD81 48 GVA SR658 
1200 LX 581 SF340 72 DRS SR6974 
1200 SU 265 TU5 90 svo SU266 
1205 SR 6965 146-300 15 BSL LX854 
1205 TK 4915 727 24 IST TK4916 
1210 BB 3477 MD82 49 OL13 
1210 AEA 695 737-300 35 SCQ ACA696 
1215 SPP227 m8o 48 PNII SPI"228 
1215 TSW 8617 737-300 35 SKP TSW3620 
1220 AF 3154 F28 39 NCE Ar3145 
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1220 LX 9023 ARJ85 92 NAP SR6928 
1220 SR3671 MD87 86 PMI SR3670 
1225 SR 803 A310 34 LIM SIU32 
1235 OA 131 737-200 42 ATI I OA132 
1235 SR 929 F100 89 GVA SR466 
1235 AEA 643 757 51 LPA ACA644 
1240 CX 290 747400 83 FCO CX290 
1240 AEA 639 737-300 35 AGP ACA605 
1240 TAT 4171 17100 88 FSC TAT4172 
1245 SR 6977 SF340 72 BSL LX91 18 
1250 AT 8639 DC9 40 IIEL AY8629 
1250 AIZ 501 757 52 TLV AIZ502 
1300 BA 5344 737-200 42 BI Ix BAS34S 
1300 TU 8620 727 24 DJE TU8621 
1300 SPP 211 mso 48 PMI SPP214 
1305 AZ 4400 A300 31 FCO AZ4401 
1310 At 193 DC8 64 DAII 
1310 KE 916 747400 83 FCO KE916 
1315 FUA 900 737400 84 LPA FUA901 
1320 TG 909 747-300 82 BRU TG909 
1325 AOJ 651 Caravell 97 SKP AOJ652 
1330 AZ 1440 M80 4S FCO AZ1441 
1330 CLC 422 DC3 71 ZRI I CLC423 
1335 LTE 625 757 52 TFS LTE 624 
1340 AXX 101 M80 48 SKI, AXXI02 
1345 AH 2048 737-200 42 GVA A112049 
1345 AAN 452 A310 34 LPA AAN453 
1350 LX 907 SF340 72 LUG LX9106 
1355 LH 4550 A320 87 FRA L114593 
1355 OK 768 ATR42 95 GVA OK769 
1355 SR 411 F100 88 ARN 
1400 AF 2866 737-300 35 CDG An89l 
1400 SR 13 It MDII 85 SKG 
1400 SR 6575 F50 89 STR SR6568 
1405 SR 6967 ARJ85 92 BSL SR6930 
1410 IG 355 DC9 40 OBL IG356 
1410 FLT 797 146 15 EDI FL7799A 
1415 TP 538 737-200 42 OPO TP538 
1430 SR 555 MD81 48 MUC SR444 
1435 SR 6617 SF340 72 TRN LX9124 
1440 BA 714 757 51 LIM DA715 
1440 SR 623 MD81 48 LIN SRS86 
1445 SR 6633 SF340 72 GOA SR6618 
1445 TP 522 A320 87 LIS TP$21 
1450 AEA 634 737-400 84 MAI I AW92 
1450 KAR 3043 DC9 40 1 IEL KAR3044 
1450 ZAS 760 mso 48 ssll ZAS761 
1455 OS245 F50 89 SZO OS246 
1500 BB 3237 MD82 49 HER 1ID3366 
1500 SR 433 MD8I 48 Vic SR750 
1505 ms 809 737-200 42 CAI NISBIO 
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1510 SR 705 MD81 48 CDG SR538 
1510 FUA 906 737-400 84 ALC FUA905 
1515 LH 5526 F50 89 DUS LI 15527 
1515 LX9135 SF340 72 CTA LX912 
1520 AEA 627 757 52 PMI AEA632 
1525 SR 6931 ARJ85 92 GVA LX9006 
1535 SR 793 MD81 48 AMS SR939 
1545 KL 305 737-300 35 AMS KL314 
1545 SR 6423 SF340 72 KLUI 
1550 KAR 3037 DC9 40 IIEL KAR3038 
1555 FIM 002 767 32 SEZ IINIG02 
1555 LX 9057 146-300 15 JTR LX9008 
1600 SR 453 F100 88 ZAG SR516 
1600 SR 593 17100 88 TXL SR968 
1600 SR 663 MD81 48 BCN SR556 
1600 VER 911 M80 48 HER VCR912 
1605 OS203 M80 48 VIE OS204 
1610 GA 977 747-200 2 LGW GA977 
1615 SR 603 MD81 48 FCO 
1615 CLC 423 DC3 71 ZRI 1 
1625 SR 805 A310 34 LRI I SRS06 
1635 SR 6875 SF340 72 SXB 
1650 AY 8630 M80 48 IIEL AY8620 
1650 EK 036 A300 31 MAN EK036 
1650 SR 6937 AR185 92 GVA SR6940 
1655 BB 3265 MD83 50 LPA BB3864 
1700 BB 3257 MD87 86 TFS BB3378 
1700 BB 3605 A310 34 NILE 
1700 RG 768 DCIO 20 CDG RG769 
1700 SR 107 MDIl 85 LAX 
1705 SR 447 1`100 88 WAW 
1705 TK 909 737-200 42 IST TK910 
1710 BB 3153 MD87 86 LPA 
1710 LX 843 F50 89 GCI SR6567 
1710 SR 6451 F50 89 IJU 
1710 TU 8612 737-300 35 MIR TUS613 
1710 AXX 105 TU5 90 SKP AXXI06 
1715 AAN 408 M80 48 inz AAN407 
1720 LX 9013 ARJ85 92 ATI 1 
1735 AZ 1494 DC9 40 LIN AZ1495 
1735 Lx 9119 SF340 72 SOD 
1735 SR 1691 F100 88 LIS 
1740 SR 169 MDI 1 85 NRT 
1745 BA 718 757 51 LIIR 
1745 EI 662 737-300 35 SNN E1669 
1745 KQ 144 A310 34 NBO KQ145 
1745 TU 8610 727 24 WE 
1745 AEA 606 737 35 PMI AEA642 
1750 IB 4476 M80 48 BCN ID3467 
1755 LH 4556 737 35 FRA 1.114539 
1755 LX 913 SF340 72 LUG 
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1755 MA 566 737 42 BUD NIA567 
1755 SR 467 F100 88 13UD 
1755 AF 2868 A320 87 CDO AF2867 
1800 SR 6635 SF340 72 GOA 
1805 OS219 F50 89 LNZ 
1805 OS227 DH7 65 INN OS228 
1815 SR 309 MD81 48 SKG SRS44 
1815 SR 463 F100 88 OTP SR796 
1815 SR 649 MD81 48 MLA SR664 
1815 SR 687 MD81 48 AGP SR436 
1820 OS247 F50 89 SZG 
1820 SK 603 DC9 40 CPI I SK604 
1820 SR 693 A310 34 LIS SR842 
1825 SK 607 DC9 40 ARN SK608 
1825 SR 325 A310 34 IST SR808 
1830 SR 491 MD81 48 svo SR708 
1830 SR 659 MD81 48 MAD SR420 
1835 LH 5548 CRJ 94 1 [AM LI 15549 
1835 SR303 MDIl 85 ATI 1 
1835 SR 445 MD81 48 PRG SR942 
1835 SR 969 F100 88 BSL SR624 
1840 SK 611 M80 49 FBU SK612 
1840 SR 197 MDII 85 PEK 
1840 SR 487 MD81 48 LED SR650 
1840 SR 751 MD81 48 NCE SR468 
1840 TU 484 727 24 DJE TU485 
1845 SR 321 MD81 48 ESD 
1850 SR 245 A310 34 GVA 
1850 SR 6619 SF340 72 TRN 
1850 TK 993 A310 34 AYT TK994 
1855 AZ 400 M80 48 FCO AZ401 
1855 SR 887 MD81 48 BRU SR326 
1855 TU 602 A320 87 TUN TU603 
1900 MD 053 747-200 2 CDG NID054 
1900 SR 6941 F50 89 GVA SR6378 
1900 
. 
SPP 213 M80 48 IBZ SPP212 
Source: Zurich Airport Authority (1994) 
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Zurich Busy Day Schedule - 16/7/94 
Saturday Departures 
Time FlightNo AircraftType A/CCode Destination 
635 BB 3260 MD87 86 LI'A 
645 TSW 8616 737-300 35 SKP 
645 VIM 602 TU5 90 SOF 
650 TSW 3609 737-300 35 FAO 
655 KL 300 737-300 35 AMS 
655 LH 5533 F50 89 CGN 
655 LX 580 SF340 72 DRS 
655 LX 952 Citation 57 SIR 
655 TSW 3602 737-300 35 KGS 
700 LH 4563 737-300 35 FRA 
705 LX 582 SF340 72 LEJ 
705 SA 274 747400 83 hixp 
705 SR 400 MD81 48 CPI 1 
705 SR 6770 SF340 72 LYS 
710 LX 9056 146-300 15 JTR 
710 SR 590 FIDO 88 TXL 
710 SR 6570 MD81 48 STR 
715 ix 900 ARJ85 92 LUG 
715 SR 430 MD81 48 Vic 
715 SR 506 17100 88 1 IAM 
720 SR 600 MD81 48 rco 
725 BB 3256 MD87 86 TFS 
725 LX 570 SF340 72 NUE 
725 SR 442 MD81 48 PRO 
725 SR 790 MD81 48 ANIS 
725 SR 3960 MD81 48 BSL 
730 SR 193 MDI 1 85 GVA 
730 SR410 17100 88 ARN 
730 SR 700 MD81 48 CDO 
735 SR510 17100 88 DUS 
735 SR 800 A310 34 LIIR 
740 SR 982 MD81 48 BRU 
740 SR6610 F50 89 TRN 
740 TSW 3606 737-300 35 MAI 1 
745 SQ 328 747400 93 CrI 1 
745 GBL 953 737-200 42 LOW 
750 CX 291 747400 83 rco 
750 SR 550 F100 88 Muc 
750 SR 620 A310 34 LIN 
755 BB 3152 MD87 86 LPA 
755 SR 532 MD8I 48 FRA 
800 BB 3264 MD83 50 LPA 
800 LX 9022 ARJ85 92 NAP 
800 TK 4914 A310 34 IST 
805 AF 2849 A320 87 CDO 
805 MAK 291 737-200 42 SKP 
810 BA 709 757 51 LIIR 
810 SR 6639 Sr340 72 GOA 
815 BB 3236 MD82 49 HER 
815 IB 3473 M80 48 MAD 
815 SR 1310 MDII 85 SKO 
820 1 LX 9134 SF340 1 72 CTA 
_j 
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820 TG 909 747400 2 BRU 
820 AOJ 650 Caravell 97 SKp 
820 PMX 302 F100 88 SKI, 
830 BB 3476 MD82 49 OLD 
830 SR 920 MD81 48 GVA 
830 AXX 104 M80 48 SKp 
840 OS242 F50 89 sza 900 El 663 737-300 35 DUB 
900 FLT 796 146 is ED[ 
905 VER 918 M80 48 1 IER 
910 AZ 1237 M80 48 LIN 
915 CLC210 DC3 71 DIJ 
920 LFA 428 A300 31 IST 
925 LH 4851 A320 87 FRA 
930 LH 5525 F50 89 DUS 
935 OS202 mso 48 VIE 
935 QS 411 SF340 72 BTS 
945 SN 362 737-200 42 DRU 
945 AEA 633 737-300 35 MAI 1 
945 FUA 907 737400 84 ALC 
950 DI 217 SF340 72 BRE 
950 SR 6572 MD81 48 STR 
950 AEA 628 757 51 PMI 
955 SR 922 F100 88 OVA 
1000 BB 3672 A310 34 MBJ 
1000 KL 302 737-300 35 AMS 
1000 LH 5543 CRI 94 1 [Ahl 
1000 LH5557 F50 89 CGN 
1010 GA 976 747-200 2 LGW 
1015 AA 037 767 33 ORD 
1015 AF 2885 A320 87 CDG 
1015 OU 461 737-200 42 ZAG 
1015 SR 490 MD81 48 svo 
1020 AEA 677 757 52 Phil 
1020 TCr 6912 727 24 IST 
1025 LX 904 SF340 72 LUG 
1025 LZ 7522 TU5 90 VAR 
1025 TK 990 A310 34 AYT 
1030 BB 3664 A310 34 Nico 
1030 LD 292 737-200 42 WAW 
1030 LX 9012 ARJ85 92 ATI 1 
1030 RO 352 Bli 37 OTP 
1035 LH 4589 A320 87 FRA 
1040 AY 862 M80 48 1 IEL 
1040 SR 256 A310 34 AD] 
1040 TK 720 737-300 35 IST 
1045 CY 473 A310 34 LCA 
1045 OHY 612 A320 87 IST 
1055 SR 6974 SF340 72 BSL 
1055 TK 920 737-200 42 ESB 
1055 TK 4909 727 24 IST 
1055 Tw 891 767 32 JFK 
1100 JP 1663 DC9 40 uU 
1100 CLC 422 DC3 71 7-RI 1 
1105 LZ 492 A320 87 SOF 
1115 AA 065 767 33 JrK 
1115 1 LX 942 Fso 1 89 1 CCI 
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1115 SR 6962 SF340 72 IISL 
1120 OK 775 737 42 PRO 
1120 SR 486 MD81 48 LED 
1120 SR 1690 1`100 88 LIS 
1125 MA 565 737 42 BUD 
1125 OS224 DI 18 64 GRZ 
1125 FUA 965 737400 84 Phil 
1130 FV 553 737-300 35 AGP 
1130 OS218 F50 89 LNZ 
1135 BA 711 757 51 LIM 
1135 SR 926 MD81 48 OVA 
1135 SR 6632 SF340 72 GOA 
1140 SR 320 MD81 48 ESB 
1140 SR 662 MD8l 48 BCN 
1145 SR 554 MD81 48 Muc 
1145 SR 692 A310 34 LIS 
1145 SR 6616 SF340 72 TRN 
1150 SR 686 MD81 48 AGP 
1155 SR 192 747-300 82 BONI 
1155 SR 432 MD81 48 Vic 
1155 SR 704 MD81 48 CDO 
1155 SR 6574 F50 89 STR 
1200 SR 324 A310 34 IST 
1200 SR 792 MD81 48 AXIS 
1200 TU 8601 A320 87 MIR, 
1205 OS244 F50 89 SZG 
1205 SR 622 MD81 48 LIN 
1205 UA 965 767 33 IAD 
1210 SK 606 M80 48 ARN 
1210 SR 302 MDIl 85 ATI 1 
1215 SR 592 17100 88 TXL 
1215 SR 802 A310 34 LIM 
1215 SR 6422 SF340 72 KLU 
1215 SR 6964 AR185 92 BSL 
1220 KL 304 737-300 35 ANIS 
1220 SK 602 M80 48 CrI 1 
1220 SR 462 17100 88 OTP 
1225 LX 906 SF340 72 LUG 
1225 SR 446 17100 88 WAW 
1225 SR 602 747-300 82 rco 
1230 El 667 737-300 35 SNN 
1230 1B 4475 M80 49 SCQ 
1230 OS226 D118 64 INN 
1230 SR 452 F100 88 ZAG 
1235 SR 126 747-300 82 PI IL 
1235 SR 262 MDIl 85 LOS 
1240 SR 120 747-300 82 ATL 
1240 SR 308 MD8I 48 SKO 
1240 SR 648 MD81 48 NILA 
1240 TSW 3600 737-300 35 LPA 
1245 CY353 A310 34 LCA 
1245 SK 610 mso 48 mu 
1250 SR 138 MDII 85 YYZ 
1250 SR 168 MDIl 85 NRT 
1250 SR 3 19 MD81 48 LCA 
1250 SR 6974 SF340 72 LUX 
1250 1 AAN 409 M80 48 1 111Z 
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1300 AC 879 767 32 YYZ 
1300 SR 100 747-300 82 irK 
1300 SR 106 MD11 95 LAX 
1300 SR 658 MD81 48 MAD 
1300 AEA 696 737-300 35 SCQ 
1305 SR 6928 ARJ85 92 GVA 
1310 SR 376 A310 34 AUI 1 
1310 SR 3670 MD87 86 PNII 
1310 SU 266 TU5 90 svo 
1310 TK 908 A310 34 IST 
1310 TK 4916 727 24 IST 
1320 AF 3145 F28 39 NCE 
1320 SR 124 747-300 82 ORD 
1320 SR 6450 F50 89 uU 
1320 SPP 228 M80 48 Phil 
1325 DL 123 A310 34 CVG 
1330 LX 854 146-300 15 DUB 
1330 OA 132 737-200 42 ATI 1 
1330 AEA 605 737-300 35 Phil 
1330 AEA 644 757 51 LPA 
1330 TAT 4172 F100 88 Fsc 
1335 TSW 3620 737-300 35 Rl 10 
1340 AY 8629 DC9 40 1 IEL 
1340 LX9118 SF340 72 son 
1345 SR 466 F100 88 BUD 
1350 TU 8621 727 24 DIE 
1355 SPP 214 M80 48 lBZ 
1405 AZ 4401 A300 31 rco 
1405 AIZ 502 757 52 Em 
1410 CX 290 747400 83 1 lKG 
1410 KE 916 747400 83 SEL 
1410 SR 332 A310 34 TLV 
1415 FUA 901 737-400 84 LPA 
1420 AZ 1441 M80 48 FCO 
1420 TG 909 747400 83 BKK 
1425 AH 2049 737-200 42 ALO 
1425 BA 5345 737-200 42 EDI 
1425 SR 804 A310 34 Ll IR 
1430 LX 9106 SF340 72 GCI 
1430 SR 1322 MD81 48 Esn 
1430 AOJ 652 Caravell 97 SKP 
1430 AXX 102 M80 48 SKP 
1435 OK 769 ATR42 95 PRO 
1440 BB 3526 MD82 49 AGP 
1440 SR 6634 SF340 72 GOA 
1440 LTE 624 757 52 TFS 
1445 LH 4593 A320 87 FRA 
1445 SR 6930 ARJ85 92 GVA 
1450 AF 2891 737-300 35 CDO 
1450 CLC 423 DC3 71 ZRI 1 
1500 IG 356 DC9 40 OLB 
1500 TP 538 737-200 42 OPO 
1500 FLT 799A 146 15 LGW 
1510 AAN 453 A310 34 LTA 
1515 LX 9124 SF340 72 JrR 
1525 OS246 F50 89 szo 
1525 SR 444 1 MD81 1 48 1 PRO 
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1535 SR 886 MD81 48 BRU 
1540 BA 715 757 51 LI IR 
1540 SR 750 MD81 48 NCE 
1540 SR 6568 F50 89 1 IAJ 
1540 AEA 592 737-300 35 LPA 
1545 LH 5527 F50 89 DUS 
1545 TP 521 A320 87 LIS 
1550 BB 3366 MD82 49 ALC 
1550 SR 6618 SF340 72 TRN 
1550 KAR 3044 DC9 40 IIEL 
1550 ZAS 761 M80 48 ssil 
1600 BB 3234 MD81 48 KGS 
1600 LX 912 SF340 72 LUG 
1600 LX 9128 SF340 72 OLB 
1610 AEA 632 757 52 PMI 
1610 FUA 905 737-400 84 PMI 
1615 MS 810 737-200 42 CAT 
1625 KL 314 737-300 35 AMS 
1625 LX 9006 ARJ85 92 MAII 
1645 HM 002 767 32 LGW 
1645 OS204 M80 48 VIE 
1650 LX 9008 146-300 15 REU 
1650 SR 516 FlOO 88 DUS 
1650 KAR 3038 DC9 40 IIEL 
1655 Al 194 DC8 64 BLR 
1700 SR 538 MD81 48 FRA 
1700 SR 968 'FlOO 88 BSL 
1700 VER 912 M80 48 1 IER 
1705 SR 938 MD81 48 GVA 
1710 GA 977 747-200 2 CGK 
1715 SR 556 MD81 48 MUC 
1735 AY 8620 M80 48 IIEL 
1740 SR 806 A310 34 LIIR 
1745 BB 3864 MD83 50 MAII 
1745 SR 6567 F50 89 STR 
1745 SR 6940 ARJ85 92 GVA 
1750 EK 036 A300 31 DXB 
1750 SR 404 FIOO 88 CPII 
1800 BB 3378 MD87 86 IBZ 
1800 TK 910 737-200 42 IST 
1800 TU 8613 737-300 35 MIR 
1800 AXX 106 TU5 90 SKP 
1805 AAN 407 M80 48 PMI 
1820 AZ 1495 DC9 40 LIN 
1835 El 669 737-300 35 DUB 
1835 1B 3467 M80 48 MAD 
1835 AEA 642 737-300 35 AGP 
1840 KQ 145 A310 34 NBO 
1845 LH 4559 737-200 42 FRA 
1850 AF 2867 A320 87 CDG 
1855 MA 567 737-200 42 BUD 
Source: Zurich Airport Authority (1994) 
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Zurich Airport Standard Routings 
Arrivals 
BLM Iz From BSL to GOLKE to EKRON (Holding Stack) followed by radar 
vectors to runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the North West 
HOC IZ From HOC to GOLKE to EKRON (Holding Stack) followed by radar 
vectors to runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the West 
WIL Iz From WIL to EKRON (Holding Stack) followed by radar vectors to 
runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the South West 
SUL lz From SUL direct to SHA (Holding Stack) followed by radar vectors to 
runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the North 
TGO IZ From TGO to HEUSE to SHA (Holding Stack) followed by radar 
vectors to runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the North East 
KPT IZ From KPT to BODSE to SHA (Holding Stack) followed by radar 
vectors to runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the East 
RESIA IZ From RESTA to SOSON to ALBIX to EKRON (Holding Stack) 
followed by radar vectors to runway 14 - Covers arrivals from the 
South East 
CANNE IZ From CANNE to SOSON to ALBIX to EKRON (Holding Stack) 
followed by radar vectors to runway 14 - Covers arrivals rrom the 
South 
Departures 
ALBIX 5W Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept KLO 255R to AARAU. 
Leave AARAU to intercept HOC IIR. to ALBIX - Covers departures 
to the South East 
HOC 5W Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept KLO 255R to AARAU. 
Leave AARAU on track 291M to HOC - Covers departures to the 
North West 
MOROK 5W Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept KLO 255R to AARAU. 
Right onto track 278M to LASON then left on track 266M to MOROK 
- Covers departures to the West 
WIL 5W Ahead to KLO, 2.5d, then left on WIL 054R to WIL - Covers 
departures to the South West 
ZUE 6Z (Prop a/c only) Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left onto KLO 223R. At 
KLO right turn to intercept ZUE 235R to ZUE - Covers departures to 
the North and East 
ZUE 6W Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept KLO 255R. At KLO 10d 
turn left to intercept ZUE 235R to ZUE - Covers departures to the 
North and East 
TEBRI IY (RNAV SID) Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept KLO 2551L 
Remain within KLO 12d, left turn to OTTAB and TESMA, then right 
to TEBRI - Covers departures to the South and South East 
EBOTO IY (RNAV SID) Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept WIL 054R to 
BREGO. Then left to BERSU, right to TELNO and right again to 
EBOTO - Covers departures to the South West 
RESTA lY (RNAV SID) Ahead to KLO 2.5d, then left to intercept KLO 235R. 
Left to OTTAB and TESMA, then right to KELAP and finally left to 
RESIA - Covers departures to the South East 
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Gatwick Airport Typical Busy Day Arrivals - 30th June 1995 
Arr. Time Flt No. Aircraft Type A/C code From Turnaround Dest 
0.55 RPX706 RPH 67 SIN RPX707P STN 
1.00 EXS472 HPH 67 LPL 
1.05 GR614 SH6 68 EMA 
2.20 MON3685 AB6 31 LPA 
3.40 AIH494 M83 50 AGP 
3.45 AIH470 M93 50 GRO 
4.15 BA062 742 2 SEZ 
4.35 AMM593 757 51 TLV 
4.40 FD223 SH6 68 CDO 
5.00 BY060B 757 51 PMI BY222A CFU 
5.05 BY158B 762 32 HER 
5.10 BY291B 762 32 mco BY341A NAP 
5.15 BA074 742 2 LOS 
5.25 BY438B 757 51 LPA 
5.30 BY347B 757 51 KGS BY194A Pml 
5.30 CKT132 DIC 20 mco 
5.40 LE16024 734 84 AGP LE6227 isl 
6.10 EXC384 320 87 SKG 
6.15 BY375B 757 51 PMI BY047A ATII 
6.15 TIHO49 763 33 mco 
6.20 BA198 762 32 PIT 
6.20 BA294 742 2 MIA 
6.25 EK007 313 34 DXB 
6.30 BA172, DIC 20 FK 
6.40 DLO12 L15 23 ATL 
6.45 MON5513 320 87 KGS MON5226 PVK 
6.45 DP013 757 52 LCA AMM450 MAN 
6.50 BA194 762 32 BWI 
6.50 BA224 DIC 20 RH 
6.50 BA192 DIC 20 DFW 
6.50 BA232 DiC 20 BDA 
6.55 Q7001 313 34 DOH 
7.00 C0028 DIC 20 EWR 
7.00 GT821 732 42 FAO GT888 CFU 
7.05 BA226 DIC 20 ATL 
7.10 BA196 762 32 CLT 
7.10 LE16560 734 84 DLM 
7.15 DB541 AT4 95 RNS DB542 LEH 
7.25 BA8012 AT7 96 ANR BA8035 JER 
7.25 BA8058 AT4 95 RTM BA8059 RTM 
7.25 VD460 M38 50 ORY VD461 ORY 
7.25 VS006 742 2 MIA 
7.30 BA3127 F28 39 LYS BA3128 LYS 
7.30 ZI211 EMB 69 URO Z1212 URO 
7.35 BA8090 AT4 95 DUS BA8011 ANR 
7.35 TW720 741 1 STL 
7.45 BA2411 734 84 BRU DA2016 ABZ 
7.45 BA2001 734 84 MAN 
7.45 LE16226 734 84 SKO 
7.45 DB943 AT4 95 NTE DB944 NTE 
7.50 HV601 732 42 AMS lIV602 AMS 
7.50 VS012 741 1 BOS 
7.55 BA8081 AT7 96 DUB BA8082 DU3 
7.55 BA252 742 2 ANU 
7.55 BA2817 734 84 CDG DA2472 AGP 
7.55 5E463 J31 99 EIN SE464 EIN 
7.55 NW048 D14 21 DOS 
7.55 BA3400 733 35 muc DA3401 muc 
8.00 MON7712 757 51 MAN MON7712 LXR 
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8.00 AA174 762 33 RDU 
8.05 CK175741 757 51 TFS 
8.10 BA8070 AT4 95 NCL BA8073 NCL 
8.10 JY900 F2E 67 GO JY903 GCI 
8.10 BA2785 734 84 GOT BA2464 MAD 
8.15 JY930 142 15 JER JY933 JER 
8.15 UK510 143 15 EDT UK511 EDT 
8.15 BA2333 732 42 BOD BA2606 NAP 
8.15 MON3005 757 51 ZTH MON5584 MAII 
8.15 NG107 763 33 VIE N0106 VIE 
8.15 VS016 742 2 Mco 
8.20 BA2913 734 84 FRA BA2654 TLV 
8.20 DMI01 735 35 BLL DMI02 BLL 
8.25 LTK480 143 15 GLA UK483 GLA 
8.30 JY961 143 15 131-11) JY962 13111) 
8.30 BA2735 732 42 GVA BA2614 GOA 
8.30 BA2015 732 42 ABZ BA2004 MAN 
8.30 BA3203 100 88 MRS BA3202 MRS 
8.35 BA2640 734 84 FBU BA2640 ATI 1 
8.40 BA2824 734 84 svo BA2824 CDO 
8.45 BA2691 732 42 VIE BA2894 OTT, 
8.45 AA050 MIT 85 DFW AA051 DFW 
8.45 AZ1262 M82 49 BLQ AZ1261 PSA 
8.50 BA8122 SH6 68 LBA BA8123 LBA 
8.50 NW044 D14 21 MSP 
9.00 IG3531 141 15 FLR 103532 FLR 
9.05 BA2595 732 42 VRN 
9.05 AMM425 757 51 DLM 
9.10 BA2613 732 42 GOA 
9.15 DM13 735 35 CPH DMI 14 CPIl 
9.20 BA2605 734 84 NAP BA2328 MPI. 
9.20 BA2463 732 42 MAD BA2334 BOD 
9.20 NW032 D14 21 DTW 
9.25 T1777 721 25 RIX 11779 RIX 
9.30 AA138 762 33 DNA 
9.30 TQ031 100 88 ARN TQ032 ARN 
9.30 TS852 LII 22 YYC 
9.35 DLOIO L15 23 ATL DLOIl ATL 
9.35 FV162 733 35 AGP FV163 AGP 
9.45 C0004 DIC 20 EWR 
9.55 SBE2443 732 42 TFS 
9.55 DL036 L15 23 CV0 
10.00 MON1959 AB6 31 TFS MON5389 TFS 
10.00 C0014 DIC 20 EWR 
10.00 FRI 12 732 42 DUB FRI 13 DUB 
10.10 BU585 735 35 FBU BU596 BGO 
10.15 BA2821 734 84 CDO BA2828 CDO 
10.15 BA2003 732 42 MAN BA2006 MAN 
10.20 AF2570 320 87 MRS AF3589 MRS 
10.30 KM140 320 87 MIA KM141 MIA 
10.30 FLT799 143 15 ZRIT 
10.35 BA2413 734 84 BRU DA2518 FAO 
10.40 BA8036 AT7 96 JER DA803 ORK 
10.40 CL14 10 313 31 YVR CL1411 MAN 
10.45 BA8050 AT4 95 RTM DA8091 DUS 
10.45 DB041 SF3 72 DES DB042 DES 
10.45 NG1409 CRJ 94 szo N01410 SZG 
10.50 BA8022 SH6 68 GCI DA8023 GCI 
10.55 UK509 143 15 EDT UK51 5 EDT 
10.55 MON3053 320 87 MAII MON7802 TFS 
11.00 BA8072 AT4 95 NCL BAR037 JER 
11.00 BA8014 AT4 95 ANR DA8051 RTM 
11.00 
. 
TS258 LII 22 YYZ 
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11.05 AZ284 M82 49 WE AZ285 VCL 
11.10 CKT5129 LIO 22 MAII 
11.10 QN742 LIO 22 YYZ QN743 YYZ 
11.20 AA078 763 33 DFW AA079 DFW 
11.40 JY965 143 15 BHD IY966 BIID 
11.45 AMM443 757 51 VRN AMM456 CFU 
11.50 BA2737 732 42 GVA BA2596 VRN 
11.50 DB945 AT4 95 NTE 
11.55 NS7608 AT7 96 FMO NS7609 FMO 
12.00 JY938 142 is JER JY907 GCI 
12.00 LTK484 143 15 GLA UK497 GLA 
12.00 BA2005 732 42 MAN 
12.00 BY194B 757 51 PMI BY243A MLA 
12.00 CMM4511 757 51 YYZ CMM4512 YYZ 
12.05 HV603 732 42 AMS lIV604 AMS 
12.15 BA2825 734 84 CDG BA238 TLS 
12.15 BA2017 734 84 ABZ 
12.20 BA2915 734 84 FRA BA2916 FRA 
12.20 FV140 733 35 MAD FV141 MAD 
12.25 JY904 F2E 67 GO JY941 JER 
12.25 AIH404 320 87 IBZ AII-1403 IBZ 
12.30 BA8083 AT7 96 DUB 
12.30 BA8074 AT4 95 NCL BA8075 NCL 
12.30 BA2801 734 84 CPH BA2801 AGP 
12.30 DBIII AT4 95 RNS DBI12 RNS 
12.30 U3172 F28 39 FSC 
12.45 AZ4280 M82 49 FCO AZ4279 FCO 
12.50 BA2381 732 42 TLS BA2414 BRU 
12.50 BY341B 762 32 NAP BY187A MAII 
12.50 EXC224 320 87 PSA EXC311 ssil 
13.00 AMM427 757 51 AGP AMM430 MAII 
13.00 TQ033 100 88 ARN TQ034 ARN 
13.05 MON1921 AB6 31 PMI MON1960 MAII 
13.15 DMI05 735 35 BLL DMI06 BLL 
13.25 AMM451 757 51 1ýwi AMM438 NAP 
13.25 GV401 732 42 RIX GV402 RIX 
13.40 BA2573 734 84 LIN BA2012 MAN 
13.40 BY222B 757 51 CFU BY099A IBZ 
13.40 SBE2511 732 42 NAP 
13.45 BA2007 732 42 MAN BA2738 GVA 
13.45 IT4488 733 35 BOD IT4489 BOD 
14.00 BA2615 732 42 GOA 
14.00 BVvL554 BIS 37 VCE BWL561 AOI 
14.00 BA3205 100 88 MRS BA32D4 MRS 
14.15 BA8038 AT4 95 JER BA90 15 ANR 
14.15 BY173B 757 51 MAII 
14.15 BA8953 732 42 VLC 
14.20 BA8024 SH6 68 GCI 
14.20 BA2465 734 84 MAD BA2836 CDG 
14.25 MON5585 757 51 MAII 
14.30 BA8052 AT4 95 RTM BAS053 RTM 
14.30 BA8903 734 84 GIB 
14.35 MON3663 733 35 CIA MON7894 SFA 
14.40 LE16142 734 84 MAII LE16371 AGP 
14.55 BA2329 734 84 MPL 
14.55 FR0307 AB3 31 TFS 
15.05 BA8045 AT7 96 ORK BA8045 JER 
15.05 BA8092 AT4 95 DUS BA8077 NCL 
15.10 BA2335 732 42 BOD BA2416 BRU 
15.10 GT889 732 42 CFU GT818 BUD 
15.15 IY944 F2E 67 JER JY913 GO 
15.15 MON5227 320 87 PVK MON3076 ALC 
15.20 BA2695 734 84 VIE 
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15.30 SBE677 732 42 SKU 
15.40 VD466 M93 50 ORY VD467 ORY 
15.40 OOE319 LIO 22 TFS 
15AO ALT151 320 87 TFS ALT152 MAI 1 
15.45 JY910 142 15 GCl JY947 JER 
15.45 BA2607 732 42 NAP DA2840 CDO 
15.50 JY969 143 15 BIID JY970 BIID 
15.50 BY047B 757 51 ATI I BY264A RMI 
15.55 MON3693 757 51 NAP MON5236 GRO 
16.00 BA2473 734 84 AGP BA2473 CPIl 
16.00 LE16229 734 84 SKG LE-16565 MAII 
16.00 FRI 14 732 42 DUB FRI 15 DUB 
16.00 00E161 LIO 22 TFS 00E134 AGP 
16.05 BA118 742 2 MAN 
16.05 UK490 143 15 GLA UK491 GLA 
16.15 BA2833 732 42 CDG BA2009 MAN 
16.15 HV605 732 42 AMS lIV606 AMS 
16.20 BA2897 732 42 svo 
16.25 AIH472 M83 50 ClIQ 
16.30 IY748 722 24 ORY IY749 ORY 
16.35 UK520 143 15 EDI UK521 EDI 
16.35 AMM517 320 87 isi 
16.45 CKT3211 757 51 CFLJ 
16.50 AIH438 M83 50 ACE 
16.55 AZ4284 D93 40 VCE AL4285 VCE 
16.55 IB5134 M87 86 SCQ IB5135 SCQ 
16.55 TQ035 100 88 ARN TQ036 ARN 
17.00 BA2415 732 42 BRU BA2336 DOD 
17.10 BU595 735 35 BGO BU588 FBU 
17.15 BA2011 734 84 MAN BA20 10 MAN 
17.15 EAF3025 B15 37 UN 
17.20 AMM359 757 51 TFS AMM404 GRO 
17.25 BA2597 732 42 VRN BA2740 OVA 
17.30 BAS076 AT4 95 NCL DA8047 JER 
17.30 BA3129 F29 39 LYS DA3120 LYS 
17.30 ZI213 EMB 69 URO Z1214 URO 
17.35 BA2519 734 84 FAO DA2786 GOT 
17.40 BA80 16 AT4 95 ANR BA8095 DUS 
17.45 BA2917 734 84 FRA BA2774 FBU 
17.45 BA2641 734 84 ATII 
17.45 BA2895 732 42 OTP BA261a GOA 
17.50 BA8026 SH6 68 GCI DA8129 LBA 
17.50 DB543 AT4 95 L. Ell DB544 RNS 
17.50 DMI 17 735 35 CPH 'DMI18 CPIl 
17.55 BA8054 AT4 95 RTM DA8055 RTM 
17.55 5E467 J31 98 EIN 5E468 EIN 
17.55 DMI09 735 35 BLL DMIIO BLL 
18.10 BA2383 734 94 US DA2420 BRU 
18.10 BA2739 732 42 GVA BA2598 VRN 
18.15 BA8046 AT7 96 JER BASO 17 ANR 
18.15 BA2837 734 84 CDG DA2837 svo 
18.15 FV142 733 35 MAD FV143 MAD 
19.15 PS551 732 42 KBP PS552 KBP 
18.15 RA229 313 34 FRA RA230 FRA 
18.30 BA8087 AT7 96 DUB BA8088 DUD 
18.30 BA2019 732 42 ABZ DA2020 ABZ 
18.30 NG109 734 84 VIE NG108 VIE 
"18.40 BA2417 732 42 BRU DA2699 VIE 
18.45, DB941 AT4 95 NTE DB942 NTE 
18.45 VD470 M83 50 ORY VD471 ORY 
18.45 EAF3119 B15 37 LDE 
19.50 JY950 142 15 JER JY974 1311D 
18.50 IG3533 141 15 FLR IG3534 FLR 
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18.50 BA3404 733 35 muc BA3405 muc 
18.55 BA8128 SH6 68 LBA 
18.55 JY918 F2E 67 GO IY919 GO 
19.05 JY973 143 15 BIID JY974 BIID 
19.10 BA3207 100 88 MRS BA3206 MRS 
19.15 UK524 141 15 EDI UK525 EDI 
19.15 BA2839 734 84 CDO BA2849 CDG 
19.15 AMM431 757 51 MAII AMM434 TFS 
19.15 AZI260 M82 49 PSA AZI263 BLQ 
19.20 BA2475 734 84 AGP 
19.25 BA8078 AT4 95 NCL BA8079 NCL 
19.30 FRI 16 732 42 DUB FRI 17 DUB 
19.35 BA2009 732 42 MAN 
19.40 MON1961 AB6 31 MAH 
19.40 CKT601 LIO 22 MAH CKT5064 ATII 
19.45 HV609 732 42 AMS lIV610 AMS 
19.50 BYI 97B 762 32 MAII 
20.00 UK496 143 15 GLA UK497 GLA 
20.15 BA2841 732 42 CDG 
20.20 AMM439 757 51 NAP AMM502 ADB 
20.25 BY089B 757 51 IBZ BY376A clu 
20.30 EXS821 HPH 67 GO 
20.30 BY243B 757 51 MLA 
20.30 CKT463 LIO 22 TFS CKT3340 DLM 
20.35 UK526 143 15 EDI 
20.35 MON5389 A136 31 TFS MON7822 ATI I 
20.35 BV, 11,562 B15 37 AOI 
20.40 GR611 SH6 68 JER GR613 EMA 
20.45 BA9048 AT4 95 JER 
20.45 MON7713 757 51 LXR MON7713 Nm 
20.55 AMM457 757 51 CFU AM440 CFU 
21.00 BY264B 757 51 RMI BY208A IBZ 
21.00 EXC226 320 87 HRO EXC237 ATII 
21.05 BA2811 734 84 CPH 
21.15 LE16028 734 84 AGP LE16029 ATIl 
21.25 MON7803 320 87 TFS MON5206 ATII 
21.40 BA2521 734 84 FAO 
21.40 BA2655 734 84 TLV 
21.40 BA2467 732 42 MAD 
21.45 ALT153 320 87 MAH ALT158 ATII 
21.50 LE16372 734 84 AGP LE16231 TFS 
21.55 GT959 732 42 Muc 
21.55 AT5202 735 35 AGA ATS203 AGA 
22.00 MON3671 757 51 BJL MONI 158 ATII 
22.00 MON5237 757 51 GRO MON1496 ALC 
22.05 LE16566 734 84 MAII LE16457 AT11 
22.15 GT819 732 42 BUD GT804 AGP 
22.20 BA8056 AT4 95 RTM 
22.25 MON7895 733 35 SFA MON3014 ATIT 
22.30 MON3077 320 87 ALC MON5288 AGP 
22.45 MON1551 757 51 ALC MON7244 DLM 
22.45 AM405 757 51 GRO 
22.50 GT6967 734 84 ALC GT6944 cfu 
22.55 JY977 142 15 BHD 
23.15 BY537B 757 51 FAO 
23.20 BA8907 732 42 GIB 
23.40 00E135 LIO 22 ACP 
Note: Aircraft Code refers to SIMMOD aircraft Data file. 
Source: UK Airport Timetables 1995 
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Gatwick Airport Typical Busy Day Departures - 30th 
Dep. Time Fit. No. A/c Type A/c Code Dext. Tumaround 
0.05 AMM424 757 51 DUA 
0.20 MON3004 757 51 ME 
0.45 GT820 732 42 FAO 
0.55 BY375A 757 51 PNU 
0.55 SBE2442 732 42 TFS 
1.05 MON1958 AB6 31 TFS 
1.25 RPX707P IHPH 67 slw y 
1.40 FD222 SH6 69 CDO 
4.25 GR612 SH6 68 JER 
5.15 EXS820 IHPH 67 GCI 
5.30 CKT5 128 LIO 22 MAH 
6.00 AVB502 CND 57 JER 
6.00 MON3052 320 87 MAII 
6.00 SBE118 732 42 MAH 
6.00 FRO306 AB3 31 TFS 
6.00 OOE318 LIO 22 TFS 
6.10 CKT600 LIO 22 1%, Wl 
6.10 SBE676 732 42 Jsl 
6.35 BY222A 757 51 CFU y 
6.35 BY194A 757 51 PNU y 
6.45 BY341A 762 32 NAP y 
6.55 AMM442 757 51 VRN 
6.55 ALT150 320 87 TFS 
7.00 LE16227 734 94 isl y 
7.00 LTK509 143 15 GLA 
7.00 LE16027 734 84 AGP 
7.00 AMM426 757 51 AGP 
7.10 JY962 143 15 BTID 
7.20 BA2886 732 42 svo 
7.25 BA8071 AW 95 NCL 
7.25 BA2002 732 42 MAN 
7.30 BY047A 757 51 ATII y 
7.30 GT888 732 42 CFU y 
7.30 BA2820 734 84 CDG 
7.30 SBE2510 732 42 NAP 
7.35 AMM516 320 87 Jsl 
7.40 BA2412 734 94 BRU 
7.45 DB542 AT4 95 LEH y 
7.50 BA2736 732 42 OVA 
7.50 EXC223 320 87 PSA 
7.55 BA8059 AN 95 RTM y 
7.55 MON1920 AB6 31 PNR 
7.55 AIH471 M83 50 CIIQ 
8.00 MON5226 320 97 PVK y 
8.00 Z1212 ENM 69 URO y 
8.00 BA8021 SH6 69 GCI 
8.00 BA2800 734 84 CPII 
8.00 ANM58 757 51 TVs 
8.00 AIH437 M83 50 ACE 
8.10 BA8035 AT7 96 JER y 
8.10 BA8011 AN 95 ANR y 
8.10 BA2914 734 94 FRA 
8.10 BA8902 734 84 G113 
8.20 DB944 AT4 95 NTE y 
8.20 5E464 J31 98 EIN y 
9.25 AMM450 757 51 MATI y 
8.25 HV602 732 42 AMS y 
8.30 VD461 M83 50 ORY y 
8.30 BA3128 F28 39 LYS y 
8.30 BA2016 734 84 A13Z y 
8.35 BA3401 733 35 muc y 
8.40 BA9082 AT7 96 DUB y 
8.45 BA2380 732 42 TLS 
8.55 BA8073 AW 95 NCL y 
8.55 1 DA2464 1 734 1 94 , MAD yj 
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8.55 JY933 142 15 JER y 
8.55 LT, 511 143 is EDI y 
8.55 BA8952 732 42 VLC 
9.00 BY173A 757 51 MAIT 
9.00 MON7712 757 51 LXR y 
9.00 DMI02 735 33 BLL y 
9.05 BA2572 734 84 LIN 
9.05 LTK483 143 15 CLA y 
9.10 JY962 143 15 BID y 
9.10 BA2614 732 42 GOA y 
9.10 BA2640 734 84 ATH y 
9.15 BY179A 762 32 mco 
9.15 MON3662 733 35 CIA 
9.15 MON3670 757 51 BJL 
9.15 JY903 F2E 67 GCI y 
9.15 MON5584 757 51 MAII y 
9.15 NG106 763 33 VIE y 
9.15 BA2004 732 42 MAN y 
9.20 ILEI6141 734 84 NM 
9.20 BWL553 B15 37 VCE 
9.25 CKT3210 757 51 CFU 
9.30 BA193 DIC 20 DFW 
9.30 EXC225 320 87 1HRG 
9.30 BA2606 732 42 NAP y 
9.30 BA3202 100 88 NIRS y 
9.30 BA2824 734 84 CDO y 
9.30 BA8123 SH6 68 I33A y 
9.40 BA2472 734 84 AGP y 
9.45 DA255 742 2 BGI 
9.45 AZ1261 M82 49 PSA y 
9.45 IG3532 141 is FLR y 
9.55 BA225 DIC 20 IATI 
9.55 MON3692 757 51 NAP 
10.00 BA295 742 2 NHA 
10.00 AA139 762 33 BNA 
10.00 BA2654 734 84 TLV y 
10.00 BA2894 732 42 OTP y 
10.00 DMI14 735 35 CPH y 
10.10 BA2694 734 84 VIE 
10.15 TQ032 100 88 ARN y 
10.30 BA227 DIC 20 AM 
10.30 CKT077 DIC 20 TAB 
10.35 BA2328 734 84 NTL y 
10.40 DA173 DIC 20 JFK 
10.40 AA051 Mil 83 DFW y 
10.40 FRI 13 732 42 DUB y 
10.45 FV163 733 35 AGP y 
10.55 BA163 DIC 20 GCM 
10.55 TIHO57 763 32 mco 
10.55 TW721 741 1 STL 
11.00 BA081 742 2 ACC 
11.00 EK008 313 34 DXB 
11.00 DLOII L15 23 AM y 
11.00 BU596 735 35 BGO y 
11.00 BA2828 734 84 CDG y 
11.00 BA2006 732 42 MAN y 
11.10 AF3589 320 97 MRS y 
11.10 BA8036 AT7 96 ORK y 
11.15 CKT462 LIO 22 TFS 
11.15 C0025 DIC 20 EWR 
11.15 VS005 742 2 MIA 
11.15 BA2334 732 42 BOD y 
11.15 T1778 721 25 RIX y 
11.15 BA251 9 734 94 FAO y 
11.15 NG1410 CRI 94 szo y 
11.20 DA197 762 32 CLT 
11.20 BA8091 AN 95 DUS y 
11.30 BA265 742 2 NBJ 
11.30 AA173 1 762 1 33 1 RDU -j 
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11.30 TS853 Lll 22 YYC 
11.30 KM141 320 87 hMA y 
11.30 BA8023 S116 68 GO y 
11.35 MON5388 AB6 31 TFS y 
11.40 CL1411 313 34 MAN y 
11.40 BAS051 AT4 95 RlM Y 
11.45 NW049 D14 21 BOS 
11.45 DB042 SF3 72 BES y 
11.45 UK315 143 15 EDI y 
11.45 BA8037 AT4 95 JER y 
12.00 C0005 DIC 20 lAll 
12.00 Q7002 313 34 DOIT 
12.00 AZ285 M82 49 WE y 
12.10 NW045 D14 21 MSP 
12.15 BA199 762 32 Prr 
12.20 JY966 143 is BUD y 
12.25 BA195 762 32 BWl 
12.25 MON7802 320 87 TFS y 
12.30 VS015 742 2 mco 
1140 JY907 142 15 GO y 
12.40 LTK487 143 is GLA y 
12.45 NW033 D14 21 DTW 
12.45 BA2596 732 42 VRN y 
12.50 HV604 732 42 AMS y 
12.55 JY941 F2E 67 JER y 
13.00 EAF3024 BIS 37 LIN 
13.00 QN743 LIO 22 YYZ y 
13.05 AA079 763 33 DFW y 
13.05 FV141 733 35 MAD y 
13.05 BA2801 734 94 AGP y 
13.10 TS259 LlI 22 YYZ 
13.15 AMN4456 757 51 CFU y 
13.15 NS7609 AT*7 96 FMO y 
13.30 BA237 742 2 mco 
13.30 BA2832 732 42 CDO 
13.30 DL037 LIS 23 CV0 
13.30 BY243A 757 51 NILA y 
13.30 CMM4512 757 51 YYZ y 
13.45 BA2916 734 94 FRA y 
13.45 DBI12 AT4 95 RNS y 
13.45 AZ4279 M82 49 FCO y 
13.45 EXC311 320 87 ssil y 
13.55 DMI06 735 35 BLL y 
14.00 BA8075 AT4 95 NCL y 
14.00 TQ034 100 88 ARN y 
14.05 BA2382 734 84 TLS y 
14.05 AIH403 320 97 113Z y 
14.05 AMM430 757 51 MAII y 
14.15 BA2414 732 42 BRU y 
14.15 AMM438 757 51 NAP y 
14.25 OV402 732 42 RIX, y 
14.25 BA2738 732 42 GVA y 
14.30 DB946 AT4 95 NTE 
14.30 LT3173 F28 39 FSC 
14.30 MON1960 AB6 31 MAII y 
14.30 BA2012 734 84 MAN y 
14.35 BYI 87A 762 32 MAII y 
14.40 C0019 DIC 20 EWR 
14.45 BA8086 AT7 96 DUB 
14.45 BA2019 732 42 ABZ 
14.45 EAF31 18 BIS 37 LDE 
14.45 IT4489 733 35 BOD y 
14.50 BA3204 100 98 Nms y 
14.50 DA8015 AT4 95 ANR y 
15.00 DLO19 L15 23 AM 
15.00 vsoll 741 1 BOS 
15.00 BY089A 757 51 IBZ y 
15.00 DA8025 S116 68 ocl y 
15.00 1 DA8033 I AT4 1 95 , RTM y 
Appendix 6.6 
15.15 BA2520 734 84 FAO 
15.15 BWLS61 DIS 37 Aol y 
15.30 BA2836 734 84 CDO y 
15.35 MON7894 733 35 SFA y 
15.45 BAS045 AT7 96 MR y 
15.50 LE16371 734 84 AGP y 
16.00 BA8077 AT4 95 NCL y 
16.00 DA2416 732 42 BRU y 
16.20 JY913 F2E 67 GCI y 
16.25 BA2466 732 42 MAD 
16.25 JY947 142 15 JER y 
16.30 GT818 732 42 BUD y 
16.30 JY970 143 15 MID y 
16.35 BA2473 734 84 CPH y 
16.40 SBE2524 732 42 PSA 
16.40 ALT152 320 87 MAII y 
16.40 FRI15 732 42 DUB y 
16.40 UK491 143 15 GLA y 
16.50 BY264A 757 51 RMI y 
16.55 00E134 L10 22 AGP y 
17.00 BY537A 757 51 FAO 
17.00 GT6966 734 84 ALC 
17.00 MON3076 320 87 ALC y 
17.00 IM6565 734 84 MAU y 
17.00 HV606 732 42 AMS y 
17.05 BA2008 732 42 MAN y 
17.10 MON1550 757 51 ALC 
17.15 VD467 M83 50 ORY y 
17.15 UK521 143 15 EDI y 
17.25 MONS236 757 51 GRO y 
17.30 BA2840 732 42 CDG y 
17.40 GT958 732 42 muc 
17.45 1135135 M87 86 SCQ y 
17.50 BU588 735 35 FBU y 
17.55 AZ4285 D93 40 VCE y 
18.00 BA2608 734 84 NAP 
18.00 FLT792 143 Is ZRH 
18.00 TQ036 100 88 ARN y 
18.00 BA2336 732 42 BOD y 
18.10 IY749 722 24 ORY y 
18.15 BA8047 AT4 95 JER y 
18.15 BA3120 F28 39 LYS y 
18.20 BA2786 734 84 GOT y 
18.25 AMM404 757 51 GRO y 
18.25 5E468 J31 98 EIN y 
18.30 Z1214 FIvM 69 URO y 
18.30 BA2010 734 84 MAN y 
18.30 BA2618 732 42 GOA y 
18.30 DMI18 735 35 CPIT y 
18.35 DMIIO 735 35 BLL y 
18.40 BA8055 AT4 95 RTM y 
18.45 BA8129 SH6 68 LBA y 
18.50 BA8017 AT7 96 ANR y 
18.55 BA2740 732 42 GVA y 
18.55 BA2598 732 42 VRN y 
18.55 BA2837 734 84 SVG y 
19.00 DPOIZ 320 87 LCA 
19.00 FR0320 AB3 31 HER 
19.00 BA8095 AT4 95 DUS y 
19.00 BA2774 734 84 FBU y 
19.00 BA2420 734 84 BRU y 
19.00 BA8088 AT7 96 DUB y 
19.05 BA2918 734 84 FRA 
19.10 NG108 734 84 VIE y 
19.15 AIR439 M83 50 SKO 
19.15 FV143 733 35 MAD y 
19.15 PS552 732 42 KBP y 
19.20 DA2020 732 42 ADZ y 
19.25 1 IG3534 1 141 15 1 FLR y 
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19.30 DB544 AT4 95 RNS y 
19.30 DB942 AT4 95 NTE y 
19.30 BA3405 733 35 muc y 
19.35 RA230 313 34 FRA y 
19.35 JY919 F2E 67 GO y 
19.45 DA2698 732 42 VIE y 
19.45 VD471 M83 50 ORY y 
19.45 JY974 142 Is Bill) y 
19.50 BA2470 734 84 MAD 
19.50 JY95 5 143 is X, R y 
19.50 UK525 141 is EDI y 
19.55 BA2849 734 84 CDG y 
19.55 BA8079 AT4 95 NCL y 
20.00 CKT3812 LIO 22 HER 
20.00 BA3206 100 88 MRS y 
20.00 AZ1263 M82 49 BLQ y 
20.10 AIH473 M83 50 HER 
20.10 FR1 17 732 42 DUB y 
20.15 OOE320 LIO 22 DLM 
20.30 HV610 732 42 AMS y 
20.35 UK497 143 15 GLA y 
20.50 AMM434 757 51 TFS y 
20.55 CKT5850 757 51 CFU 
21.00 SDI17 LIO 22 KRT 
21.25 CKT5064 LIO 22 ATH y 
21.35 MON1574 757 51 HER 
21.35 MON7713 757 51 MAN y 
21.40 CKT3340 LIO 22 DLM y 
21.45 MON7822 AB6 31 ATH y 
21.55 BY376A 757 51 CFU y 
22.00 CKT5102 757 51 AGP 
22.00 AMM502 757 51 ADB y 
22.00 EXC237 320 87 ATH y 
22.05 BY208A 757 51 IBZ y 
22.20 ALT158 320 87 AIII y 
22.30 GR613 SH6 68 EMA y 
22.30 MON5206 320 87 ATH y 
22.30 BY292A 762 32 PNH 
22.40 EXS473 EPH 67 LPL 
22.40 MON3400 AB6 31 TFS 
22.40 LE16231 734 84 TFS y 
22.45 LE16029 734 84 ATII y 
22.45 AT5203 735 35 AGA y 
22.50 AMM440 757 51 CFU y 
22.50 LE16457 734 84 AIII y 
23.15 BY313A 757 51 CFU 
23.15 MON1158 757 51 AM y 
23.30 MON1496 757 51 ALC y 
23.30 GT804 732 42 AGP y 
23.30 MON5288 320 87 AGP y 
23.30 GT6944 734 84 CFU y 
23.45 MON3014 733 35 AM y 
23.45 1 MON72441 757 1 51 1 DLM I Y 
Note: A/C Code refers to SIXIMOD Data Me 
Source. UK Airport Timetables 1995 
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AggendIx 6.7 
Gatwick Airport Standard Routings 
Arrivals 
TIM IE From DET to LARCK (TIMBA Holding Stack) to MAY and radar 
vectors to runway 26L - Covers arrivals from the North East 
TIM IF From LYD to LARCK (TIMBA Holding Stack) to MAY and radar 
vectors to runway 26L - Covers arrivals from the East 
TIM 1B ABB to BEXIL to TMA Holding Stack to MAY and radar vectors 
to runway 26L - Covers arrivals from the South East 
TIM IG HASTY to TIMBA Holding Stack to MAY and radar vectors to 
runway 26L - Covers arrivals from the South and South West 
WLO IA SAM to SELS1 to HOLLY (WILLO Holding Stack) and radar vectors 
to runway 26L - Covers arrivals from the West 
WLO 2C KATHY to SELS1 to HOLLY (WILLO Holding Stack) and radar 
vectors to runway 26L - Covers arrivals from the South West 
WLO IB MID to HOLLY (WILLO Holding Stack) and radar vectors to runway 
26L - Covers arrivals from the North and North West 
Departures 
LAM 2M Ahead to IWW 2.3d, then right to intercept DET 261R by DET 31d. 
At DET 10d, left onto LAM 161R to LAM - Coven Departures to 
the North 
DVR6M Ahead to IWW 2.3d, then right to intercept DET 26 1R by DET 31d. 
At ACORN right onto DVR 28 1 R. to DVR. - Covers departures to the 
East 
WIZAD 3M (High Performance SID) Ahead to IW 2.3d, then left to intercept 
MAY 28SR by MAY 13d. AT MAY left onto DVR 263R to WIZAD - 
Covers departures to the East 
CLN 4M Ahead to RM 2.3d, then right to intercept DET 261R by DET 31d. 
At ACORN right onto DVR 28 1 R. to DVR 31d, then left on DET 188R 
to DET. At DET right on DET 017R to SND, then right on CLN 
229R to CLN - Covers departures to the North East 
SFD 4M Ahead via 'GY' then left onto SFD 315R to SFD - Covers departures 
to the South 
BOG IM Ahead via'GY". At MID 10.5d left onto OCK 180R to OCK 28d, 
then left onto MID 15OR to BOGNA - Covers departures to the 
south 
SAM 2M Ahead via 'GY' then left to intercept MID 067R to MID. AtMID 
right onto MID 262R to SAM - Covers departures to the west and 
south west 
KENET 2M Ahead via 'GY' then left intercept MID 067R to MID. At MID 
right onto MID 262R to MID I Od then right onto GWC 331R to 
KENET - Covers departures to the North and North West 
Appendix 6.8 
The Costs and Benefits of Implementing Special Regional A ircraft 
Procedures. 
Case 1: Base Case - No Change to Present System 
Costs Value Benefiti Value 
DIRECT DIRECT 
Increased Delay for Business L67/hr* Saving for all parties in planning L67 per (a) 
Pax. and testing of new procedures pcrson/hr 
Increased Delay for Leisure L101hr* Saving in Airport Investment Variable (b) 
Pax. Budget 
Increased Airline Operations L1313/hr (a) INDIRECT 
cost 
Airline Cost of missed Variable (b) Increased revenue from landing Variable (c) 
intcrlincs fees 
INDIRECT Increased Pax commercial Variable (d) 
revenue 
Increased Air ]Pollution (c) Unquantifiable Reduce disturbance to local Unquantiriable 
residents 
Increased Noise Pollution Unquantifiablc INDUCED 
Lost Airport Revenue as Pax Variable (d) Improved level of technology as Variable but 
demand falls aircraft and airport work to significant (e) 
achieve more from the existing 
system. 
Increased ATC airspace and Variable (e) Improved c1ficicncy of existing Unquantifiable 
workload problems system (f) 
Cost to airlines as smaller Variable but 
aircraft arc banned significant (f) 
INDUCED 
Negative Multiplier in local 41%dircct (g) 
economy 7% indirect 
Negative Multiplier on 41% direct 
National Economy 7% indirect 
Reduction in Airport Unpredictable 
Reputation 
Reduction in Airline Unpredictable 
Reputation I 
Notes: 
Costs 
Figures used by the UK CAA in the 1996, developed using a model from the Roskhill report. 
Last used for the RUCATSE report. 
(a) Figure derived from data supplied from Crossair during the 1994 ERA RNAV Conrercncc in 
Brussels in which they stated, 'a minute of flight time in a typical regional aircraft costs 
approximately $35. Using an exchange rate of 031.6 and multiplying the resultant by 60, a 
cost of L1313 per hour was determined. 
(b) Absolute cost will depend on the numbcr of interlining passengers, regional airline cost to rc- 
route passengers and inconvenience to other airline. 
(c) Increased delays will result in increased exposure to noise pollution over holding areas, and 
general increase in air pollution. Exact cost implications of these factors is very diMcult to 
quantify and beyond the scope of this author. 
(d) if runway congestion leads to a reduced movement rate and excessive delays, airlines may 
move their flight to alternative airports. If so, the airport will lose their aeronautical and 
commercial revenue generating opportunity. Some of the cost implication of this is also 
covered in the loss of airport reputation in the induced section. 
(C) As an airport reaches saturation the ATC controller workload will increase exponentially and 
their cfficiency will decrease beyond the optimum level. Costs arc very difficult to assess 
here, as stress related costs vary from person to person. If an additional time factor could be 
added to the current one to account for the increased workload, a cost could be made in terms 
of additional hours worked. In addition to the workload problem, costs also need examining 
as to the cffect of congestion on other parts of the airspace; TMA, other airports and en- 
route. 
Costs relate to the loss passengers to the regional airline, loss of fecd traffic to the major 
airline, lower aircraft utilisation costs for the regional airline, legislation costs to impose the 
ban and loss of airport and airline reputation. 
(g) These percentage figures are taken from the proof of evidence given by York Consulting 
LtcL, to the Manchester second runway enquiry, (May 1994). They rclatc to the multiplier 
effect already discussed. Local multiplier in this case reflects the impact of the regional 
airline to the local community it serves, away from the major airport. The effect on the 
national multiplier relates changes in the effect of the regionals intcrline ability to the 
majors, passenger throughput at the airport and the overall system efficicncy. 
Bencrits 
(a) Savings in planning and lobbying costs are related to a saving in a persons time which, being 
a professional, are rated at L67 per hour. Savings in aircraft testing costs arc related to a 
saving in flight time, rated at L1313 per hour. 
(b) Saving relates to the size of the investment budget and the level of investment that would be 
needed to introduce new procedures. 
(c) As landing slots become more scarce, the airport will achieve a monopoly situation and be 
We to increase slot price accordingly, assuming demand remains greater than supply. The 
drop off in demand will depend on suitable alternative airports, level of congestion and the 
strength of desire of the airlines to continue using the airport. 
If passengers are increasingly delayed at the airport they may spend more money in the 
commercial retail outlets. 
(e) As congestion begins to bitc at the airport, ATC, airlines and tho airport will be encouraged 
to develop and improve existing technology to provide extra capacity from the existing 
infrastructure. 
Similar to V but related purely to the benefit of a system operating closer to its optimum. 
Obviously, this assumes the system is not already at its optimum working position. If this 
were the case, increased workload would place the system Jn a sub-optimal position and 
related in increased operating costs. 
Case 2: Maximise Use of Existing Airfield Layout 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
DIRECT DIRECT 
Add new Taxiways - RET's, 00/sq. m (a) Reduced delays for Business Pax. L67 per hour 
RAT's and DSP's 
Planning and Lobbying time L67/hr per Reduced delay for Leisure Pax. LIO per hour 
person 
Testing new taxiways 113 13/hr per a/c, Reduced airline operating costs. L1313 per hour 
L67/hr per 
person 
Increased ATC workload Variable Possible extra slot generation Variable (a) 
Extra Tower Controller L22/hr (c) INDIRECT 
Addition of Ground Surface f (optional) Increased aeronautical revenue Variable 
Movement Radar from landing fees 
Increased ATC airspace and Variable Increased Pax commercial revenue Variable 
workload problems 
INDUCED Reduce disturbance to local Unquantifiable 
residents 
Increased Noise Pollution Unquantifiablc Reduced air pollution Unquantiflable 
INDUCED 
Improved level of technology as Variable but 
aircraft and airport work to significant 
achieve more from the existing 
system. 
Improved cfficicncy of existing Unquantifiable 
system 
Positive Multiplier in local 41% direct 
economy 7% indirect 
Positive Multiplier on National 41% direct 
Economy 71/o indirect 
Improved Airport Reputation Unpredictable 
Improved Airline Reputation Unprcdimble 
Costs: 
(a) Figure passed to the author following discussion with Birmingham airport planning 
dcpartment. 
(b) Based on an ATC controller costing L20,000 per annum and L20,000 to train. Working a 
37.5 hr week for 47 weeks a year, (= 1762.5 hrs/yT). 
Benefits: 
(a) Slot costs will vary widely depending on desirability of the airport by airlines. UK CAA 
CAP 534 (1988) placed the value of additional slots at Heathrow and Gatwick at L180 
million and L70 million respectively for a year. Placing an accurate figure on this will prove 
difficult however due to frequency of use and opportunity cost if another user places a higher 
value than the one paid for the slot by the user 
Case 3: Early Turn after Take Off. 
Costs Value Benefits value 
DMECT DIRECT 
Planning and testing of L1313/hr per Reduced delays for airlines L 13 13 per hour 
concept by airline and airport a/c, L67 per 
person 
Obtaining planning L67 per Reduced dclays for business Pax L67 per hour 
permission to operate new petwn/hr 
routc 
Increased controller L67/hr on top Reduced delays for leisure Pax. L 10 per hour 
workload to redirect regional of existing cost 
aircraft on early turn to join (a) 
existing airways 
Airline costs to train flight L67 per Increased slots at peak times at Depends on 
crews in new procedure and person/hr airport level of 
equip a/c L709.5 Sim congestion (a) 
cosL. (b) 
___ Costs to retrain ATCO's to Uncertain (c) Increased aeronautical revenue by Variable (b) 
pLo]jde service for pLocedurc additional landings 
Safety implications Unquanfifabic Increased commercial revenue from Variable (c) 
in this thesis passengers 
INDIRECT INDIRECT 
Air pollution over new areas Unquantifable Reduced air pollution as delays Unquantifable 
reduce (May cancel outwith cost) 
Effba of procedi= on L1313/hr per INDUCED 
existing tmffic a/c (d) 
Increased Insurance costs Marginal (e) Positive multiplier to national 41%direct 
economy 7% indirect 
Larger noise footprints over Unquantifablc Positive multiplier to local economy 41% Direct 
previously unaffected areas as more revenue is generated by the 7% Indirect 
airport 
Improvement in image of airport by Unquantirable 
users 
Improvement in image of airline by Unquantifable 
users 
Noter. 
Costs 
Absolute amount will vary depending on existing traffic levels. Cost must account for 
increased ATC co-ordination required between tower and area controllers. 
Simulator cost provided by Crossair based on an hourly charge of Sfr 745. Using an 
exchange ratio of Sfr 2.1: f1 over two hours - which is the minimum training time required 
by Crossair before carrying out early turns, the figurc is derived. 
(C) Could be given by the number of extra hours training required at a set rate per hour, and 
associated simulation costs, if necessary. 
(d) The figure given is for regional aircraft. Ujct airmf1were affected, using a cost of $150 per 
minute, from SAS a figure of L5625 is derived in the same format as %ith the regional 
aircraft. 
(C) Aircraft hull insurance may be increased if it is shown that the use of this procedure 
significantly shortens the life span of the aircraft or represents an increased safety riSL 
Benefits 
(a) As with Case 2, the exact value gained here will be depcndcnt on the value calculated for 
slots at each airportý a function of demand and alternative resources. 
(b) As with 'a' the benefit will depend on how far the airport can incrc= charges and the 
number of feasible alternatives. 
(C) This value is tentative, dependent on the assumption that the early turn will increase 
passenger throughput at the airport and, using the law of averages, mom money wil I be spent 
in the commercial outlets at the airport. 
Case 4: Discrete Arrival Routings 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
DIRECT DIRECT 
Planning and testing of L67/hr per Reduced delays for airlines L1313/hr per 
concept by airline and airport person a/c 
Obtaining planning L67 per person Reduced delays for business Pax. L67/hr 
permission to operate new per hour 
route 
Airline costs to retrain flight L67 per Reduced delays for leisure Pax. LIO/hr 
crews. pcrson/hr 
- Costs to retrain ATC L67 per Increased aeronautical revenue for Variable 
pgson/hr the airport 
Increased Controller L67/hr above INDIRECT 
workload to sequence arrival existing cost 
traffic flows 
Upgrade ATC Radar Variable (a) Increased slots at peak times at Variable 
airport 
INDIRECT Increased commercial revenue for Variable 
airport. 
Increases in insurance or Marginal Reduced air pollution as delays Unquantifable 
aircraft depreciation with reduce. 
new procedure (May be cancelled by cost poll. ) 
Increased noise pollution Unquantifable Improved interlinc ability for Variable 
over wider area regional airlines 
Air pollution over new areas Unquantifable_ INDUCED 
INDUCED Positive multiplier to local economy 4 1% Direct 
as more revenue is generated by the 71/6 Indirect 
airport 
Possible effect to existing Variable (b) Positive multiplier to national 41%Dircct 
traffic economy TA Indirect 
OPTIONS (c) Improvement in image of airport by Unquantifable 
users 
Addition of MLS to airport L? Improved airline interlincs for hub Unquantifablc 
Addition of DGPS to airport $150,0001 a/c airports 
Fitting of MMR to aircraft $130,000/ a/c 
Fitting of RNAV to aircraft $150-90,000 
Fitting of FMS to aircraft L Variable 
Notcs: 
Costs 
(a) The upgrade costs of the ATC radar may be rcquircd to provide more accurate approach 
position and guidance to the controller. Frankfurt airport use the COMPAS system for 
example. Absolute cost will be detcrmincd by scale of improvcmcnt required and system 
used. 
(b) If use of this procedure delays other traffic from arriving or departing from the airport, then 
this must be taken into account as a cost. It may be caused by increased arrival separation, 
sequencing delays, or reduction in departure slots during peak arrival pcriods. 
(c) Figures are taken from Crossair for the DGPS and RNAV installation costs and Air UK for 
the MNIR- 
Case 5: Steep Approach 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
DIRECT DIRECT 
Addition of 611 PAPI system Variable (a) Reduced noise on approach by Unquantifable 
higher aircraft , 
Addition of steep approach f 3,800 per a/c Reduced delays for airlines L1313 per hour 
modification to aircraft 
Train ATC in procedure L67 person/hr Reduced delays for business Pax. L67/hr 
Planning and testing of L1313 a/c/hr Reduced delays for leisure Pax. LIO/hr 
concept by airline and airport L67 person/hr 
Retraining flight crews (b) L1419 sim cost Increased aeronautical revenue for Variable 
L67 person/hr the airport 
Modify runway markings and Variable (c) Increased slots at peak times at Variable 
lighting ai! p2rt 
INDIRECT INDIRECT 
Increased ATC controller L67 pcrson/hr F,, a air pollution as delays LO per min 
workload reduce 
Increased a/c maintenance Variable (d) Increased airport commercial Variable 
costs revenue as pax. mov. increases. 
Increases in insurance or Variable Improved airline intcrlinc ability Variable (a) 
aircraft depreciation with 
new procedure 
INDUCED INDUCED 
Effect on existing trafric Variable (e) Positive multiplier to local economy 41%Direct 
as more revenue is generated by the 71/a Indirect 
airport 
OPTIONS Positive multiplier to national 41%Direct 
economy 7% Indirect 
Other Costs for Precision Improvement in image of airport by Variable 
Improved resolution radar ;E Variable users 
Addition of NILS to airport L7 
Addition of DGPS to airport $150,000 / a/c 
Fitting of MMR to aircraft $130,000/ a/c 
Fitting of RNAV to aircraft $150-90,000 
Fitting of FMS to aircraft I f Varia eI 
I I Improved airline reputation Variable 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) The type of PAR system chosen will dictate the cosL assuming the system is not already 
installed as a 3" glidepath approach aid. If so alteration to 6" will be minimail. 
(b) Figures are derived from Crossair as in Case 3. In this case however Crossair require I hour 
briefing, 4 hours simulator training and a written test for pilots to carry out steep approaches 
at Bern, Sion and Lugano. 
(C) Absolute cost will depend on scale of changes required which will Mate to lcvcl of current 
facilities. London City for instance provide specific lighting throughout the recommended 
touchdown point. 
(d) Use of the steep approach will increase the stresses on the undercarriage which will usually 
require strengthening. Problems of tyre bursts may also rise due to the tighter round out 
from the steeper approach angle and resultant limited buffer for pilots to correctly flare 
before touchdown. This will rclate to heavier landings. 
(e) The use of the steep approach may negatively affect existing traffic movements by reducing 
the time between successive arrivals. The cost will be in terms of increased delays for 
departures. Costs may also arrive due to the increased likelihood of go-arounds from steep 
approaches due to the higher decision heights enforced by steep approach regulations. 
Bencrits 
(a) Exact benefits will be detennincdby the number of extra intcrlincs achieved by use of the 
procedure which will be vary hard to accurately define. 
Case 6: STOL Commuter Runway 
Costs Value Benef its Value 
DIRECT DIRECT 
Design and planning for new L67 persoaft Reduced delays for airlines L1313 per hour 
STOL runwal 
Planning and testing of L1313 aloft Reduced delays for business Pax. L671hr 
concept ýy airline and airport L67 person/hr 
Obtaining planning L67 person, /hr Reduced delays for leisure Pax. LIO/hr 
permission to operate new 
route 
Retraining flight crews E1419 sim cost Incrcased aeronautical revenue for Variable 
L67 airport 
person/hr 
Building new STOL runway, L70 in. sq. (a) Increased slots at peak times -at Variable 
and taxiyM airport 
Costs to retrain ATCO's to L67 person/hr INDIRECT 
provide service for procedure 
Increases in insurance or Variable Incrcased airport commercial Variable 
aircraft depreciation with revenue as pax. mov. increase 
new procedure 
INDIRECT Reduced air pollution as delays Unquantifable 
reduce 
Increased maintenance costs Variable (b) INDUCED 
Increased ATC workload 467 person/hr Positive rmiltiplicr to local economy 4 1% Direct 
operating more runways as more revenue is generated by the 70/a Indirect 
airport 
Increased noise from STOL Unquantifable Positive multiplier to national 4 1% Direct 
runway use economy 7% Indirect 
INDUCED Improvement in image of airport by Unquantifable 
users 
Effect on existing traffic Variable (c) Improved airline intcrlines for hub Unquantifable 
ai! 3? orts 
OPTIONS 
Other Costs for Precision 
Improved resolution radar Variable 
Addition of MLS to airport i? 
Addition of DGPS to airport $150,000/ ate 
Fitting of MMR to aircraft $130,000/ a/c 
Fitting of RNAV to aircraft $150-90,000 
Fitting_ of FMS to aircraft L Variable 
.I 
I I 
Notes, 
Costs 
As in case two this figure was derived following discussions with Birmingham airport 
planning department 
(b) Due to the greater use of maximum power for take offs and full braking mctliods for landing 
engine and brake components may require more regular rcplacement using this proccdurc. 
(C) If the STOL runway intersects with the main runway, interfere= with departing and 
arriving traffic tnay occur. Costs will be related to increases in operating delays. Delays may 
also occur if arrival paths intersect with each other. 
Case 7: Reliever Airport 
Coits Value Benerits Value 
DIRECT DIRECT 
Planning and design costs L67 pcrson/hr Reduced delays for airlines at main L1313 per hour 
airport 
Possible Land acquisition L67 persoalir Reduced delays for business Pax. at L67/hr 
and Public Enqumity +Land Costs main ajM2rt 
Planning and testing of L67 person/hr Reduced delays for leisure Pax. at 001hr 
concept by airline and ai! port L1313 a/c thr main aiM2rt 
Obtaining planning L67 person/hr Increased slots at peak times at main Variable (a) 
permission to operate new airport 
route 
Budding new STOL runway, E70 sq. ra INDIRECT 
taxiways and Wrons 
Providing lighting and Variable (a) Reduced air pollution as delays Unquandfable 
markings for runway CAT reduce 
1/2/3 gZ, 
Develop efficient transport Variable (b) INDUCED 
links with main airport 
Costs to retrain ATCO's to Variable Positive multiplier to local economy 41%Direct 
provide service for proced= as more revenue is generated by the 70%, Indirect 
aiM2rt 
INDIRECT Positive multiplier to national 41%Direct 
economy 7% Indirect 
Ixss efflcient interlines for Variable (c) Improved reputation of main airport Variable 
Pax and airlines and airlines using it. 
Increased ATCO workload to L67 person/hr 
ope te two aiM2rts 
INDUCED 
Effect of new runway on Variable (d) 
CMs g aýmt 
Increased noise along flight Unquantifable 
path of new airport 
OPTIONS 
Other Costs for Precision 
Improved resolution radar Variable 
Addition of MLS to airport f? 
Addition of DGPS to airport $150,0001 a/c 
Fitting of MMR to aircraft $130, OW/ a/c 
Fitting of RNAV to aircraft $150-90,000 
Fitting of FN4S to aircraft L Variable 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) Costs will be dependent on runway length and 1=1 of precision approach lighting required 
Costs will vary depending on type of transport link chosen and distance between cach airport. 
Costs will increase if the link requires special construction methods such as tunneling or 
bridging. 
(C) The costs relate to slower more inconvenient transfer connections between regional and 
major carrier, larger possibility of missing connections and possible loss of use of intcrtinc by 
passengers. 
(d) To be of any cffect the reliever airport must be relatively close to the main airport. In a 
congested TMA airspace the provision of extra arrival and departure routes for the airport 
will invariably conflict with existing ones, and more than likely those related to the airport it 
is supposed to relieve. The exact cffect will depend on the amount of free airspace and use of 
other special procedures such as steep approaches. 
(C) The costs related to the options listed, although having a specific value, may vary in cost in 
this study due to subsidies from either national governments, systems developers or airport 
authorities. 
Bcncflts 
(a) The actual value of slots at the main airport may fall due to reduced congestion problems. 
The actual effect will be offset by perceived importance of the slots by the airlincs and 
expected time duration of reduced congestion period. 
Appendix 6.9 
1. Regional Airline Questionnaire 
2. European Airport Questionnaire 
3. Major Airline Questionnaire 
College of Aeronautics 
Department of Air Transport 
Cranfleld NIVERSITY 
Cranfield 
Bedford MK43 OAL 
United Kingdom 
Tel +44 (0) 234 750111 
Fax +44 (0) 234 752207 
Telex 825072 CITECH C 
Tel: 44(0)234 750111 ext 2232 
Dear Sir/Madam, 24th Novenibcr 1994 
I am currently carrying out a NO study at Cranfield University to assess the feasibility of specially 
designed turboprop routes into and out of congested airports. My work, so fir, his focused on 
developing a background understanding of this topic, followed up with current industry exposure 
through the European Regional Airlines Association, (ERA). A practical study of the concept, 
applied to Manchester Airport. UK. has also been undertaken. 
The principal aim of the questionnaire. is to help develop criteria for assessing the viability of 
implementing these special routes within Europe, by obtaining opinions regarding them from all sides 
of the aviation industry. 
I Nvould be most grateful if you could take approximately 20 minutes of your tinic to answer the 
enclosed questionnaire. I should, like to use data from this questionnaire in my final report. If, 
however, you wish your hiforniation to remain confidential, the results will only be prcscntcd in 
aggregate form. if this is the case, could you please indicate this at the beginning of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is hopefully sclf explanatory, however. if there arc any queries 
concerning it, or anything else, please do not hesitate to contact mc at Cranficld. 
I intend to produce a summary report from the findings of the questionnaire, so if you are interested, 
please let me know at the end of the questionnaire. 
I Uike this opportunity to thank you, in inticipition, for your help. 
Yours faithfully, 
Mr. A. Jefferson. 
PliD Rescarchcr. 
Professor Rigas Doganis 
Head of Department 
Direct dial +44 (0) 234 754742 
College of Aeronautics 
Department of Air Transport 
Cranfleld ,, NIVERSITY 
USE OF TURBOPROP SPECIAL 
PROCEDURES AT CONGESTED AIRPORTS. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Part 1) 
Instructions: 
1. The questionnaire is spht into two parts, please complete part I before moving onto 
part 2. 
2. Part I is split into rive main sections, you may not need to answer sections B, C, or 
D, however, sections A and E need answering by-all participants. This part of the 
questionnaire should take you no longer than 15 minutes, and Part 2, no longer than 
5 minutes. 
3. During the questionnaire reference wiH be made to the phrase 'special procedure'. 
Ilis phrase is a form of shorthand, and covers any procedure used by a turboprop, 
or Avro/BAe 146 regional jet to gain access to a congested airport by using, for 
example, early turns after take off, or steep approaches for landing, etc. 
Do you wish this data to be restricted? Please delete as appropriate. Yes/No 
00 Questionnaire. 
Name: 
Airline: 
Position in Organisation: 
Section A: This section intends to collate information on your current airline's 
operation irrespective of whether or not your airline is involved in 
special procedures. 
1. Please state your airline's aircraft fleet types and numbers- 
Aircratt 'I 
2. At which, if any, of the airports in your route network do you suffer significant 
delays? 
Could you please tick the relevant box to indicate whether this delay is greatest 
inbound or outbound. I 
Airport. Inbound delay. Outbound delay. Delayed on both. 
3. Which airports mentioned above, do you feel would benefit from in(roducing 
special procedures, and why? 
Airport Reason for introducing special procedures. 
End of Section. 
Section B: This section is intended to obtain information coumming current 
activities you may be involved in, regarding the use of special 
procedures with your fleet. 
1. Does your airline take advantage of regional aircraft perforimince to (icvcl()I) 
special procedures at congested airports? 
Yes[No - If yes go to Question 2 
- If no go to Section C 
2. Which of the following special procedures do you currently use? Please ring as 
appropriate. 
(a) Intersecfion take off Yes/No 
(b) Early turn after take off Yes/No 
(c) Steep approach for landing Yes/No 
(d) Use of a STOL or separate runway Yes/No 
(C) Separate airspace approach and/or 
departure route Yes/No 
(f) A combination of these Yes/No 
If yes, please indicate which ones by 
letter code 
(g) Others. Please specify. 
3. Are these procedures, 
(a) On trial 
(b) Certificated 
If they are on trial when do you expect them to be certificated'? 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
4. Is there a clearly defined route in the aeronautical charts for (hese procedures, and 
can a copy be enclosed with the questionnaire? 
Yes/No If yes go to Question 6 
If no go to Question 5 
5. Could you briefly expUn each of the procedures, stating the route and what 
means of navigation are used? 
6. Are any of your aircraft restricted from using these routes? Ycs/No 
If yes, Why? 
7. What were the reasons for introducing these procedures? 
8. Can you indicate what these procedures means for your airline in terms of, 
(a) Cost Saving, i. e. Fuelburn 
(b) Time Saved from previous operation 
9. Has there been any opposition to these procedures? Yes/No 
If yes from where? 
10. Do you get any incentives to use these routes? Ycs/No 
If yes, please specify. 
11. Do you feel these procedures could be further developed? Ycs/No 
If yes, please explain how? 
End of Section. 
Section C: This section analyses any previous experience you may of had wilb 
the use of special procedures. 
1. Has your airline attempted any of the procedures indicated in question 2, section 11 
in the past? 
Yes[No -If yes, go to Question 2 
-If no, go to Section 
2. Are there any navigation/route charts available with the past special procedures 
defined, and can these be enclosed with the completed questionnaire? 
Yes/No - If yes go to Question 4 
- If no go to Question 3 
3. Could you briefly explain what the procedures entailed, stating the route, what 
means of navigation were used, airports affected, and any operating restrictions'? 
4. How did the procedures benefit your airline in terms of cost or time savings? 
5. Why did the procedures stop? 
End of Section. 
Section D: This section enquims whether or not you will be pursuing the me of 
special procedures in the future. 
1. Do you intend to carry out any of these procedures, as indicated in question 2, 
section B, in the future? 
Yes/No - If yes, go to Question 2 
- If no, go to Section E 
2. Which ones are you considering and why? (Reduce delay, or provide access) 
I Could you indicate when you intend to start operating the routes'? 
4. Could you briefly explain the predicted procedures, stating the route, what 
means of navigation will be used, airports likely to be affected, and possible 
operating restrictions? 
5. How do you feel these procedures will benefit your airline in terms ot'cost and time 
savings? 
End of Section. 
Section E: This part is intended to obtain your opinions in generil, on the whole 
concept of special procedures, and, in addition, any further commeiit: s 
you may have, 
Are there particular reasons why your airline would not use my ofthe procedures 
mentioned in question 2? 
Yes/No 
If yes, please indicate why? 
2. Do you feel these procedures will alleviate the access/congestion problem for 
regional airfines or not, 
(a) in the short term? Please explain. 
(b) in the longer term? Please explain. 
3. Which of the following issues do you feel will present the greatest obstacle to die 
implementation of these special procedures at congested airports. 
Please ring appropriate number(s). 
I. Dominant Mulfinational Airline, trying to reduce competition. 
2. Airpon Authority/Local Government, scared oftipsetting local 
residents. 
3. Air traffic unwilling to change current system. 
4. Local pressure groups concerned about noise and safety. 
5. Lack of communication between affected parties, with consequent 
poor understanding of the problem. 
6. Other. Please Specify. 
4. If you feel there arc areas that have been ornitted or need further consideration, 
please let me know. 
End of Questionnaire Part 1. Please go to Part 
College of Aeronautics 
Dcpartment of Air Transport 
Cranfield 
I UNIVERSITY 
USE OF TURBOPROP SPECIAL 
PROCEDURES AT CONGESTED AIRPORTS. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Part 2) 1 
Instructions. 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain opinions regarding statements made concerning the use of 
turboprop special procedures at congested airports. The statements cover views from a variety of stand 
points within the industry. It is appreciated that you may not be an expert in all the fields, however, I 
would very much appreciate if you could answer all the statements. Please answer each question by 
placing a ring around the appropriate number, indicating how far you agree. or disagree with each 
statement. 
Questionnaire 
Strongly Disstret Atrte Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1. Managing special procedure routes will create too much work for the air 
traffic controller. 1234 
2. Aircraft size is growing and this problem will go away. 1234 
3. Special allowances for turboprops will create further noise pollution 
problems around airports. 1234 
4. Regional aircraft need access to congested hubs to feed the major carriers. 1234 
5. Landing charges are unfair to regional carriers. 1234 
6. Too little use is made of regional aircraft performance. 1234 
7. Aircraft occupying runway space should be charged the same rate 
irrespective of their size. 1234 
8. Microwave landing systems or GPS will greatly enhance the regional 
aircraft's ability to access congested airspace. 1234 
9. Common practice in the aviation world, such as large carriers dominating 
airports and squeezing regional airlines out, will mean special procedures 
will have little effect at the end of the day. 1234 
10. Environmental issues make special procedures too costly to consider. 1234 
11. Regional aircraft should use reliever airports. 1234 
12. The infrastructure costs required to develop These special procedures arc too 
high, giving the ideas no chance of success. 1234 
13. Regulation authorities are too short sighted to recognise the benefits of 
special procedures. 1234 
14. The safety issues, related to the special procedures, present too high a risk, 
making the concepts unworkable. 1234 
15. The use of area navigation, (RNAV), routes would improve a regional 
airlines chance to access congested airports. 1234 
16. Too little is known of individual regional aircraft performance capabilities 
by the aviation community with the result that their potential is not realised. 1234 
17. Access to congested airports, for regional airlines, is crucial no matter what 1234 
the Cost. 
18. Congested terminal airspace around busy airports allows no room to 
accornmodate the new special routes. 1234 
19. Ile routes will only work if they are totally self-sufficicrit, requiring 
minimal air traffic control intervention. 1234 
20. These special procedures will only be applicable to airports With more than 
one runway. 3 Lf 
21. Ifigh levels of navigational accuracy will be required for these special 
routings to be considered. 1234 
Strongly Distagrce Agret Strongly 
22. The problem is not airspace or runway congestion but taxiway, apron. 
Disagrce Agrce 
and/or terminal congestion. 1234 
23. Separate STOL ports are better than trying to fit aircraft into eniergency or 
cross runways at existing airports. 1234 
24. Special Procedures, such as steep 6" approaches, which involve operating at 
the edge of an aircraft's performance envelope, present safety implications. 1234 
25. Making special allowances for regional aircraft will detrimentally affect 
current commercial operations in terms of safety separation standards and 
possible longer delays on the ground for other aircraft. 1234 
26. The procedure would only be worthwhile if extra movements into the 
congested airport are created and air traffic delays reduced. 1234 
27. These procedures represent a long term solution to the problems of regional 
aircraft access to congested airports. 1234 
29. Regional aircraft should make better use of the off-peak slots and lighter 
night restrictions, than trying to increase capacity in an already saturated 
time zone. 1234 
29. If regional aircraft can be put on separate approaches to STOIJemcrgency 
runways at congested airports, while the larger jet aircWt remain on the 
standard arrival routes for the main runways. there will be a double increase 1234 
in capacity. 
30. These special procedures will only work with the co-operation of all 
airlines, airports, air traffic controllers, and aircraft manufacturers, 
involved. 1234 
31. A full cost bencf it analysis, taking into account both the direct and indirect 
effects of the routes would be re4uircd, if these routes were to be considered 
at a. 1234 
32. Overall the idea is a good one but just not feasible due to the high costs 1234 
associated with training air crew and air traffic controllers, in addition to 
infrastructure modifications, etc. 
33. Air traffic controllers arc not given the flcxibWty to copc with special 
performance procedures for turboprops. 1234 
34. United States special turboprop procedures will not be feasible in Eumpe 
due to differing operating rules. 1234 
35. Although some European airports arc already doing something towards 
developing special procedures forriegional aircraft, much more could still be 
done. 1234 
36. Route operating costs for special procedures will be too high to justify their 
use. 1234 
37. Aviation regulators are aware of the problem of commuter access to 
. 
congested airports but have to take every users interests into account. 1234 
38. Commuter traffic should not be forced to move to rcliever/regional airports, 
but increase their movements at international hubs to feed the majors. 1234 
That completes the questionnaire. Thank you very much for taking the tinle to rill it In. 
Tel: +44 (0) 1234 750111 ext 2232 
25 August 1995 
Dear 
I am currently carrying out research at Cranfield University to assess the feasibility of maintaining 
regional airline access to congested European hub airports. My work, so far, has focused on 
developing a background understanding of this topic, followed up with current industrý exposure 
through the European Regional Airlines Association, (ERA), and a practical study of the problems at 
Gatwick, Zurich, and Manchester airports. 
A preliminary result of the research is the catch 22 situation where regional traffic feed to the major 
airlines is becoming more critical to the formers' survival, whilst their access to the major European 
airports, to feed the ma or airline, is becoming more difficult, as congestion increases. 71e fbllowing j 
two page questionnaire aims to see how you, as a major European airport, are coping and plan to deal 
with regional traffic, and capacity limitations at your airport both now, and in the future. 
I would be most grateful, therefbre, if you could take a few minutes of your time to answer the 
attached questions yourself, or pass it on to somecne who can. I should like to use data from this 
questionnaire in my final report. If, however, you wish your information to remain confidential, the 
results will only be presented in aggregate form. If this is the case, could you please indicate this at 
the beginning of the questionnaire. The questionnaire is hopefully self explanatory, however, if there 
are any queries concerning it, or anything else, please do not hesitate to contact me at Cranfield. 
With reference to the questionnaire the term, "regional aircraft'. is used regularly. Ibis refers to all 
aircraft types up to and including the Avro RJ/BAe 146. 
I intend to produce a summary report from the findings of the questionnaire, so if you are interested, 
please let me know at the end of the questionnaire. 
I take this opportunity to thank you, in anticipation, fbr your help. 
Yours faithUly, 
Mr. A. Jefferson. 
PhD Researcher. 
I DO you wish this information to remain confidential? Yes/No 
Name: Position: 
Company: 
Ouestionnaire 
Hease complete thefollowing questions by ringing the approptiate answer or adding any comments 
where relevant. 
1. What percentage of movements at your airport involve regional traffic? 
2. Would you say this traffic is mainly point to point, or feed traffic? 
All Point to Point All Feed 
12345 
I Are the following airport charges weight related? 
1. Landing Yes/No 
2. Passenger Yes/No 
3. Parldng Yes/No 
4. How would you rate your airport in tenns of congestion in peak periods? 
Not Congested Very Congested 
1345 
5. What Plans does the airport have to expand it's capacity in the future? 
......................................................................... I ........................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
6. What changes in regional traffic do you expect at your airport in the next 10 years? 
Reduction No Change Growth 
7. Do you allow any early turns or special arrival procedures for regional aircraft at your airport? 
Yes/No If yes, go to question 8. If no, go to question 12. 
8. Please specify the types of procedures used. 
1. Early turn after take off 
2. Discrete arrival routing 
3. Steep Approach 
4. Other. Please Specify ................................................................................. 
9. In your opinion, do these special regional aircraft procedures actively enhance your capacity? 
Yes/No 
Go to Next Page 
10. What is the biggest issue ooncerning the use of these procedures? 
1. Environmental Restrictions 
2. Physical Limitations - ATC/Runways etc. 
3. Political Limitations 
4. Other. Please Specify ..................................................................... 
Do you think your answer to question 8 will change in the future? Ye3/No 
If yes, how? ............................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
Go to Question 14 
12. Why do you not use special procedures for regional aircraft? 
1. No demand from operators 
2. Environmental Restrictions 
3. Physical Limitations - ATC/Runways etc. 
4. Political Limitations 
5. Other. Please Specify ..................................................................... 
13. Do you see a need to develop new regional procedures in the future? Yes/No 
If yes, what? ............................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
14. In general, do you see these procedures as a short or long terni solution to the access situation? 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
15. Any other comments? ............................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
Many thanks for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
Please return to Andy Jefferson: 
By Fax on: +44 (0) 1234 752207 
By Post to: Andy Jefferson 
Department of Air Transport 
Building 115 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield 
BEDS MK43 OAL 
ENGLAND 
Tel: +44 (0)1234 750111 ext 2232 
16th August 1995 
Dear 
I am currently carrying out a PhD study at Cranfield University to assess the feasibility of 
maintaining regional airline access to congested European hub airports. My work, so 
far, has focused on developing a background understanding of this topic, followed up 
with current industry exposure through the European Regional Airlines Association, 
(ERA), and a practical study of the problems at Gatwick, Zurich, and Manchester 
airports. 
A preliminary result of the research is the importance of these regional services in 
providing traffic feed to the larger carriers, whether as part of a franchise agreement or 
not. The following one page questionnaire aims to see how you, as a major carrier, see 
this role of regional hub feed developing in the future. 
I would be most grateful, therefore, if you could take approximately 5 minutes of your 
time to answer the attached questions yourself, or pass it on to someone who can. I 
should like to use data from this questionnaire in my final report. If, however, you wish 
your information to remain confidential, the results will only be presented in aggregate 
form. If this is the case, could you please indicate this at the beginning of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is hopefully self explanatory, however, if there are any 
queries concerning it, or anything else, please do not hesitate to contact me at Cranfield. 
I intend to produce a summary report from the findings of the questionnaire, so if you 
are interested, please let me know at the end of the questionnaire. 
I take this opportunity to thank you, in anticipation, for your help. 
Yours faithfully, 
Mr. A. Jefferson. 
PhD Researcher. 
I Do you wish this information to remain confidential? Yes/No 
Please complete the following questions by ringing the appropriate answer or adding any 
comments where rekvant. 
Yes/No If yes, go to question 2. If no, go to question 4. 
Name: Position: 
Company: 
I. Does your airline have agreements/franchises with regional airlines to provide feed traffic for your 
longer haul services? Please ring. 
Ouestionnaire 
2. How important do you feel this feed traffic is? Please ring. 
Not Important 
1 
Very Important 
5 
3. Is this feed traffic currently affected or restricted by airport operating rules? 
Yes/No 
If yes, at which airports? ................................................................................................................ 
4. What do you think will happen to this feed traffic in the next 5 years? Please rate each scenario 
on a scale from 1-5, from very unlikely to very likely. 
Rating 
------- I a) Regional airlines will have to increase their aircraft size and stay at the main airport. 
-------- b) Regional airlines will move to a reliever/secondary airport and feed traffic will be brought 
in to the main airport by surface transport. 
------- I c) Better technology and increased flexibility of the Air Traffic Control system will enable 
------ regional traffic to remain at the main airport unaffected. 
------- I d) Other. Please specify . ..................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................ * ....... 
5. Does your answer to question 4 change when the future time scale is increased to 20 years? If 
yes, how? ..................................................................................................................................... 
6. Do the answers you give in questions 4 and 5 represent what you would like to see happen to 
feed traffic? 
Yes/No 
If not, please specify what you would prefer to see . ................................................................. "*** 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
7. Any other comments? ................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................... * 
..................................................................................................................................... 6 ............... 
................................................................................................................................................ 4. #. 6 
Many thanks for taking your time to complete this questionnaire. 
Please return by fax or post to Andy Jefferson at the address shown overleat. 
Please return completed Questionnaire: 
By Fax on: +44 (0) 1234 752207 
By Post to: Andy Jefferson 
Department of Air Transport 
Building 115 
Cranfield University 
Cranfield 
BEDS MK43 OAL 
ENGLAND 
Appendix to Chapter 7 
7.1: SIMMOD Manchester Hourly Movement Rate and Delay Results 
7.2: Manchester Airport - Cost Benefit Analysis Case Study Results 
7.3: SIMMOD Zurich Hourly Movement Rate and Delay Results 
7-4: Zurich Airport - Cost Benefit Analysis Case Study Results 
7-5: SIMMOD London Gatwick Hourly Movement Rate and Delay Results 
7.6: London Gatwick - Cost Benefit Analysis Case Study Results 
7.7: Regional Airline Questionnaire Results - Part 1 
7-8: Regional Airline Questionnaire Results - Part 2 
7-9: European Airport Questionnaire Responses 
7.10: Major Airline Questionnaire Responses 
234 
N 
10 
0 
7 
-2-9 88 
R; z g ý; z 2VPP, '. -2 a3 
10 : 8888 Cc, .0 00 US ý:. .9 Im 10 A988t2 8 
8 88 888 888 888 8 8888'ý 28 88888 82 
t: Ný-0nw, ý? F, ý2 v ý?;: - ;! -M 
ý-, 12 R!; ý RV:: -0 
1 ý 
1 
V-00ý00' ý! c 
F lý 01 
M-Nooo 
; §? § ý3_88--- , -M - --- 
N, -0 1 ýIIFM? Výl 
Or 
n-0n 
t: 41C 
99 
'Ii 
:' 
(1) 
I 
IA 
m 
:E 
I- 
"- 
t 
cl 
Z 
21. 
NN- 
I N 
0 - 
9RRAA 
1 ý4 
a e 
888888 
-1ý 
.0 
,a 
(. d 
c 
cc 
17 
88 53 88A5? 8 8,0 22 
- 
j888888"S. 
'OD IS 
-ýo 
P "o "2 ;z93 'V "V Ss 7A88W 
0c 
, oo 0D20MI 
88 81 
ý Nv-0ý ýo , -R&V .V:!! g :: ý! ! 2F, T (ýb V :: - 00 
I C04 
80 
U. - 
8 (A AA83 ýl 9 r: 7,9 3P PI 33 88 
- - - - - - s- 88888888q2892 8888 8- 2 2 8 8 9 8 
0 LO 
ia 
-0ý 
1 
E 
0 
I- 
7 
008ý 8 8SO80ýý . 00 11 
00mo Wý) vWA 
No N, 
RO 9s AMO AAAR 
I- 
N ý F 
cc, C, 
00 
188888 888r; 81ý ;ý 2088""' ý, 2888A 81, 
OD 
88888S 'm ID ýs 988 
0"S, 'D 
CA 
Is i-"Ooo. g 
N llý 0 1 
i ;: P4;: V4 88:! 888888M, ý;:: ýý; z 4SAG 
, cool 
88888o8R828 
- - -9-8 8 8-8 'S 8888888888 ýý 88888888 9 9 
. 
8 ý" R81.8 11.1 ý 9: 2 1. z .12A1.9 " . .......... 
I 'Aný. - ;; I 
98 
z 
t 
:98S9 
....... .. . 
........... 
V;;; RA ýR 98 
pA t- 
8888888888Eý888888888888888 
IE i 
P 
li 
l 2AIAA A 1 AA i 
--- --- ---------- 
I I '3 
u 
cl 0 
J02 
1, R-.; c OR K u's 
ki "I tl! R hý ýi k; 
?RA 
- - 8 %: ý v0A;! AIý. s- 
- Týgw--; R -17 9 -.. R -T. ý e4kl m 
77- 7 
AAAAAAAA 
s 
cl 
--Oý 
v. ýj 4ý K4 ý-- 41 2s as 
- - ? 55ý6 T-9 s 
ýi m S; z a 
3 8-8 
- !! 4-ws 888 88 
R88 8 
Pt 888 st 82q98R28 ý4's 
- 
at 
I ýi-R -s -- 
518 
---- ýý2 8 ! 
'74 r, An 
li- 
cu 
9: 6 
9: 6 
-e 
0 
E Co 
< 20 
Appendix 72 
Cost Ben efit An alysis Case Stu dy Resu Its 
Manchester Airport 
Case Two - Intersection Departures - 
Total Delay Saving = 6.33 tirs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benerits Value 
Planning and Lobbying 
time (I Month) 
130,150 (a) Reduction in Delay for Business 
Pax. 
1170 (a) 
Test the procedure 
(I Day) 
121,384 (b) Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. JE3 
8 (b) 
TOTAL ; E51,534 Reduction in Operating costs 
nal Aircraft 
E2743 (c) 
Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
E22,076 (d) 
TOTAL L25,027 
Potential Multiplier Effect 110,261 (e) 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) To calculate the cost given, the number of hours accumulated during the month 
whilst planning and lobbying for the procedures needed deriving. To do this 
the author has guestimated to a certain extent. It was assumed that thrce 
people would be involved with this issue for 150 hrs each over the month, 
(37.5 hrs a week). This figure was then multiplied by 167, the value given for 
business time. 
(b) There were two values to calculate in this figure. Firstly the aircraft cost 
involved to test the procedure was made assuming 12hrs of testing were 
required at a cost of 11313/hr for regional aircraft. The second part rclated to 
the cost of peoples time involved in the testing, again for 12 hours, involving 7 
people; 2 flight crew, 2 ATCO's, 2 airport representatives and I unbiased 
observer. These two costs were 115,756 and 15,628 respectively. 
Benerits 
(a) To calculate the benefit associated with a reduction in delay for business 
passengers, the number of business passengers travelling during the period of 
the simulation needed to be defined. Three pieces of information were 
required, the average aircraft seat size for regional and jet aircraft, the total 
number of business and lesiure flights and the average load factor for business 
and lesiure flights. For simplicity in this example, it was assumed that all 
regional flights were business flights, as were all scheduled flights. These were 
totalled and subtracted from the charterAeisure flights taken from tile arrival 
and departure schedules given in appendix 6.2 The total passengers figurcs 
were then calculated and the percentage of business versus leisure passengers 
deduced. Using this information the total delay saving made during the 
simulation was split proportionally between business and leisure, according to 
the percentages derived from the passenger figures. The resultant delay saving 
was then multiplied by the value of passenger time per hour. 
The figures used to calculate the figures above are given below. 
Manchester Traffic Figures Calculated from Ai! 31o! l - 
Schedule in 
APIDIndix 6.2 
Regional Aircraft - 180 33% of total flights 
Jet Aircraft - 334 62% of total flights(Of which 191 are charter flights) 
Average Regional Aircraft Seat Capacity = 60 
Average Jet Aircraft Seat Capacity = 160 
Regional Aircraft Passengers 
Charter Passengers 
Business Passengers 
TOTALFASSENGERS 
= 7020 (Assuming 65% load factor) 
= 27,504 (Assuming 90% load factor) 
= 11,440 (Assuming SO% load factor) 
= 45,964 (40% Business/60% Leisure) 
(b) The monetary saving for leisure passengers was calculated in exactly the same 
format as (a). 
(C) Savings for regional aircraft operating costs were made by proportionally 
splitting the total delay saving to account for the percent of total traffic the 
regional aircraft represented and multiplying the resultant by 11313/hr. 
The saving for jet aircraft was calculated in the same manner as regional 
aircraft, except the operating value per hour was changed to IS62S/hr. 
(e) The multiplier figure represents 41% of the total benefits, which represent the 
direct investments. It is not included in the total figure given as it may take 
longer time for the multiplier effect to take place due to its very nature. The 
result would be a slower accumulation of benefit within the system, so making 
exact definition of its value at any one time rather difficult. 
Case Three - Early Turns After Take Off - 
Total Delay Saving = 18.1 hrs from the base case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
Planning and Lobbying 
ime (One Mont! ý 
130,150 Reduction in Delay for 
Business Pax. 
1487 
Testing of Procedure 
(I Day) 
121,384 Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. 
1108 
Obtaining Permission to 
run procedure (I Week) 
L7537 (a) Reduction in Operating costs 
for Regi nal Aircraft 
17843 
IncreasedATC Workload 
(10hrs/day) 
1670 Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
163,124 
Cost to train crews L98,924 (b) TOTAL 01,562 
TOTAL L158,665 IncreasePeak Period movement 
rate by one. I 
150,000(s) 
I 
Potential Multiplier Efrect 1 129,340 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) This cost is based on the assumption that it takes three people from each of the 
organisations concerned, airport, airline and ATC, 37.5 lirs each to obtain 
permission to operate this procedure. Cost per hour for each person is 167. 
(b) This cost uses the information taken from Crossair given in chapter six. Crews 
have one hour of briefing and two hours simulator training for early turns. This 
costs 1911 per person. With two crew per aircraft and 89 regional aircraft in 
the schedule the total cost is derived. 
Benerits 
(a) This figure for an additional slot at Manchester is purely a guess by the author. 
It is not included in the total figure given as the slot improvement may not be 
used immediately due to inertia in the system. 
Case Four - Early Turns After Take Off (Stage 2) - 
Total Delay Saving = 18.15hrs ftom the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
TOTAL (From Case 3) ; E158,665 Reduction in Delay for 
Business Pax. 
L486 
Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. 
L109 
Reduction in Operating costs 
for Regi nal Aircraft 
L7864 
Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
L63,298 
TOTAL L71,757 
Increase Peak Period 
movement rate by one. I 
L50,000 
Potential Multiplier Effect 1 1292420 
Case Five - Early Turns After Take Off (Stage 3) - 
Total Delay Saving = 18.49hrs ftom the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
TOTAL (From Case 3) ; E158,665 Reduction in Delay for 
Business Pax. 
L496 
Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. 
1111 
Reduction in Operating costs 
for Regio al Aircraft 
18,012 
Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
164,484 
TOTAL V3,103 
I 
Increase Peak Period 
movement rate by one. I 
L50,000 
I Potential Multiplier Effect I L29 , 972 
Case Six - Discrete Arrival from the North -ý 
Total Delay Saving = 2,9hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
Planning and Lobbying 
Time (I Month) 
_- 
130,150 Reduction in Delay for 
Business Pax. 
178 
Test the Procedure 
(IDay) 
121,384 Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. 
117 
Obtain Permission to 
operate procedure 
_(I 
Week) 
17,538 Reduction in Operating costs 
for Regional Aircraft 
V, 261 
, Retrain flight crews to 
fly procedure 
; E47,704 (a) Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
L10,148 
Retrain ATC to operate 
procedure 
L6,030 (b) TOTAL :C 11,504 
IncreasedATC Workload 
_C20hrs/Day) 
11,340 Increase Peak Period 
movement rate by one. 
150,000 
TOTAL Ll 14,146 Potential Multiplier Effect L4,717 
OPTIONS 
Addition of DGPS 193,750 
Addition of RNAV 156,250 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) It was assumed that each pilot would need 4 hours of retraining at 167/hr. 
With two pilots per crew and 89 relevant aircraft the total cost was dcrived. 
(b) Retraining ATC was assumed to take three hours per person and involving 30 
people at 167/hr. 
Case Seven 'a' - Discrete Arrival from the North and South - 
Total Delay Saving =6 hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
TOTAL (As Case 6) f 114,146 Reduction in Delay for 
Business Pax. 
1161 
OPTIONS Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. 
136 
Addition of DGPS L93,750 Reduction in Operating costs 
for Regio at Aircraft 
L2,600 
Addition of RNAV L56,250 Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
L20,925 
TOTAL L23,722 
Increase Peak Period 
movement rate by one. 
L50,000 
Potential Multiplier Effect L9,726 
Case Seven V- Discrete Arrival from the North and South - 
Total Delay Saving = 5.3 hrs ftom the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
TOTAL (As Case 6) 1114,146 Reduction in Delay for 
Business Pax. 
L142 
Additional 20hrs/day 
ATC Workload 
11,340 Reduction in Delay for Leisure 
Pax. 
132 
TOTAL 015,486 Reduction in Operating costs 
for Region Aircraft 
L2,296 
OPTIONS Reduction in Operating costs 
for Jet Aircraft 
117,888 
Addition of DGPS L93,750 TOTAL L20,358 
Addition of RNAV 156,250 Increase Peak Period 
movement rate by one. 
150,000 
Potential Multiplier Effect L8,347 
Case Eight - Discrete Arrival and Steep Approach - 
Total Delay Saving = 2.9 hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
Planning and Lobby time 160,300 Reduction in Delay for 177 
-Months) 
Business Pax. 
Test the Procedure (1 178,780 Reduction in Delay for Leisure 117 
-Week) 
Pax. 
Add Steep Approach 1339,200 Reduction in Operating costs 11,257 
Mod. to aircraft (a) for Regional Aircraft 
Retrain Flight Crews to L173,995 Reduction in Operating costs 110,114 
2H! X out steep approach (ý) for let Aircrafl 
Retrain ATC to operate 160,300 (c) TOTAL 911,465 
procedure 
IncreasedATC workload 12,010 Potential Multiplier Effect 1143,363 
(30 hrs/day) (including Steep Approach 
investment) 
TOTAL 1713ý585_ 1 1 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) Crosmir figures show that to retrofit a 146 aircraft with steep approach 
modification costs 13,800, This figure represents 0,800 x 89 aircraft in 
schedule. 
(b) Again Crossair figures were used. Flight crew training requires four hours of 
simulator training per pilot at 167/hr. Simulator costs per four hour period are 
11419. Figure is for 89 aircraft crew costs. 
(C) Figure assumes 30 ATC personnel trained for three hours each at 167/hr. 
Case Nine - Discrete Arrival, Steep Approach and Special Holds - 
Total Delay Saving = -8.4 hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benerits Value 
TOTAL (as Case 8) 1713$. 585 Reduction in Delay for 4225 
Business Pax. 
Extra ATC Workload L2680 Reduction in Delay for Leisure -150 
(Another 40hrs/dU) Pax. 
TOTAL E716,265 Reduction in Operating costs 43,640 
for Regional Aircrall 
Reduction in Operating costs 429,295 
for Jet Aircraft 
TOTAL 433,210 
Potential Multiplier Effect L125,046 
(including Steep Approach 
investment) 
Case Ten 'a' - STOL Runway for Regional Arrivals - 
Total Delay Saving = 37.8 hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
Design, Planning and 11,535,138 Reduction in Delay for L1,013 
!, 2ýng Time (I Year) (a) Business Pax. 
_ Test New Runway 1781,780 Reduction in Delay for Leisure Y. 227 
(I Week) Pax. 
Build New Runway 16,090$000 Reduction in Operating costs 116,378 
(1500m, STOL strip) (b) nal Aircraft 
Retrain Flight Crews L173,995 Reduction in Operating costs 1131,828 
(c) for let Aircraft 
Add Steep approach 039,200 Increase of Peak Period Slots 12,750,000 
Mod. to aircraft by 5.5 
_ Retrain ATC to operate 1120,600 TOTAL C149,446 
new runway (d) 
Increased ATC 113,400 (e) Potential Multiplier Effect L2,696,835 
Workload (including Steep Approach 
investment and Runway 
Constructio! ý 
TOTAL L8,350,113 
OPTIONS 
Fit RNAV to Aircraft 1156,250 
rFit DGPS to Aircraft 1193,750 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) The planning time is calculated assuming the involvement of five airport, two 
ATC and six airline staff over a year. Each person works a 37.5 hr per week 
for 47 weeks a year. Cost per hour is 167. 
(b) Dimensions of the new runway are assumed to be 1500m x 50m, with 240m x 
50m of taxiways. This makes 87,000 sq. m., which at 170/ sq. m, gives the 
cost. 
(C) Costs to retrain flight crews as taken from case eight. 
(d) Costs to retrain ATC are based on 60 hours of retraining per person, for 30 
people, at 167/hr. 
(e) ATC Workload is expected to increase by 200hrs a day. This figure attempts 
to take into account the need for additional ATC controllers. 
Case Ten 'b'- STOL Runway for Regional Arrivals and Holding 
Total Delay Saving = 37.7 hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
TOTAL ; E8,350,113 Reduction in Delay for 11,0 10 
(As Case 10 'a') Business Pax. 
_ OPTIONS Reduction in Delay for Leisure 1226 
Pax. 
Fit RNAV to Aircraft L56,250 Reduction in Operating costs 116,335 
for Regi nal. Aircraft 
Fit DGPS to Aircraft 193,750 Reduction in Operating costs Y. 131,479 
for Jet Aircraft 
Increase of Peak Period Slots L2,750,000 
by 5.5 
TOTAL U49,050 
Potential Multiplier Effect L2,696,673 
(including Steep Approach 
investment and Runway 
Construction) 
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Appendix 7.4 
Cost Benefit Anallwis CaseSlu4v Resm/tv 
Zurich 
Case Two - Intersection Departures - 
Totai Delav Saving -171 Irs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benerits Value 
Planning and Lobbying 00,150 Reduction in Delay fior f8l 
time (I Month) Business Pax. 
Test the procedure 121,384 Reduction in Delay for Leisure 14.5 
(I Dav) Pax. 
Add new taxiway to 1105,000 Reduction in Operating costs L414 
Runway 28, (a) for Regional Aircraft 
Increased ATC f 670 Reduction in Operating costs f 7,56-1 
Controller Workload for Jet Aircraft 
(I Ohrs/dav) 
f 157,204 TOTAL E8,063 
Potential Multiplier Effect f 46,3 ) 56 
(including Taxiway 
construction) 
Notes: 
Costs 
(a) Cost figure relates to construction of additional intersection departure taxiway 
at the 28 threshold end of the runway. Dimensions 50m x 310m = 1500 sq. in. 
Ov 170/sq, m. 
Benef its 
(a) The passenger and arcrafl figures used to calculate the benefits above are 
_given 
below 
Zurich Traffic Fi2ures Calculated from Airport Schedule in Appendix 6.4 
Regional Aircrafi 114 = 19% of total flights 
Jet Aircraft 492 =81% of total flights (01'which 100 are charter 
flights) 
Average Regional Aircraft Seat Capacity = 60 
Average Jet Aircraft Seat Capacity = 200 
Regional Aircraft Passengers = 4,446 (Assuming 65% load 
Charter Passengers = 19,000 (Assuming 95% load factor) 
Business Passenoers = 47,040 (Assuming 60% load factor) 
TOTAL PASSENGERS = 70,486 (73% Business/27% Leisure)* 
*Total Passenger figure breakdown between leisure and business is calculated by 
summing the regional and jet business passengers to obtain the total business 
passengers and taking the charter passengers to represent the leisure passengers. 
Case Three - Early Turns after Take Off - 
Total Delav Saving = 7.72 Hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
Total from Case 2 f 15 7,204 Reduction in Delay for f378 
Business Pax. 
Additional 20hrs/day 11,340 Reduction in Delay for Leisure 121 
ATC workload Pax. 
TOTAL L 158,544 Reduction in Operating costs 11,926 
for Regional Aircraft 
Reduction in Operating costs f35,174 
for Jet Aircraft 
TOTAL : E37,499 
Potential Multiplier Effect 158,425 
(including Taxiway 
construction2 
Other Zurich Ca3eS 
As none of the other cases produced a delay reduction compared to the base case, no 
positive benefits were generated, negating the need to provide a cost benefit analysis 
for them. 
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A endix 7.6 
Cost BenefitAnalysis CaseStudy Results 
London Gatwick 
Case Two - Intersection Departures - 
Total Delay Saving = 34.3 Hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benefits Value 
Planning and Lobbying X30,150 Reduction in Delay for f 1241 
time Business Pax. 
(I Month) 
Test the procedure E21,384 Reduction in Delay for Leisure L158 
ýI Day) Pax. 
Increased ATC L670 Reduction in Operating costs 19,908 
Controller Workload for Regional Aircraft 
I Ohrs/day) 
TOTAL E52,204 Reduction in Operating costs f, 150,491 
for Jet Aircraft 
TOTAL L 161,798 
Potential Multiplier Effect L66,3 37 
(including Taxiway 
construction) 
Notes: 
Benefits 
(a) The passenger and aircraft figures used to calculate the benefits above are 
given below: 
London Gatwick Traffic Figures Calculated from Airport Schedule in 
Appendix 6.6 
Regional Aircraft = 141 = 22% of total flights 
Jet Aircraft = 489 = 78% of total flights (Of which 100 are charter 
flights) 
Average Regional Aircraft Seat Capacity = 88 
Average Jet Aircraft Seat Capacity = 220 
Regional Aircraft Passengers = 8,065 (Assuming 65% load factor) 
Charter Passengers = 41,173 (Assuming 95% load factor) 
Business Passengers = 39,336 (Assuming 60% load factor) 
TOTAL PASSENGERS = 88,574 (54% Business/46% Leisure)* 
*Total Passenger figure breakdown between leisure and business is Calculated by 
summing the regional and jet business passengers to obtain the total business 
passengers and taking the charter passengers to represent the leisure passengers. 
Case Three 'a' - Early Turns after Take Off - 
Total Delay Saving = 44.2 Hrs from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benerits Value 
7otal from Case 2 L52,204 Reduction in Delay for 11,559 
Business Pax. 
Additional I 0hrs/day L670 Reduction in Delay for Leisure L203 
ATC workload Pax. 
TOTAL L52,874 Reduction in Operating costs L12,768 
for Regional Aircraft 
Reduction in Operating costs 1193,928 
for Jet Aircraft 
TOTAL f. 208,498 
Potential Multiplier Effect 185,484 
(including Taxiway 
construction) 
Case Three IbI - Early Turns after Take Off - 
Total Delay Saving = 44.3 Hrs from the Base Case 
COSt3 Value Benefits Value 
TOTAL (As Case 3 'a') L52,874 Reduction in Delay for L1,603 
Business Pax. 
Reduction in Delay for Leisure L204 
Pax. 
Reduction in Operating costs L12,796 
for Regional Aircraft 
Reduction in Operating costs L194,366 
for Jet Aircraft 
TOTAL L208,969 
Potential Multiplier Effect L85,677 
(including Taxiway 
construction) I 
Case Three Y- Early Turns after Take Off - Total Delay Saving = 44.6 Hr3 from the Base Case 
Costs Value Benerits Value 
TOTAL (As Case 3 'a') L52,874 Reduction in Delay for 11,614 
Business Pax. 
Reduction in Delay for Leisure 1205 
Pax. 
Reduction in Operating costs f12,883 
for R onal Aircrafl 
Reduction in Operating costs E195,683 
for Jet Aircraft 
TOTAL L210,385 
Potential Multiplier Effect 06,258 
(including Taxiway 
construction) 
Appendix 7.7 
Regional Airline Questionnaire Responses 
Airport Delay List -, 
Airport Mentioned Delay Out Delay In Delay Both Could use Special 
Procedures 
Amsterdam Q N Y Y Y 
Athens A N Y N N 
Berlin Templehof A N Y N N 
Brussels x2 Y Y Y N 
Copenhagen A Y N N N 
Florence x2 Y N Y Y 
Frankfurt X1 N Y N N 
Helsinki A Y Y N Y 
Iraklion A N Y N N 
London Gatwick x2 N N Y Y 
London Heathrow x3 Y N Y Y 
Manchester x2 N N Y Y 
Marseille A N Y N N 
Milan Linate A N N Y Y 
Nice X1 N Y N Y 
Pads CDG X1 N Y N Y 
Rhodes X1 N Y N Y 
Rome Fiumincino A N N Y Y 
Stockholm Arlanda A Y N N Y 
Thessaloniki X1 N Y N Y 
, Zurich X1 N N Y Y 
Use of Special Procedures 
Procedure Present Past Future 
Intersection Dept. 10 1 1 
Early Turn 9 3 3 
Steep Approach 3 0 0 
STOUSeparate RWY 1 1 0 
Separate Arr/Dept. Path 2 0 3 
Combination 2 0 1 
Other Procedures 
Mentioned 
Reduced Separation 1 
RNAV Direct Routing 
High Speed Approach 
DGPS Trial 
Early Turn Off (R ETS) I 
Restrictions on Special Procedures 
None of the procedures outlined above are certified 
3 are restricted to Visual conditions only 
2 do not allow the use of either Fokker 50 or 146/Avro RJ aircraft 
One early turn procedure is limited to aircraft take off weights less than 5700kgs. 
Ability of the Procedures to solve airport congestion 
ShortTerm 
Long Term 
1 
9 
6 
Obstacles to Use of Procedures 
Dominant Major Airlines 2 
Airport/Government Restrictions 11 
ATC Restrictions 9 
Local Pressure Groups 7 
Poor Communication 6 
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I. Managing special Procedure routes will create too much work for the air 
traffic controller. 
2. Aircraft size is growing and this problem wiH go away. 
3. Special allowances for turboprops will create further noise pollution 
problems around airports. 
4. Regional aircraft need access to congested hubs to feed the nmjor carriers. 
5. Landing charges are unfair to regional carriers. 
6. Too litde use is made of regional aircraft performance. 
7. Aircraft occupying runway space should be charged the same rate 
irrespective of their size. 
8. Microwave landing systems or GPS will gready enhance the regional 
aircraft's abdity to access congested airspace. 
9. Common practice in the aviation world, such as large carriers dominating 
airports and squeezing regional airlines ouý will mean special procedures 
will have htde effect at Lhe end of the day. 
10. Environmental issues make special procedures too cosdy to consider. 
11. Regional aircraft should use reliever airpons. 
12. The infrastructure costs required to develop these special procedures are too 
high, giving the ideas no chance of success. 
13. Regulation authorities are too short sighted to recognise the benefits of 
special procedures. 
14. The safety issues, related to Lhe special procedures, present too high a risk, 
making the concepts unworkable. 
15. The use of area navigation, (RNAV), routes would improve a regional 
airlines chance to access congested airpons. 
16. Too litdc is known of individual regional aircraft performance capabdities 
by the aviation community with the result that their potential is not realised. 
17. Access to congested airports, for regional airlines, is crucial no matter what 
the COSL 
18. Congested terminal airspace around busy airports allows no room to 
accommodate the new special routes. 
19. The routes will only work if they are totally self-sufficiem requiring 
minimal air traffic control intervention. 
20. These special procedures will only be applicable to airports with more than 
one runway. 
21, Iligh levels of navigational accuracy will be required for these special 
routings to be considered. 
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
(3 34 
234 
03 
C2 
34 
2 30 4 
034 
1 
234 
124 
124 
124 
I34 
I3 
124 
Strongly Di.,., gr" Agr" Strongly 
Disagrcc Agrce 
22. The problem is not airspace or runway congestion but taxiway, apron, 
and/or terminal congestion. 134 
23. Separate STOL ports are better than trying to fit aircraft into eniergency or 
cross runways at existing airports. 1034 
24. Special Procedures, such as steep 60 approaches, which involve operating at 
the edge of an aira-aft's performance envelope, present safety impfications. 1034 
25. Making special allowances for regional aircraft will detrimentally affect 
current commercial operations in terms of safety separation standards and 
possible longer delays on the ground for other aircraft. 34 
26. The procedure would only be worthwhile if extra movements into the 
congested airport are created and air traffic delays reduced. 2 30,4 
27. These procedures represent a long term solubou to the problems of regional 
aircraft access to congested airports. 124 
28. Regional aircraft should make Mier use of the off-peak slots and lighter 
night restfictions, than trying to increase capacity in an already saturated 
Lime zone. I 
(D 34 
29. If regional aircraft can be put on separate approaches to tT'OUemergency 
runways at congested airports, while the larger jet aircraft remain on the 
standard arrival routes for the main runways, there will be a double increase 124 
in capacity. 
30. These special procedures will only work with the co-operation of all 
airlines, airports, air traffic controllers, and aircraft manufacturers, 
involved. 124 
31. A full cost benefit analysis, taking into account both the direct and indirect 
effects of the routes would be required, if these routes were to be considered 
at all. 124 
32. Overall the idea is a good one but just not feasible due to the bigh costs 134 
associated with training air crew and air traffic controllers, in addition to 
infrastructure modifications, etc. 
33. Air traffic controllers are not given the flexibil-ity to cope with special 
performance procedures for turboprops. 124 
34. United States special turboprop procedures will not be feasible in Europe 
due to differing operating rules. - 134 
35. Although some European airports are already doing something towards 
developing special procedures for regional aircraft, much more could still be 
done. 124 
36. Route operating costs for special procedures will be too high to justify their 
use. 134 
37. Aviation regulators are aware of the problem of commuter access to 
congested airporls but have to take every users interests into account. 124 
38. Commuter traffic should not be forced to move to reliever/regional airports , but increase their movements at international hubs to feed the majors,. 123 
That completes the questionnaire. Thank you very much for taking the time to fill it in. 
Appendix 7.9 
European Airport Questionnaire Responses 
Responclants 
Amsterdam Geneva 
Barcelona London Heathrow 
Brussels Manchester 
Copenhagen Munich 
Dublin Stockholm Arlanda 
Dusseldorf Zurich 
. Frankfurt 
Percentage of Regional Traffic 
Combined Summary to Provide 13.6 4 
Confidentiality 10 25 
30 25 
22 41.5 
50 25 
25 8.8 
Type of Traffic Rating Response 
Point to Point I 
2 
3 2 
4 4 
Hub Feed 5 1 
Weight Related Airport Charges Yes No 
Landing 13 0 
Passenger 0 13 
Parking 10 2 
Rating of Airport in Congestion Terms 
Rating Response 
Not Congested 12 
21 
31 
44 
, Very Congested 54 
Airport Development Plans - Runways and Taxiways 
Amsterdam New runway planned to allow mclepenclant parallel appraoche5 in all vit'ibility conditions 
Brussels Construction of RET's, new taxiways and apron traffic flow schemes planned 
- Copenhagen ' ?; Ian to in crease hourly movement rate from 73 to 91 
Frankfurt Plan to improve operations, increase aircraft stands, decrease approach separation 
with technical improvements. Increase movement rate from 70 to 80 per hour, 
and from 370,000 to 430,000 annual movements by 2000 Further expawýions al-. o planned 
London Heathrow 7a-xiwaymodifications, addition of RET's and IDSP's for runway 27L and 27R 
Manchester 1 2nd Runway enquiry under way in addition to apron and IDSP extenlýioný 
1 
Stockholm Arlancla I Plans for a third runway to be operational in 1999 
Expectations for Regional Traffic Responses 
Reduce 3 
No Change 1 
Increase 9 
jUseofSpecial rocedures Response 
Yes 8 
No 
141 
Type of Special Procedure Used Response 
Early Turn 
Discrete Arrival 
Steep Approach 
Appendix 7.9 
European Airport Questionnaire Responses 
Does use of Special Procedure Enhance Capacity 
Yes 91 
No I Use of the STOL approach on Runway 28 at 
Zurich increases departure delays 
Largest Issue of Concern with use of Procedures 
Environmental 5 
Physical 5 
Political 
1 
0 
Other 0 
ul-16 = Larly turns may be introduced tor regional aircran 
DUB = Environmental restictions will increase 
ARL 3rd runway will remove current problems 
MAN Airport congestion will put pressure on airports to increase non standard departures 
but environmental restrictions will increasingly opose the use of non standard departures 
AMS Environmental restrictions at the airport will make operations at the airport more difficult 
esp. Noise zoning, flight track and noise monitoring 
If not using Procedures, why not? Responses 
No Demand 3 
Environmental Restrictions 2 
Physical Restrictions 1 
Political Restrictions 1 
Other 0 
If not using procedures, is there a need to develop thern? 
Yes 2 
No 
15 
BCN = Development will be dictated by the % of regional aircraft movements and demand 
XXX = Longer term may see regional traffic relocated to another airfield 
FRA = Procedures represent a long term solution because they represent a potential to reduce used aw, paco 
DUS = Regional traffic will be moved to Monchengladbach 
MAN = We try to strike a balance and have sold earlty turns as a method of controlling non standard 
departures by larger nosier jets. Early turns only apply for aircraft upto BAe ATP size 
We are currently evaluating the comments of a selection of regional operators as to their operating 
nmr. ndures orior to any decision on the 2nd runway 
Appendix 7.10 
Major Airline Questionnaire Responses 
Respondants 
British Airways Lufthansa 
Finnair SAS 
Sabena KLM 
TAP Air Portugal 
Franchise Agreements 
Yes 
No 
Importance of Feed Traffic 
Not Important 1 0 
2 1 
3 1 
4 3 
lVery Important 5 1 
Restrictions 
Yes 4 
No 2 
Airports highlighted as causing restrictions = German Airports, DUS, FBU, CPH, ARL 
Future Expectations Respondant 
in Next 5 Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Regional Increase in Aircraft Size 1 5 3 2.5 2 5 
Regionals Move to Reliever Airport 3 1 2 1 1 
Imporved Technology 5 5 3 4 4.5 4 
Other 5 
Note: 1= Very Unlikely, 5= Very Likely 
Longer Term Expectations 
Comments Made- Use of reliever airports will increase for routes less than 300km 
Technological developments will improve the current congestion problems 
I 
Aircraft size will increase 
High speed trains will replace some regional feed traffic 
